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


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THE CONSULATE AND EMPIRE  
OF FRANCE

VOL. I.



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A. THIERS.

HISTORY OF THE  
CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE  
OF FRANCE  
UNDER NAPOLEON

BY LOUIS ADOLPHE THIERS

TRANSLATED, WITH THE SANCTION AND APPROVAL  
OF THE AUTHOR, BY

D. FORBES CAMPBELL AND JOHN STEBBING

With Thirty-six Steel Plates

IN TWELVE VOLUMES  
VOL. I.

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## AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

AFTER fifteen years of assiduous work I have completed my History of the Consulate and the Empire, which I began in 1840. Of these fifteen years, I have not suffered one to go by (always excepting that which political events compelled me to pass out of France) without consecrating the whole of my time and energies to the difficult task I had undertaken. I agree that the work might have been accomplished more quickly, but such is my veneration for the mission of history, that the fear of stating an inaccurate fact fills me with a feeling akin to shame. When such a doubt assails me, I have no peace until I have discovered proof of the fact which is the subject of my doubts: I seek it unremittingly, never resting until I have found it or until I am convinced that proof is non-existent. In which case, reduced to taking my position as in a jury-box, I speak according to my innermost conviction, but ever with the greatest fear of self-deception; for I think nothing to be more reprehensible, when one has voluntarily undertaken the mission of informing others of the truth concerning great events in history, than to disguise it through feebleness, to misrepresent it through passion, or to suppose, only, through indolence, and thus, whether knowingly or not, to lie to one's own generation and those to come.

It is under the influence of such scruples that I have read, re-read, and annotated with my own hand, the numberless documents contained in the State Archives, the thirty thousand letters which compose Napoleon's personal correspondence, the letters, no less numerous, of his ministers, his generals, his aides-de-camp, and even those of his police agents: in fact, the greater portion of the MS. Memoirs in the possession of private families. I must say, under every Government (and I have seen three successive ones since I first started my work) I have met with the same facilities, the same generosity in providing me

with the documents I required; and under the nephew of Napoleon I was not refused access to the secrets of Imperial policy, any more than under the Republic, or the régime of Constitutional Royalty. It is thus that I consider myself to have seized and reproduced, not that conventional truth so often arrived at by contemporaneous generations, and by them transmitted to future ones as authentic, but that absolute truth of facts themselves, only to be found in documents of State, and above all in the correspondence of exalted personages. I have at times devoted a whole year to the preparation of a volume which has taken me but a couple of months to write; and thus have kept the public waiting for a work to which they have been good enough to attach a certain amount of importance.

I ought perhaps to observe that to the above scruple has been added my taste for investigating to the very utmost what were the agents which, in one of the most excited periods of the history of humanity, acted so potently upon men, money, and events. Secrets of administration, of finance, war, diplomacy have attracted, detained, captivated me, and it has seemed to me that this distinctly technical portion of history has deserved at least as much attention from serious minds as did the dramatic portion. To my mind, praise or blame awarded to great operations is but vain declamation, if it do not rest upon a dispassionate statement, clear and positive, of the manner in which the said operations have been carried out. To fall into ecstasies, for instance, about the passage of the Alps, and, by way of exciting the enthusiasm of others, to pile on words—mass the rocks, heap up the snow—is, in my eyes, but puerile and even annoying to the reader. The one legitimate, earnest manner in which to excite interest and admiration alike is to observe an exact and complete statement of things as they occurred. The distance to go in crossing such and such mountains, the number of cannon and the quantity of stores which had to be transported along unbeaten roads, up prodigious heights, along terrific precipices where animals were useless, and where man alone could preserve his courage and will; to relate all this simply, giving all necessary particulars, weeding out unimportant details,—this to my mind is the proper way to describe an undertaking such as the

passage of the Saint-Bernard, for instance. When, after some such clear and precise statement of facts, an exclamation perchance escapes the lips of the narrator, it goes straight to the heart of the reader, because it has probably already occurred to him, and is thus only an echo of his own admiration. This explains the bulky proportions of this history, and the length of time I have spent in writing it. It also leads me to express upon history, and the method of writing it, a few ideas inspired by long practice in the art, and by a profound respect for its great dignity.

I know nothing in the sphere of the human mind more exalted than is poetry of the first order; but it will not be denied that there are epochs more suited to its appreciation than to its production. For instance, I do not think there was ever a period in which Homer and Dante have been so profoundly appreciated as in our own times, at once so emotional and so erudite. And yet, although we have had our distinguished poets and painters, our age has not gone near to producing the naïve and energetic poetry of thirteenth century Florence or of primitive Greece. Societies have their different ages as have individuals, and each age has its own occupations. I have always considered history to be the occupation, not exclusively, but more especially, adapted to our period. We have not lost appreciation for great actions, at any rate,—if we had, this nineteenth century would have given it back to us,—and we have acquired the experience which allows us to recognise and criticise them. Hence, from early youth I have devoted myself with confidence to historical research, convinced that by so doing I was taking up the work especially adapted to my own times. I have devoted thirty years of my life to the writing of history, and I can affirm that, even when taking my part in the affairs of public life, I, so to say, in no wise dissociated myself from my art. When, in the presence of tottering thrones, in the midst of assemblies thrilled by the voice of powerful statesmen, or menaced by the multitude, I had a moment for reflection, I did not see before me such and such a passing individual bearing the name of some contemporaneous person, but the undying figures of all times and of all places, who in Athens, Rome, or Florence had previously acted in like manner. I

was at once less irritated and less troubled, because less surprised, as I felt I was assisting, not at the scene of a day which passes, but at the eternal scene appointed by God when He placed man in society with passions noble or base, low or generous; man ever like himself, ever variable, ever actuated by laws as profound as they are immutable.

My life then, I may say, has been one long study of history, and, with the exception of those times of violent action which stupefy, in which the rushing torrent of events carries one away with it, making it impossible to see its magnitude, I have almost always taken note of what has been passing around me, and, comparing it with previous events, have found its points of difference or resemblance. Such deliberate comparison is, I think, the true preparation of the mind for the rendering of that epic of history which is not to be condemned for want of colour because it is positive and exact; for your real man, be he Alexander, Hannibal, Cæsar, Charlemagne, or Napoleon, is as replete with poetry, although of a different nature, as is the man of fiction, whether he be an Achilles, an Æneas, a Roland, or a Renaud.

The careful observation of men and events, or, as painters call it, the observation of nature, does not suffice; it needs a certain gift in order to be able to write history well. What is that gift? Is it mind, imagination, critical power, the art of composition, the talent of painting? I reply, that it would be highly desirable to be possessed of every one of these gifts, and that every history in which only one of them is apparent, is an appreciable work, greatly to be valued by future generations. I say that there is not one only, but there are twenty different methods of writing history; it may be written in the style of Thucydides, Xenophon, Polybius, Livy, Sallust, Cæsar, Tacitus, Comines, Guicciardini, Macchiavelli, Saint-Simon, Frederick the Great, or Napoleon, and be superlatively written, although very differently. I would desire nothing better of Providence than to have acquitted myself as the least eminent of these historians, in order to feel certain that I had done well, and that I should leave behind me a memento of my ephemeral existence. Each of them has his own salient characteristic: one narrates with an eloquence that carries the reader along with it; another is inconsequent, progressing by leaps and bounds,



but, in passing, sketches in a few strokes figures which are never effaced from the memory ; while yet another, less eloquent or less of a word-painter, but more calm and reticent, searches with an eye which nothing escapes the depths of human events, illuminating them with a brilliancy which endures for ever. Whichever be their method, I repeat, it is good. And yet, withal, is there not one essential quality, preferable to every other, which should distinguish the historian, and constitute his true superiority ? So I think ; and without circumlocution I say that, in my opinion, this quality is intelligence.

I use the word here in its ordinary acceptation, and, applying it to subjects most diverse, will endeavour to make my meaning plain. One often observes in a child, a workman, or a statesman, something which one does not at once qualify by the name of wit, because it is devoid of brilliance, but which one calls intelligence, because the person endowed with it is able at once to grasp the meaning of what is said to him ; sees, understands with half a word, if a child, what is being taught him—if a workman, the work given him to execute—if a statesman, events, their causes and consequences ; reads character, the proclivities of the men he has to deal with, the conduct to be expected from them, and is neither surprised nor embarrassed by what may take place, although it may cause him sorrow. This is what is understood by intelligence, and for all practical purposes this simple quality, which makes no show, is of greater utility in life than all the gifts of mind, genius excepted, which, after all, is but intelligence with the addition of brilliancy, power, breadth, and readiness.

It is this quality, applied to the great objects of history, which is, to my mind, the essential quality of the narrator, and which, if there, brings in its train all the others, provided that to nature's gift be joined experience born of practical knowledge. With that which I call intelligence a man sifts the true from the false ; he does not suffer himself to be deceived by the vain traditions or the false reports of history, he exercises his own critical judgment : thoroughly grasping the characters of the men and their times, he exaggerates nothing, neither magnifies nor diminishes aught, gives to each his true characteristics, brushing aside the tinsel—most meretricious of all the ornamentations of history. He paints in

true colours, enters into the secret springs of actions, himself understanding, and enabling others to understand, how they came about. Diplomacy, administration, war, the navy, these varied subjects are all brought within scope of the comprehension of most people, because the writer has known how to seize upon the aspect most intelligible to the ordinary mind; and having thus possessed himself of command of all the numerous elements which compose a vast recital, the order in which they should be presented comes of itself in the chain of events; for he who has known how to seize the mysterious link which connects them, and the manner in which one has been engendered by the other, has discovered the best, because the most natural, order of narration; and, moreover, if he be not made of ice, in recording those grand scenes in the life of nations, he warms to his subject, making event succeed event with fire and fluency. He leaves to the stream of time its flow, its force, nay, its grace, never forcing its action, nor changing any of its outlines; and, last and supreme attribute, he is just, because there is nothing which calms, which allays the passions, like a profound knowledge of mankind. I will not say that it divests a man of all severity, for that would be a misfortune; but when one knows humanity and its weaknesses, when one knows what leads and dominates it, without hating evil or loving good the less, one is more indulgent to the man who has succumbed to the thousand temptations to which humanity is exposed; one reverences none the less ardently the man who, amid every debasing allurements, has kept his heart up to the level of the good, the great, and the beautiful. Intelligence then, to my mind, is that happy faculty which teaches the historian to separate the true from the false, to paint men justly, to elucidate the secrets of politics and of war, to narrate events in harmonious order, to be equitable—in a word, to be a truthful narrator.

Dare I say it? Almost without art, the far-seeing mind I am imagining has but to allow itself to yield to that need of utterance which sometimes possesses us, leading us to relate to others events which have affected us, and he may produce a *chef-d'œuvre*. Among the many examples I could cite, I will ask permission to select two, those of Guicciardini and of Frederick the Great.

Guicciardini had never intended to take to literary work, and had served no apprenticeship to the art. His whole life had been spent in diplomacy and administration, and on one or two occasions he had served in the army. But he had one of the most discerning minds the world has ever seen, above all in political affairs. His temperament was somewhat sad, both naturally and from satiety of pleasure. Not knowing how to occupy his leisure upon his retirement from public life, he set himself to writing the annals of his times, a portion of which had passed before his own eyes, and he did it with a fulness of narration, a vigour of description, and a depth of judgment, which cause his history to rank among the finest monuments of the human intellect. His style is long-winded, confused, sometimes heavy, yet it is the gait of an active man, even though he be encumbered with awkward limbs. He has a thorough insight into human nature, and his sketches of the men of his time are undying, because true, simple, and vigorous. To these merits he unites the disappointed, morose tone of a man wearied with the innumerable mistakes and miseries he has witnessed—too morose to my idea, for history should remain calm and serene, not distressful; portraying therein, as with the sombre severity of Tacitus, the sadness of the upright man.

Frederick the Great, who was never sad, was a passionate admirer of letters, and his love of letters is assuredly one of the noblest traits of his character, sustaining him, as it did, more than once in desperate situations, when his fortunes seemed on the very point of being wrecked. On the night of a lost battle he would console himself by writing bad verses: not bad as to idea, for at every instant one meets deep thought, ingenious or striking, but bad in form, needing revision as to harmony and grace. Thought without art goes for nothing in poetry. Nor was form all that was needed by Frederick the Great for the composition of books; having hitherto merely made literature a recreation, not an art, he had never extended his labours beyond a short poem, a pamphlet, or an address: thus the art of book-making was as unknown to him as was that of writing correctly. And yet this man, in the history he has bequeathed to us of his family and his reign, bringing to light the subtle webs of his diplomacy,

the profound combinations of his military genius; retracing, as he does, the vicissitudes of a career of close upon fifty years, the unspeakable variations of politics in an age when women governed states, while philosophers governed minds; in fine, the perpetual alternations of a war in which, as often vanquished as victorious, but ever covered with glory, he saw himself at every instant on the verge of succumbing to the hatred of three women and under the weight of three great states,—this remarkable man has given, in bad French and in a style of his own, a picture simple, animated, and almost wholly true of this curious epoch, great through him alone and a few French writers. This bad writer writes well enough, composes unscientifically but with order and interest, sketches character with masterly hand, and would be an important judge, had he the equity and dignity of one who judges. But, uniting to the licence of the times his own unbridled spirit; despising those kings whom he had humiliated, their generals whom he had vanquished, their ministers whom he had deceived; caring only for the society of men of letters, whose vanity, however, often afforded him a subject of laughter; liking to make himself and others appear worse than they really were; intemperate, cynical;—he has given to history a slanderous tone, while at the same time he has immortalised his own work by stamping it with the mark of the most profound intelligence and the rarest good sense the world has ever seen.

I do not speak of Cæsar, because he was one of the finest writers of his age; nor of Napoleon, who became one; but the two examples I have given will suffice to explain my meaning, and to prove that whoever possesses a clear insight into men and things, has the true genius of history. But, it will be objected, is art nothing and intelligence everything? Any one who is simply possessed of this power of comprehension, can he compose, paint, relate, according to the conditions of the true historian? I should be ready to reply yes, were it not necessary to put some reservation on this unqualified assertion. Comprehension is almost, but not quite, everything. To it must be superadded a certain knowledge of composition, of painting, of arranging the colours, diffusing the light; a certain talent for writing, too, is necessary, for language must be the

medium, whether it be Greek, Latin, Italian, or French, in which the world's vicissitudes are to be recounted. And I admit that to intelligence must be added experience and calculation, that is to say, art.

Thus, man being a finite being, it becomes almost necessary that his mind should be made infinite. The events you have to set before him may be passing in a thousand and one places; not only in France, if the scene of your history be France, but in Germany, Russia, Spain, America, India; and yet you who relate, and he who reads, can only be in one place at a time. Frederick the Great was fighting in Bohemia, while at the same time fighting was going on in Thuringia, Westphalia, and Poland. Upon the field of battle, where he directs the whole plan of action, he is fighting in the left wing, but fighting is also going on in the right wing, in the centre, everywhere. Even when one has clearly grasped the general chain which unites events, it needs a certain art to take the reader from place to place, and to knit up the thread of secondary facts which have had to be neglected for those of greater importance. The writer must hie to the right, to the left, to the rear, without losing sight of the main scene, without letting the action languish, at the same time without omitting anything, for every omission constitutes a fault, not alone against material exactitude, but against moral veracity, because it rarely happens that a neglected fact, be it great or small, is not wanted to complete the whole context whether as to cause or effect. And withal the reader, that finite being who hears all and ever aspires to the infinite, who is so eager to know all, yet is so destitute of patience to learn,—the reader must be taken into consideration. I must know everything, he must be spared all effort of attention: such is the writer—such the reader—such the world in general!

Thus a certain dramatic art becomes necessary, demanding experience, thought, science, and a sense of proportion. Nor is that all. The historian must be a word-painter; he must understand the art of description; he must be able to seize in an individual the salient characteristic which distinguishes him, in an event the most picturesque circumstances connected with it; he must know how to lay on colour with proportion, with fitting gradation, and not be too lavish with it, so as to

have none to spare for the parts which require to be more highly coloured. Finally, as the implement with which all this is accomplished is language, the historian should know how to express himself with that elegance and gravity of diction which befits great as well as small things, enabling the one to be told with loftiness, the others with ease, precision, and lucidity. This is all art, I admit, and art of a very high order. It is therefore necessary to add to the perfect understanding of facts a certain habit of handling and disposing them, of describing them in their slightest details in an order which is learned yet easy, noble yet simple; to penetrate everywhere, to be at home in the sanguinary battlefield as much as in the cabinets of diplomacy or in the boudoir, where State secrets may often be discovered, as much as in the dirty streets where wild and foolish demagogues are raging.

But while admitting that art should go hand-in-hand with intelligence to form the perfect historian, I should like to say why intelligence, as I have defined it, succeeds better than any other faculty, in this complicated art. Of all the productions of the mind of man, the purest, most chaste, and severe, at once the most sublime and the most humble, is history. This proud Muse, far-seeing and modest, needs, above all things, to be clothed in unaffected raiment. Art is indispensable, but if art be too lavishly employed, if it be detected, all truth and dignity disappear, for this noble and simple being has essayed to deceive, and from this time forth all confidence in her is lost. Exaggerate the terror in a tragic scene, or the laughter in a comic one; in an epic, ode, or idyl magnify or embellish the characters; make your heroes always intrepid, your shepherdesses always pretty,—in a word, use deception, however slight, in these arts, which are all called the art of fiction,—and no one can feign illusion any longer, for every one has been placed on his guard. I would here counsel authors of fiction to remain truthful, though they are exempt from being exact. But in history, to lie from the foundation, in form and colour, is intolerable! History does not say, I am fiction; it says, I am the truth. Imagine any wise serious-minded father, loved and honoured by his children, who, desiring to instruct them, should call them together, and say,—I am going to relate to you what I, and my father and my grandfather before me, have

done towards building up the fortunes and dignity of our house. I shall tell you their good actions, their faults, their errors, everything, in fact, to enlighten and instruct you and put you in the path of well-being and of honour. The children are all assembled; they listen in religious silence. Now, can you understand such a father embellishing his statements, consciously altering them, and thus giving to the children who are so dear to him a false idea of the business, the pleasures, and the sorrows of life?

History is this father instructing his children. After such a definition, can you understand its being made pretentious, exaggerated, coloured, or declamatory? I submit to everything in the way of art; but when it comes to history the slightest pretentiousness revolts me. In composition, drama, portraits, style, history should be truthful, simple, unvarnished. Which is best adapted, among the various types of intellect, to preserve to it these essential qualities? Evidently the profoundly intelligent mind, which sees things as they are, sees them impartially, and writes them down as it sees them. A perfect understanding of things brings out their natural beauties, causing them to be so balanced that to add or to take away from them would be alike repugnant, the sole aim being to attain the perfection of art by reproducing them as they are. Perhaps I may be permitted to make a comparison in order to bring out my meaning more clearly.

Raphael painted fancy pictures, principally of the Holy Family, and portraits. The greatest critics differ as to whether the Holy Families or the portraits are the better, without being able to arrive at any decision. I will not say that in time the critics come to prefer the portraits, for he would be very bold who would venture to judge between these divine works: but in the course of time they certainly come to acknowledge no inferiority between them, and the most celebrated Madonna of Raphael is not prized above his simplest portrait; the poetry of the one does not efface the noble realism of the other. But how did even Raphael succeed in producing that remarkable portrait of Leo X., one of the most perfect works ever executed by the hand of man? <sup>1</sup> When painting a Holy Virgin, this great genius sought in the

<sup>1</sup> In the Pitti Palace of Florence.

treasures of his imagination the most chaste lineaments he knew, purifying them still more, and adding to them the grace which was innate in his soul, and thus evolved one of those exquisite heads which once seen is never forgotten. But when painting a portrait, he renounced all combining, purifying, inventive processes. In the countenance of the old prince of the Church, with red and swollen nose, sensual lineaments, small but piercing eyes, he saw nothing ugly or repulsive. Seeking nature, he could admire it in its reality, was careful to alter nothing, to put into it nothing of his own but perfect correctness of drawing, truth of colour, skilful adjustment of light—qualities he had observed in nature; for even in ugliness she is ever correct in drawing, beautiful in colouring, striking in effects of light.

History is portraiture, as the Madonnas of Raphael are poetry. As one examines a portrait of Raphael, struck with the nature in it and the beauty of its perfect reality, so does one become a great historian by strictly confining oneself to facts, observing, contemplating them as the painter contemplates nature, admiring it even in an ugly countenance, seeking his effects alone in the perfect truth of his reproduction.

History has its picturesque side just as painting has, and the picturesque is in man, and in events accurately and profoundly observed. For instance, open a history of France, take Henri IV., Louis XIII., Louis XIV., Louis XV.; take their ministers, their mistresses, their confessors, Richelieu, Mazarin, Louvois, Colbert, Choiseul, Mesdames de Montespan, de Maintenon, de Pompadour, Letellier, Fleury, Dubois; from these powerful, graceful, feeble, or uncomely personages turn to the heroes—the fiery Condé, the wise Turenne, lighthearted Villars, as posterity designates them; from these subordinate heroes pass on to the ruling ones, Frederick the Great and Napoleon: contemplate these figures as portraits, suspended in the Louvre of history, see them as they are, with their grandeur and their misery, their charm and their repulsiveness! Do you not feel the same kind of thrill, when you behold these figures such as God has created them, as you do when you come across a portrait of Raphael, of Titian, or of Velasquez? Do you not feel how under their true characteristics, sometimes sublime, sometimes eccentric, sometimes coarse, there lies the



picturesque beauty of nature? Is there not in Henri IV., with his great mind, his chivalrous calculating courage, his gracefulness, goodness of heart, cunning, and sensual appetites; in Louis XIII., with his awkward timidity, his courage, his submission, his revolt against the mighty minister to whom he owes the glory of his reign; in Louis XIV., with his vanity, his good sense, his greatness; in Louis XV., with his egotism, which dazed without blinding him; in Richelieu, with his pitiless spirit; in Mazarin, with his patience and depth; in Condé, with his ardour illuminated by intelligence; in Turenne, with his bold prudence; in Villars, with his talent for seizing opportunities; in Frederick, with his arrogant spirit; in Napoleon, with that Titanic genius which would fain have scaled the heavens,—is there not in one and all an historic beauty which it would be a crime to touch, a crime to add or take away a single trait? What is needed to portray them? To understand them. Once understood, one has but one desire, to study them carefully and reproduce them as they are, and after having studied them, to study them again, in order to make sure that one has not neglected any single line written on the countenance by misfortune, time, or passion, which should complete the truth of the portraiture.

It is the profound understanding of things which leads to this idolatrous love of the true, which painters and sculptors call love of nature. They would not alter in the slightest degree, because to them nature is above everything. In poetry one selects, one does not alter nature; in history one has not even the right to select, the sole right there is to arrange. If truth be essential in poetry, it is infinitely more so in history. You would be interesting, dramatic, profound, trace grand portraits which shall stand out from your narrative as though from a canvas, and impress themselves upon the memory; your episodes shall be touching; well, take it as a certainty that you will be nothing of this, that your narrative will be forced, your scenes exaggerated, your portraits purely academical. And do you know why? Because your mind will be preoccupied with the effort to be dramatic, or graphic. Have but one thought, that of being exact: study a period exhaustively, its people, their characteristics, vices, quarrels, the causes of difference between them; then apply yourself to

state them simply. When a person is on the stage, sketch him in such a manner as to make the part he plays proceed from his character, but without making any complaisant pause over it; certain personages have violent dissensions among themselves: relate what is necessary to make clear the motives of their differences, the why and wherefore thereof, their faults of character, and do not stop over them to compose tragedies; go on, go on, always as does the world; if there be technical details, give them: it is just the material in human things that must not be omitted, for in real life all is not drama, grand bursts of passion, fierce sword-thrusts; there are long-drawn-out periods which precede great crises; the collecting together of men, of money, of material which precede sanguinary wars; all this must have its place and time, each must succeed the other in your recital as it does in real action; and if your sole thought has been to be simply true, you will have been what the events themselves have been, interesting, dramatic, varied, instructive, but you will be nothing more than they have been, you will be nothing but through them, neither more nor less than they are. And do not feel uneasy about your subject, whatever it may be. Fear neither its difficulties, its aridity, nor its obscurities. God has made the face of the world and the mind of man one for the other. Show to man a picture of the world, and his eyes are attracted to it; there is but one condition necessary, and that is, that he should not allow the deficiencies of his own mind to influence his view of events. Take any history, or portion of history, state its facts accurately, following them up to their natural consequences without false ornamentation, and you will be interesting, I might add, picturesque. If in order to systematise your narrative you have not sought to group them arbitrarily, if you have thoroughly seized their natural coherence, they will possess an irresistible fascination, that of a river flowing through meadows. Doubtless there are rivers great and small, their banks may be smiling or dreary, mean or imposing. And yet, take them under all aspects, and say whether every waterway, be it river or streamlet, does not flow with a certain natural grace—whether passing under such a hillock, sinking to the horizon behind such a thicket, it has not its striking effects? Thus will it be with you, whatever be your subject, if you make

your events succeed each other with the easy flow, now peaceful, now precipitate, of nature.

After such a profession of faith, do I need to say what are the conditions of style necessary for the writing of history? I enunciate first and foremost the essential, that of being neither seen nor heard. There have been recently exhibited to the astonished eyes of the public, among the industrial productions of the century, sheets of plate-glass of extraordinary dimensions and purity, before which the Venetians of the fifteenth century would have paused in amazement, through which could be seen without the slightest change of contour or of colour the innumerable objects contained in our great Paris Exhibition. I have heard astonished onlookers, not perceiving the glass, but seeing only the framework, wonder what the magnificent frame could be intended for. When informed of their error, they were lost in admiration of the purity of the glass. The fact of seeing glass proves it to have a defect, its merit being absolute transparency. Such is style in history. The moment you become aware of it, its sole object being to demonstrate events, it testifies to a defect. Is this perfect transparency of style arrived at, then, without labour? Decidedly not. If the style be vulgar or pretentious, if it offend by unnecessary changes in names,—for in history the names of men, of places, and of battles are given in the language of their nation, and one cannot always find exact equivalents for them,—if style offend in the slightest particular, it is because the crystal has a flaw. To be simple, lucid, accurate, easy, elevated at times when the great interests of humanity are in question, is what is required, and I am convinced that the choicest, most carefully thought-out verse does not give more food for study than a simple phrase in history designed to convey some technical detail without being colloquial or commonplace. But who would take such pains, such care and devotion solely to obliterate self? Who? The intelligent man who alone comprehends the one essential, which is to lay all before the reader without ever bringing himself to the fore. I have already said that intelligence alone is needed. I may be permitted to add yet a few words on that important subject.

If I experience a kind of shame at the mere idea of stating an inaccurate fact, I do not feel less at the idea

of doing an injustice to the actors. When one has been judged oneself, often by an outsider knowing neither the persons concerned nor the circumstances, nor the questions upon which he is pronouncing an *ex cathedra* judgment, one experiences as much shame as disgust on becoming oneself a similar judge. When men have shed their blood for a too often ungrateful country, when others have spent their strength in the consuming anxieties of political life for it, whether or not ambition may have been one of their motive powers, to pronounce with a stroke of the pen upon the merit of their blood, or of their labours, without a due knowledge of events or care for truth, is a kind of impiety! That there should be injustice during a lifetime, well and good! there will be flatterers to counteract the work of detractors, albeit to noble hearts the inanities of flattery do not counterbalance the bitterness of calumny; but after death, let us at least have justice; justice alike free from adulation or detraction; justice, if not for the one who vainly looked for it, at least for his children! But who can boast that in history he can hold the balance of justice with a perfectly sure hand? Alas! no one, for they are God's weights in men's hands. What problems, what complications of problems, what delicate shades of distinction are needed, in order to be perfectly equitable! Such a man has done great things; but entirely on his own initiative? Had he no coadjutors to assist him, no predecessors to smooth the way for him? Alexander had his father Philip before him, laudation of whom filled him with wrath. Frederick the Great had his father and the Prince of Anhalt-Dessau, who had made the Prussian army for him. Napoleon had received from the French Revolution an incomparable army. Such a man had caused great evil; but did the evil belong to him personally or to his period? Had he not been carried away by his times? Were not the passions to which he had yielded those of his contemporaries as much as his own? Moreover, if he had the misfortune to have caused the shedding of human blood, must not the time in which he lived be taken into account? Ought not one single drop of blood in this century of ours, in which the value of human life is so fully realised, to weigh almost as much in the balance of justice as a river of blood in

the thirteenth century? There are other problems! Here we find a general of tried bravery, of quick and sure intelligence, who on one fatal day loses his head, makes mistakes, and sacrifices his army—there a person, hitherto always wise, who one day, from weakness or absence of mind, suffers himself to be grossly deceived! How judge of such accidents? And how many events are there still more difficult to pronounce upon, in our own national history!

Here we have a remarkable young man who, after ten years of horrible anarchy, comes before his contemporaries covered with glory! Trampling every law under his feet—laws, it must be conceded, which had never inspired respect—he reaches to supreme power. By his wisdom, his prudence, his good deeds, the wonders he accomplishes, he becomes the idol of his country, and the admiration of the world. But soon the intoxication of success mounts to his head, he attacks Europe, overwhelms, subdues, oppresses, revolts it, draws it down upon himself, and falls, surrounded by glory unparalleled, into an abyss into which France is dragged with him! How judge of such a stupendous career? Was he right, was he wrong to have seized upon a sceptre to which the whole world invited him? What man could have resisted such an invitation? Did not his fault rather consist in the use he made of supreme authority? But if he be absolved from the usurpation of power only to be blamed for the use made of it, do we not forget that in the violent manner of seizing it probably lay the germ of the violent manner of employing it? Again, in this abuse of victory which revolted the whole world, did the fault lie exclusively with him, or with the world against which he fought? Is the crime of that terrible struggle, which caused more bloodshed than in any other century, to be laid all to his charge, or to the world's, or partly to one and partly to the other? Is the insatiable pride of the conqueror, or the implacable resentment of the conquered, to be taken into account? Thus in one single life (remarkably great, it is true) there are problems deep as the human soul! How resolve them?

The first condition is to extinguish all passion in one's soul. But how, it will be asked, accomplish such a miracle? It might as well be said that you are to be placed before a vast stage, unquestionably the vastest of all, for it is the universe

itself. Seated in front of this stage you are to see pass before your eyes the most illustrious actors known, with their greatnesses and littlenesses, their terrible or laughable idiosyncrasies, and are not to be affected by one or the other, to experience neither indignation, nor love, nor hatred, nor feelings of ridicule ! Thus to stultify the human soul is beyond the bounds of possibility, nor is it desirable. But is it not possible to destroy passion without destroying sentiment ? It seems to me that it is so, and that the way in which to accomplish it is to exalt the mind by the assiduous study of history. Place yourself before the arena of human actions ; meditate upon them unceasingly ; get to understand, to grasp them ; live with the men of the past and of the present ; take account of their weaknesses ; in order better to understand them, think of your own ; and by a knowledge of mankind you will become, if not impassive, at any rate just and equitable. All bitterness will of a certainty have been expunged from your heart. According to your natural bias you may feel a preference for Turenne or for Condé, for Richelieu or for Mazarin, but your reason, independent of your instincts, will soar above your feelings, and will pronounce judgments befitting poor humanity whilst still awaiting that of the Supreme Judge. If you happen to be indulgent or severe by nature, something of it may appear, not in the groundwork, but in the form, of your judgments. You may be sad like Guicciardini or Tacitus, but, like them, you will possess that justice which proceeds from reason. Thus I return to my first proposition : possess yourself of an understanding for human events, and you will have what is needed in order to relate them with clearness, variety, depth, order, and justice.

As for me, I have spent five-and-twenty years in public life, and more than thirty in the study of history. I have been especially attracted by the annals of my own times, or rather of those which ended when my youth began. After having written the History of the French Revolution, I have endeavoured to write that of the Consulate and the Empire. The History of the French Revolution is known, and—judging, at least, from the number of copies that have been sold of it—I may say that it has been read in my generation. I have already published a great portion of that of the Empire ; I

am now about to publish the remainder. It has to be known and judged. I cannot tell what may be the public verdict upon it, but there will be this one opinion, if I am not greatly mistaken—that it bears the impress of a deep sentiment of justice and of truth. I began it in 1840, under a king whom I served and loved, while, at the same time, I differed from him on certain points; I have continued it under the Republic, and I finish it under the Empire re-established by the nephew of the great man whose life I have written. I cherish, however, one hope, and that is, that no one will perceive any trace of these different epochs in my writings, not alone in the groundwork of my judgments, but even in the tone of my language. When one stands in the presence of mighty actions, of stupendous prosperity or adversity, which have had unspeakable consequences for the world in general, and which bear upon themselves undying beauties and horrors,—to think of self at such a moment shows a feebleness either of character or of spirit of which I flatter myself that I have never been guilty. I trust, therefore, that there will appear in my history no trace of the time when I was in power, when I was exiled, or when I was tranquilly happy in retirement; and that my reason, calm, benevolent, and just, at least in intention, will alone appear in my narrative. I do not say that my personal opinions will not be made manifest—nay, I should be greatly ashamed were they not—but they will be found to be the same in the last volume as they were in the first.

I have ever loved the true greatness which rests upon the possible, and the true liberty which is compatible with the infirmities of human societies. These feelings were born and will die with me, and I have not divested myself of them in order to write the History of Napoleon; but I do not think that they have detracted from the rectitude of my judgment of him; rather do I think they have contributed to elucidate it. No human being in the world's history has seemed to me to unite in himself qualities so mighty and so diverse; nor, after having meditated upon the end of his career, have I changed my opinion. But on beginning his history I thought, as I do now at its close, that it was the abuse of those great qualities which caused his fall; and I thought, as I do at this day, that it was the impetuosity of his genius,

joined to want of control, which caused his misfortunes and ours. While profoundly admiring him, while feeling powerfully attracted towards that nature, so great, so spirited and so ardent, I have ever regretted that the natural intemperance of his character, and the liberty accorded him to indulge in it, should have thus precipitated him to his ruin. In a poetical aspect he is not the less striking, rather more so. In all that concerns politics and patriotism, he deserves a judgment just but severe. But in every epoch of his career I have striven to describe him as he was, and such he will be seen, I am convinced, in my later chapters: pushing the blindness of success to madness in 1811 and 1812 in his expedition into the depths of Russia; bringing to bear upon that fatal invasion powers of conception most extraordinary, but weakening in execution; astounded even during the retreat by the unexpected blow which had struck him; awaking on the banks of the Bérésina, and from that day rousing himself under the stimulus of ill-fortune; displaying in 1813 the most prodigious powers in order to regain success, but deceiving himself as to the attitude of the world; even in that year injudicious in his policy, but magnificent in warfare, and admirable in the midst of the greatest reverses—misunderstood hitherto, because the true facts have been unknown; rising with greater majesty than ever in 1814, but at that time in no way deceived as to Europe, as to France, or as to himself; knowing that he stood alone, alone against every one; right for the first time in his policy against his wisest counsellors; choosing rather to succumb than to accept a France less powerful than he had received her; understanding with as great depth as nobility of spirit that a vanquished France would stand higher under the sceptre of the Bourbons than under his own; still fighting, but fighting alone, and, although divested of all other illusions, preserving one last confidence, confidence in his art—a confidence as great as was his genius—and justifying it so well that, although in the wrong against the whole world, having France no longer with him, having at his side a mere handful of soldiers who had nobly sworn to die under his standard,—he thus weighs for one moment in the scales of Destiny as heavily as do reason, justice, and truth!

Before such a spectacle, such a man, such events, to



experience any inclination to lessen or increase such or such a circumstance in order to gratify personal sentiment would be the most signal of puerilities. I am convinced that my character is free from any such meanness.

Napoleon's genius is therefore out of court in the judgment of history. What is not, in my opinion, is the licence left him to will and do all. My conviction on this point dates not from 1855 or 1852, but from the first day I began to think. To be enabled to accomplish all one can will is, to my mind, the greatest of misfortunes. Those judges who see in Napoleon a man of genius, do not see all; he should be recognised as one of the most reasonable minds that ever existed, and yet he ends by being one of the maddest of politicians. Despotism can effect any and everything upon the mind of men, for it could pervert the natural good sense of Napoleon. This conviction will consequently be traced through my history; how could it be otherwise? It is forty years since I began to think, and I have ever thought the same thing. I know well that it will be said to be a life prejudice with me: let it be so; I shall reply, it truly has been the prejudice of my whole life. I would only ask from certain minds that kind of excuse. I know all the dangers of liberty, and what is worse, its miseries. And who should understand them, if those who, having attempted to sound them, have gone aground, did not know them? But something there is even worse, and that is, the unbounded power of action left even to the best, even to the wisest of men. It is often said that liberty impedes this or that action, the raising of such a monument or the execution of such a deed in the world. Long reflection has led me to think that if sometimes governments have need to be stimulated to action, more often they need to be restrained; that if sometimes they tend to inaction, they more often in matters of policy, or war, or expense, are led to undertake too much; and that a little restraint is never a misfortune. True, it may be added, "But who shall keep within bounds this liberty designed to restrict the power of one man?" I reply unhesitatingly, everybody. I well know that a whole country may sometimes go wrong, and I have seen it; but it does not go wrong so often, nor so utterly, as does one man.

I see that I am forgetting myself, and hasten to assure the reader that I have no wish to convince him. I have merely desired to explain the reason of an opinion, the traces of which will be found in this history; an opinion which age and experience have not weakened, and which, I dare affirm, personal interest has not sustained in me. Indeed, did I venture to allude to myself personally, I should say that never have I been happier than since the period when, retired from public life, I have been able to return to my former occupation, that of the assiduous and impartial study of human events. Certain minds may be unwilling to believe me, and they have a right to their opinion, as I, in my turn, should be disposed to disbelieve them when they declare themselves to be disinterested in their professions concerning the excellence of absolute power. I ask pardon for having, for a moment, descended from the exalted region of history to enter that of contemporaneous controversy. I desired, I would repeat, in stating the opinion which will be apparent in this book, to excuse my persistence in those convictions of mine which go back to the early years of my life. I am convinced that in these later volumes will be recognised an historian who is an ardent admirer of the great Napoleon, the most ardent friend to France, who, while deploring that this remarkable man was so unfettered in action, even to his own destruction, is immensely grateful to him that he left to us, in leaving us glory, that seed of heroes, that precious seed, which has sprung forth again in our land and has given to us the conquerors of Sebastopol. Yes, even without him, our soldiers, his pupils, have been as great, as victorious as they were of yore under him! May they ever be so, and may our armies, whatever be the government directing them, be ever triumphant! The best compensation for being of no account in one's country is to see that country taking the place in the world to which it is entitled.

A. THIERS.

PARIS, *October 10, 1855.*

# CONTENTS OF VOL. I.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE . . . . .	PAGE v
----------------------------	-----------

## BOOK I.

### CONSTITUTION OF THE YEAR VIII.

The Provisional Consuls enter upon their Functions—Division of Duties between Sieyès and General Bonaparte—The General secures for himself the Administration of Affairs, and leaves the Digesting of the new Constitution to Sieyès—State of France in Brumaire, Year VIII.—Disorder in the Administration of the Finances—Extreme Destitution of the Armies—Disturbances in La Vendée—Agitation of the Revolutionary Party in some of the Cities of the South—First Efforts of the Provisional Consuls to restore Order in the different Departments of the Government—Appointment of Cambacérès to the Ministry of Justice, Laplace to the Ministry of the Interior, Fouché to the Ministry of the Police, Talleyrand to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berthier to the Ministry of War, Forfait to the Ministry of the Marine, Gaudin to the Ministry of the Finances—First Financial Measures—Suppression of the Progressive Forced Loan—Institution of the Agency of Direct Contributions, and immediate preparation of the Assessments left in Arrear for several Years—Creation of Bonds of the Receivers-general—Confidence begins to be Restored; the Bankers of Paris lend the Government the first Funds that it has need of—Relief sent to the Armies—Political Acts of the Provisional Consuls—Repeal of the Law of Hostages; Release of the Priests in Confinement, and of the Persons shipwrecked off Calais—Parleys with the Chiefs of the Royalist Party—Suspension of Arms in La Vendée concluded with Messrs. de Bourmont, d'Autichamp, and de Châtillon—Commencement of Relations with Foreign Cabinets—State of Europe—England and Austria bent on continuing the War—Paul I., irritated against his Allies, is disposed to withdraw from the Coalition, and to accede to the System of Neutrality adopted by Prussia—Importance of Prussia at that Moment—General Bonaparte sends his Aide-de-Camp, Duroc, to Berlin—Rumours of Peace—Sensible Improvement in the material and moral State of France, in consequence of the first Acts of the Provisional Consuls—The Subject of the Constitution begins to be taken up—Plan of Sieyès long before Projected and Matured—Lists of Notables, the Conservative Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, the Grand Elector—Disagreement between Sieyès and Bonaparte relative to the Organisation of the Executive Power—Danger of a Rupture between those two Personages—They are reconciled through the Mediation of Friends—The Grand Elector superseded by Three Consuls—Adoption of the Constitution of the Year VIII., and the Commencement of its Operation fixed for the 4th of Nivôse . . . . .

## BOOK II.

## INTERNAL GOVERNMENT.

PAGE

Definitive Establishment of the Consular Government—Composition of the Senate, of the Legislative Body, of the Tribunate, and of the Council of State (*Conseil d'Etat*)—The First Consul's Manifesto to the Powers of Europe—Public Offers of Peace made to England and to Austria—Proclamation addressed to La Vendée—Opening of the first Session—Germs of Opposition in the Tribunate—Speeches of the Tribunes Duveyrier and Benjamin Constant—A considerable Majority approves the Measures of the Consuls—Numerous Laws for the Organisation of Public Bodies—Institution of Préfectures and of Sub-Préfectures—Creation of Tribunals of First Instance, and of Appeal—The List of Emigrants closed and discontinued—Restoration of the Right to dispose of Property by Will—Law relating to Income and Expenditure—The Bank of France—Sequel of Negotiations with European Powers—Refusal of England to entertain the Proposals of Peace—Warm Debate on this Subject in the British Parliament—The Refusal of Austria couched in milder, but not less firm Terms than that of England—Necessity for recommencing Hostilities—On the Rejection of his Overtures by the Belligerent Powers, the First Consul endeavours to propitiate Prussia, and frankly explains his Views—He strives to bring the War in La Vendée to a close before commencing the Campaign of 1800—Position of Parties in La Vendée—Proceedings of the Abbé Bernier—Peace of Montfaucon—Messrs. d'Autichamp, de Châtillon, de Bourmont, and Georges Cadoudal proceed to Paris and see the First Consul—M. de Frotté is shot—Final Submission of La Vendée—Troops are put in March for the Frontiers—The Session of the Year VIII. closes in Quiet—Police Regulations in regard to the Press—Funeral Ceremony on the Occasion of the Death of Washington—The First Consul takes up his Abode at the Palace of the Tuileries . . . . .

63

## BOOK III.

## ULM AND GENOA.

Preparations for War—Forces of the Coalition in 1800—Army of Baron Melas in Liguria; of Marshal Kray in Swabia—Plan of the Campaign of the Austrians—Importance of Switzerland in this War—Plan of General Bonaparte—He forms the Resolution to make use of Switzerland, in order to debouch on the Flank of Kray, and in the Rear of Melas—The Part which he destines for Moreau, and that which he destines for Himself—Creation of the Army of Reserve—Instructions to Masséna—Commencement of Hostilities—Melas attacks the Army of Liguria on the Apennines, and divides it into two Halves, one of which is driven back towards the Var, the other upon Genoa—Description of Genoa—Masséna, blocked up in Genoa, prepares for an obstinate Resistance—Heroic Combats of Masséna—The First Consul urges Moreau to commence Operations in Germany, that he may be able to succour Masséna the sooner—Passage of the Rhine at four Points—Moreau succeeds in concentrating three out of four Corps, and falls upon the Austrians at Engen and Stockach—Battles of Engen and Mös Kirch

	PAGE
—Retreat of the Austrians upon the Danube—St. Cyr's engagement at Biberach—Kray posts himself in the entrenched Camp of Ulm—Moreau manœuvres to dislodge him—False Movements of Moreau ; but not productive of any disastrous Result—Moreau definitively shuts up Kray in Ulm, and takes a strong Position in Advance of Augsburg, to wait the Result of Events in Italy—Summary of Moreau's Operations—Character of that General .	127

## BOOK IV.

## MARENGO.

Impatience of the First Consul for News from Germany—On receiving Intelligence of Moreau's Success, he resolves to set out for Italy—Extreme Distress of the Garrison of Genoa—Fortitude of Masséna—The First Consul hastens to his Relief and to execute the Plan of crossing the High Alps—Departure of the First Consul ; his sham Visit to Dijon ; his Arrival at Martigny, in the Valais—Choice of the St. Bernard for crossing the Great Chain—Means devised for forwarding the Artillery, the Ammunition, the Provisions, and the whole of the <i>Matériel</i> —Commencement of the Passage—Inexpressible Difficulties surmounted by the Enthusiasm of the Troops—Unexpected Obstacle of Fort de Bard—Surprise and Mortification of the Army at the Sight of that Fort, deemed at first Impregnable—The Infantry and the Cavalry make a Circuit and avoid the Obstacle—The Artillery drawn on by Hand under the Fire of the Fort—Ivrea taken—The Army deploys on the Plains of Piedmont before the Austrians are aware of its Existence and its March—Simultaneous Passage of the St. Gothard by the Detachment from Germany—Plan of General Bonaparte, when once in Lombardy—He determines to proceed to Milan, to rally the Troops from Germany, and to envelop Melas—The long Illusions of Melas suddenly destroyed—Mortification of that old General—His Orders for Evacuating the Banks of the Var and the Environs of Genoa—Last Extremities of Masséna—The absolute Impossibility of feeding the Soldiers and the Inhabitants of Genoa compels him to Surrender—Honourable Capitulation—The Austrians, having taken Genoa, concentrate themselves in Piedmont—Importance of the Route from Alexandria to Piacenza—Eagerness of both Armies to occupy Piacenza—The French arrive there first—Position of La Stradella chosen by the First Consul for enveloping Melas—Halt of some Days in that Position—Conceiving that the Austrians have Escaped him, the First Consul goes in Quest of them, and falls in with them unexpectedly in the Plain of Marengo—Battle of Marengo, lost and regained—Happy Inspiration of Desaix, and his Death—Grief of the First Consul—Despair of the Austrians, and Convention of Alexandria, by which they give up Italy and all its Fortresses to the French Army—The First Consul is employed for some Days at Milan in settling the Affairs of Italy—Conclave at Venice, and Elevation of Pius VII. to the Papacy—Return of the First Consul to Paris—Enthusiasm excited by his Presence—Operations on the Danube—Passage of that River below Ulm—Victory of Hochstett—Moreau conquers all Bavaria as far as the Inn—Armistice in Germany as well as in Italy—Commencement of Negotiations for Peace—Arrival of M. St. Julien, sent by the Emperor of Germany to Paris—Fête of the 14th of July at the Invalides . . . . .	195
--	-----

## BOOK V.

## HELIOPOLIS.

State of Egypt after the Departure of General Bonaparte—Profound Grief of the Army : its Desire to return to France—Kléber excites, instead of repressing, that Feeling—His Report on the State of the Colony—This Report, destined for the Directory, is received by the First Consul—Falsehoods with which it is filled—Great Resources of the Colony, and Facility of securing it to France—Kléber, influenced by the feeling which he had encouraged, is induced to treat with the Turks and the English—Culpable Convention of El-Arisch, stipulating the Evacuation of Egypt—Refusal of the English to execute that Convention : they calculate upon obliging the French Army to lay down its Arms—Noble Indignation of Kléber—Rupture of the Armistice and Battle of Heliopolis—Dispersion of the Turks—Kléber pursues them to the Frontiers of Syria—The Vizir's Camp taken—New Distribution of the Army in Lower Egypt—Return of Kléber to Cairo, to reduce that City, which had risen in his Rear—His skilful Temporising—Having collected his Means, he attacks and retakes Cairo—General Submission—Alliance with Murad Bey—Kléber, who thought it impossible to keep Egypt when subdued, reconquers it in thirty-five Days from the Turkish Forces and the revolted Egyptians—His Faults gloriously repaired—Emotion of the Mussulman Populations on learning that Egypt is in the Hands of the Infidels—A Fanatic travels from Palestine to Cairo to assassinate Kléber—Lamentable Death of the latter, and its Consequences for the Colony—Present Tranquillity—Kléber and Desaix both killed on the same Day—Characters and Lives of those two Warriors . . . . .

PAGE

273

## BOOK VI.

## ARMISTICE.

Vast Preparations for Succouring the Army in Egypt—Arrival of M. de St. Julien at Paris—Impatience of the French Cabinet to treat with him—Notwithstanding the Insufficiency of M. de St. Julien's Powers, Talleyrand induces him to sign preliminary Articles of Peace—M. de St. Julien signs and sets out with Duroc for Vienna—State of Prussia and Russia—Clever Expedient of the First Consul in regard to the Emperor Paul—He sends back to him six thousand Prisoners without Ransom, and offers him the Island of Malta—Enthusiasm of Paul I. for General Bonaparte, and Mission of M. de Sprengporten to Paris—New League of the Neutral Powers—The four great Questions of Maritime Law—Reconciliation with the Holy See—The Court of Spain, and its Intimacy with the First Consul—Sketch of the internal State of that Court—General Berthier sent to Madrid—This Representative of the First Consul negotiates a Treaty with Charles IV. by which Tuscany would fall to the House of Parma, and Louisiana to France—Erection of the Kingdom of Etruria—France reinstates herself in the Favour of the European Powers—Arrival of M. de St. Julien at Vienna—Astonishment of his Court when apprised of the Preliminary Articles signed without Powers—Embarrassment of the Cabinet of Vienna, which had engaged not to treat without England—Disavowal of M. de St. Julien—Attempt at a joint Negotiation, com-

prehending England and Austria—For the Admission of England into the Negotiation, the First Consul requires a Naval Armistice, which would enable him to succour Egypt—England refuses, not to treat, but to grant the proposed Armistice—The First Consul then insists on a direct and immediate Negotiation with Austria, or the Resumption of Hostilities—Manner in which he has Profited by the Suspension of Arms to put the French Armies on a formidable Footing—Alarm of the Austrians, and cession of the Fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, to obtain a Prolongation of the Continental Armistice—Convention of Hohenlinden, granting a fresh Suspension of Arms for forty-five Days—Appointment of M. de Cobentzel as Envoy to the Congress of Luneville—Festival of the 1st of Vendémiaire—Removal of Turenne's remains to the Invalides—The First Consul devotes the Leisure left him by the Interruption of Hostilities in attending to the internal Administration—Success of his Financial Measures—Prosperity of the Bank of France—Payment of the Stockholders in Cash—Repair of the Roads—Return of the Priests—Difficulties respecting the Celebration of Sunday and Decadi—New Measures in regard to the Emigrants—Posture of Parties—Their Dispositions towards the First Consul—The Revolutionists and the Royalists—Policy of the Government towards them—Conflicting Influences about the First Consul—Parts acted by Messrs. Fouché, de Talleyrand, and Cambacérès—The Bonaparte Family—Letters of Louis XVIII. to the First Consul, and Answer to that Prince—Plot of Ceracchi and Aréna—Public Sensation created by the Discovery of this Plot—Imprudent Friends of the First Consul wish to make a Handle of it to raise him too soon to the Supreme Power—Pamphlet written in that Spirit by M. de Fontanes—Necessity for Disavowing that Pamphlet—Lucien Bonaparte removed from the Ministry of the Interior, and sent to Spain . . . . .

312

## BOOK VII.

## HOHENLINDEN.

Peace with the United States and with the Barbary Regencies—Meeting of the Congress of Luneville—M. de Cobentzel declines a separate Negotiation, and insists at least on the Presence of an English Plenipotentiary, to mask the real Negotiation between Austria and France—The First Consul, with a view to hasten the Conclusion, orders the Renewal of Hostilities—Plan of the Winter Campaign—Moreau is directed to cross the Inn, and to March for Vienna—Macdonald, with a second Army of Reserve, has Orders to pass from the Grisons into the Tyrol—Brune, with eighty thousand Men, is destined to force the Adige and the Mincio—Plan of the young Archduke John, appointed Generalissimo of the Austrian Armies—His Plan for turning Moreau miscarries through defective Execution—He halts by the way, and purposes to attack Moreau in the Forest of Hohenlinden—Admirable Manceuvre of Moreau's executed in a superior Manner by Richepanse—Memorable Battle of Hohenlinden—Important Results of that Battle—Passage of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, and the Enns—Armistice of Steyer—Austria promises to sign the Peace immediately—Operations in the Alps and in Italy—Macdonald crosses the Splügen, despite the Perils and Hardships of Winter—His Arrival in the Italian Tyrol—Dispositions of Brune for crossing the Mincio at two Points—Defect in those Dispositions—General Dupont attempts a first

Passage at Pozzolo, and draws upon himself alone the Main Body of the Austrian Army—The Mincio is forced after a useless Effusion of Blood—Passage of the Mincio and the Adige—Fortunate Escape of General Laudon in consequence of a Falsehood—The Austrians, being Beaten, propose an Armistice in Italy—Signature of that Armistice at Treviso—Renewal of Negotiations at Luneville—The Principle of a separate Peace admitted by M. de Cobentzel—The First Consul requires Austria to pay the Expenses of this second Campaign, and imposes harder Conditions than in M. de St. Julien's Preliminaries—He fixes, as his Ultimatum, the Boundary of the Rhine in Germany, the Boundary of the Adige in Italy—Courageous Resistance of M. de Cobentzel—This Resistance, though honourable, causes Austria to lose valuable Time—While the Negotiations are pending at Luneville, the Emperor Paul, to whom the First Consul has ceded the Island of Malta, claims it from the English, who refuse it—Rage of Paul I.—He invites the King of Sweden to St. Petersburg, and renews the League of 1780—Declaration of the Neutrals—Rupture of all the Northern Powers with Great Britain—The First Consul avails himself of it to force harder Terms upon Austria—He insists, not only upon the Boundary of the Adige, but also on the Expulsion of all the Princes of the House of Austria from Italy—The Grand Duke of Tuscany and the Duke of Modena are to be removed to Germany—M. de Cobentzel at length gives way, and, with Joseph Bonaparte, signs the celebrated Peace of Luneville, on the 9th of February 1801—France obtains for the second Time the Boundary of the Rhine, throughout its whole Length, and is left almost Mistress of Italy—Austria is thrust back beyond the Adige—The Cisalpine Republic is to include the Milanese, Mantua, the Duchy of Modena, and the Legations—Tuscany destined for the House of Parma, with the Title of Kingdom of Etruria—The Principle of the Secularisations laid down for Germany—Important Results obtained by the First Consul in the course of Fifteen Months . . . . .

391

## BOOK VIII.

## THE INFERNAL MACHINE.

Plots against the Life of the First Consul—Carbon, St. Réjant, and Limoëlan, three Agents of Georges, form a plan for destroying the First Consul by the Explosion of a Barrel of Gunpowder—Choice of the Rue St. Nicaise, and of the 3rd Nivôse for the Execution of this Crime—The First Consul saved by the Dexterity of his Coachman—Sensation produced—The Crime attributed to the Revolutionists, and to the Indulgence shown them by Fouché, the Minister—Animosity of the new Courtiers against that Minister—His Silence and Coolness—He discovers Part of the Truth and makes it known; but Measures are nevertheless taken against the Revolutionists—Irritation of the First Consul—Project of an arbitrary Measure—Deliberation on this Subject in the Council of State—After long Discussions, a Resolution is adopted for transporting a certain Number of Revolutionists without Trial—Some Resistance, but very faint, made to this arbitrary Act—Discussion whether it shall take place by a Law, or by a spontaneous Measure of the Government, referred only to the Senate, for the sake of Constitutionality—The latter Course adopted—Transportation decreed against one hundred and thirty alleged Terrorists—Fouché, who knew them to be innocent of the Attempt of the 3rd Nivôse, consents,



nevertheless, to the Measure which proscribes them—Discovery of the real Authors of the Infernal Machine—Execution of Carbon and St. Réjant—Unjust Condemnation of Topino Lebrun, Aréna, &c.—Session of the Year IX.—Fresh Manifestations of Opposition in the Tribunate—Institution of Special Tribunals for the Suppression of Robbery on the Highroads—Financial Statement of Ways and Means for the Years VI., VII., and VIII.—Budget of the Year IX.—Definitive Adjustment of the Public Debt—Rejection by the Tribunate, and Adoption by the Legislative Body, of this Plan of Finance—Sentiments of the First Consul—Continuation of his administrative Labours—Roads—Canal of St. Quentin—Bridges over the Seine—Works at the Simplon—The Monks of the Great St. Bernard established at the Simplon and at Mont Cenis . . .

440

## BOOK IX.

## NEUTRAL POWERS.

Sequel of the Negotiations with the Powers of Europe—Treaty with the Court of Naples—Exclusion of the English from the Ports of the Two Sicilies, and Engagement entered into by the Neapolitan Government to receive a French Division at Otranto—Spain pledges herself to coerce the Portuguese, to put an End to the English Trade on the Coasts of Portugal—Vast Naval Projects of the First Consul, for combining the Naval Forces of Spain, Holland, and France, to enable them to act in Concert—Means contemplated to assist Egypt—Admiral Ganteaume, at the Head of a Division, leaves Brest during a Gale of Wind, and proceeds to the Straits of Gibraltar on his Way to the Mouth of the Nile—General Coalition of all the Maritime Nations against England—Preparations of the Neutral Powers in the Baltic—Warlike Ardour of Paul I.—Distress in England—She is visited by a frightful Famine—Her Financial and Commercial Position before, and since the War—Her Income and Expenditure both doubled—Unpopularity of Mr. Pitt—His Differences with George III., and Retirement from Office—The Ad-dington Administration—England, in spite of her Embarrassments, faces the Storm, and despatches Admirals Nelson and Parker to the Baltic, to break up the Confederacy of the Neutral Powers—Plan conceived by Nelson and Parker—They determine upon forcing the Passage of the Sound—The Swedish Coast being badly defended, the English Fleet passes the Sound almost without Difficulty, and appears before Copenhagen—Nelson's views are to attack the Danes, before proceeding to the Baltic—Description of the Position of Copenhagen, and Measures adopted to defend this important Maritime Position—Nelson executes a bold Man-œuvre, and succeeds in Anchoring in the King's Channel, Broad-side on to the Danish Fleet—Bloody Engagement—Gallantry of the Danes, and Danger of Nelson—He sends a Flag of Truce to the Crown Prince of Denmark, and thereby obtains the Advantage of a Victory—Suspension of Hostilities for Fourteen Weeks, during which the Death of Paul I. becomes known—Events which have taken place in Russia—Exasperation of the Russian Nobility against the Emperor Paul, and their Resolution to get rid of this Prince by any Means, even by Crime—Count Pahlen—His Character and Projects—His Conduct towards the Grand Duke Alexander—The Scheme of a forced Abdication made to conceal their Project of Assassination—Frightful Scene at the Palace (Michael) on the Night of the 23rd of March—Tragical Death of Paul I.—Accession

	PAGE
of Alexander—The Confederacy of the Neutral Powers dissolved by the Death of the Emperor Paul—Virtual Armistice in the Baltic—The First Consul endeavours, by offering Hanover to Prussia, to retain her in the League of the Neutrals—England, satisfied with having broken up this Confederacy by the Battle of Copenhagen, and with being rid of Paul I., seeks to improve the Opportunity offered, by treating with France, and redeeming the Errors of Mr. Pitt—The Addington Administration Proposes Peace to the First Consul, through the Medium of M. Otto—This Proposal accepted, and Opening of Negotiations between France and England at London—Peace becomes general, both by Sea and Land—Progress of France since the 18th Brumaire . . . . .	474

## PLATES IN VOL. I.

A. THIERS . . . . .	<i>Frontispiece</i>
DESAIX . . . . .	<i>To face page 248</i>
KLEBER . . . . .	,, 310

# HISTORY OF THE CONSULATE AND THE EMPIRE OF FRANCE UNDER NAPOLEON.

## BOOK I.

### CONSTITUTION OF THE YEAR VIII.

**T**HE events of the 18th of Brumaire had terminated the existence of the Directory.

The men who, after the storms of the Convention, devised that sort of republic, were not thoroughly convinced of the excellence and solidity of their work; but, on emerging from the reign of blood which they had just witnessed, it was difficult for them to do better or otherwise than they did. It was impossible, in fact, to think of the Bourbons, to whom public opinion was decidedly hostile; it was equally impossible for them to throw themselves into the arms of an illustrious general; for, at that period, none of our military men had acquired sufficient glory to subjugate the national mind. All illusions, moreover, were not yet dispelled by experience. The nation had just escaped from the hands of the Committee of Public Welfare; it had yet tried only the sanguinary Republic of '93, consisting of a single assembly, which exercised all the powers at once: a last trial was yet left to be made, that of a moderate republic, in which the supreme power should be judiciously divided, and the administration of which should be committed to new men, who had had no hand in those excesses which had filled France with horror. The Directory was in consequence devised.

This new scheme of a republic lasted four years, from the 14th of Brumaire, year IV., till the 18th of Brumaire, year VIII. It was set on foot honestly and heartily by men, most of whom were upright, and animated by excellent intentions. Some persons of violent character or suspected integrity, such as Barras, for instance, had contrived to introduce themselves into the list of governors, who, during those four years,

transmitted the supreme power from one to another; but Rewbell, La Reveillère-Lepeaux, Le Tourneur, Carnot, Barthelemy, Roger-Ducos, Sieyès, were men of integrity, some of them of considerable ability, and the last, M. Sieyès, possessed a very superior mind. And yet the Directorial Republic had very soon exhibited a scene of distressing confusion: less cruelty but more anarchy—such had been the character of the new government. The Directory gave up guillotining; it only transported. It ceased to force people to take assignats upon pain of death; but it paid nobody. Our soldiers, without arms and without bread, were beaten instead of being victorious. Terror had been succeeded by a feeling of intolerable uneasiness. And, as weakness also has its gusts of passion, this Republic, moderate in intention, had finished with two measures that were absolutely tyrannical—the progressive forced loan and the law of the hostages. This latter measure, in particular, though there was nothing sanguinary in it, was one of the most odious vexations invented by the cruel and fertile imagination of parties.

Is it surprising that France, to which the Bourbons could not be presented in 1799, and which, after the ill success of the directorial constitution, began to have no faith in the Republic—is it surprising, I say, that France should throw herself into the arms of that young general who had conquered Italy and Egypt, a stranger to all the parties, affecting to disdain them all, endowed with an energetic will, showing equal aptness for military and civil affairs, and affording glimpses of an ambition which, instead of alarming the nation, was then hailed by it as a hope? Less glory than he had acquired would have sufficed to enable a man to seize the reins of government; for, some time previously, General Joubert had been sent to Novi, that he might there earn those titles which he still wanted for effecting the Revolution, since styled in our annals that of the 18th of Brumaire. The unfortunate Joubert was defeated and fell at Novi; but young Bonaparte, always fortunate and victorious, at least at that time, escaping the dangers of the sea as well as the dangers of battles, had returned from Egypt to France in an almost miraculous manner; and, on his first appearance, the Directory succumbed. All parties hastened to meet him, demanding of him order, victory, and peace.

It was not, however, in a day that the authority of one could supersede that mob-government where so many, alternately oppressed or oppressors, had enjoyed for a moment a share of the supreme power. It was necessary to save appearances, and, in order to induce harassed France to submit to absolute power, to lead her to it through a glorious, restorative, and semi-republican government. It was requisite, in short, that the Consulate should pave the way to the Empire.

It is this portion of our contemporary history of which I am now about to treat. Fifteen years have elapsed since I recorded the events of our first revolution. Those fifteen years have been passed amid the storms of public life: I have seen an ancient throne crumble to pieces and a new throne rise up; I have seen the French Revolution pursue its invincible course: and though the scenes which I have witnessed have not excited in me any great surprise, I have not the presumption to believe that the experience of men and of business has taught me nothing; I have the confidence, on the contrary, of having learned much, and of thus being more apt perhaps to appreciate and describe the great things done by our fathers during those heroic times.

But I am certain that experience has not frozen within me the generous sentiments of my youth; I am certain that I love, as I ever did love, the liberties and the glory of France.

I now resume my narrative from the 18th Brumaire, year VIII. (November 9, 1799).

The law of the 19th of Brumaire, which instituted the Provisional Consulate, being passed, the three new consuls, Bonaparte, Sieyès, and Roger-Ducos, left St. Cloud, and repaired to Paris. Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, members of the late Directory, were already settled in the palace of the Luxembourg. Bonaparte quitted his small house in the Rue de la Victoire, and, with his wife, his adopted children, and his aides-de-camp, took up his residence in the apartments of the Petit-Luxembourg. There, in proximity to his two colleagues, surrounded by the fragments of the late government and the elements of the new one, he fell to work with that unerring and rapid intelligence, and with that extraordinary activity, which had always marked his operations in the field.

With him had been associated two colleagues, Roger-Ducos and Sieyès, both of whom had belonged to the Directory, and both been busily engaged in destroying that government which they despised. Sieyès, in particular, had been placed beside General Bonaparte, because he was the second personage of the Republic. Author of the grandest and best conceptions of the French Revolution, such as the union of the three orders, the division of France into departments, the institution of the National Guard, Sieyès, destitute of eloquence, had rivalled Mirabeau in the early days of our revolution, when oratory conferred more power than all other qualifications; and now that universal war assigned the first place to military genius, Sieyès, who had never worn a sword, was almost the equal of General Bonaparte; so great is power of mind, even unaccompanied by the talents which render it useful or applicable. But now that it was necessary to lend a hand to business, Sieyès, who was indolent, peevish, obstinate in his ideas, irritated or upset by the

slightest contradiction, could not long vie in influence with his young colleague, who was capable of working night and day, whom no contradiction ruffled, who was abrupt but not testy, who could win the goodwill of men when he pleased, and who, at any rate, when he neglected to do so, had always the alternative of carrying his point by force.

There was, however, a task which was generally assigned to Sieyès—that of preparing the new Constitution, which the Provisional Consuls were charged to digest, and to propose to France without much delay. At this period people were still somewhat imbued with the ideas of the eighteenth century; it was less generally but yet too much believed, that human institutions might be purely a work of mind, and that the constitution of a nation might spring ready made from the brain of a legislator. Assuredly, if the French Revolution must have had a Solon or a Lycurgus, M. Sieyès was worthy of being so; but there is only one real legislator in modern times,—that is, experience. This idea was not so common then as it is now-a-days, and it was universally agreed that M. Sieyès should be the author of the new Constitution: this was hoped, this was said; it was asserted that he possessed one, which was the result of long meditation; that it was a profound, an admirable production, and that, being now rid of the obstacles which the revolutionary passions threw in his way, he could bring it forward; that he would be the legislator, and General Bonaparte the administrator of the new government, and that between them they would render France powerful and happy. Every period of the Revolution had had its illusions: the present period is not free from them; but these, it is true, are likely to be the last.

It was, therefore, agreed by common consent that Sieyès should prepare the Constitution, and that General Bonaparte should govern. It was urgent, in fact, that some one should govern; for the state of the country in all respects was deplorable: the disorder, moral and material, was at its height,

The staunch revolutionists, beaten at St. Cloud, still had partisans in the Society of the Riding House (*Manège*), as it was called, and in similar societies in different parts of France. They had at their head few of the leading men of the two assemblies: but they numbered among them some officers highly esteemed in our armies: Bernadotte, a man of moderate abilities, and of a vain and ambitious disposition: Augereau, a brave soldier, supremely unreasonable, and luckily possessing but little influence; lastly, Jourdan, a good citizen and a good general, whose military miscarriages had soured his temper, and thrown him into an exaggerated opposition. There was reason to fear that the fugitives of the Council of Five Hundred would assemble in some considerable city,—form there a sort of Legis-

lative Body and Directory, and rally round them the men who still retained all the ardour of the revolutionary sentiments, some because they were compromised by excesses, or were in possession of national domains; others because they loved the republican system for its own sake, and were afraid lest they should see it overturned by the hand of a new Cromwell. Such an attempt would have occasioned serious embarrassment in a juncture already extremely difficult, and apprehensions were entertained that it might be made in Paris itself.

In regard to the opposite faction also, there was ground for serious fears; for La Vendée was again in a flame. M. de Châtillon on the right bank of the Loire, M. d'Autichamp on the left bank, Georges Cadoudal in the Morbihan, M. de Bourmont in Le Maine, M. de Frotté on the coast of Normandy, all excited and supported by the English, had renewed the civil war. The law respecting hostages, the weakness of the government, the defeats of our armies—such were the motives which had induced them to take up arms again. M. de Châtillon had for a moment occupied Nantes; he had entered the city but made no stay in it. This circumstance had been sufficient to induce the large communes in the insurgent districts to throw up hasty entrenchments, and to surround themselves with palisades when they could not have the protection of walls. Some, with a view to provide for their own defence, retained the little money which the insurgent country contributed to the public exchequer, alleging that, since the government did nothing for their protection, it was right that they should take care of themselves.

The Directory, though resolved to shun the excesses of the Convention, had not been able to resist all the violent measures which the war in La Vendée, as soon as it broke out again, led the revolutionary party to propose. Hurried along by the movement of the popular mind, it had passed the law of the hostages, by virtue of which all relations or supposed accomplices of the Vendéans were to be confined and to be punished with certain penalties, by way of repressing acts committed in the localities for which they were responsible as hostages. This unjust and violent law had but inflamed the passions, without disarming a single hand in La Vendée, and it had excited inexpressible animosity against the Directory.

The war abroad had been somewhat less disastrous towards the conclusion of the last campaigns. The victories of General Masséna at Zurich, and of General Brune at the Texel, had driven back the enemy to a considerable distance from our frontiers; but our soldiers were in a state of absolute destitution. They were neither paid, clothed, nor fed. The army which had defeated the combined English and Russians in

Holland, having the advantage of being maintained by the Batavian Republic, was better off than the others; but the army of the Rhine, which had lost the battle of Stockach, and that of Helvetia, which had gained the battle of Zurich, were in the utmost want. The army of the Rhine, stationed on French ground, practised there, without mercy and without benefit, the system of requisitions; that of Helvetia subsisted by means of war contributions imposed upon Basle, Zurich, Berne—contributions badly levied and badly employed, and which, quite insufficient for the subsistence of the soldiers, revolted the spirit of independence and economy that distinguishes the Swiss. The army of Italy, which, since the disasters of Novi and the Trebbia, had fallen back upon the Apennines into a sterile country ravaged by the war, was a prey to disease and the most distressing privations. Those soldiers, who had endured the greatest reverses with unshaken constancy, and had shown heroic fortitude in ill fortune, covered with rags, consumed by fever and famine, solicited charity on the roads in the Apennines, having nothing to eat but the far from nutritious fruits growing in the arid soil of those parts. Many of them deserted or joined the troops of banditti that infested the high roads in the south as well as in the west of France. Whole corps were seen quitting their posts without orders from their generals, and occupying others where they hoped to live less wretchedly. The sea, scoured by the English, exhibited in all directions none but an enemy's flag, and never brought them any succour. There were divisions whose pay had been withheld for eighteen months. Some provisions were levied by means of requisitions; but as for muskets, cannon, and ammunition, which are not to be procured by requisitions—the want of these our soldiers had no means of supplying. The horses, already inadequate to the services of the artillery and of the cavalry, were almost all swept off by disease and famine.

Such were the results of a weak, ill-regulated administration, and more especially of extreme financial embarrassment. The armies of the Republic had, for several years, lived upon assignats and victory. The assignats no longer existed; and Victory, after suddenly forsaking us, had scarcely begun to show herself again to our legions, and had not yet opened to them the abundant plains of Germany and Italy.

It is necessary to give here an idea of our financial situation—the principal cause of the sufferings of our armies. This situation outdid all that had ever been seen at former periods. The Constituent Assembly had committed two faults, which had been remedied, to a certain extent, by means of the assignats, but for which, since the discredit of that paper money, there was left no palliative. These two faults were, firstly, the



suppression of the indirect contributions imposed upon liquors, salt, and articles of consumption in general; secondly, the right granted to the municipal administrations to make themselves the assessments of the land-tax and of the other direct contributions.

By the suppression of the indirect contributions the treasury had lost, without compensation, one-third of its revenues. The produce of the domains of the State being reduced to almost nothing by a vicious administration, that of the registration by the falling off of private transactions, and that of the customs by the war, the direct contributions formed almost the only resource of the exchequer; but these contributions, amounting to about 300,000,000*f.* in a budget of 500,000,000*f.*, were extraordinarily in arrear. There were outstanding debits for the year V., the year VI., and the year VII. The assessments for the year VI. were not completed; for the year VII., one-third yet remained to be made out; and for the current year, that is to say, the year VIII., they were scarcely begun. Owing to this delay in the preparation of the assessments, the current contributions could not be levied, and the accumulation of the contributions in arrear occasioned new difficulties to the collectors, who frequently had to demand payment for several years at once.

This state of things proceeded from the adoption of a principle apparently just, but in reality mischievous, namely, that of leaving the local administrations to tax themselves, in some measure, by preparing the assessments themselves. The departmental and municipal administrations were then conjoined, as every one knows. Instead of prefects, sub-prefects, and maires, who were instituted at a later period, there were attached to all these administrations commissioners, having a consultative voice, and whose duty it was to originate and urge the acceleration of the administrative operations, but not to execute these themselves. The system of cantonal municipalities, uniting the 44,000 communes of France into 5000 collective communes, had increased the disorder. All local affairs were suspended: but what was a still greater misfortune, the two grand affairs of the State, the recruiting of the army and the collection of the taxes, were completely neglected. To make amends for this default of administrative action, the 5000 commissioners attached to the cantonal municipalities were charged with the duty of accelerating the preparation of the assessments; but they had not the only power which could be efficacious, that of acting themselves; and besides, engaged in a thousand different occupations, they paid but little attention to that important work, the preparation of the assessments. The indemnity granted to them for this service,

being much more expensive than it has been since the institution of the office of the direct contributions, was a heavy charge to the treasury, and without any corresponding advantage.

Thus the direct contributions, the principal branch of the revenue of the State, were not collected. Besides the permanent deficit arising from the default of receipts, there was another, arising from the amount of the expenditure, which at that time far exceeded the income. The ordinary expenditure might have been provided for by means of a revenue of about 500,000,000 f.; but the war had raised it to nearly 700,000,000 f. Nothing was left to meet the deficiency but the national domains, absorbed for the greater part, and which it was, moreover, difficult to realise to advantage, because the definite triumph of the Revolution was still a matter of great doubt.

This state of things had led to revolting abuses and to a situation which it is necessary to describe for the instruction of nations and governments.

The assignats, as we have just observed, had long ceased to exist. The mandats which succeeded them had disappeared also. Paper money was, therefore, completely abandoned; and, great as the void might be, it was better not to fill it up at all for the present, than to fill it, as had before been done, with a forced paper, which was scarcely taken in payments, though forced, and which uselessly furnished occasion for the exercise of all the rigours of the law, in order to compel its acceptance. In lieu of this suppressed paper money the following system was introduced.

In the first place, the government ceased to pay the civil functionaries, even in paper, so that in Brumaire, year VIII., they had received nothing for ten months. It was necessary, however, to give something to the *rentiers* and to the pensioners of the State. To these were delivered *bons d'arrérage*, the sole value of which consisted in their being taken as money in payment of the contributions. The pay of the troops was withheld; but what the armies took upon the spot for their subsistence was paid for by means of *bons de réquisition*, likewise receivable in discharge of the taxes. The companies which had contracted to supply some of the wants of the soldier, performing that service ill, and sometimes not at all, obtained, instead of money, orders upon the first receipts of the treasury: and by virtue of titles of this sort, granted very arbitrarily, they laid their hands upon almost all the cash that found its way into the public exchequer. Lastly, *rescriptions* on the national domains, receivable in payment for those domains, were another sort of paper money added to all those that we have just enumerated, and contributing to the most frightful stock-jobbing.

These papers, in fact, had not a forced currency like the assignats; but, thrown into circulation, incessantly bought and sold in the market of Paris, rising or falling on the slightest whisper of good or bad news, they were the subject of a ruinous speculation for the State, and of a deplorable demoralisation for the public. The men of business, depositaries of all the ready money, could procure them at a very easy rate. They bought them up from the *rentiers*, the contractors, or the other holders, at the lowest price; then sent them in to the treasury in payment of the contributions, passing for 100 francs what had cost them at most eighty, and sometimes sixty or fifty. The collectors themselves embarked in this kind of speculation, and, while they received money from part of the tax-payers, they paid into the coffers of the State at par the paper which they had bought at the lowest rate. Thus very few persons paid their contributions in cash; there was too much inducement to discharge them in paper. In this manner, the treasury scarcely ever received any specie, and its distress, in consequence, increased every day.

As the irritation against the Vendéans had produced the law of the hostages, the irritation against the jobbers had led, in like manner, to the measure of the progressive forced loan, destined to reach the great capitalists, and to make them contribute to the expenses of the war. This is what had been called in France, during the days of terror, the tax upon the rich; it is what in England was denominated the income-tax—a tax to which Mr. Pitt had at this time recourse, in order to carry on the furious war which he was waging against France. This tax, proportioned not to the extent of immovable property, which constitutes a sure basis, but to the supposed wealth of individuals, was feasible, though with considerable trouble, in England, where order prevailed, and the fury of parties did not make the assessment of fortunes a medium of vengeance. But it was not feasible in France, for amidst the disorders of the times, the tax-jury had been a sort of revolutionary committee, capriciously attributing wealth or poverty at the dictates of its passions, and never passing for just even when it was just, which is almost equivalent to never being so. The government durst not bring forward this measure, as formerly, under the mere simple form of a tax; they disguised it under the name of a *forced loan*, repayable, it was said, in national property, and divided, according to the supposed faculties of each, by an assessment jury.

Thus this measure had become one of the calamities of the moment. That and the law of the hostages formed the two grievances most frequently alleged against the Directory. It was not the cause, as it was asserted, of the poverty of the

treasury, a poverty arising from a complication of circumstances ; but it had kept aloof the rich speculators, whose aid was indispensable to the government, and of whom it was under the absolute necessity of availing itself, if but for a moment, that it might be able to shift without them afterwards.

This financial situation was, as we have said, the principal cause of the destitution and the reverses of our armies. Being well known to the foreign powers, it inspired them with confidence that they should conquer us with a little perseverance. The two victories of Zurich and the Texel had, to be sure, removed those powers somewhat farther from the object which they had in view, but not diverted them from the pursuit. Austria, proud of having reconquered Italy, was determined to fight to the last extremity rather than yield again. Her bearing there was that of an absolute power. Occupying Piedmont, Tuscany, the Roman States, she had not recalled either the King of Sardinia to Turin, or the Grand Duke of Tuscany to Florence, or the pontifical government to Rome. The defeat of Korsakoff and Suwaroff at Zurich, gave her less concern than might have been expected. It was in her eyes a check for the Russian arms, not for the Austrian ; a fault of Generals Korsakoff and Suwaroff,—a military mishap not very difficult to be retrieved, and of no great consequence unless it should disgust the Russians with the war. But she confidently hoped, by means of British influence and subsidies, to bring them back into the field.

As for England, rich from the income-tax, which already produced more than 200,000,000 *l.* a year ; blockading Malta, which she expected soon to take by famine ; intercepting all succours sent to our army in Egypt, which she hoped before long to reduce by privations and force, England was fully resolved to pursue all the objects which her policy flattered itself with the prospect of attaining, before she laid down her arms. She calculated, moreover, upon a sort of social dissolution in France, which would soon change our country into an open country, accessible to whomsoever might think fit to enter it.

Prussia, the only one of the northern powers that had not taken part in the war, maintained a reserve full of coldness towards the French government. Spain, obliged by the treaty of St. Ildefonso to make common cause with us, appeared extremely grieved at this community of interests. No one, indeed, seemed to care about having relations with a government that was ready to fall. The victories of Zurich and the Texel had regained it an outward show of respect, but not the confidence of the cabinets with which it was at peace or in alliance.

Thus, at home, La Vendée again in insurrection, abroad, the principal powers of Europe in arms, rendered the danger of the

war doubly pressing. It was necessary, by the adoption of some financial measure, to supply the first wants of the famished armies; it was necessary to reorganise them, to move them forward, to give them able commanders, to add new victories to those which had been gained at the conclusion of the last campaign; it was necessary, above all, to cure foreign cabinets of the notion of an approaching social dissolution in France, which rendered some so confident in the result of the war, others so shy in their relations with us; and all this could only be accomplished by a strong government, able to curb parties and to enforce unity of action, without which there cannot be, in the exertions that it makes to save itself, either harmony, or energy, or success.

The disease had arrived at that height which is frequently followed by a favourable turn, on one condition indeed, that the patient has sufficient strength left to get over the crisis. Fortunately, the strength of France was still great. The Revolution, though decried by those whom it had jostled, or whose illusions it had not realised, was, after all, the cause of justice and of reason, and it still excited the attachment which a great cause always excites. It had, moreover, numerous partisans, bound to its fortunes, in all those who had acquired new situations, bought the possessions of emigrants, or acted a part by which they had compromised themselves. In short, the nation was not so exhausted, morally and physically, as to submit quietly to the invasion of its territory by the Austrians and Russians. On the contrary, it felt indignant at this idea: its armies swarmed with admirable soldiers, officers, generals, who needed only a good direction. All these forces were ready to unite spontaneously in a single hand, if that hand was capable of directing them. Circumstances, therefore, favoured the man of genius who was about to present himself, for genius itself has need of circumstances.

Had young Bonaparte, for example, come forward in 1789, even with his talents and his glory, to preserve French society, at that time tending on all sides to dissolution, because its elements had become incompatible, in vain would he have propped it with his mighty arms: his human strength would have availed nothing against the powers of Nature. At this period, on the contrary, when that old society, broken up, as it was requisite that it should be, before it was recast in a new mould, presented only scattered elements, but tending of themselves to approximate, it was prepared to accommodate itself to all the efforts of the able hand that knew how to grapple it. General Bonaparte, therefore, had for him both his own genius and the favour of circumstances. He had a whole society to organise, but a society willing to be organised and by him, because it

had immense confidence in him, inspired by his unparalleled successes.

The law which decreed the Provisional Consulship, conferred extensive powers on the three Consuls. This law invested them with the plenitude of the "directorial power;" it specially charged them to "restore order in all the departments of the administration," to "restore domestic tranquillity," and to "obtain for France an honourable and solid peace." It associated with them two legislative commissions of twenty-five members each, selected from the Council of the Ancients and that of the Five Hundred, to supply the place of the Legislative Body, and to give a legal character to the acts of the Consuls. It authorised these two commissions to decree all necessary measures, on the proposition of the executive authority. It confided to them, moreover, the highly important duty of preparing the new Constitution. And yet, as such powers could not be conferred on them for an unlimited time, the same law enacted that, on the 1st of the following Ventose, the two Councils of the Ancients and the Five Hundred should have full right to assemble again, if, in the interim, a new Constitution had not been promulgated and accepted. In that event the members of the then Legislative Body would retain their powers, excepting sixty of them, erased from the list of the Councils by an extraordinary measure. The eventual reassembling being fixed for the 1st of Ventose, the dictatorship confided to the Provisional Consuls was limited to three months. It was, in fact, a real dictatorship with which they had been invested: for these commissions, deliberating with closed doors; divided into different sections, of finances, legislation, constitution; meeting together only to legalise what the government had to propose to them; were the surest and most convenient instruments for acting with promptness. For the rest, there was little reason to fear that these powers would be abused; for, when there is so much good to be done, and so short a space to do it in, men do not waste time in doing evil.

On the very day that the three Provisional Consuls removed to the Luxembourg, they met to deliberate on the most urgent affairs of the State. It was the 11th of November 1799 (20th of Brumaire). It was necessary to choose a president; the age and position of M. Sieyès seemed to call him to that distinction, but Roger-Ducos, though his friend, as if carried away by the feeling of the moment, said to General Bonaparte, "Take the arm-chair, and let us deliberate." Bonaparte immediately complied. The official acts of the Provisional Consuls, however, made no mention of a president. They entered into a first summary examination of the state of the country. Young Bonaparte was ignorant of many things, but he guessed intuitively

tively those which he was not acquainted with. He had carried on war, provided for the maintenance of numerous armies, administered conquered provinces, negotiated with Europe: he could not have served a better apprenticeship in the art of governing. For superior minds, but for those alone, war is an excellent school: there a man learns to command, to decide, but above all, to govern. Thus the new Consul appeared to have on all subjects either an opinion ready formed, or one that was formed with the rapidity of lightning, particularly after he had heard special men, the only men to whom he listened, and solely on the subject of their special pursuit.

He was still deficient in a species of knowledge most serviceable in the exercise of the supreme authority—the knowledge not of men generally, but of individuals. As for men in general, his knowledge of them was profound; but, having always lived with the armies, he was a stranger to the individuals who had figured in the Revolution. To supply this deficiency he had recourse to the testimony of his colleagues. But, gifted with rapid penetration and a prodigious memory, he very soon made himself as well acquainted with the *personnel* of the government as with that of his army.

After this first conference, the parts were taken and accepted. The young general, without waiting for the opinion of his colleagues, gave his own at the instant, summed up and settled every affair with the decision of an acting man. It was evident that the impulsion would thenceforth proceed from him alone. They separated, after agreeing upon the things most urgent to be done; and Sieyès, with a resignation which does honour to his reason and his patriotism, said in the evening to Messrs. de Talleyrand and Rœderer, “We have a master who knows how to do everything, who can do everything, and who will do everything.” He thence wisely concluded that it was best to let him act, for, at that moment, personal rivalries would have ruined France. It was anew agreed, by a sort of voluntary division of the official duties, that, during this dictatorship, which it was necessary to render brief and serviceable, General Bonaparte should govern, and that M. Sieyès should undertake the preparation of the Constitution. This, as we have already said, was a task which public opinion adjudged to the latter, and in the accomplishment of which his colleague was not disposed to cross him much, a single point excepted—the organisation of the executive power.

The most urgent matter of all was the composition of the ministry. In a monarchy, it is the first men in a country who are called to it. In a republic, those first men having become themselves the heads of the republic, there are left for the ministry only second-rate men, mere clerks, without any

responsibility, because the real responsibility has ascended higher. When such persons as M. Sieyès and General Bonaparte were Consuls, highly distinguished men, like Messrs. Fouché, Cambacérès, Reinhart, de Talleyrand, could not be real ministers. The choice of them had no other importance than a certain political signification and the due despatch of business. It is in this respect alone that their selection can be considered as of any moment.

The lawyer Cambacérès, a scholar and a philosopher, whom we shall notice more particularly by-and-by, was retained, without opposition, as minister of justice. After a brisk discussion among the Consuls, M. Fouché was continued in the ministry of the police. M. Sieyès would have rejected him, because, he said, he was not to be depended on, and a creature of Barras', the Director. General Bonaparte supported him, and caused him to be confirmed in his post. He considered himself bound to this course by the services which Fouché had done him during the events of the 18th of Brumaire. Besides, he united to a very shrewd mind a profound knowledge of the men and things of the Revolution. Public opinion, at that time, had marked him out for the minister of police, as M. de Talleyrand, from his familiarity with courts, his experience in business of importance, his acute understanding, and his conciliatory spirit, was marked out for the minister of foreign affairs. M. Fouché was retained; but such was the animosity of the revolutionists against M. de Talleyrand, either on account of his constant connection with the moderate party, or in consequence of the part which he had played in recent events, that it was found expedient to defer for a few weeks his return to the ministry for foreign affairs. M. de Reinhart was kept for a fortnight longer in that post. General Berthier, the faithful companion of the conqueror of Italy and Egypt, the inseparable chief of his staff, who could so thoroughly comprehend and issue his orders,—General Berthier received the portfolio of war, in the place of M. Dubois-Crancé, who was considered as much too warm in his opinions. M. Quinette was superseded in the ministry of the interior by an illustrious *savant*, M. de La Place. This was a signal and just homage paid to science, but it was not a service rendered to the administration. His superior genius was not fitted for the details of business. M. Forfait, an engineer and naval constructor of ability, succeeded M. Bourdon (de l'Oise) in the ministry of the marine.

At this moment, the most important choice to be made, perhaps, was that for minister of the finances. In the departments already specified, the Consuls could supply the place of the ministers, especially in the two most important departments—war and foreign affairs; General Bonaparte, in fact, could perfectly



well perform all the duties of Messrs. Berthier and de Reinhart. But that was not the case with the finances. This is a subject upon which technical knowledge is indispensable; and there was not in the ministry that went out with the Directory any man who could labour effectively at a reorganisation of the finances, which had become necessary and urgent. There was a person who had formerly been chief clerk, a man not of a brilliant but of a solid understanding, and possessing great experience, who had rendered, both during the old system and in the early period of the Revolution, those obscure but valuable administrative services with which governments cannot dispense, and which they ought to appreciate highly. The first clerk to whom I allude here was M. Gaudin, since Duke of Gaëte. M. Sieyès, well qualified to judge of men, though not to control them, had discovered M. Gaudin, and had been desirous to commit to his hands the portfolio of the finances towards the end of the Directory. M. Gaudin, a good financier, but a timid citizen, had declined the offer made to him under an expiring government, which wanted the first requisites of credit, strength, and the appearance of stability. But when power seemed to fall without opposition into able and firm hands, he could no longer feel the same repugnance. General Bonaparte, having a decided partiality for practical men, joined without hesitation in the opinion of his colleague, Sieyès, and offered to M. Gaudin the administration of the finances. M. Gaudin accepted this post, in which he never ceased, for fifteen years, to render eminent services.

All the departments of the ministry were thus filled. Another appointment was added to the preceding—that of M. Maret, since Duke of Bassano, who became secretary to the Consuls, with the title of secretary of state. Charged to prepare for the Consuls the elements of their labour, frequently to draw up their resolutions, and to communicate them to the heads of different departments, to keep the secrets of the State, he had a kind of ministry, destined sometimes to make up for, to complete, or to control the others. A cultivated mind, a certain acquaintance with Europe, with which he had already negotiated, particularly at Lisle, with Lord Malmesbury, a tenacious memory, a fidelity not to be shaken, caused him to become one of the most serviceable, and most constantly employed fellow-labourers about General Bonaparte. In those who served him, the general preferred exactness and intelligence to brilliancy. It is a partiality common to superior geniuses, which desire to be comprehended and obeyed, but want no substitute. Such was the secret of the high favour also enjoyed by M. Berthier for twenty years. M. Maret, though far from equalling him, had, in civil affairs, some of the

merits displayed by the illustrious chief of the staff in his military career.

General Lefebvre was retained in the command of the 17th military division. It will be recollected that, at first, in the morning of the 18th of Brumaire, he had shown some hesitation, and that he had afterwards blindly thrown himself into the arms of the new dictator. He was rewarded for it by the 17th military division and the command of Paris. Thenceforward his fidelity might be depended upon.

Members of the two Councils, who had distinguished themselves by their co-operation in the 18th of Brumaire, were sent into the provinces to explain and justify that event, and, if necessary, to supersede such of the agents of authority as might prove either refractory or inadequate to their functions. The result of the 18th of Brumaire was everywhere hailed with joy: the revolutionary party had, nevertheless, in the men compromised by their excesses, adherents who might have become dangerous, especially towards the provinces of the South. Where they did show themselves, the *gilded youth*, as they were called, were quite ready to come to blows with them. The defeat or the victory of either might have produced serious inconveniences.

Some changes were made in the distribution of the great military commands. General Moreau, deeply irritated against the Directory, which had so ill rewarded his patriotic devotedness during the campaign of 1799, had consented to become the lieutenant of General Bonaparte, to assist him in consummating the Revolution of the 18th of Brumaire. At the head of 300 men, he had condescended to act the part of keeper of the Luxembourg, the palace in which the Directors found themselves prisoners while their deposition was determined on at St. Cloud. General Bonaparte, who, by skilfully feeding the pride and the resentments of Moreau, had induced him to accept that singular post, owed him some compensation. He united the two armies of the Rhine and of Helvetia into one, and gave him the command of it. This was the most numerous, the finest army of the Republic, and it could not have been put into better hands. General Moreau had gained but little glory during the last campaign. His services, though substantial, especially when, with a handful of men, he stopped the triumphant career of Suwaroff, were nevertheless no victories, and were not appreciated at their proper value. At this period the battle of Zurich had eclipsed everything. Besides, the political conduct of Moreau on the 18th of Fructidor, when he denounced Pichegru either too soon or too late, had injured him in public opinion, and caused him to be considered as a weak character, wholly beneath himself when he was not upon the field of

battle. General Bonaparte, therefore, raised him considerably by conferring on him so extensive a command; and he came to another very wise determination. The legions of the Rhine and of Helvetia comprehended the most ardent republicans of the army, and many who were envious of the glory acquired in Italy and in Egypt. Masséna commanded them, and he had but little affection for General Bonaparte, though subjugated by his genius. In regard to him, he passed alternately from admiration to ill-humour. There was reason to fear, on his part, some unpleasant demonstration on account of the 18th of Brumaire. The choice of Moreau cut short all possible manifestations, by removing an ill-disposed general from a discontented army. This choice was likewise a good one in a military point of view; for this army of the Rhine and of Helvetia was destined, in case the war were renewed, to operate in Germany, and no one had so thoroughly studied this part of the theatre of war as Moreau.

Masséna was sent to the army of Italy, to places and among soldiers that he was perfectly acquainted with. It was honourable for him to be selected for the repairer of the faults committed in 1799, and the continuator of the exploits of General Bonaparte in 1796. Separated from the army amidst which he had just won a victory and made himself supporters, he was to be transferred to a new army, to which the Directory was odious, and where he would find none but approvers of the 18th of Brumaire. This choice, like the preceding, was highly judicious in a military point of view. It was the Apennines that the French would have to dispute with the Austrians; and, for a war of this kind, on this theatre of operations, Masséna had not his equal.

After they had decided upon these indispensable appointments, the Consuls had to direct their attention to an affair not less urgent, namely, that of the finances. Before they could obtain money from the capitalists, it was requisite that they should give them the satisfaction of suppressing the progressive forced loan, which, like the law of the hostages, had incurred universal reprobation. The forced loan, as well as the law of the hostages, was far from having produced all the evils that were attributed to it. But these two measures, truly paltry in regard to utility, were vicious in a moral point of view, inasmuch as they revived the most odious recollections of the Reign of Terror. All, therefore, agreed in condemning them. The revolutionists themselves, who, in their patriotic ardour, had demanded these measures of the Directory, by a reaction very common in parties, had suddenly declared themselves hostile to them as soon as they perceived their failure and unpopularity.

No sooner was Gaudin installed minister than, by order of

the Consuls, he submitted to the legislative commissions a resolution, the object of which was the suppression of the progressive forced loan. This suppression took place amidst universal applause. In lieu of the forced loan there was substituted a war-supply, consisting of an addition of 25 per cent. to the principal of the land-tax, the tax on movable property, and the personal tax. This supply was payable, like the other taxes, in money or State paper of any kind; but, owing to the urgency of the case, it was required that half the amount should be paid in cash.

The war-supply, which had thus superseded the progressive forced loan, could not furnish immediate relief, for it was only to be levied upon the assessments of the direct contributions, and at the same time as those contributions, of which it was in reality but an augmentation, in the proportion of one-fourth. It was requisite for the current service, and more particularly for the troops, that the treasury should be immediately replenished. M. Gaudin, on the strength of this new measure, destined more especially to please the great capitalists, appealed to the principal bankers of the capital, and applied to them for assistance, the urgency of which was felt by all. General Bonaparte entered into direct communication with them, and the sum of 12,000,000*f.* in cash was immediately lent to the government. It was to be repaid out of the first receipts of the war contribution.

This accommodation was a great boon, and reflected honour on the public spirit of the bankers of the capital. But it was a supply for a few days only. More durable supplies were needed.

We have seen, at the beginning of this book, how the suppression of the indirect contributions, decreed at the very outset of the Revolution, had reduced the treasury to the mere produce of the direct contributions; how this revenue had itself been almost annulled by the delay in the preparation of the assessments; lastly, how the assignats, the ordinary medium for supplying all deficits, having totally disappeared, recourse was had to papers of various kinds, which, not having the forced currency of coin, were no longer a clog, as before, to private transactions, but left the government without resources, and gave rise to the most hideous stock-jobbing. It was necessary to put an end to this state of things, and to reorganise the collection, if the government wished to open again the sources of the public revenue, and, with the sources of the public revenue, those of credit.

In every country where there exist taxes on property and person, which we term in France direct contributions, it is requisite to have a return of that property, with an estimate of its produce, and a list of the names of persons, with an

estimate of their pecuniary means; it is requisite that these returns be modified every year, according to the transfer of property from hand to hand, according to the birth, death, or removal of persons; it is then requisite to apportion every year among the properties and the persons the amount of taxes that has been decreed; lastly, there must be a collection, at once exact and prudent: exact, to ensure the receipts; prudent, not to harass the payers. Nothing of this kind existed in the year VIII. (1799).

The register of real property (*cadastre*), a work which has occupied the last forty years,\* was not yet begun. There were ancient terriers in some communes, and a general return of properties undertaken in the time of the Constituent Assembly. These data, though by no means accurate, were turned to account. But the operations which consist in revising the lists of properties and persons, according to their incessant changes, and in apportioning annually among them the amount of taxes decreed—these operations, which properly constitute what is called the preparation of the assessments, were left to the municipal administrations, to whose disorganisation and carelessness we have already adverted.

The collection was in not less disorder. It was given to the lowest bidder: that is, to those who undertook the duty at the cheapest rate. These collectors paid over the funds levied by them to receivers, who acted as intermediates (*agents*) between them and the receiver-general. Both the one and the other were in arrear. The disorder prevailing in every department did not permit a strict eye to be kept upon them. Besides, the non-preparation of the assessments always furnished them with a plausible pretext for deferring the payments, and stock-jobbing with the means of making those payments in depreciated paper. In short, they received little, and paid in less.

On the recommendation of M. Gaudin, the Consuls were not afraid to revert to certain practices of the old government, which experience had proved to be sound and useful. Upon the improved model of the ancient administration of the *vingtièmes*, there was instituted the agency of direct contributions, hitherto constantly rejected, from the mischievous idea of leaving the local administrations to tax themselves. A director and an inspector in each department, and 840 comptrollers, distributed in greater or less number in the *arrondissements*, were themselves to perform the duty of preparing the assessments; that is to say, to draw up the list of properties and persons, to ascertain the changes which had taken place during the year, and to charge them with their fair proportion of the tax. Thus,

\* The reader will perceive that this portion of the work was written some years ago. —*Translator.*

instead of the 5000 cantonal commissioners, who could do no more than urge the communes to the preparation of the assessments, there were to be 99 directors, 99 inspectors, and 840 comptrollers, performing the duty themselves, at an expense to the State of three millions instead of five. It was hoped that in six weeks this administration would be completely organised, and that in two or three months it would have finished the third yet remaining to be made of the assessments of the year VII. (the last year), all those of the year VIII. (the current year), lastly, all those of the year IX. (the next year).

Courage was required to overcome some prejudices, but General Bonaparte was not the man to let prejudices stop him. The legislative commissions, debating with closed doors, adopted the proposed plan after some observations. Guarantees were granted to such persons liable to the contribution as had claims to make—guarantees which have since been rendered more secure by means of the institution of the councils of prefecture. The basis of all regular contribution was thus re-established.

This done, it was requisite to organise the collection and the payment of the funds into the treasury.

At the present day, in consequence of the perfect order which the Empire and the subsequent governments have successively introduced into our finances, the levy of the funds of the treasury is executed with a facility and a regularity that leave nothing to be desired. Collectors receive, month by month, the *direct contributions*, that is to say, the taxes imposed upon land, buildings, and persons, which they pay over to the particular receiver stationed in the principal place of every arrondissement, and the latter to the receiver-general resident in the chief town of the department. The receivers of the *indirect contributions*, consisting of customs levied on the frontiers upon foreign merchandise, duties of registration chargeable on transfers of property and on judicial acts; lastly, duties imposed upon articles of consumption of various kinds, such as liquors, tobacco, salt, &c.; the receivers of these contributions pay over the proceeds as they receive them to the particular receiver, and the latter again to the receiver-general, the real banker of the State, whose duty it is to amass the funds, and to dispose of them agreeably to the orders transmitted to him by the administration of the treasury.

The equal distribution of the public burdens and the general prosperity have rendered the payment of taxes so easy at the present day; moreover, the periodical returns, which contain a summary of all the operations connected with the receipts and expenditure, have become so clear; that the taxes are paid on the day specified—frequently before—and that the precise date of their receipt and appropriation is also known. Thus govern-

ment has found means to establish a system grounded on the truth itself of facts, according as they take place. It is, therefore, in the nature of the *direct contributions* levied upon property and persons (and thus a species of rent), to be capable of being fixed beforehand, both as to the amount and as to the term of payment. They are demanded, therefore, a twelfth at a time, and monthly. The receivers are *debited* with them, that is to say, constituted debtors for their amount, every month. But it is presumed that they have not received them till two or three months after each twelfth or instalment is due, in order to leave them the means of exercising forbearance towards the payers, and, at the same time, to create in themselves a motive for getting in the tax; for, if they receive it before the time at which they have to pay it in, they derive a profit, by interest, proportionate to the despatch of the collection. It is, on the contrary, in the nature of the *indirect contributions* (which are levied only upon the importations of foreign goods into France, upon the transfers of property, or upon the consumption of articles of different sorts), to be received but irregularly, and according to the extent of the transactions in the articles upon which they are laid. The receivers are therefore *debited*, that is to say, constituted debtors, for them, at the very moment when they come into their hands, and not by twelfths and monthly, as is the practice for the *direct contributions*. Every ten days the receiver-general is constituted debtor for what has come in during the past ten.

As soon as he is *debited*, no matter for what kind of contribution, the receiver-general pays interest upon the sums with which he is *debited*, till the day that he pays them away for account of the public services. On the other hand, from the day that he pays any sum whatever on account of the State, before he is in debt to it, the State, in its turn, gives him credit for the interest. A balance is afterwards struck between the interest owing by the receiver-general upon the sums that have remained in his hands beyond the time prescribed, and the interest due by the treasury upon the sums that have been advanced to it; so that not a single day's interest is lost either by the one or the other; and the receiver-general becomes a real banker, having a running account with the treasury, obliged to hold constantly at the disposal of the government the funds which the wants of the service may require, no matter to what extent.

Such is the system which experience on the one hand, and the improved circumstances of the tax-payers on the other, have gradually introduced in the collection of the funds of the treasury.

But at the period the history of which we are recording, the

taxes came in irregularly, and the system of accounts was confused. The collector who was in arrear might allege the delay in the preparation of the assessments, or the distress of those from whom they were to be levied; he could, moreover, conceal the amount of his receipts, owing to the want of clearness in the returns of the operations. The government knew not, as at present, what was passing every day in the several thousand coffers, great and small, composing the general exchequer of the State.

M. Gaudin proposed, and prevailed on General Bonaparte to adopt, a system borrowed in a great measure from the old government, an ingenious system, which has gradually led us to the organisation at present established. This system was that of bills of the receivers-general. These receivers, real bankers of the treasury, as we have called them, were to give bills, falling due from month to month, for the total amount of the direct contributions, that is to say, for 300,000,000 f. of the 500,000,000 f. then composing the budget of the State. These bills, when due, were made payable at the office of the receiver-general. To compensate for the delay afforded to the contributor in paying his tax, it was assumed that each twelfth was discharged about four months after the period when it was due. Thus the bills for the twelfth, payable on the 31st of January, were to be drawn so as to fall due on the 31st of May; by which means the receiver-general, having before him a term of four months, was at once enabled to grant indulgence to the payer of the tax, and stimulated to obtain payment earlier; for, if he could get it in before the expiration of two months instead of four, he gained two months' interest.

This combination, besides possessing the advantage of sparing the payer of the tax and interesting the collector in getting it in, had the merit of preventing the receivers-general from delaying payment; for the treasury had bills of exchange upon them at a fixed date, which they were obliged to pay, upon pain of their being protested. Such a combination, it is true, was not possible till after the preparation of the assessments, and the collection had been ensured; the receivers-general being unable to pay punctually unless they were supplied punctually. But, this being accomplished by the means which we have stated, it was easy to establish the system of bills; and independently of the advantages enumerated, it was attended with this, that, on the first day of the year, it placed at the disposal of the treasury the 300,000,000 f. of direct contributions, in bills of exchange, which could be surely and easily discounted.

To give credit to this paper, destined to answer the purpose which the royal *bons* fulfil at this day in France, and the exchequer bills in England, the *caisse d'amortissement* (sinking fund) was devised. This institution, which we shall see, ere



long, entrusted with the management of the entire public debt, had at first no other object than to support the bills of the receiver-general. The manner in which this was managed was as follows. The collectors of the public money, as a guarantee for their operations, gave at that time a security in immovable property only. This kind of security, exposing the State to the difficulties of a forced ejection, when it was obliged to proceed against the granter, did not sufficiently answer the object of its institution. It was therefore determined to require of the receivers a security in money. They were then making such large profits, by jobbing with the produce of the tax itself, as to submit cheerfully to this condition rather than resign their posts.

These securities, paid into the *caisse d'amortissement*, were destined to serve as a guarantee to the bills. Every bill, when due, was to be paid at the office of the receiver-general, or, in default, at that of the *caisse d'amortissement*, which was to discharge it on presentation, if protested, out of the security of the granter. The bill, in consequence, immediately equalled in character the best commercial paper. Nor was this the only advantage of that combination. Probably a small portion of the securities might suffice to uphold the credit of the bills, for few of the receivers-general would be tempted to suffer their paper to be protested: the surplus would then be left at the disposal of the treasury, which might settle for it with the *caisse*, by ceding to it immovable property or *rentes*.

The government had, therefore, by means of this institution, the advantage of giving assured currency to the bills, and of procuring for itself a certain sum in cash, that might be made forthwith available—a resource which, just then, came most seasonably.

Such was the system of collection and of payment, which in a short time placed the treasury at its ease. It consisted, as we have seen, in making up the assessments of the contributions, and in putting them in a train to be collected with punctuality and despatch; in then drawing bills on the principal receivers for the total amount of the tax—bills readily discounted, owing to the means devised to enable the receivers-general to discharge their obligations themselves, or which the *caisse d'amortissement* could discharge for them.

We have adverted to the direct contributions only. As for the indirect contributions, which did not come in regularly or by twelfths, the receivers-general were, after the receipt of them, but not till then, to transmit to the treasury *bills at sight* on their chest; so that these were not available till after the drawer had received the amount. This part of the service, which left too great an enjoyment of funds to the receivers-general, was subsequently improved.

At the moment of the introduction of every new system, there are inconveniences of transition, arising from the difficulty of adjusting the present state of things with that which one purposes to create in its stead. Thus the *bons d'arrérages* delivered to the *rentiers*, the *bons de réquisition* delivered to the farmers, whose commodities had been taken on the spot, lastly, the *delegations* on funds to be paid into the chests, delivered with a culpable licence to certain contractors, were liable to derange all the calculations. Different methods were adopted to remedy the inconveniences which resulted from the presence of all these papers in the circulation. The *bons d'arrérages*, given to the *rentiers*, had exclusively the favour of being still received in payment of taxes; but the amount of them for the current year was known, and by so much the sum of the obligations which the receivers-general were to subscribe was diminished.

As for the *bons de réquisition* and the *delegations*, papers of suspicious origin, and the amount of which was unknown, they were subjected to a particular liquidation. They were discharged at a later period, partly with national property, partly with paper of different kinds, and with due regard to equity.

By paying the *rentiers* in money, as it was proposed soon to do, whenever the due receipt of the contributions should be secured; by providing for the armies, and relieving them from the necessity of recurring to the system of requisitions; by obstinately refusing to the contractors the irregular *delegations*, which had before been granted to them on the receipts of the treasury; the government could not fail to dry up the source of the paper circulation, and to re-establish everywhere the collection of taxes in cash.

With these means, devised for ensuring the revenues of the State, were combined measures, some of them quite legitimate at any time, others still having the character of expedients and the excuse of necessity. The purchasers of national domains, doing as everybody then did, that is to say, disregarding the laws, withheld the price of the immovable property which they had bought. They were required to pay it within four months, upon pain of forfeiture. This obligation could not but bring in a great part of the paper in circulation, which was specially receivable in payment for national domains. Certain classes of purchasers were to pay a portion of the price in cash. For this portion they were obliged to sign negotiable engagements. These papers were safe and easy to be disposed of; for those who had signed them were threatened with the loss of their purchases, if they suffered their engagements to be protested.

National domains to the value of 300,000,000 or 400,000,000*f.* still remained unsold. This value, entirely hypothetical, founded on the estimates of 1790, might, if better times were waited for,

be worth double, treble, and even more. The best course would have been not to dispose of them. Urgent necessity, however, caused recourse to be had to a new alienation. It was decided that *rescriptions*, representative of the price of the domains proposed to be sold, should be negotiated to speculators, to the amount of 150,000,000 f. Luckily, a very small part only of this sum was issued.

Lastly, a scheme was adopted for representing by paper of the same kind the capital of certain ground-rents belonging to the State, and which anterior laws had permitted the debtors to redeem. This produced well-nigh 40,000,000 f. The parties who owed these rents had ceased to pay them, without having, however, effected their redemption. Paper, destined to represent this capital of 40,000,000 f., and negotiable, like the *rescriptions* on the national domains, through the medium of stockbrokers, was issued.

These emissions of artificial securities were the last concessions made to pressing wants. Disposed of to speculators, they were destined to procure some resources till the re-establishment of the finances, which there was reason to expect from the punctual preparation of the assessments, and the system of the bills of the receivers-general. For the rest, these papers, as we shall see by-and-by, were issued with great reserve, and had not their usual inconveniences, namely, the depreciation and the alienation at a low price of the resources of the State.

The solidity of these various schemes, undoubtedly good in themselves, depended entirely on the solidity of the government itself. Founded on the supposed return of order, they would yield the results which were hoped from them, if order were actually restored; if the executive power displayed vigour and perseverance in the execution of its plans; if it organised well and speedily the new administration of the direct contributions; if it took constant care to require that the assessments should be made out, and put in train to be collected within the time prescribed; that the bills of the receivers-general should be subscribed and paid when due; that the securities should be promptly furnished and deposited in the *caisse d'amortissement* in sufficient amount to uphold the credit of the bills; if, finally, it abandoned for ever those ruinous expedients, such as *bons d'arrérages*, *bons de réquisition*, and *delegations*, which it had promised itself to renounce. If all this were effected, it was certain to obtain the beneficial results which were expected from the new financial system. There was reason to hope for it too from the intelligence and the firmness of General Bonaparte. All these plans he had himself discussed, approved, nay, frequently modified and improved; he appreciated their importance and their merit, and he was firmly resolved to see that they were

strictly executed. No sooner were they decided upon than they were sent to the legislative commissions, which converted them into laws, without the loss of a moment. Twenty days sufficed for conceiving, for digesting, for clothing them with a legal character, and for carrying them partly into effect. General Bonaparte was at work several times a week with the minister of the finances, and he thus took the best method of putting an end to those pernicious *delegations*, which were frequently granted on the solicitation or through the corrupting influence of the contractors. Every week, he made the ministers bring him a statement of their necessary expenses; he compared it with the statement of the probable receipts furnished by the treasury, and divided among them the real resources, in proportion to the wants of each. He disposed, therefore, of that only which was certain to be collected; and, in consequence of this firmness, the principal abuse, that of the *delegations*, was fated very soon to disappear.

In the meantime, till the assessments were completed, and put in a train to be collected, and till the bills of the receivers-general were transmitted to the treasury and discounted, the government had for its present wants, besides the 12,000,000 f. lent by some of the bankers, the sums lodged by the receivers-general in the *caisse d'amortissement*, whatever amount could be raised, through stockbrokers, upon the newly created securities, and, lastly, the current income or receipts, with which, most imperfect as it was, a shift had hitherto been made. The confidence inspired by the Provisional Consuls had a good effect upon the brokers; means were found to negotiate the new securities with them, though not a creature would have taken them a few days before.

It was by these united means that the government was enabled to relieve the naked and famished armies, and to procure for them a first supply, of which they were in such urgent want. So great was the disorder that, even at the office of the minister of war, there were no returns of the troops, their number, and their quarters. The office of the artillery was the only one which possessed returns of this kind for the troops of that arm. But, as the army was neither fed nor clothed, as the battalions of conscripts, raised in the departments and equipped with the *bons de fourniture*, had been most frequently organised without the intervention of the central authority, the latter knew scarcely anything concerning them. General Bonaparte was obliged to send officers of the staff to the armies themselves to procure such documents as he wanted. He transmitted at the same time, to the different corps, some supplies, but very inadequate to the extent of their necessities. Addressing them, by proclamation, in that language which he could render so

impressive for soldiers, he conjured them to have patience a few days longer, and to display under hardships the same courage which they had oft displayed in battle.

“Soldiers,” said he, “your wants are great: all possible measures are taken to supply them. The first quality of a soldier is constancy in enduring fatigue and privation; valour is but the second. Several corps have quitted their positions; they have turned a deaf ear to the voice of their officers. The 17th Light is of this number. Are they all dead then—those heroes who fought at Castiglione, at Rivoli, and at Neumarek? They would have perished rather than abandon their colours, and they would have recalled their young comrades to honour and to their duty. Soldiers, your rations have not been regularly distributed, you say. What would you have done, if, like the 4th and 22nd Light, and the 18th and 32nd of the line, you had found yourselves in the midst of a desert, without bread or water, feeding on horses’ and mules’ flesh? ‘Victory will give us bread,’ said they—and you quit your colours!

“Soldiers of Italy, a new general commands you: he was always in the advanced guard in the most brilliant days of your glory. Surround him with your confidence; he will restore victory to your ranks.

“I shall have a daily account sent me of the conduct of each corps, and especially of that of the 17th Light, and of the 63rd of the line: they will recollect the confidence that I had in them.”

The administration of the finances, and that of the armies, were not the only departments of the government which claimed, in a pressing manner, the attention of the new Consuls. It was necessary, at the same time, to revoke those rigours, unworthy of a wise and humane government, which the violence of the parties had wrung from the weakness of the expiring Directory: it was necessary to maintain order, threatened here by the Vendéans in arms, yonder by the revolutionists, exasperated at the events of the 18th of Brumaire.

The first political measure of the new Consuls was relative to the law of the hostages. This law, which made the relations of the Vendéans and Chouans responsible for acts committed in the revolted provinces, punished some with imprisonment, others with transportation. It shared with the law of the progressive forced loan, and, with much better reason, the public animadversion. It was, in fact, only under the influence of the blind passions of this time, that men durst render the relations of the insurgents responsible for acts which they had not committed, even though they wished them success. The Consuls dealt with this law as they had done with the law of the progressive forced loan: they proposed its repeal to the legislative commissions, by which it was immediately decreed. General Bonaparte went

himself to the prison of the Temple, where many of these hostages were confined, to break their fetters with his glorious hands, and to receive those numerous benedictions, which the reparative acts of the Consulate so invariably and so justly called forth.

To this measure were added others of a like kind, which stamped the policy of the Provisional Consuls with a precisely similar character. Many priests, though they had taken that oath as to the civil constitution of the clergy which became the origin of the schism, had nevertheless been persecuted. These priests, who were distinguished by the epithet *assermentés* (sworn), were some of them concealed or fugitives; others imprisoned in the isles of Ré and Oléron. The Consuls issued orders for the release of all who were still in confinement. This measure had the effect of drawing from their retreats, or bringing back to France, all the priests of the same class, who had sought their safety in flight or concealment.

Several emigrants, shipwrecked off Calais, had been for some time a subject of deep interest to the public mind. These unfortunate persons, placed between the horrors of shipwreck and the rigour of the laws against emigration, had not hesitated to throw themselves on the shore of France, not imagining that their country could be as pitiless to them as the tempest. The partisans of measures of severity alleged, and the thing was nearly certain, that these emigrants were going to La Vendée, to take part in the renewal of the civil war; and they thence concluded that it was right to apply to them the terrible laws of the time against emigration. But public humanity, luckily awakened, was adverse to this mode of reasoning. The question had been several times resolved in a contrary spirit. At the instigation of the new Consuls it was finally decided that these emigrants should be liberated, but transported out of the territories of the Republic. Among them were several members of the highest families in France, and, in particular, that Duke de Choiseul, whom we have since found invariably among the steady friends of a discreet liberty, the only liberty that honest men can love and defend.

The acts which we have just recorded gave universal satisfaction. Admire the difference that can exist between one government and another! Had these acts emanated from the Directory, they would have been termed unworthy concessions made to the emigrant party: emanating from the new consular government, at the head of which figured an illustrious general, whose presence, wherever he might happen to be, instantaneously suggested the idea of strength, these acts were regarded as signs of a vigorous but moderate policy. So true it is, that to be moderate with honour and with benefit, one must needs be powerful!

In this first moment, it was only in regard to the revolutionary party that the policy of the Provisional Consuls was deficient in moderation. It was with this party that the recent struggle had been on the 18th and 19th of Brumaire. Some irritation and distrust were naturally felt towards it; and, among these acts of a conciliatory and reparative policy, severity was exercised against it alone. The news of the 18th of Brumaire had produced a strong sensation among the patriots of the South. The societies affiliated to the parent society of the Riding House, formed in Paris, manifested redoubled indignation. It was reported that the deputies, deprived by the law of the 19th of Brumaire of their quality of members of the Legislative Body, were about to assemble at Toulouse, for the purpose of installing there a sort of Directory. General Bonaparte, now that he had in his hands the government and the army, was afraid of nothing. He had shown, on the 13th of Vendemiaire, that he well knew how to quell insurrections, and he felt no uneasiness about what a few hot-headed patriots, without soldiers, were able to do. But his colleagues, Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, had not the like confidence. Several of the ministers joined them, and they persuaded him that it was necessary to take precautions. Inclined himself, from disposition, to energetic measures, though disposed to moderation from policy, he consented to doom thirty-eight members of the revolutionary party to transportation, and eighteen others to confinement at La Rochelle. Among the number were wretches, and one, in particular, who boasted of having murdered the Princess de Lamballe; but there were also honourable men, members of the two Councils, and one distinguished and respectable personage, General Jourdan. His public opposition to the 18th of Brumaire had at the moment excited some apprehensions. To inscribe the name of such a man in such a list was a fault upon a fault.

Public opinion, though unfavourably disposed towards the revolutionists, treated this measure with coldness and almost with censure. Such was the aversion to severity, to reactions, that they were disapproved, even when exercised against those who had themselves stuck at nothing of the kind. Remonstrances poured in from all quarters, and some of them from very high ones, in favour of certain names included in this list of proscription. The Court of Cassation presented a memorial in behalf of one of its members, Xavier Audouin, who had not deserved that so much trouble should be taken on his account. M. de Talleyrand, always mild from disposition, always adroit in his proceedings, whom the revolutionary party contributed by its aversion to keep out of the ministry of foreign affairs, had the good feeling to interpose in favour of one Jorry, who

had publicly insulted him. He did so, he said, for fear the insertion of this vulgar offender's name in the list of the new proscripts might be attributed to revenge on his part. His published letter did him honour, and saved the person for whom he pleaded. In compliance with a public demand, as it were, General Jourdan's name was also erased. Most fortunately, the speedy and favourable turn taken by events allowed the abrogation of this act, which was only an accidental deviation from a course otherwise firm and straightforward.

General Bonaparte had sent his devoted lieutenant, General Lannes, to Toulouse. On the mere appearance of this officer all preparations for resistance ceased. Tranquillity was restored in the city of Toulouse; the societies auxiliary to that of the Riding House were shut up in all the cities of the South. The hot-headed revolutionists soon saw that public opinion, reacting against them, had ceased to be in their favour, and they perceived at the head of the government a man whom nobody could hope to be able to resist. Besides, the most rational of them could not forget that it was this same man who, on the 13th of Vendemiaire, had dispersed the royalist bands of the sections of Paris, which had risen against the Convention, and who, under the Directory, by lending a hand to the government, had furnished it with the means of bringing about the 18th of Fructidor. They submitted, therefore: the most violent uttering some cries of rage which were soon stifled; the others hoping at least that under the military government of the new Cromwell, as they then called him, the Revolution and France would not be conquered for the advantage of the Bourbons, the English, the Austrians, and the Russians.

A single act of resistance, not by force, but by legal means, was offered to the 18th of Brumaire. The president of the criminal tribunal of the Yonne, named Barnabé, following the example of the ancient parliaments, refused to register the law of the 19th of Brumaire, constituting the provisional government. This magistrate, denounced to the legislative commissions, was charged with having refused to perform his duties, suspended, and removed from his seat. He submitted to his fate with resignation and dignity.

The speedy defeat of these attempts at resistance allowed the government to rescind a measure which was in contradiction with its prudent policy. On a report from Cambacérès, minister of justice, stating that order was re-established in the departments, and that the laws were everywhere executed without impediment, the transportation decreed against the thirty-eight individuals, and the confinement at Rochelle of eighteen others, were commuted into mere *surveillance*, and this, too, was soon discontinued.

This measure was soon eclipsed by the series of sensible,



judicious, and vigorous acts which marked the new government. La Vendée had, in its turn, created some uneasiness. A recent rising had been attempted towards the end of the Directory. But the accession of General Bonaparte completely changed the face of things, and the views entertained in all parts of the Republic. The leaders of the new royalist insurrection had been excited to take up arms as much by the late severities of the Directory, as by the hope of the speedy overthrow of that government. But, on the one hand, the repeal of the law of the hostages, the liberation of the priests, the grant of life to the shipwrecked emigrants, had a conciliatory effect; while, on the other, the attainment of General Bonaparte to power put an end to all hope of witnessing the dissolution of the order of things which had sprung from the Revolution. The 18th of Brumaire had been productive of a change of sentiment in La Vendée, as in other quarters, and given birth to feelings altogether new.

The royalist chiefs, some of whom were fighting in the fields of La Vendée, while others were in Paris engaged in political intrigues, worked up, like every party which seeks to overturn a government, to a continual activity of mind, and incessantly in quest of new combinations for rendering their cause triumphant, conceived that there might perhaps be some way of coming to an understanding with General Bonaparte. They thought that so eminent a personage could not be very desirous of figuring for a few days on the shifting stage of the French Revolution, only to disappear like his predecessors, in the abyss opened beneath their feet; and that he would much rather occupy a place in a peaceable and regularly constituted monarchy, of which he would be the ornament and support. They were, in short, so credulous as to hope that the part of Monk would suit a man who considered even that of Cromwell as not great enough for him. They availed themselves of the medium of one of those foreign diplomatic agents, who, under the pretext of studying the country to which they are accredited, dabble in all the underhand intrigues of parties, and obtained an introduction to General Bonaparte. Messrs. Hyde de Neuville and d'Andigné were the royalists who ventured to take this step.

It is unnecessary to demonstrate how very erroneous the judgment which they had formed of General Bonaparte must have been. This extraordinary man, now sensible of his strength and his greatness, would not be the servant of any party. If he was not fond of disorder, he was fond of the Revolution: if he did not believe in the full extent of liberty which it had promised, he desired that total social reform, which it was its object to accomplish. He desired, therefore, the triumph of that Revolution; he desired the glory of terminating it, and making it lead to a peaceful and regular state of things:

he desired to remain its head, with no matter what title, under no matter what form of government: but as for being the instrument of any other power than that of Providence, he had already too much glory, and consciousness of his strength, to consent to that.

He gave audience to Messrs. Hyde de Neuville and d'Andigné, listened to their insinuations, more or less plain, and frankly declared his intentions, which were to put an end to persecutions, to reconcile all the parties with the government; but to let none of them triumph, excepting that of the Revolution itself—of the Revolution, understood in its better signification. He expressed his fixed determination to treat with the Vendean insurgents on reasonable conditions, or to exterminate them to the last man. This interview, then, led to nothing, and only served to make the royalist party better acquainted with the general.

While these negotiations were taking place in Paris between General Bonaparte and some friends of the Bourbons, others were carried on in La Vendée itself, between the leaders of the insurrection and the generals of the Republic. Towards the end of the Directory, when nobody knew whom to obey, a sort of laxity, nearly approaching to disloyalty, had crept into the army which guarded La Vendée; and more than one republican officer, doubting the existence of the Republic much longer, had turned their eyes towards the royalist party. Everything having changed with the accession of Bonaparte, these communications, which had well-nigh become dangerous, became, on the contrary, useful, and the parleys took a new direction. The royalist leaders, who drew to them the officers of the republican army, were drawn in their turn, by those same officers, towards the government of the Republic. It was pointed out to them how little chance there was of conquering the conqueror of Italy and Egypt, and what hopes they might indulge of obtaining from him a mild and reparative system, which would render the condition of all parties peaceable and agreeable. This language was not without success. At this moment there was at the head of the army of the West a discreet, conciliatory, and trusty officer, who had been much employed by General Hoche at the time of the first pacification of La Vendée: this was General Hédouville. He made himself master of all that was going forward, and offered to communicate his information to the new Consul.

The latter at once availed himself of it, and ordered General Hédouville to treat with the Vendean chiefs. These chiefs, intimidated by the presence of General Bonaparte in power, manifested a disposition to come to terms. There were difficulties in the way of signing a capitulation forthwith, and of agreeing upon the articles of that capitulation; but a sus-

pension of arms was not attended with the same difficulties. The chiefs offered to sign one immediately. The offer was accepted on behalf of the government, and, in a few days, Messrs. de Châtillon, d'Autichamp, and de Bourmont signed a suspension of arms for La Vendée and part of Bretagne. It was agreed that they should address themselves to Georges Cadoudal and to M. de Frotté, and propose to them to adopt the like course in the Morbihan and Normandy.

This act of the new government was not long in hand, for it was accomplished at the beginning of Frimaire, about twenty days after the installation of the Provisional Consuls. It afforded general satisfaction, and led to surmises that the pacification of La Vendée was nearer than it could possibly be.

Some rumours of the like kind respecting foreign powers likewise led people to hope, from the lucky star of General Bonaparte, for a speedy re-establishment of the peace of Europe.

As we have said at the beginning of this book, Prussia and Spain alone were at peace with France, the former always showing coldness, the latter always embarrassed by her community of interests with us. Russia, Austria, England, and all the lesser powers in their train, both in Italy and in Germany, kept up an obstinate conflict with the French Republic. England, with whom the war was a mere question of finance, had resolved this question for herself by establishing the income-tax, which already yielded an abundant revenue. She decided, therefore, to continue hostilities, that she might have time to take Malta, which she was then blockading, and reduce the French army in Egypt by blockading that country too. Austria, in possession of all Italy, was determined to risk everything rather than restore that conquest. But the chivalrous Paul I., who had rushed into the war from an inspiration of his wild enthusiasm, had just seen his arms humbled at Zurich, and had, on this account, conceived a keen resentment against everybody, but especially against Austria. He had been persuaded that the latter was the sole cause of this mischance; for her soldiers, bound, in terms of a concerted movement, to advance on the Rhine, and to relinquish Switzerland to the Russians, had, by quitting the position of Zurich too soon, left Korsakoff exposed alone to the attack of Masséna, who, having vanquished Korsakoff, had afterwards made short work of Suwarow. Paul I. considered this as the act of a bad ally, perhaps an act of treachery. Mistrust once excited, everything appeared to him in an unpleasant light. He had taken up arms, he said, only to protect the weak against the oppression of the strong, and to replace on their thrones the princes whom the French Republic had hurled from them. Now, Austria had everywhere hoisted her flag in Italy, and had not recalled to that country

any of the dethroned princes. He began to say to himself that, acting from pure generosity, he was the dupe of allies who acted solely from interest. Fickle to excess, he gave himself up to these new sentiments as violently as he had before abandoned himself to the contrary sentiments. One other circumstance had exasperated him in the highest degree; the Russian flag had been struck at Ancona, and the Austrian hoisted in its stead. This was but a wrong done by an inferior officer, but a wrong, of whatever kind it might be, that touched him to the quick.

The sentiments of absolute princes, in spite of their pretensions to secrecy, break forth as speedily as the sentiments of free nations: the former, in fact, will not be repressed any more than the latter. This new result of the battle of Zurich began to be known all over Europe, and this was not the less fortunate for us.

On this news, Austria and England redoubled their attentions to Paul I. Suwarow, the invincible Suwarow (as he was called before he encountered Masséna) had been loaded with distinctions of all sorts. But the chagrin of the Russian general was no more soothed than the resentment of the Czar. A quite new manifestation, on the part of Paul I., served more especially to excite apprehensions that he would soon abandon the coalition.

In the first heat of his zeal for the coalition, he had declared war against Spain, because she made common cause with France, and he had well-nigh issued a similar declaration against Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, because those powers determined to remain neuter. With Prussia his relations had entirely ceased. Since the late events, he appeared to be in much better humour with the courts against which he had before been so inimically disposed, and sent, in particular, to Berlin, a diplomatist who possessed his confidence, M. de Krudener, who was directed to proceed thither as a mere traveller, but with the secret commission to re-establish relations between the two courts of Prussia and Russia.

We had then at Berlin a prudent and able agent, M. Otto, whose name was afterwards associated with the most important events of that period. He had apprised the government of the new state of things. It was evident, in fact, that if we were inclined to peace rather than war, the key of the situation was in Berlin. Spain, thrown to the extremity of Europe by her geographical position, and of politics by the weakness of her government—Spain could be of no utility. But Prussia, placed in the midst of the belligerent powers, having remained neuter in spite of their strong solicitations, ill thought of at first by all the cabinets, in the first heat of the coalition; afterwards more

favourably judged, since they had grown more calm—Prussia became the centre of influence, especially since Russia appeared to court her. What had been called pusillanimity in her, now began to pass for wisdom. This court, if it were to take up energetically the part that seemed to be assigned to it by events, might serve for a link between France and Europe, might even impose its mediation, that method, so much employed since and with such profit, of interfering seasonably between weary adversaries, and of reaping all the fruits both of the war, which one has not waged, and of the peace which one has dictated. Had Prussia dared to do this, she would not have played a grander part since the days of the great Frederick.

At this period, there was on the throne of Prussia a young king, honest, full of good intentions, passionately fond of peace, and who never ceased to deplore the fault committed by his father, in throwing away, upon a mad war against the French Republic, the military glory and the treasure accumulated by the great Frederick. Now, replaced in pacific relations with the French Republic, he availed himself of them to retrieve by his economy the treasure left by his great-uncle, and wasted by his father. In his Council he had an able, intellectual minister, M. d'Haugwitz, gifted in the highest degree with the talent of eluding difficulties; a partisan, like his master, of a pacific policy, but more ambitious than he, and believing that from a well-directed neutrality more extensive aggrandisements might be derived for Prussia than from war itself. At that time, indeed, this might be true. He therefore urged his sovereign to assume actively the part of mediator and pacificator of the Continent. The part, no doubt, was a very great one for the young and timid Frederick William; but this prince was able to fill it to a greater or less extent, and to take upon himself a portion, if not the whole.

General Bonaparte, having perceived all this, immediately began diligently to caress the court of Prussia. It had at one time been very convenient for him to be a member of the Institute, that he might figure by that title only at certain solemnities, especially at the festival held on the 21st of January, at which he did not choose to appear in a political character; it was now convenient for him to be a general and to have aides-de-camp to send off whithersoever he thought fit. The idea occurred to him to follow the example of sovereigns who, on ascending the throne, despatch high dignitaries to announce their accession. He did, in fact, the same thing with less show, by sending to Berlin one of his aides-de-camp, which an entirely military head of a State might assuredly venture to do, without appearing to go beyond his part. Among those who served him in that capacity was one, prudent, discreet,

intelligent, combining highly polished manners with a pleasing person: this was Duroc, who had returned from Egypt with his general, and bore on his brow some reflection of the glory of the Pyramids. The new Consul ordered him to proceed forthwith to Berlin, to compliment the King and Queen of Prussia, to present himself there as charged with a mission of courtesy and respect; but to take advantage of any occasion that might offer, to explain the last revolution which had just been effected in France, to represent it as a return to order, to sound traditions, and, above all, to pacific sentiments.

Duroc was to flatter the young king, and to hint that the French government would be glad to make him, if he pleased, the arbiter of the future peace. The Republic, strengthened by the victories of the Texel and of Zurich, and by others, for which the name of General Bonaparte was a pledge in future, could, without fear for her dignity, present herself with the olive branch of peace in her hand.

While he was despatching Duroc to Berlin, General Bonaparte performed, in the name of the Provisional Consuls, several acts designed to produce a similar impression abroad. In the first place, after having for some time deferred the entry of M. de Talleyrand upon the ministry of foreign affairs, he at length called him to it. The post could not have been conferred on a personage more conciliatory, more fitted to treat with Europe, more capable of pleasing, nay, even flattering it, without lowering the French cabinet from its elevated position. We shall have other occasions for portraying this singular and remarkable character. Suffice it here to observe, that the choice of this personage clearly proved that, without passing from energy to weakness, the French government was abandoning the policy of passions for the policy of calculation. There was nothing, even to that exquisite elegance of manners peculiar to M. de Talleyrand, that was not an advantage for the new position which government sought to assume towards foreign powers.

General Bonaparte made some other diplomatic appointments, conceived in the same spirit. Though M. Otto, *chargé d'affaires* at Berlin, since M. Sieyès quitted that post, was an excellent agent, still he was but a mere *chargé d'affaires*. Another destination, in which he soon made himself very useful, was assigned to him, and the appointment of minister at Berlin was given to General Beurnonville, an old friend of Lafayette's, long the prisoner of Austria, and one of those members of the minority of the French noblesse, who had, in 1789, sincerely embraced the cause of the Revolution. General Beurnonville was a straightforward soldier; open, sincere, moderate in opinion, and perfectly qualified for a fit representative of the new government. Austria, whose prisoner he

had long been, inspired him with a hatred, which was a sort of passport in Berlin, where nearly the same sentiments prevailed in regard to that power as in the time of the great Frederick.

For our representative at Madrid we had one of the demagogues of former years, a man without any sort of influence, who has left no name in the diplomatic world, into which events had accidentally thrown him. He was superseded by a Constituent, a discreet, clever, well-informed man, who figured with honour in the diplomatic events of that time: this was M. Alquier. Lastly, in the place of a creature of the Directory's, named Grouvelle, M. Bourgoing was sent to Copenhagen, where the principles of maritime neutrality, so flagrantly violated by England, were likely to produce sentiments favourable to us. All these appointments were excellent, and well calculated to indicate the spirit of prudence and moderation, which began to prevail in the relations of France with foreign powers.

To the selection of these persons the Consuls were solicitous to add certain acts, which might serve for answer to a charge generally circulated in the courts of Europe, alleging that the French Republic was incessantly violating the law of nations, or the treaties concluded with her. Assuredly she had not violated the law of nations and treaties so much as Austria, England, and all the courts at war with us; but it was the practice to assert that it was impossible to have relations with an unstable, passionate government, represented by new men, who never considered themselves bound by their engagements, or by the traditions of European public law. This reproach might be flung back, with greater justice, upon the cabinets of Europe, who had done worse without having the excuse either of revolutionary passions or of continual changes of government. To convey a better idea of the policy of the Consuls, General Bonaparte performed an act of justice towards the unfortunate Knights of Malta, who, when possession was taken of the island, had been promised that such of them as belonged to the *French tongue* should not be treated in France as emigrants. Hitherto they had not been able to benefit by this condition of their capitulation, either in regard to their persons, or in regard to their possessions. General Bonaparte caused them to be put into the complete enjoyment of the advantage granted in that capitulation.

In respect to Denmark, he adopted a measure, excellent in its effect, and benevolently equitable. There were in the ports of France many Danish vessels, detained by the Directory, by way of reprisals in regard to neutrals. They were accused of neglecting to uphold the rights of maritime neutrality, of submitting to be searched by the English, and allowing French property, with which they were loaded, to be seized on board of

them. The Directory had declared that it would order them to be subjected to precisely the same acts of violence as they endured on the part of the English, to compel them to defend with more energy the principles of the law of nations, in virtue of which they navigated. This would certainly have been but justice, if, having the power to enforce respect, they had not chosen to employ it; but the unfortunate Danes did the best they could, and it was harsh to punish them for the violence of others by the violence of ourselves. In pursuance of this system, many of their merchantmen had been detained. General Bonaparte ordered them all to be released, in token of a more equitable and more moderate policy.

Duroc, who was sent to Berlin, speedily arrived there, and was presented by M. Otto, who was still in that capital. According to the strict rules of etiquette, Duroc, a mere aide-de-camp, could not be placed in direct communication with the court. All these rules were set aside for an officer attached to the person of General Bonaparte. He was received by the king, by the queen, and incessantly invited to Potsdam. Curiosity had as great a share as policy in these attentions; for glory, in addition to its lustre, has material advantages in public affairs. To see, to hear, the aide-de-camp, Duroc, was like approaching, though distantly, the extraordinary man whom the whole world was talking of. Duroc had borne a part in the battles of the Pyramids, Mount Tabor, and Aboukir. He was asked a thousand questions, and he answered them simply, truly, and without exaggeration. He appeared mild, polite, modest, deeply submissive to his general, and furnished a most advantageous idea of the kind of behaviour which that general imposed upon all about him. The success of Duroc in Berlin was complete. The queen manifested the greatest kindness for him, and in all quarters people began to talk of the French Republic in more favourable terms. Duroc found the young king highly pleased to see a strong and moderate government at length established in Paris, and, above all, flattered at being courted at one and the same time by Russia and France, earnestly desiring to play the part of mediator, but having more desire than ability; showing, nevertheless, great zeal and ardour for performing it.

The success of this mission engaged the courts of Europe, and re-echoed as far as Paris itself. The idea of a speedy peace soon began to gain ground. A very specious circumstance, but in itself of little consequence, contributed singularly to the propagation of this idea. The French and Austrian armies were in presence of each other along the Rhine, and on the crests of the Alps and the Apennines. On the Rhine they were stopped by an obstacle sufficient to prevent any serious operation; for the



passage of the Rhine by either was too great an enterprise to be undertaken, unless with the determination to open the campaign. It was now the month of Frimaire, that is, December; that was, therefore, not to be thought of. Skirmishes on the banks of the river became, under these circumstances, a useless effusion of blood. An armistice was agreed upon for this frontier. As for that of the Alps and the Apennines, the case was different. In that country, abounding in such diversity of situations, a well combined operation in this or that valley might procure an enviable position for the resumption of operations. The parties, therefore, would not tie their hands in that quarter, and no armistice took place there. But attention was paid only to that which had been just signed upon the Rhine; and among the happy changes which people pleased themselves with expecting from the new government, was classed the possibility, nay, the probability of a speedy peace.

In public evils there are always a real evil and an imaginary evil, the one contributing to render the other insupportable. It is a great point gained to do away with the imaginary evil; for you diminish the sense of the real evil and inspire him who has to endure it with the patience to await the cure, and above all a disposition to submit to the proposed remedy. Under the Directory people had made up their minds not to expect anything from a weak, disrespected government, which, in order to repress faction, proceeded to violence, without obtaining any of the effects of strength. Everything that it did was taken in bad part; people would not expect from it any good, neither would they even believe it, when, by accident, it accomplished some little. Victory, which had seemed to return to that government in the last days of its existence,—victory, which would have brought glory to others, had not even served to gain it honour.

The accession of General Bonaparte, of whom the public was in the habit of expecting everything, in point of success, had changed this disposition. The imaginary evil was cured; people had confidence; they took everything in good part. His acts were certainly good in themselves; for it was good to release the hostages, to liberate the priests, to manifest pacific dispositions to Europe; but above all the public was disposed to consider them as such. A symptom of approach such as the welcome given to an aide-de-camp, an armistice of no consequence, like that which had just been signed on the Rhine, were already regarded as pledges of peace. Such is the spell of confidence! It is everything for a government at its outset; and for that of the Consuls it was immense. Accordingly, money flowed into the treasury, from the treasury to the armies, which, content with these first supplies, waited with patience for those that were promised them by-and-by. Overawed by a

power reputed to be superior to all resistance, the parties submitted: the oppressing parties without claiming a right to oppress any more; the oppressed parties with the confidence that they should no longer be oppressed. The good accomplished, therefore, was no doubt great; but all that time had not yet permitted to be done was added by hope.

One thing was already circulated in all quarters, on the daily report of those who had transacted business with the young Consul; it was said that this soldier, above whom was placed no general of the present time, and scarcely any of past times, was, moreover, a consummate administrator, a profound politician. All the special men with whom he had surrounded himself, to whom he had listened with attention, whom he had even enlightened by the justness and the promptness of his views, whom he had besides protected against oppositions of every kind, had not left him without being subjugated, and filled with admiration. This they admitted the more cheerfully, since it had become all at once the fashion to think and to say so. Sometimes we do see false merit succeed for a season in captivating the popular mind, and commanding extravagant admiration; but sometimes also it happens that genuine merit, that genius itself, inspires this sort of caprice, which then becomes a passion. It was but a month since Bonaparte had seized the direction of affairs, and the impression already produced around him by his powerful mind was general and profound. The good-natured Roger-Ducos could talk of nothing else; the humorist Sieyès, little disposed to give way to mere fashion, especially when he was not the favourite of it, acknowledged the superiority, the universality of that genius for government, and paid the purest of homage by leaving it to act. The panegyrists from conviction were joined by those who praised from interest, and who, seeing in General Bonaparte the evident chief of the new Republic, set no bounds to the expression of their enthusiasm. General Bonaparte had among his admirers, and, by-the-by, very sincere ones, Messrs. de Talleyrand, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, Rœderer, Boulay (de la Meurthe), Defernon, Réal, Dufresne, &c., who everywhere repeated that never were seen such promptness, such decision, such a grasp of mind, or such prodigious activity; and it is very true that what he had already accomplished in one month in all the departments of the government was immense, and, what is rarely the case, that, in this instance, the reality equalled all the inventions of flattery.

In all quarters he was considered as the man to whom the new Constitution would attribute the greatest share of the executive power. People desired not a Cromwell; this must be admitted to the honour of the men of that day; and the friends of the general said aloud that the parts of Cæsar and Cromwell were

worn out, and unworthy of the genius and the virtues of the young saviour of France. What they wished was, that a sufficient concentration of the supreme authority in his hands, with certain guarantees for liberty, should allow him to govern the Republic prosperously and gloriously. Such was the wish of the moderate revolutionists, then the most numerous. The enthusiastic revolutionists, persisting in viewing the young general as a Cromwell or a Cæsar, desired, nevertheless, in order that they might secure their heads, or their national domains, that he should have time to keep off the Bourbons and the Austrians. The royalists begged him to save them from the revolutionists and to reconstitute the supreme power, with some vague hope that he would restore it to them after he had reconstituted it; and they were disposed, in that event, to pay him for the restitution, were it even with the dignity of constable of Louis XVIII., if it must be so.

Thus all awarded to him the supreme power, more or less completely, for a longer or shorter period, but with different views. The new legislator, Sieyès, had therefore to make a place for him in the new Constitution which he was preparing. But M. Sieyès was a dogmatic legislator, labouring for the nature of things, at least, so he conceived, and not for circumstances, still less for one man, whoever he might be. The reader may judge of this from what follows.

While his indefatigable colleague was governing, M. Sieyès had at length applied himself to the task that was assigned to him. To give a Constitution to France, not one of those ephemeral Constitutions, the ridiculous offspring of ignorance and the passions of parties, but a scientific Constitution, founded on the observation of societies and the lessons of experience, had been the day-dream of his life. In his solitary and morose meditations he was incessantly engaged upon it. He had pondered over it amidst the sincere but inconsiderate proceedings of the Constituent Assembly, amidst the gloomy frenzy of the Convention, amidst the weaknesses of the Directory. At each epoch he had remodelled his work; he had at length made up his mind, and, his mind once made up, he would not alter any part of his plan. He would not sacrifice a whit of it to the circumstances of the times, not even to the principal character of the day, to General Bonaparte, for whom, however, it was absolutely necessary to prepare a place adapted to the genius and the character of him who was to occupy it.

This singular legislator, always meditating, but seldom writing any more than acting, had never yet committed his Constitution to paper. It was in his head, from which it was now requisite that he should draw it forth. This was no easy matter for him, whatever desire he might feel to see it brought forward, and

converted into law. He was urgently pressed to make it known, and at length decided to communicate his ideas to one of his friends, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, who undertook to write it down from the conversations which they should have together. In this manner that remarkable conception was gradually collected with accuracy, and preserved for posterity, of which it is worthy.

M. Sieyès had made a powerful effort of mind to reconcile the Republic and the monarchy; he had borrowed freely from each such points as were useful and necessary; but, while borrowing from them, he had violently distrusted both. He had taken infinite precautions against the demagogue spirit, on the one hand, and against the royal power on the other. He had thus produced a scientific and complicated work, but in which everything was so nicely balanced that if it were a scientific and complicated work, compact enough as a whole, but which, if modified for and by General Bonaparte, or deprived of one of its counterpoises, might, contrary to the intention of its author, lead to nothing short of despotism.

The first care of M. Sieyès in his combinations had been to guard against demagogue passions. Without stripping the nation completely of that immense participation in public affairs, which it had enjoyed so unfortunately for itself, he wished to leave to it a power which it could not abuse. An expression, which for the first time, perhaps, was in every mouth, that of *representative government*, conveys an accurate idea of the feeling afloat at this period. It was understood by this expression that the nation was to take part in its government only by intermediate persons, that is to say, that it was to be *represented*; and, as we shall soon see, it was but very indirectly that it was intended to be so.

The elections under the Directory had brought in by turns the royalists at one period, the Jacobins at another, and it had been found expedient to exclude by violence the former on the 18th of Fructidor, the latter on the 22nd of Floréal. Thus the system of elections, and especially of direct elections, had become highly suspicious to everybody. Perhaps, if the government had ventured to reduce the total number of the electors to one hundred and fifty or two hundred thousand, it might have tried to brave once more the electoral agitations. But an electoral body, reduced to about the proportions of ours, would have given offence but not security to the public. Two hundred thousand electors granted to a nation, which had recently enjoyed universal suffrage, would have appeared an aristocracy; and at the same time electors, how small soever their number, choosing directly their representatives, with liberty to give way to all the passions of the moment, would have appeared a

renewal of the continual reactions which had been witnessed under the Directory. A direct but restricted mode of election, such as now exists among us, was, therefore, out of the question. M. Sieyès, with his habitual dogmatism, had made a maxim for himself. "Confidence," said he, "must come from below, and power from above." To realise this maxim, he had accordingly devised the system of national representation which we are about to describe.

Every person of the age of twenty-one years, having the quality of Frenchman, was to be obliged, if he wished to enjoy his rights, to get his name entered in a list called the Civic Register. This might give a total of five or six million citizens admitted to the exercise of their political rights. They were to meet by *arrondissements* (this circumscription, which did not then exist, was to be proposed), and to choose one-tenth of their number. This designation of one-tenth would produce a first list of five or six hundred thousand persons. These five or six hundred thousand persons, meeting, in their turn, by departments, and again choosing one-tenth from among themselves, were called to form a second list, comprehending fifty or sixty thousand citizens. These proceeded to a third selection, and reducing themselves again to one-tenth, formed the last list, which was limited to five or six thousand candidates. These three lists were called lists of notability.

The first, of five or six hundred thousand persons, was called the list of the communal notability; from it were to be taken the members of the municipal administrations, those of the councils of *arrondissement*, and other administrators on a par with them, such as the *maires*, the functionaries whom we now call sub-prefects, the judges of first instance, &c. The second list, of fifty or sixty thousand persons, was called the list of the departmental notability, and from this were to be chosen the members of the departmental councils, the functionaries since called prefects, the judges of appeal; in short, all the functionaries of that order. The last and third list, of five or six thousand persons, constituted the list of the national notability: and from this were to be taken, obligatorily, all the members of the Legislative Body, all the functionaries of the higher order, councillors of State, ministers, judges of the Court of Cassation, &c., &c. M. Sieyès, borrowing a figure from geometry, to afford an idea of this national representation—broad at the base, narrow at the top—called it a pyramid.

Thus we see that, without attributing to the nation the right of choosing itself the delegates charged to represent it, or the functionaries charged to govern it, M. Sieyès confined his ingenuity to the formation of a list of candidates, from which were to be selected both the representatives of the country

and the agents of the Executive. Every year the mass of the citizens were to assemble for the purpose of erasing from these lists those names that were not worthy to appear there, and to replace them by others. It is to be remarked that if, on the one hand, this power of designation was extremely indirect; on the other, it comprehended not only the members of the deliberative assemblies, but the executive functionaries themselves. This is less and more than what is usually to be found in the monarchical representative system. However, the agents called to perform functions purely special, and not implying any political confidence, such, for instance, as those belonging to the financial department, or agents called to perform functions so difficult that merit, when it is met with, ought to be taken wherever it may be found, such as generals and ambassadors—these agents were not to be chosen obligatorily from the lists of the notability.

We have shown how M. Sieyès, carrying out his maxim, made “confidence come from below:” let us now explain how he made “power descend from above.”

Under the influence of the impressions of the day, he dreaded election, because he had recently seen passionate electors choose representatives as passionate as they were themselves. He renounced it, therefore, and intended that, in these lists of notability formed by the public confidence, the legislative power, and the executive power, should be authorised to designate their own members, and thus constitute themselves. He imposed on them no other limit than that of selecting from the lists of notability. But, before we explain the mode of formation of the powers, we must describe their organisation.

The legislative power was to be organised as follows: firstly, the Legislative Body, properly so called, placed between two opposite bodies, the Tribune and the Council of State; secondly, apart and above, the Conservative Senate.

The Legislative Body was to be composed of three hundred members, who were to hear the laws discussed, not themselves to discuss them, and to vote silently. How, and between whom the discussion took place, is now to be shown.

A body of one hundred members, called the Tribune, charged to represent in this Constitution the liberal, innovating spirit of inquiry, received communication of the laws, discussed them in public, and voted, merely to decide whether it should advocate their adoption or rejection before the Legislative Body. It was then to appoint three of its members, to support before the Legislative Body the opinion which had prevailed in its own bosom.

A Council of State, the origin of that which now exists, but superior in importance and in attributions, was attached to the government, to draw up the proposed laws; it presented them

to the Legislative Body, and sent three of its members to discuss them in opposition to the orators of the Tribunate. Thus the Council of State pleading *for*, the Tribunate *against* (that is to say, if the latter had disapproved the law), the Legislative Body voted in silence the adoption or rejection. Its vote alone gave the character of law to the propositions of the government. The Council of State was moreover to complete the laws by appending the regulations necessary for their execution.

Lastly came the Senate. This body, composed of one hundred members, took no part in these legislative labours. It was charged, spontaneously, or on the denunciation of the Tribunate, to annul any law or any act of government which should appear to it to be tainted with *unconstitutionality*. For this reason it was called *Conservative Senate*. It was to be composed of men who had attained mature age, excluded, by the mere fact of their belonging to the Senate, from all active functions, being consequently confined exclusively to their part of conservators, and having a considerable interest in performing it well, for M. Sieyès intended that a handsome salary should be attached to it.

Such were the attributions of the deliberative powers. Here follows their mode of formation.

The Senate composed itself by electing its own members out of the list of the national notability. It nominated also the members of the Legislative Body, of the Tribunate, and of the Court of Cassation, choosing them by ballot out of that same list of the national notability.

The executive power was likewise the author of its own formation, by choosing all its agents out of whichever of the three lists of notability corresponded with the offices that were to be filled up. It took the ministers, the councillors of State, in short, the superior agents, from the list of the national notability. From the list of the departmental notability it took, in the first place, the councillors of department, who, like the councillors of State, were considered as purely administrative authorities; it also took from it the prefects and the functionaries of each department; and lastly, from the list of the communal notability, it selected the municipal councils, the maires, and all the functionaries of the like order.

Thus, as M. Sieyès designed, "confidence came from below, power came from above."

But as, above the legislative power there was a supreme creator, namely, the Senate, so there was required, above the executive power, a supreme creator, that should appoint the ministers, who were then to appoint the functionaries, down to the lowest step of the hierarchy. At the head of this executive power, then, there was to be a generative power. M. Sieyès had

given its possessor a name analogous to his function; he had called him the Grand Elector. This supreme magistrate was confined exclusively to one act: he was to choose two superior agents, the only ones of their rank and kind, called, the one Consul of peace, the other Consul of war. These then nominated the ministers, who, under their personal responsibility, selected all the agents of power from the lists of notability, governed, administered, in short, managed the affairs of the State.

A magnificent existence was destined for this Grand Elector. He was the generative principle of the government, and he was likewise the outward representative of it. That inaction to which M. Sieyès purposed to confine the Senators, to ensure their impartiality, and to which he had attached a yearly revenue of 100,000 livres in national domains—that inaction, imposed upon the Grand Elector from a similar motive, was to be accompanied with a much more splendid income than that of the Senators, for his vocation was to represent the entire Republic. M. Sieyès was for assigning him a salary of six millions (£240,000), magnificent residences, such as the Tuileries in Paris, and Versailles in the country, besides a guard of 3000 men. It was in his name that justice was to be administered, that the laws were to be promulgated, and the acts of government executed. It was to him that the foreign ministers were to be accredited, and with his signature that the treaties with foreign powers were to be provided. In short, he united with the important function of choosing the two active heads of the government the splendour, call it vain, if you please, of outward state: in him was to glitter all the luxury of a polished, elegant, and magnificent nation.

This Grand Elector himself must be supplied either by election or by hereditary succession. In the latter case, he would be a king, and monarchy would be re-established in France. But this M. Sieyès, whether he wished it or not, would not have ventured openly to propose. He therefore assigned to the most impartial of the bodies of the State, the Senate, the election of this supreme magistrate, who himself was placed so high solely that he might be as impartial as possible in his two selections.

A last formidable clause completed this complex machine.

The Senate, which had the power to annul any unconstitutional act, law, or measure of the government, was endowed moreover with the faculty of removing the Grand Elector from his functions by nominating him Senator against his will. This was what M. Sieyès called *absorbing*. The Senate might pursue the same course in regard to any citizen, whose importance or whose talents gave umbrage to the Republic. Thus there were given to the citizen doomed to compulsory inaction by *absorption* into the Senate,—there were given to him, by way of



indemnification, the importance, the well-paid idleness, of the members of a body which could not act of itself, but which could, by its *veto*, prevent all action whatsoever.

In this singular but profound conception, who can fail to discover an image, faint, indistinct, perhaps designed to be so, of representative monarchy? This Legislative Body, this Senate, this Grand Elector, were virtually a lower house, an upper house, a king, the whole resting upon a sort of universal suffrage, but with such precautions that democracy, aristocracy, royalty, admitted into this Constitution, were no sooner admitted than nullified by it. Those lists of notability, from which the deliberative bodies and the executive functionaries were alike to be selected, what were they but universal suffrage,—universal, but null? for they formed so vast a circle of candidateship, that the obligation to choose from this circle was an absolute power of election granted to the government and to the Senate. That mute Legislative Body, listening to the discussion of the law, but taking no part itself in that discussion, having at its side the Tribunate, and whose mission it was to oppose in debate the Council of State, was but a sort of House of Commons cut in two, one half having the right of voting, the other that of speaking, and both nullified by this very separation; for the first was liable to fall asleep in the silence, the second to exhaust itself in barren debates. That Senate, nominating itself and all the deliberative bodies, nominating the head of the executive power, and, if need were, absorbing him into its bosom; that Senate, possessing all this power, but deprived of active functions, taking no part in new laws, but merely authorised to annul any that were unconstitutional; that Senate, reduced to a sort of inaction, that it might be the more disinterested, and animated solely by the sentiment of conservation; that Senate was an ingenious but exaggerated imitation of a titled aristocracy, taking little part in the movement of affairs, sometimes checking it by its *veto*, and receiving into its bosom the men who, after a stormy career, gladly seek repose amidst a grave, influential, and honoured body. Lastly, that Grand Elector was nothing but royalty, confined to the nearly inactive yet important part of choosing the acting chiefs of the government; it was royalty, but with infinite precautions against its origin and its duration, for it issued from the urn of the Senate, and might, upon occasion, be flung back into it again. In short, that universal suffrage, that Legislative Body, that Tribunate, that Senate, that Grand Elector, thus constituted, weakened, neutralised, the one by the other, attested a prodigious effort of the human mind, in order to combine all the known forms of government in one Constitution, but for the purpose of afterwards annulling them by dint of precautions.

Representative monarchy, it must be confessed, has, with less trouble and effort, by trusting more to human nature, procured, for two centuries past, an animated but not subversive liberty, for one of the first nations of the world. Simple and natural in its means, the British Constitution admits of royalty, aristocracy, and democracy; then, after admitting them, it suffers them to act freely, imposing upon them no other condition but to govern by common consent. It does not limit the king to this or that act; it does not draw him forth by election, to plunge him back afterwards; it does not debar the peers from active functions; it does not deprive the elective assembly of speech; it does not grant universal suffrage, to render it null afterwards by rendering it indirect; it allows royalty and aristocracy to spring from their natural source, hereditary succession; it admits of a king, of hereditary peers, but, on the other hand, it leaves the nation to choose directly, according to its tastes or its passions of the day, an assembly which, empowered to grant or to refuse to royalty the means of governing, thus obliges it to take for directing chiefs of the government those men who have contrived to gain the public confidence. All that Sieyès, the legislator, was in search of, was here accomplished almost infallibly. Royalty, aristocracy, act no more than he wished; they merely moderate too rapid an impulsion: the elective chamber, full of the passions of the country, but checked by two other powers, chooses, in fact, the real leaders of the State, raises them to the government, upholds them in it, or overthrows them, if they have ceased to correspond with its sentiments. Here is a simple, a true constitution, because it is the production of nature and of time, and not, like that of M. Sieyès, the scientific but artificial work of a mind disgusted with monarchy by the reign of the last Bourbons, and filled with dread of a republic by ten years of storms.

Now, let us suppose the times more calm; let us suppose this Constitution of M. Sieyès put peaceably in practice, at a period when the need of a powerful hand, like that of General Bonaparte, would not have over-ruled all other considerations; let us suppose that vast notability established, that Senate freely drawing from its own bosom the bodies of the State, and the head of the government, what would have happened? Ere long the nation would have ceased to take any interest in the renewal of the lists, which would be but an impotent medium for expressing its sentiments; these lists would have become almost permanent; the Senate would have selected from them, at its pleasure, the bodies of the State and the Grand Elector; and, nominating the head of the executive power, having authority to remove him at any moment, holding him in absolute dependence, it would have been nearly everything; it would have been—

what?—the Venetian aristocracy, with its golden book, with its pompous and impotent doge, charged every year to marry the Adriatic Sea—a curious spectacle, and worthy of contemplation! M. Sieyès, a man of profound and elevated mind, sincerely attached to the liberty of his country, had, in ten years, run round that circle of agitations, terrors, and disgusts, which had led most of the republics of the middle ages, and the most celebrated of them, that of Venice, to the golden book and a nominal chief. He had arrived at last at the Venetian aristocracy, constituted for the benefit of the men of the Revolution, since it attributed, for ten years, to those who had exercised functions since 1789, the privilege of figuring by right in the lists of notability; and he purposed, moreover, to reserve for himself and for three or four principal personages of the day the faculty of composing, for the first time, all the bodies of the State.

But aristocracy is not to be created off-hand; despotism alone is. That harassed society could not find repose but in the arms of a powerful chief. In this extraordinary Constitution everything was admired, everything admitted, everything excepting the Grand Elector, with his magnificent income, and apparently nothing to do. In his stead was substituted an energetic and active chief, General Bonaparte; and, by the change of a single spring, this Constitution was destined, without any participation of its author, to lead to the imperial despotism, which, with a Conservative Senate, with a mute Legislative Body, we have seen governing France for fifteen years, in a glorious but arbitrary manner.

When M. Sieyès had, with great effort, contrived to draw forth all these combinations from the recesses of his mind, where they had long been, as it were, buried, he laid them before his friend, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, who committed them to paper, and before various members of the two legislative commissions, by whom they were communicated to those around them. The two legislative commissions had divided into sections, and in each of the two was a section of the Constitution. To these two united sections M. Sieyès, when he could make himself master of his ideas, explained his system. That system struck and astonished every one by the novelty, the singularity, and the infinite art of the combinations.

In the first place, the interests of the auditors of M. Sieyès were not overlooked; for he had, as we have observed, adopted a transitory disposition, which was absolutely necessary. With a view to save the Revolution, by keeping in power the men who had been actors in it, he proposed a resolution nearly resembling that by which the Convention had perpetuated itself in the two Councils of the Ancients and the Five Hundred. He proposed that all the men who, since 1789, had exercised

public functions, who had been members of the different assemblies, legislative, departmental, or municipal, should have a right to be entered in the lists of notability, and that these lists should not be made up afresh for ten years. Moreover, Messrs. Sieyès, Roger-Ducos, and General Bonaparte were to appoint, for the first time, the members of the bodies of the State, in virtue of the right which they attributed to themselves of framing the new Constitution. This disposition was bold, but indispensable; for, it is to be observed, that all the new men who came in by means of the elections, animated with a spirit of reaction then general, indulging, moreover, the ordinary propensity to censure what one has not done, openly expressed a detestation of the acts and the men of the Revolution, even when they held its principles. M. Sieyès had, therefore, taken his precautions against the necessity for a new 18th of Fructidor, by ensuring for ten years the putting in practice his Constitution by hands of which he was sure. The ideas of M. Sieyès were suited to all interests. Every one already thought that he was certain of being a senator, legislator, councillor of State, or tribune; and to these charges liberal salaries were attached.

But, setting interest aside, the combinations seemed equally new and skilful. Men are easily filled with enthusiasm for military genius; but they as readily conceive an enthusiasm for what has the appearance of depth of mind. Sieyès the legislator had his enthusiasts, as well as General Bonaparte had his. The lists of notability appeared the happiest of combinations, especially in the state of discredit into which the elective system had fallen, since the elections which returned the *Clichyens*, excluded by the revolution of Fructidor, and the Jacobins, excluded by means of the *scissions*. The idea of a Council of State and a Tribunate maintaining opposite sides of each question, before a mute Legislative Body, pleased persons weary of discussions, and urgently demanding repose. The Senate, placed so high, and moreover so useful for preserving harmony, had the power to get rid of eminent and dangerous citizens by ostracism: all this found numerous admirers.

The Grand Elector alone appeared a singularity to men who, having not yet reflected much on the English Constitution, did not comprehend a magistracy, limited to the sole duty of choosing the superior agents of the government. They thought that there was too little power for a king, and too much state and pomp for the mere president of a republic. In short, everybody agreed that the place was not adapted to him who was to fill it, namely, General Bonaparte. This place had too much shadow, and too little real power; too much shadow, because it was necessary to avoid alarming the public, by making the return to monarchy too manifest; too little real power, because an

almost unlimited authority was needed by the man who was charged to reorganise France. Certain minds, incapable of comprehending the disinterestedness of a profound thinker, who had studied only to make his conceptions harmonise together, and not to combine the springs of his Constitution in a personal interest, these persons affirmed that the Grand Elector could not have been invented for so active a character as General Bonaparte; that, of course, M. Sieyès could have devised it only for himself; that he reserved for himself this place, and destined that of Consul of war for his young colleague. This was a paltry and malicious conjecture. With great power of thought, M. Sieyès combined remarkable shrewdness of observation, and he had too just a conception of his own personal position, and that of the conqueror of Italy, to imagine that he himself could be that kind of elective king, and General Bonaparte merely his minister. In this he had obeyed solely the spirit of system. Other interpreters, less malevolent, believed, in their turn, that M. Sieyès did actually destine the post of Grand Elector for General Bonaparte, but with a view to tie his hands, and, above all, to cause him to be speedily *absorbed* by the Conservative Senate. The friends of liberty were not displeased with him for it. The partisans of General Bonaparte could not speak of this device of the Grand Elector without inveighing against it; and among them Lucien Bonaparte, who alternately crossed or served the head of his family, but always capriciously, without consistency or discretion; sometimes acting the part of a brother, passionately promoting the greatness of his brother; at others, the citizen hostile to despotism, Lucien Bonaparte declaimed with violence against the plan of M. Sieyès. He loudly declared that they needed a president of the Republic, a Council of State, and very little more; that the country was tired of babblers, and wanted only men of action. These inconsiderate speeches were of a nature to produce the most mischievous effect; but, fortunately, no great importance was attached to the words of Lucien.

Amidst his incessant occupations, General Bonaparte had heard the rumours circulated around him respecting the plan of M. Sieyès. He left his colleague to proceed, in accordance with a sort of division of attributions agreed upon between them; and he declined meddling with the Constitution till the time should arrive for digesting it definitively, promising himself, no doubt, to accommodate to his liking the place that was destined for him. The reports, however, which reached him from all quarters, at last irritated him, and he expressed his displeasure with his usual warmth of language—a warmth which was to be regretted, and which he was not always master of.

The disapprobation which he expressed respecting some of the ideas of the plan of the Constitution reached the author.

M. Sieyès was deeply pained by it. He was, in fact, afraid that, having lost, from the ignorance and violence of preceding times, the opportunity of becoming the legislator of France, he should lose it once more through the despotic humour of the colleague he had given himself in effecting the 18th of Brumaire. Though a stranger to intrigue, and destitute of activity, he bestirred himself more than ever to gain, one by one, the members of the two legislative sections.

Meanwhile, his friend, M. Boulay de la Meurthe, and two intimate friends of General Bonaparte's, Messrs. Rœderer and de Talleyrand, anxious to preserve harmony between two so important personages, actively exerted themselves to reconcile them. M. Boulay de la Meurthe had accepted the commission to transcribe the ideas of M. Sieyès, and had thus become the confidant of his plan. M. Rœderer was an old Constituent, a clever man, a genuine politician after the fashion of the eighteenth century, very fond of reasoning about the origin and organisation of societies, and framing plans of constitutions, adding to this very decided monarchical predilections. M. de Talleyrand, capable of comprehending and appreciating minds, even the most contrary to his own, was alike touched by the acting genius of young Bonaparte, and the speculative genius of Sieyès, the philosopher; he had a bias for both. He thought, besides, that these two men had need of one another, and earnestly strove to promote the success of the affairs of the new government. Messrs. Boulay de la Meurthe, Rœderer, and de Talleyrand, therefore, exerted themselves to reconcile the general and the legislator. An interview was prepared; it was to take place at General Bonaparte's, in presence of Messrs. Rœderer and de Talleyrand. It contributed but very little to mend the matter. General Bonaparte was under the impression of the reports made to him concerning the Grand Elector, inactive, and liable to be absorbed by the Senate; M. Sieyès was soured by the condemnatory expressions which were attributed to the general, and which had been, no doubt, exaggerated. They met in the worst humour, did nothing but disagree, and used the bitterest language to one another. M. Sieyès, who needed composure for explaining his ideas, did not develop them, on this occasion, with sufficient clearness and coherence. General Bonaparte, on his part, was abrupt and impatient. They inveighed against each other, and parted almost at enmity.

The mediators, in alarm, renewed their efforts to repair the ill effect of this interview. They told M. Sieyès that he ought to discuss with patience, to take pains to convince the general, and, above all, to concede some points; they said to the general that, in this case, more forbearance than he exercised was required; that, without the support of M. Sieyès, and his

authority over the Council of the Ancients, General Bonaparte would never have been able to obtain, on the 18th of Brumaire, the decree which had put power into his hand: that M. Sieyès, as a political personage, had immense influence with the public; and that, in case of a conflict between the legislator and the general, many would declare in favour of the legislator, as the representative of the Revolution and of liberty, oppressed by a soldier. The first moment was not favourable for attempting a reconciliation; it was necessary to wait a while. Messrs. Boulay de la Meurthe and Rœderer devised fresh models of executive power, which should remove the two difficulties on which General Bonaparte appeared inflexible—the inaction of the Grand Elector, and the threat of ostracism suspended over his head. They first thought of a Consul with two colleagues to assist him; then of a Grand Elector, as M. Sieyès had projected, who should nominate the two Consuls of peace and of war, but also attend their deliberations, and decide between them. This was not enough to satisfy General Bonaparte, and it was a great deal too much for M. Sieyès, whose plan was thus overthrown. Whenever it was proposed to M. Sieyès to make the head of the executive power participate in the government, “It is a bit of the ancient monarchy,” he would say, “that you want to give me. I won’t have it.” In fact, he would hear nothing but the royalty of England, minus the title of king, irremovability, and hereditary succession. This was still very far from the mark, and M. Sieyès, with that promptness of discouragement incident to speculative minds, when they find obstacles thrown in their way by the nature of things, M. Sieyès said that he would have nothing further to do with the matter: that he would quit Paris, retire to the country, and leave young Bonaparte alone, with his nascent despotism revealed to every eye. “He means to go?” said the general; “let him. I will get a Constitution drawn up by Rœderer, propose it to the two legislative sections, and satisfy public opinion, which requires the affair to be settled.” He deceived himself when he talked in that manner, for it was still too early to show France his sword quite unsheathed: he would have met with unexpected resistance in more quarters than one.

Nevertheless, these two men, who, in spite of their instinctive dislike, had managed to agree for a moment to consummate the 18th of Brumaire, were destined to come to an understanding once more to make a Constitution. The reports which were circulated had roused the legislative commissions: they knew what language Lucien Bonaparte held; how decided a tone the general took upon the subject; what a disposition to relinquish everything was manifested by M. Sieyès. They said to themselves, and very justly, that, after all, it was on them the

task of framing a Constitution properly devolved; that they ought to do their duty, draw up a plan, present it to the Consuls, and force them to agree, after effecting a reasonable compromise between them.

They accordingly fell to work; and, as the ideas of M. Sieyès had been communicated to some of the members of the commission, and had been approved by these, they adopted his plan as the basis of theirs. To a systematic mind, the adoption of all its ideas save one causes it almost as much vexation as the rejection of the whole. To take the plan of M. Sieyès for the basis of the new Constitution, was, nevertheless, an important concession. He began, at length, to grow somewhat calmer; and General Bonaparte, seeing the commissions apply themselves to their task, and prosecute it resolutely, became himself a great deal milder. This moment was seized for a new attempt at reconciliation. A second interview took place between M. Sieyès and the general, at which Messrs. Boulay de la Meurthe, Rœderer, and de Talleyrand were present. This time the two principal interlocutors were more calm, and more disposed to agree. Instead of jostling one another as before, by dwelling, in preference, on the points upon which they disagreed, they strove, on the contrary, to arrive at a better understanding, by introducing those topics only upon which their opinions chimed. M. Sieyès was moderate and full of tact; the general displayed his usual good sense and originality of mind. The subject of their conversation was the state of France, the vices of the preceding Constitutions, and the precautions to be taken in a new Constitution to prevent the past disorders. On all this they could not fail to agree. They separated, therefore, pleased with one another; and they promised, as soon as the sections had finished their work, to call them together for the purpose of adopting or modifying their propositions, and, at length, relinquishing the provisional system, which began to displease everybody. M. Sieyès had thenceforward the certainty that, excepting his Grand Elector, and some attributions of the Conservative Senate, he should carry the adoption of his entire Constitution.

In the first ten days of Frimaire (from the 20th of November to the 1st of December) the sections had completed their plan. General Bonaparte summoned them to his residence, to meetings at which the Consuls were to be present. Some members of the sections thought this convocation not very consistent with their dignity; and yet, having made up their minds to pass over many difficulties, to concede much to the man who was so necessary, they complied with the summons.

The sittings commenced immediately. At the first, M. Sieyès was charged to communicate his plan, since that plan was the very foundation of the work of the commissions. This he did



with a force of thought and language which produced the strongest impression on his hearers. "All this is fine and profound," said the general; "yet there are several points which deserve serious discussion. But let us proceed regularly; let us consider consecutively the different parts of the plan, and choose a secretary. Citizen Daunou, take the pen." Thus it was that M. Daunou became the compiler of the new Constitution. This labour occupied several sittings, and the following resolutions were agreed upon.

The lists of the communal, departmental, and national notability were successively adopted. They were too well calculated to neutralise the popular action, by rendering it indirect, not to suit the apprehensions of the moment, and the notions of General Bonaparte. Two accessory provisions, the one conformable, the other contrary, to the ideas of M. Sieyès, were adopted. It was decided that the functionaries of every kind should not be obligatorily chosen from the lists of notability, unless when the Constitution should have designated them by name. No objection, indeed, was made to the selection of the members of the deliberative bodies, the consuls, the ministers, the judges, the administrators, from these lists; but generals, ambassadors! that appeared exorbitant. The second decision was relative, not to the groundwork of the plan, but to the necessity of adapting it to the then state of things. Instead of putting off the reformation of the lists for ten years, it was deferred to the year IX., that is to say, for one year; and it was agreed that all the members of the great bodies of the State should be nominated immediately by an act of the constituent power, and that the persons so nominated should be entered as of right in the first lists. The revision, instead of being annual, was to be triennial.

They next proceeded to the organisation of the great powers. The maxim of M. Sieyès, "confidence ought to come from below, power ought to come from above," entirely prevailed. The right of electing was placed above; but with the obligation to choose out of the lists of notability. The Senate of M. Sieyès was adopted, as well as the Legislative Body, placed between the Council of State and the Tribunate. The Senate was to choose from the lists of notability, in the first place the Senators themselves, then the members of the Legislative Body, of the Tribunate, of the Court of Cassation, of the Commission of Accountability (since Court of Accounts), and, lastly, the chief or chiefs of the executive power. However, the Senate—and this was a considerable limitation of its attributions—was to nominate the Senators only upon the presentation of three candidates, one proposed by the Consuls, another by the Legislative Body, and the third by the Tribunate. As for the

Council of State, this body, forming part of the executive power, was to be nominated by that power. Besides the faculty of making the most important nominations, the Senate received the supreme attribution of repealing laws or acts of the government tainted with unconstitutionality. For the rest, it was not to have any part in the making of the laws; and its members could not exercise active functions.

The Legislative Body, mute, agreeably to the plan of M. Sieyès, was to listen to the contradictory arguments of three councillors of State and three tribunes, and then to vote, without discussion, on the propositions of the government.

The Tribunate alone had the faculty of publicly discussing the laws; but it was to vote merely for the purpose of deciding what opinion it should support before the Legislative Body. Its vote, even negative, did not prevent the law from being law, if the Legislative Body had adopted it. The Tribunate had not the initiative of legal propositions; but it could express its wishes; it received petitions, and transmitted them to the different authorities whom they concerned.

The Senate was to consist of 80 members instead of 100, as M. Sieyès at first desired: 60 to be nominated immediately, 20 in the course of the ensuing ten years. The Legislative Body was to be composed of 300 members, the Tribunate of 100. The Senators were to enjoy a salary of 25,000 francs per annum; the legislators 10,000; the tribunes 15,000. So far the plan of M. Sieyès was adopted entire, excepting some limitations in the authority of the Senate. But this plan was destined to undergo considerable modification in the organisation of the executive power.

This was the capital point, and on this General Bonaparte was inflexible. M. Sieyès, already resigned to the rejection of this part of his plan, was nevertheless invited to explain his ideas. Accordingly, he proposed the institution of the Grand Elector before the assembled commissions. No one, it must be admitted, not even General Bonaparte, had then reflected sufficiently on the organisation of the powers in a free government, to comprehend the profundity of that conception, and to discover the analogy which it presented with the king of the English monarchy. But General Bonaparte, had he turned his mind to the consideration of the question in this point of view, would not have assented to it on any account, from motives purely personal, and which it is easy to comprehend. He criticised with sarcastic humour this Grand Elector. Concerning his splendid idleness he said what all kings say, only with less wit than he, and less foundation; for, in presence of a subverted society to reorganise, of sanguinary factions to quell, of the world to conquer, it was excusable to wish to

reserve for himself the full and free employment of his genius. But if, in these first days of the Consulate, when there were so many things to be done, he was perhaps right in not suffering his talents to be fettered; afterwards, sublime victim of misfortune at St. Helena, he must have regretted the liberty that was given him to exercise them without restraint. Cramped in the employment of his faculties, undoubtedly he would not have achieved such mighty things, but he would not have attempted such extravagant things; and his sceptre and his sword would probably have remained till his death in his glorious hands.

“Your Grand Elector,” said he to M. Sieyès, “is a do-nothing king, and the time of do-nothing kings is gone by. What man of head and heart would submit to such a sluggish life, at the price of six millions and an abode in the Tuileries? What! nominate persons who act and not act oneself! it is inadmissible. And, then, you think by this device to prevent your Grand Elector from intermeddling in the government. Were I this Grand Elector, I would nevertheless engage to do all that you wished me not to do. I would say to the two Consuls of peace and war, ‘If you do not choose such a person, or if you do not take such a measure, I will turn you out.’ And I would soon oblige them to act as I pleased. I would make myself master again in a roundabout way.”

Here General Bonaparte himself, with his usual sagacity, penetrated the truth, and discovered that this inaction of the Grand Elector was not a state of nullity; for this supreme magistrate had, at certain moments, the means of reappearing omnipotent in the arena where the parties were disputing for power, by coming to withdraw it from the one for the purpose of conferring it on the other. But this superintendence of English royalty over the government could not suit that ardent young man; and he must be pardoned for it, for this was neither the place nor the time for constitutional royalty.

The Grand Elector perished under the sarcasms of the young general, and under a power much greater than that of sarcasms, the power of present necessity. At that time, a real dictatorship was, in fact, required, and the authority attributed to the Grand Elector was far from adequate to the wants of the moment.

There was another part of the institution proposed by M. Sieyès which General Bonaparte as decidedly rejected, because he could not help regarding it as a snare: this was the faculty of absorption assigned to the Senate, not only in regard to the Grand Elector, but to every eminent citizen whose greatness might give umbrage.

The general would not consent that, after several years' eminent services, any one should have the power to bury him alive

in the bosom of the Senate, and to reduce him to forced idleness, for a pension of 25,000 francs. He obtained satisfaction on this new point: and the executive power was definitively organised in the following manner.

It was agreed to institute a First Consul, accompanied by two others, to disguise in some measure the omnipotence of the former. This First Consul had the direct and sole nomination of the members of the general administration of the Republic, of the members of the departmental and municipal Councils, of the administrators since called prefects and sub-prefects, of the municipal agents, &c. He had the nomination of all military and naval officers, of the councillors of State, of the ministers sent to foreign powers, of the civil and criminal judges, excepting the *juges de paix* and the members of the Court of Cassation. He could not depose the judges when once appointed: irremovability was therefore substituted to election, as a guarantee of independence.

Besides the nomination of the administrative officers, military and judicial, the First Consul had the entire government, the direction of war and diplomacy; he signed treaties, without prejudice to their discussion and adoption by the Legislative Body, in the same form as laws. In these various functions he was to be assisted by the two other Consuls, who had merely a consultative voice, but who could record their opinion in a register of deliberations kept for that purpose. Evidently, those two Consuls were placed there to mask the immense authority assigned to General Bonaparte—an authority, the duration of which was pretty long, and might even become perpetual; for the three Consuls were elected for ten years, and, moreover, indefinitely re-eligible. A vestige of the *absorption* devised by M. Sieyès was retained. The First Consul, on quitting office, by resignation or otherwise, became a Senator in full right, that is to say, was thenceforward excluded from public functions. The two other Consuls, not having exercised the plenitude of power, were at liberty to refuse this well-endowed but nullifying appointment, and were not to become Senators unless they consented to be so.

The First Consul was to have an annual allowance of 500,000 francs (£20,000 sterling), and each of the others of 150,000 francs (£6000 sterling). All three were to reside in the Tuileries. A consular guard was to attend them.

Such were the principal provisions of the famous Constitution of the year VIII. Thus M. Sieyès saw the attributions of the Senate curtailed, and an all-powerful chief substituted for his inactive Grand Elector; which caused his Constitution to lead, a few years later, not to aristocracy but to despotism.

This Constitution comprehended no declaration of rights,

but, by means of some general provisions, it guaranteed individual liberty, the inviolability of the citizen's dwelling, the responsibility of ministers, and that of the inferior agents, without prejudice, in the case of the latter, to the previous approbation of prosecution by the Council of State. It stipulated that a law might, in certain departments, and in certain extraordinary cases, suspend the action of the Constitution, which was equivalent to what we have since called putting in a state of siege. It ensured pensions to the widows and children of soldiers, and lastly, by a sort of reversion to ideas long proscribed, it laid down as a principle that national rewards might be granted to men who should have rendered eminent services. This was the germ of an institution since celebrated: that of the Legion of Honour.

The plan of M. Sieyès contained two forcible and admirable ideas, both of which have been retained in our administrative organisation; the division of the country into *arrondissements* and the Council of State.

Thus M. Sieyès was the author of all the administrative circumscriptions of France. He had already conceived the division into departments and induced its adoption; he wished on this occasion that the cantonal administrations, which existed to the number of five thousand, should be superseded by administrations of *arrondissement*, which, much less numerous, were a more convenient intermediate between the commune and the department. The principle only was laid down in the Constitution; but it was agreed that a law should ere long reform, upon this principle, the administrative system in France, and put an end to the communal anarchy, a melancholy picture of which has been given above. There was to be a tribunal of first instance for each *arrondissement*, and a tribunal of appeal for several united departments.

The second of the creations of M. Sieyès, which belongs exclusively to himself, is the Council of State, a deliberative body attached to the executive power, preparing the laws, supporting them before the legislative power, adding to them the regulations which ought to accompany the laws, and rendering the laws administrative. This is the most practical of his conceptions, and, with the preceding, it must outlive the present and subsist in future times. To the honour of this legislator be it said, Time has swept away all the ephemeral Constitutions of the Revolution, but the only parts of these Constitutions which have survived have been his work.

It was not enough to settle the dispositions of the new Constitution; it was indispensable to add to it the *personnel* of the powers, to seek it in the men of the Revolution, and even to designate it in the constitutional act. It was requisite, therefore,

after determining all the dispositions that have just been enumerated, to direct attention to the choice of the persons.

General Bonaparte was nominated First Consul for ten years. It cannot be said that he was chosen, so strongly was he indicated by the situation: he was accepted from the hands of victory and necessity. His position once fixed, the next point was to find one for M. Sieyès. This great personage had little turn for business, and still less for secondary parts. It did not suit him to be the assistant of young Bonaparte, and he refused, in consequence, to be second Consul. We shall see presently what place more conformable to his character was assigned to him. For second Consul was chosen M. Cambacères, an eminent lawyer, who had acquired high importance among the political characters of the time by great knowledge, prudence, and tact. He was at this period minister of justice. M. Lebrun, a distinguished writer, who had drawn up the Maupeou edicts, classed, under the old government, among the men disposed to wise reforms, ever faithful to the cause of moderate Revolution, well versed in financial matters, and too mild to be a troublesome contradictor, M. Lebrun was selected for third Consul. M. Cambacères could ably second General Bonaparte in the administration of justice; M. Lebrun could be a useful assistant to him in the administration of the finances; and both could aid him essentially without crossing him in any way. It was impossible to associate more suitably the men destined to compose the new government; and from these appointments were to flow all the others in the organisation of the executive power.

It was necessary to proceed to the composition of the deliberative bodies. There the natural part for M. Sieyès was pointed out of itself. It had been written in the Constitution that the Senate should elect the members of all the deliberative bodies. The point was to decide who should compose the Senate for the first time. It was decreed by a special article of the Constitution that Messrs. Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, who were about to cease to be Consuls, conjointly with Messrs. Cambacères and Lebrun, who were on the point of becoming so, should nominate the absolute majority of the Senate, that is, 31 members out of 60. The 31 Senators elected in this manner were then to elect by ballot the 29 who were deficient. The Senate, as soon as it was complete, was to compose the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, and the Court of Cassation.

By means of these different combinations, General Bonaparte found himself at the head of the executive power, but, at the same time, a sort of delicacy was observed in excluding him from the composition of the deliberative bodies called to control his acts; this duty was left principally to M. Sieyès, whose

active part would then be finished, and to him the presidency of the Senate was ensured, as a retirement. The positions were thus suitably settled and appearances saved.

It was decided that the Constitution should be submitted to the national opinion, by means of registers opened at the *mairies*, and at the offices of the justices of peace, notaries, and clerks of the tribunals, and that, till its acceptance, of which no doubt appeared to be entertained, the First Consul, the retiring Consuls, and the two Consuls elect, should proceed to make those appointments with which they were charged, so that, on the 1st of Nivôse, the great powers of the State might be constituted, and ready to put in practice the new Constitution. It was indispensable to put an end to that dictatorship of the Provisional Consuls, which began to produce a gloom in some minds, and to satisfy the general impatience that was felt to see at last a definitive government established. Everybody, in fact, longed for a stable and just government, which should ensure the strength and unity of power, without stifling all liberty; under which honest and capable men, of all ranks and of all parties, should find the place that was due to them. These wishes, it must be admitted, it was not impossible to satisfy under the Constitution of the year VIII.; it would even have satisfied them completely, but for those violences to which it was subjected at a later period by an extraordinary genius, which, however, favoured as it was by circumstances, would have overthrown much stronger barriers than those that the legislative work of M. Sieyès, or any other which it was then possible to devise, could have opposed to it.

The Constitution, decreed in the night between the 12th and the 13th of December (21st and 22nd Frimaire), was promulgated on the 15th of December 1799, to the great satisfaction of its authors, and of the public itself.

It charmed the minds of all by the novelty of the ideas, by the skill of the contrivances. Everybody began to feel confidence in it, and in the men who were about to carry it into execution.

It was preceded by the following preamble:—

“CITIZENS!

“The Constitution, now promulgated, puts an end to the uncertainty caused by the Provisional Government in the external relations, and in the internal and military situation of the Republic.

“It places in the institutions which it establishes the first magistrates, whose devotedness has appeared necessary to its activity.

“The Constitution is founded on the true principles of

representative government, on the sacred rights of property, of equality, and of liberty.

“The powers which it institutes will be strong and stable, as they must be, in order to guarantee the rights of the citizens and the interests of the State.

“Citizens! The Revolution is confined to the principles which commenced it: IT IS FINISHED.”

Two such men as General Bonaparte and M. Sieyès proclaiming in 1800, “The Revolution is finished!” What a singular proof of the illusions of the human mind! Still it must be admitted that something was finished—that was anarchy.

Great was the joy of all those, who had had a hand in this work, to see it finished. Some of the ideas of M. Sieyès had been rejected; nearly his whole Constitution was nevertheless adopted, and, without an absolute power, like that of Solon, Lycurgus, or Mahomet, a power which, in our times of doubt, no man can obtain, it was scarcely possible to infuse a larger portion of his conception into the Constitution of a great people. And, such as it was, if the conqueror of Marengo had not afterwards made two considerable changes in it—the addition of the imperial succession, and the retrenchment of the Tribunate—this Constitution might have furnished a career which would not have been the triumph of absolute power.

M. Sieyès, having put the sword which had served to overthrow the Directory into the hand of General Bonaparte, having framed a Constitution, was about to consign France to the devouring activity of the young Consul, and to retire, for his own part, into that meditative idleness, which he preferred to the stirring bustle of business. The new First Consul was desirous to give to the legislator of France a testimonial of national gratitude: at his instigation, the gift of the estate of Crosne was proposed to the legislative commissions. This gift was decreed, and announced to M. Sieyès with the noblest expressions of public gratitude. M. Sieyès was highly gratified; for, notwithstanding an incontestable probity, he had a relish for the indulgences of fortune, and he could not but be touched also by the dignified and delicate manner in which this national recompense was bestowed on him.

Preparations were then made for putting the Constitution in force in the first days of January 1800 (Nivôse, year VIII.), that is, in the first days of the year which was about to close that extraordinary century.



## BOOK II.

### INTERNAL GOVERNMENT.

THE 4th Nivôse of the year VIII. (25th of December 1799) was the day appointed for the entry of the Consuls on their functions, and the first sitting of the Conservative Senate. Numerous appointments were necessarily made prior to that date, it being requisite to organise both the Executive Power and the Senate before they could proceed to business.

General Bonaparte, upon whom it devolved to appoint the agents of the Executive Power, as well as Messrs. Sieyès, Roger-Ducos, Cambacérès, and Lebrun, who were entrusted with the selection of the members of the Senate (who again, in their turn, had to choose the members of the Legislative Body and the Tribunate), were beset by solicitations from every quarter. The applicants sought to be appointed either Senators or members of the Legislative Body, Tribunes, Councillors of State, or Prefects; and really these important posts, all conferring handsome emoluments, and all to be filled up at once, were calculated to tempt the ambitious. Many fiery revolutionists, enemies of the 18th Brumaire, were already wonderfully appeased. Many of those waverers, who only make up their minds after success, were beginning to express their sentiments aloud. There was at that time, as there always is, an expression of the day, which depicted to a nicety the state of the public mind. "We must speak out" (*il faut se montrer*), were words in every mouth; "we must show that, far from wishing to throw fresh obstacles in the way of the new government, we are, on the contrary, ready to assist in overcoming those which surround it;" which, in reality, meant, that the speaker was anxious to attract the notice of the five personages who had all the patronage in their hands. Among the applicants, there were even some who, to secure their appointment to the Tribunate, promised their zealous support to the Consular government, although they had beforehand made up their minds to pursue towards it a system of vexatious annoyance.

In revolutions, when the fire of the passions begins to burn low, cupidity may be seen to succeed violence, and the terror of the spectator is almost suddenly changed into disgust. Were

it not that deeds of lofty virtue and heroic actions covered with their lustre the sad details; and especially were it not that the vast and beneficial results which nations derive from social revolutions compensated for the present evil by an immensity of good to come, we might well turn our eyes from the spectacle which they present to the world. But they are the trials to which Providence subjects human society for its regeneration, and we ought, therefore, to study with care, and, if possible, with advantage, the scene alternately repulsive and sublime.

It appears that the impulse thus given to the ambitious of all classes was strong enough to attract the attention of public writers, and to afford a subject for their pens. Even the *Moniteur*, which was not yet an official organ, but became so a few days later (the 7th Nivôse)—the *Moniteur* felt called on to stigmatise the meanness displayed by the applicants.

“Since the Constitution,” said that paper, “has created a number of well-paid posts, how many people are in a stir! how many faces, little known, are anxious to show themselves! how many forgotten names are again wriggling under the dust of the Revolution! how many haughty republicans of the year VII. are humbling themselves, that they may reach the ear of the man of power, who can provide for them! What numbers of Brutuses are soliciting appointments! how many men of slender abilities are extolled to the skies! what trifling services are exaggerated! how many bloody spots are hidden from sight! This wonderful change of scene has taken place in a moment. Let us hope that the hero of liberty, he who has hitherto distinguished himself in the Revolution only by conferring benefits, will view these manœuvres with the disgust which they excite in every noble mind, and that he will not tolerate the attempt of a crowd of obscure or disreputable individuals to shroud themselves under the rays of his glory.”—*Moniteur* of the 3rd Nivôse.

Let us, however, in fairness, separate the good from the bad, and let it not be supposed that the above picture was that of the whole nation. If there were men who demeaned themselves, and others who, without stooping so low, yet put themselves forward, some at least awaited in a becoming manner the appeal which the government was about to make to their intelligence and zeal. If M. Constant, for instance, sought to be admitted to the Tribunate with eagerness and great assurances of devotedness to the Bonaparte family, Messrs. de Tracy, Volney, Monge, Carnot, Ginguéné, and Ducis made no applications, but left it to the free choice of the constituent power to include them or not in that vast nomination of public functionaries.

On the 24th of December (3rd Nivôse) the new Consuls met, and proceeded to appoint the members of the Council of State, in order that the installation of the government might take

place the next day, 25th of December (4th Nivôse). Messrs. Sieyès and Roger-Ducos, the two Consuls going out, along with Messrs. Cambacérès and Lebrun, the two coming into office, then proceeded to the Luxembourg to nominate thirty-one members (one more than a moiety) of the Senate, in order that that body might meet on the following day, choose the remaining members, and proceed to the formation of the great deliberating bodies.

The Council of State was divided into five sections ; the first of the finances, the second of civil and criminal legislation, the third of war, the fourth of the marine, the fifth of the interior. Each section was to be presided over by a Councillor of State, and the entire Council by the First Consul ; or, in his absence, by one of his two colleagues, Cambacérès or Lebrun.

Each section was to draw up the bills (*projets de loi*), and the regulations relating to the matters within its competence. These bills and regulations were afterwards to be discussed in a general assembly of all the sections. The Council of State was further charged to decide contested points of administration, and disputes as to competence, both betwixt the civil tribunals and the administration, and between the tribunals themselves. These are the very powers which it exercises at the present day ; but at that period it possessed solely the privilege of drawing up the laws, with the exclusive right to discuss them before the Legislative Body ; and, further, it was made acquainted with great government questions, and sometimes with those of foreign policy, as several instances in the sequel will show. The Council of State, therefore, was not at that period a mere Council of Administration, but a real Council of Government.

Several members of that body were also charged, in the different ministerial departments, with certain specific services, to which it was thought desirable either to attach greater importance, or to secure extraordinary attention : these were the departments of Public Instruction, the Treasury, the Domains, (Woods and Forests), the Colonies, and Public Works. The Councillors of State charged with the management of these various branches were placed under the authority of the proper minister. The members of the Council of State were to enjoy the handsome salary of 25,000 francs (£1000 sterling) each, and the presidents 35,000 francs each (£1400 sterling). These sums, it must be borne in mind, were, at that time, more considerable than they would be now-a-days. The appointments to the Council of State were more sought after than the appointments to the Senate, because, besides enjoying the same emoluments as the Senators and equal rank, the Councillors participated, as much as the ministers themselves, in the management of the most important business.

The principal members of this important body were—in the section of war, Messrs. Lacuée, Brune, and Marmont; in the section of the marine, Messrs. de Champagny, Ganteaume, and Fleurieu; in the section of the finances, Messrs. Defermon, Duchâtel, and Dufresne; in the section of justice, Messrs. Boulay de la Meurthe, Berlier, and Réal; in the section of the interior, Messrs. Rœderer, Cretet, Chaptal, Régnault de Saint-Jean-d'Angely, and Fourcroy. The five presidents were Messrs. Brune, Ganteaume, Defermon, Boulay de la Meurthe, and Rœderer. It would certainly have been impossible to select names of greater note, or talents more genuine and diverse.

I must observe, that the French Revolution had been prodigiously prolific of men of talent in every profession, and that there were materials for composing a most diversified, able, and, let me add, glorious phalanx of government officers: provided only that no attention were, in future, paid to the exclusions pronounced by one party against another. This was the course pursued by the new Consul. He appointed, for instance, to the section of the finances, M. Devaisnes, loudly accused, at that time, of royalism; but possessing, in that branch of business, a practical knowledge which had been, and has since been, extremely useful.

On the same day, 24th of December (3rd Nivôse), Messrs. Sieyès, Roger-Ducos, Cambacérès, and Lebrun met for the purpose of nominating twenty-nine Senators, who, with the two Consuls about to go out of office, should form together thirty-one members. The list, as might be supposed, had been previously prepared; it contained names of high standing, such as Messrs. Berthollet, Laplace (lately minister of the interior), Monge, Tracy, Volney, Cabanis, Kellerman, Garat, Lacépède, and Ducis. The last named declined the post.

On the following day, 25th of December (4th Nivôse), the Council of State met for the first time. The Consuls, accompanied by the ministers, were present at the sitting. The subject under deliberation was a bill to fix the reciprocal relations of the great bodies of the State. Several measures, which it was necessary to prepare for presentation to the Legislative Body in the approaching session, were also agreed upon.

The Senate, on the other hand, met at the palace of the Luxembourg, and proceeded to elect twenty-nine new members, who, added to the thirty-one already chosen, made the number of Senators in all sixty. The reader will remember that this number was subsequently to be increased to eighty. The supplemental list also contained some very distinguished characters, such as Messrs. Lagrange, Darcet, François de Neufchâteau, Daubenton, Bougainville, Perregaux the banker; and, lastly, a man of very old family, M. de Choiseul-Praslin.

In the following days the Senate was engaged in forming the Legislative Body and the Tribunate. For the Legislative Body they chose the moderate men of every period; members of the Constituent Assembly, of the Legislative Assembly, of the National Convention, and of the Five Hundred. Care was taken to select from these different assemblies such men as had little courted distinction and popularity, or panted for success in the turmoil of public affairs; whilst those who were known for the contrary tastes were reserved for the Tribunate. Consequently, the three hundred names which composed the Legislative Body could not be very brilliant; and it would be difficult to discover in that numerous list two or three names which are known at the present day. One of them was the modest and brave Latour-d'Auvergne, a hero worthy of antiquity for his virtues, his exploits, and his glorious end.

Among the hundred members of the Tribunate, selected with the very natural, but ere long bitterly repented, object of affording a field for active, stirring minds, desirous of fame, were many celebrated personages, some of whose names may be somewhat effaced, but are not altogether forgotten at this hour. They were Messrs. Chénier, Andrieux, Chauvelin, Stanislas de Girardin, Benjamin Constant, Daunou, Riouffe, Béranger, Ganilh, Ginguéné, Laromiguière, Jean Baptiste Say, &c.

No sooner was the formation of these bodies terminated, than the edifices assigned to them were got ready. The Tuileries was reserved for the three Consuls; the Luxembourg was appropriated to the Senate, the Palais Bourbon to the Legislative Body, and the Palais Royal to the Tribunate.

Several hundred thousand francs were expended in making the Tuileries habitable, and, until the completion of the necessary repairs, the Consuls took up their residence at the Petit Luxembourg.

General Bonaparte had already effected much since his return from Egypt: he had overthrown the Directory, and acquired an authority, apparently inferior, but in reality superior, to that of constitutional monarchy. But he had only just possessed himself of that authority, and it yet remained for him to legitimatise its assumption by measures of utility and great actions. He had still an immense deal to accomplish, and his first attempts at reorganisation were only one effort, already successful, it is true, but which still left the country exposed to sad disorder and deep suffering: there were still penury at the Treasury, privation in the armies, the flame of civil war in La Vendée, hesitation on the part of the neutral powers, and a determination truly obstinate to continue the struggle on the part of the belligerent powers. Still, that assumption of power, succeeding his first toils, and preceding

the immense task which he felt the confidence of ere long accomplishing, charmed his ambitious soul.

To celebrate the installation of his government, he performed a series of acts, purposely accumulated, and in which there were discernible profound policy, heartfelt joy, and that generosity which satisfaction imparts to every feeling and benevolent mind. These measures were successively announced between the 25th of December (4th Nivôse), the day of the installation of the Consular government, and the 1st of January 1800 (11th Nivôse), the day of the opening of the first legislative session.

In the first place, a judgment of the Council of State of the 27th of December (6th Nivôse) declared that the laws which excluded the relations of emigrants and the former nobles from public functions, should cease as a matter of course, because these laws were at variance with the principles of the new Constitution.

A certain number of individuals belonging to the revolutionary party had been condemned, as we have before seen, to banishment or imprisonment, in consequence of a measure adopted, with little reflection, a few days after the 18th Brumaire. The banishment and imprisonment had been mitigated to *surveillance* of the political police. A decree of the 5th Nivôse did away even with the *surveillance*. Having made this reparation to those who had well nigh experienced his severity, the First Consul performed a more important and more necessary act of justice towards the victims of the Directory and of the preceding governments.

Such as had been banished without a regular trial were authorised to return to France, upon condition that they should reside in the places assigned. This measure extended to persons proscribed at every period, but more especially to the proscripts of the 18th Fructidor. Messrs. Boissy-d'Anglas, Dumolard, and Pastoret were recalled, and the first was authorised to reside at Annonay, the second at Grenoble, and the third at Dijon. Messrs. Carnot, Portalis, Quatremère-Quincey, Siméon, Villaret-Joyeuse, Barbé-Marbois, and Barrère were also recalled and authorised to reside in Paris. The care taken to assign the capital for their place of abode to such men as Messrs. Carnot, Siméon, and Portalis, although they were not natives of it, clearly indicated that the government had its eye upon them, and meant to turn their talents to account.

Other measures were adopted in respect of religious worship and its free celebration. On the 28th of December (7th Nivôse) it was decreed that the edifices set apart for religious ceremonies should continue to be used for these purposes, or should be again appropriated to them, in case they had not been already restored to the ministers of the different

persuasions. Certain local authorities, wishing to obstruct the exercise of the Catholic worship, forbade the opening of the churches on Sundays, and only allowed it on the *Décadi*. The Consuls reversed the municipal decisions of this sort, and added to the restitution of the religious edifices the free permission to make use of them on the days appointed by each persuasion. For the present, however, they did not dare to prohibit the ceremonies of the Theophilanthropists, which took place in the churches, on certain days of the week, and which were viewed as profanations by the Catholics.

The Consuls caused the form of engagement which was required from the priests to be modified. Hitherto they had been called on to take a special oath to the civil constitution of the clergy—an oath which obliged them to recognise a legislation at variance, according to some of them, with the laws of the Church. It was suggested only to impose on them a simple promise of obedience to the Constitution of the State; which no one of them could reasonably scruple to give, without refusing that *obedience to Cæsar* which the Catholic religion so rigorously prescribes. This is what was afterwards termed the *promise*, as distinguished from the *oath*, and which led a great number of priests immediately to resume their religious duties. The *assermentés*, priests who took the oath, had already enjoyed the favour of the government; it was now the turn of the *non-assermentés* (non-jurors).

To the preceding measures the new First Consul added one which must have appeared to every one as peculiarly his own, since it recalled to mind matters which were in a manner personal to himself. He had negotiated with the deceased Pope, Pius VI., and signed, at the gates of Rome, the treaty of Tolentino. He had, ever since the year 1797, affected to show great respect for this head of the Catholic Church, and had received from his Holiness marked testimonies of goodwill. Pius VI., who died at Valence, in Dauphiné, had not yet obtained the honours of burial. His mortal remains were deposited in a sacristy. General Bonaparte, on his way home from Egypt, saw Cardinal Spina at Valence, learned these particulars, and resolved soon to make amends for this most unbecoming neglect.

Accordingly, on the 30th of December (9th Nivôse), he induced the Consuls to join in a decree, grounded on the noblest considerations.

“The Consuls,” so ran this decree, “considering that the body of Pius VI. has, for six months, been deposited in the town of Valence, without having yet had the honours of sepulture granted to it;

“That, though this old man, respectable for his misfortunes,

may have been for a moment the enemy of France, it was only because he was misled by the counsels of those who surrounded his advanced years ;

“That it is befitting the dignity of the French nation, and conformable to its character, to show its respect for a man who occupied one of the highest offices upon earth ;

“The Consuls decree,” &c. &c. The clauses which followed directed not only that funeral honours should be paid to the Pontiff’s remains, but that a monument should also record the rank of the departed prince.

This demonstration produced more effect, perhaps, than the most humane measures would have done, because it struck the imagination, accustomed to other spectacles. Immense numbers thronged, in consequence, to Valence, to avail themselves of the authorisation thus given for making a religious manifestation.

The list of the revolutionary festivals contained one conceived in a truly woeful spirit, namely, that which was celebrated on the 21st of January.\* Whatever might be the sentiments of the men of all parties respecting the tragic event connected with that date, it was a barbarous festival, which was designed to commemorate a sanguinary catastrophe. In the time of the Directory, General Bonaparte had shown a strong repugnance to attend at it; not that he had then any idea of honouring royalty, which he was one day to re-establish for his own profit, but he liked to defy publicly the passions which he did not share. Now that he had become the head of the government, he instigated the legislative commissions to decide that in future there should be no more than two festivals—that of the 14th of July, the anniversary of the first day of the Revolution, and that of the 1st of Vendemiaire, the anniversary of the first day of the Republic. “These days,” said he, “are imperishable in the memory of the citizens; they were hailed by all Frenchmen with unanimous transports, and awaken no recollection tending to produce division among the friends of the Republic.”

It needed all the power, all the boldness, of the head of the new government to venture upon a series of measures which, though just, politic, and moral in themselves, nevertheless appeared to hot-headed enthusiasts so many preliminary acts of a complete counter-revolution. But, in doing all this, General Bonaparte took care to set the first example himself of the oblivion of political animosities, sometimes to rouse with emphasis that sense of glory by which he led the men of the time, and raised them above the base and furious passions of parties. Thus General Augereau had offended him by unbecoming conduct on the 18th of Brumaire; he nevertheless appointed him to the command of the army in Holland.

\* The anniversary of the execution of Louis XVI.



“Show,” he wrote to him, in a letter which was published, “show, in all the acts that your command will give you occasion to perform, that you are above those miserable party dissensions, the recoil of which has unfortunately, for these ten years, torn France in pieces. . . . If circumstances oblige me to take the field in person, be assured that I shall not leave you in Holland, and that I shall never forget the glorious day of Castiglione.”

At the same time he instituted arms of honour, a prelude to the foundation of the Legion of Honour. French democracy, after such vehement demonstrations of its horror of personal distinctions, could, at most, tolerate at that time rewards for military actions. In pursuance of an article of the Constitution, the First Consul caused a resolution to be passed, that, for every brilliant action, a musket of honour should be presented to the infantry, a carabine of honour to the cavalry, grenadoes of honour to the artillery, and, lastly, swords of honour to officers of all ranks. The First Consul followed up the institution, decreed on the 25th of December (4th Nivôse), by positive acts. Next day he awarded a sword to General St. Cyr, for a brilliant action which he had just fought in the Apennines. “I offer you,” said he to him, “in token of my satisfaction, a handsome sword, which you will wear on days of battle. Let the soldiers under your command know that I am content with them, and that I hope to be still more so.”

To these acts, which proclaimed the actual assumption of power, which marked the character of his government, and clearly showed his disposition to set himself above all party passions, the First Consul immediately added proceedings of higher importance, as well in regard to La Vendée, as to the European powers.

A suspension of arms had been signed with the Vendéans, conferences with them had begun, and yet the pacification was no forwarder. General Bonaparte had left little doubt in the minds of the royalists, who had addressed themselves to him for the purpose of sounding his intentions, and ascertaining whether he would not be satisfied with being the restorer, the support, the first subject, of the house of Bourbon. He had undeceived them, by showing himself irrevocably attached to the cause of the French Revolution. This frankness in his declarations had not tended to promote the conciliation that was begun. The Vendean chiefs hesitated. They were placed between fear, excited by the vigour of the new government, and the solicitations of the emigrants in London, who were authorised to promise them, on behalf of Mr. Pitt, arms, money, and troops.

It was on a fresh insurrection in La Vendée that England

particularly reckoned. She purposed making on that part of our coast an attempt similar to that which had been tried in Holland. The failure of that expedition had not discouraged her; and she earnestly solicited of the Emperor Paul the co-operation of his troops, without much chance, indeed, of obtaining it. Prussia, which began to testify a sort of interest for the Consular government, Prussia never ceased repeating to Duroc, the aide-de-camp, and to M. Otto, the *chargé d'affaires* of France, "Get La Vendée off your hands, for it is there that the most serious blows will be levelled at you."

Of this General Bonaparte was aware. Not only did La Vendée weaken the armies of the Republic by absorbing part of their forces, but to him civil war seemed both a misfortune and a sort of dishonour for a government, as it attested a deplorable internal condition. He had, therefore, taken the most efficacious measures for bringing that business to a conclusion. He had recalled from Holland a portion of the army which, under General Brune, had recently defeated the combined English and Russians; he had added to it part of the garrison of Paris, which he could diminish considerably without apprehension, the spell of his name serving in lieu of material force; and in this manner he had contrived to assemble in the West an excellent army of about 60,000 men. General Brune was placed at the head of this force, with the recommendation to retain, as his principal lieutenant, the prudent and conciliatory Hédouville, who held all the threads of the negotiation with the royalists. The name of General Brune was an answer to those who reckoned upon a new landing of the Anglo-Russians. But, before striking a decisive blow, if the conditions of the pacification were not finally accepted, the First Consul deemed it right to address the Vendéans on the very day of his installation.

On the 29th of December (8th Nivôse) he addressed a proclamation and a decree of the Consuls to the departments of the West. He said to them, "An impious war threatens a second time to set the departments of the West in a flame. The duty of the first magistrates of the Republic is to prevent its spreading, and to extinguish it in its focus, but they are unwilling to employ force, till they have exhausted all the means of persuasion and justice."

Drawing a line between criminal men, sold to foreigners, for ever irreconcilable with the Republic, and misguided citizens, who, by engaging in civil war, intended only to resist cruel persecutions, the First Consul referred to all the measures calculated to win the confidence of the latter, and to bring them over to the new government, such as the repeal of the law concerning the hostages, the restoration of the churches to the priests, the liberty allowed to every one to keep Sunday; he

further promised a full and entire amnesty to those who should submit, abandon the assemblages of insurgents, and lay down the arms furnished by England. But he added that the most severe measures would be immediately taken against those who should persist in insurrection. He announced the suspension of the Constitution, that is, the employment of extraordinary authorities in those places where insurgent bands should continue to appear in arms. "The government," it was said, at the conclusion of the proclamation of the Consuls, "will forgive; it will pardon the repentant; its clemency shall be complete and absolute: but it will punish every one who, after this declaration, shall dare to resist the national sovereignty. But, no; henceforward we will be actuated by only one sentiment—the love of our country. The ministers of a God of peace will be the first promoters of reconciliation and concord. Let them speak to their flocks in that language which pervades the Word of their divine master; let them repair to those temples which are again opened to them, and offer the sacrifice that shall atone for the crimes of war and for the blood which it has caused to be spilt."

This proclamation, seconded by a formidable force, was calculated to make an impression, especially as it emanated from a new government, which had no hand whatever in the excesses and faults that had served as a pretext for civil war.

Having proceeded in this manner towards our enemies at home, the First Consul, addressing himself to our enemies abroad, resolved to take a formal step towards the two powers which had not yet given any sign of a return to pacific sentiments, and seemed, on the contrary, to be obstinately bent on the prosecution of the war: we mean Austria and Great Britain.

Prussia, as we have seen, had received Duroc in the most flattering manner, and was every day giving more expressive testimonies of sympathy for the First Consul. Satisfied with the footing on which she stood with him, she wished success to his government against anarchy, success to his arms against Austria. As for the scheme of offering herself as mediatrix, she still cherished the idea, but durst not take the first step, conceiving that peace was yet far distant, and being unwilling to enter rashly upon a course, the bearing of which it was impossible to foresee. In fact, whoever observed attentively the state of things in Europe, might easily perceive that, to loosen the ties which bound England and Austria, there would need another campaign. The court of Madrid had likewise beheld with satisfaction the accession of General Bonaparte, because with him the alliance of France and Spain seemed at once more honourable and more profitable. But the horizon was not completely clear in any quarter. General Bonaparte resolved, therefore, the very same

day that the Constitution invested him officially with a new authority, to address himself to the decidedly hostile powers, for the purpose of offering them peace, and publicly showing that it was their own fault if they refused it. After that, he could resort to war, having the opinion of the world on his side.

In the first place, all the French diplomatic agents previously appointed (but who had not yet left Paris, because it was desirable that they should be accredited in the name of the government definitively constituted) were instructed to proceed to their respective posts. General Beurnonville set out for Berlin, M. Alquier for Madrid, M. de Sémonville for the Hague, M. Bourgoing for Copenhagen. General Beurnonville was to pay an adroit and flattering compliment to the King of Prussia by asking him for a bust of the great Frederick, to be placed in the grand gallery of Diana, in the Tuileries. The First Consul was at that time arranging in this gallery the busts of all the great men whom he particularly admired. M. Alquier, besides conveying to Madrid the kindest assurances to the king and to the queen, was charged with a present for the Prince of Peace, who possessed considerable influence, though he was no longer minister. This present consisted of fine specimens of arms, made at the manufactory of Versailles, famous at that time throughout all Europe for the excellence of its productions.

This done, the First Consul turned his attention to the step proposed to be taken towards the two hostile powers, England and Austria. In general, it is customary to disguise such steps, to precede them by indirect overtures, in order to guard against the humiliation of a refusal. General Bonaparte, in addressing England and Austria, meant to address the world; and for this purpose he needed a solemn overture, deviating entirely from the accustomed forms, which should appeal to the hearts of the sovereigns themselves, and flatter or embarrass them. Accordingly, instead of transmitting notes to Lord Grenville or M. de Thugut, he wrote directly to the King of England and the Emperor of Germany two letters, which the ministers of those courts were desired to submit to their sovereigns.

The letter destined for the King of England was in these terms :

PARIS, 5th *Nivôse*, year VIII. (Dec. 26, 1799).

“SIRE,—Called by the wish of the French nation to fill the chief magistracy of the Republic, I think it fitting, on entering upon office, to make a direct communication on the subject to your Majesty.

“Is the war which for eight years has ravaged the four quarters of the globe to be eternal? Are there then no means of coming to an understanding?

“How can the two most enlightened nations of Europe, stronger and more powerful than their safety and independence require, sacrifice to ideas of vain greatness the blessings of commerce, internal

prosperity, and domestic happiness? How can they help feeling that peace is the first of wants, as well as the first of glories!

“These sentiments cannot be strange to your Majesty, who governs a free nation, and with the sole aim to render it happy.

“In this overture, your Majesty will discover only my sincere desire to contribute efficaciously, for the second time, to the general pacification by a prompt procedure, entirely confidential, and divested of those forms, which, necessary perhaps for disguising the dependence of weak States, betray only in strong States a mutual desire to deceive one another.

“France, England, by the abuse of their strength, may for a long time to come, for the misfortune of all nations, retard its exhaustion: but I dare assert, the lot of all civilised nations is attached to the termination of a war which has thrown the whole world into a conflagration.

(Signed) BONAPARTE,

“*First Consul of the French Republic.*”

On the same day, the First Consul addressed the following letter to the Emperor of Germany:—

“On returning to Europe, after an absence of eighteen months, I find the war rekindled between the French Republic and your Majesty.

“The French nation calls me to occupy the chief magistracy.

“A stranger to every feeling of vain glory, the first of my wishes is to stop the effusion of the blood that is about to be spilt. Every thing forebodes that, in the next campaign, numerous and ably directed armies will triple the number of the victims hitherto sacrificed, by the resumption of hostilities. The known character of your Majesty leaves me no doubt respecting the wish of your heart. If that wish alone is consulted, I perceive a possibility of reconciling the interests of the two nations.

“In the communications which I have previously had with your Majesty, you have personally testified some regard for me. I request you to consider the step which I am taking as proceeding from a desire to make a return for it, and to convince you more and more of the very high respect which I entertain for your Majesty.

(Signed) BONAPARTE,

“*First Consul of the French Republic.*”

Such was the language in which the First Consul communicated his accession, as well to the parties that divided France, as to the cabinets coalesced against her. He offered peace, preparing to secure it by force, if he could not obtain it by amicable means. His intention was to employ the winter in making a short and decisive campaign in La Vendée, that, in spring, he might be able to move upon the Rhine and the Alps such troops as, on the termination of the war at home, should be available for the war abroad.

While awaiting the result of these proceedings, he opened the legislative session on the 1st of January 1800 (11th Nivôse, year VIII.), and resolved to devote that session of four months to the preparation of sound laws, and to the administrative reorganisation of France, which was scarcely commenced. He had just appointed his brother Lucien minister of the interior, in lieu of Laplace the mathematician, and M. Abrial, a very worthy man, and very attentive to business, as minister of justice, in the room of M. Cambacérès, who had become Consul.

On the 1st of January 1800, the Senate, the Legislative Body, and the Tribunate assembled. The Senate elected M. Sieyès for president; the Legislative Body elected M. Perrin of Vosges; the Tribunate, M. Daunou. Numerous bills (*projets de loi*) were immediately presented to the Legislative Body.

At the sight of these deliberative assemblies meeting afresh, a sort of anxiety prevailed. People were weary of agitation; they longed for repose; they were cured of that violent fondness for political eloquence, which France had felt in '89, when Mirabeau, Barnave, Maury, Cazalès, opened for it an entirely new career of glory, that of the tribune. The animosity against the bar was general; there was no favour but for men of action, capable of procuring victory and peace for France. Still people had not yet resolved on the establishment of an absolute power; and they had no wish that all liberty, all temperate discussion, should be stifled. If the power of action, which a new legislator had just placed in the Constitution, by the creation of a First Consul, and the selection for that magistracy of the greatest captain of the age; if that power were incompatible with liberty, they were ready to sacrifice the latter; but everybody would have been delighted at the reconciliation of liberty and strength, if it were possible. It was not vulgar agitators or obstinate republicans who entertained these sentiments; it was men of discreet, enlightened minds, whom it would have pained to see the Revolution belie itself so soon and so completely. Accordingly, the indifferent asked themselves with curiosity, the good citizens with real uneasiness, what bearing the Tribunate, the only body which had liberty of speech, would assume towards the new government, and how the government would endure an opposition, if an opposition should happen to be formed.

When a reaction takes place, be that reaction ever so general, it does not hurry all along with it; and it irritates, nay, even shocks, those whom it does not hurry along. Messrs. Chénier, Andrieux, Ginguené, Daunou, and Benjamin Constant, who had seats in the Tribunate, Messrs. de Tracy, Volney, and Cabanis, who were members of the Senate, while they deplored the crimes of the Reign of Terror, were not disposed to think that the French Revolution was wrong in its conduct towards its adversaries.

The monarchical and religious doctrines, which were perceptibly gaining ground, galled them, as did still more the immoderate haste with which this return to ancient ideas was effected. This produced in them a dissatisfaction, which they took no pains to disguise. Most of them were sincere. Strongly attached to the Revolution, they wished for it almost entire, excepting the blood and the spoliations, and had little taste for that which people imagined they could descry in the profound conception of the new dictator. That priests should not be persecuted, good! But that they should be favoured so far as to be reinstated at the altar was too much for these staunch votaries of the philosophy of the eighteenth century. That a little more unity and strength should be given to government, good again! But that this principle should be carried to such an extent as to re-establish monarchical unity for the benefit of a military man, this was far too much in their estimation. For the rest—as it is always the case—their motives were various. If such were the opinions of Messrs. Chénier, Ginguené, Daunou, Tracy, and Cabanis, they could not be those of M. Constant, who most assuredly had not imbibed in the society of the Necker family, in which he moved, either an aversion to religious ideas, or an exclusive fondness for the French Revolution. On attaining to the Tribunate, thanks to the solicitations of his friends, he had, nevertheless, become, in a few days, the most restless and the cleverest of the new opposition. He was actuated by his sarcastic humour, but more especially by the discontent of the Necker family, which he participated. Madame de Staël, who, in her single person, then represented that illustrious family, had greatly admired General Bonaparte: and it would have been an easy matter for him to win the goodwill of one whose sprightly imagination was alive to everything that was great. But, though endowed with as much understanding as genius, he had offended, by expressions not the most decorous, a woman whom he disliked, because he found in her pretensions above her sex: and he had produced in her heart an irritation, which, if not formidable, was at least annoying. Every fault, however slight, produces its fruit. The First Consul was soon to reap the fruit of his, in meeting with a very untoward opposition from those who were under the influence of the persuasive mind of Madame de Staël. Of this number was M. Constant.

The Palais Royal had been assigned to the Tribunate, assuredly not from design, but solely from necessity; the Tuileries had been given up to the head of the government; the Luxembourg, previously appropriated to the Council of the Ancients, had naturally been assigned to the Senate; the Palais Bourbon had been set aside for the Legislative Body. Thus there was no building but the Palais Royal that could be allotted to

the Tribunate. Such was, in certain minds, the disposition to take the simplest acts amiss, that they complained bitterly of the choice of this palace, and alleged that it was with a view to lower the Tribunate that it had been made to meet in the ordinary haunt of vice and debauchery. Certain articles of regulation were under discussion in this assembly on the 2nd and 3rd of January, when, all at once, M. Duveyrier, one of its members, rose to complain of some measures, injurious, as he said, to several proprietors of establishments which had existed for years in the Palais Royal. There was nothing interesting in the case of the complainants, and, moreover, they had received compensation. Duveyrier inveighed warmly against these alleged acts of injustice, and said that the national representation ought not to be made unpopular, by being rendered responsible for harsh acts committed in its name. Then, passing to the choice of the locality, "I am not one of those," said he, "who are offended because it has been thought fit to select for the meetings of the Tribunate a place which is the ordinary theatre of vice and of every kind of excesses; in this I see neither danger nor any allusion injurious to us. I pay homage, on the contrary, to the popular intention of those who wished that the tribunes of the people should sit amidst the people; that the defenders of liberty should meet in a place that witnessed the first triumphs of liberty. I thank them for having allowed us the means of viewing, from this very tribune, the spot on which the noble Camille Desmoulins, giving the signal for a glorious movement, displayed that national cockade, our most glorious trophy, our eternal rallying sign; that cockade which gave birth to so many prodigies, to which so many heroes owe the celebrity of their arms, and which we will not lay down but with life. I thank them for having enabled us to see that spot, which, if people were inclined to erect an idol of fifteen days, would remind us of the fall of an idol of fifteen centuries."

This off-hand attack produced a strong sensation in the assembly, and before long in Paris. The Tribunate passed to the order of the day, the majority of its members disapproving such a sally. But the effect was not the less powerful; and it was a bad beginning for an assembly, which, if it wished to save liberty from the dangers with which it was threatened by a reaction at that time general, should have observed infinite caution, as well in regard to persons ready to take alarm, as to a head of the government who was easily irritated.

Such a scene could not fail to have consequences. The anger of the First Consul was vehement, and the humble adorers of his nascent power raised a loud outcry. Messrs. Stanislas de Girardin, de Chauvelin, and some others, who, without being disposed to resign all independence in the presence of the new



government, yet disapproved this unseasonable opposition, spoke in the following sitting, and, in order to neutralise the effect of the speech of Duveyrier, proposed the taking of a sort of oath to the Constitution.

“Before we proceed to our labours,” said M. de Girardin, “I think we ought to give the nation a signal testimony of our attachment to the Constitution. I do not propose to you to swear that you will uphold it. I know, and you know as well as I do, the uselessness of oaths; but I think it may be useful, on entering on our duties, to promise to perform them faithfully. Let us follow the example of the Conservative Senate and of the Council of State, and we shall thus fix the opinion that ought to be formed of us; we shall silence malice, which is already bruited that the Tribunate is an organised resistance against the government. No! the Tribunate is not a focus of opposition, but a focus of intelligence. No! the Tribunate does not mean to combat without ceasing the acts of the government; it is ready, on the contrary, to hail them with joy, when they shall be in harmony with the public interest. The Tribunate will strive to allay the passions of the day, instead of exciting them. Its moderation must place itself between all the factions to dissolve and to reunite them. It was the moderates who effected the 18th Brumaire, that salutary and glorious day, which has saved France from internal anarchy and foreign invasion. In order to save the Republic, let us return to the principles on which it was founded, but let us beware of returning to excesses which have so often brought it to the brink of perdition. If we see from this place the spot where, for the first time, the emblem of liberty was displayed, from this place, too, we see the spot where were conceived those crimes which imbrued the Revolution in blood. For my own part, I am far from congratulating myself on the choice which has been made of this palace for the place of our meetings; on the contrary, I regret it: but still the events of which it reminds us are, happily, long gone by. The time for vehement harangues, for appeals to the seditious groups of the Palais Royal, is past. If, however, certain declamations can no longer ruin us, they may delay the return of fairer prospects. Spreading from this tribune throughout Paris, from Paris over all Europe, they may create alarm, furnish pretexts, and retard that peace which all of us desire. . . . Peace,” added M. de Girardin, “peace ought incessantly to occupy our thoughts: and if we keep this important interest continually in view, we shall no longer indulge in such expressions as those which the other day escaped one of our colleagues, on which none of us animadverted, because they were irrelevant, for we know no idol in France.” He concluded his speech by moving that each member should make the following declaration:—“I

promise faithfully to perform the functions which the Constitution has assigned to me."

This proposition was adopted. M. Duveyrier, vexed at the scandal produced by his speech, strove to excuse himself, and desired to be the first to make the declaration suggested by M. de Girardin, which all the members of the Tribunate cheerfully repeated after him.

The effect of the previous scene was, therefore, somewhat repaired. The First Consul, nevertheless, conceived an insuperable aversion for the Tribunate, which, it is true, he would have felt for any free assembly, using and abusing the liberty of speech; and he caused some extremely bitter observations on the tribunes of France and the tribunes of Rome to be inserted in the *Moniteur*.

The following sittings produced fresh manifestations, quite as much to be regretted as the preceding. The first proposition of the government was designed to regulate the forms to be observed in the presentation, discussion, and adoption of bills (*projets de loi*). This was one of the points neglected by the Constitution of the year VIII., and left to the legislature. In the proposed arrangements, no great deference was shown to the Tribunate. The plan of the government provided that the laws should be carried by three Councillors of State to the Legislative Body, and afterwards communicated to the Tribunate, and that, on a day fixed by the government, the Tribunate was to be ready to discuss them, through the medium of its three orators, before the Legislative Body. The Tribunate, however, was allowed to demand a delay of the Legislative Body, which was to decide whether that delay could be granted. It must be confessed that the Tribunate was here treated very unceremoniously; for it was expected to have finished its task by a given day, which one would scarcely dare to require of a section of the Council of State, or of any ministerial department. Nobody would, now-a-days, presume to prescribe to any deliberative assembly the day and the term of a discussion; this is a point which, even in cases of urgency, is left to its intelligence and its zeal. But parliamentary courtesies, which, like politeness, are the offspring of usage, could not precede, with us, the practice of representative government. From revolutionary violence, we passed, almost without transition, to military rudeness. The commissions, which had recently, for a month, exercised the legislative power, had, by their discussion with closed doors, and their despatch of laws in twenty-four hours, humoured the taste of the First Consul, who always wanted to be served and satisfied at the moment. This may account for, but cannot excuse, the objectionable details of the government plan.

The rising opposition of the Tribunate had, therefore, good

reason for attacking this plan; but, after commencing with an indecorous scene, it was unlucky for it to have to combat the first proposition emanating from the Consuls; because it induced a belief that a resolution was taken to attack everything: and to this misfortune it added the fault of the form, which was vexatious. The most violent attack proceeded from M. Constant. In a clever and ironical speech, such as he knew how to make, he required that the Tribunate should have a fixed time for examining the bills (*projets de loi*) which should be submitted to it, and that it should not be expected to examine them at a gallop. He adverted, on this subject, to the danger of the *laws of urgency* passed during the Revolution, which had always proved disastrous laws; he asked why such care was taken to hurry business so rapidly through the Tribunate; why it was already considered so hostile, that government was anxious to abridge as much as possible the passage of the laws through that house. "All this," he added, "proceeds from the false idea that we are only an opposition body, destined to do nothing but to thwart the government incessantly; which is not the case, which cannot be the case, which would lower us in public opinion. This false notion has stamped all the clauses of this plan with a restless and unreasonable impatience: the propositions are presented to us flying, as it were, in the hope that we may not be able to lay hold of them; they are to be hurried away from our examination, like an enemy's army, and to be transformed into laws before we can overtake them."

Many stinging reflections were mingled with this long speech, which produced a very strong sensation. M. Constant had taken particular care to insist that the Tribunate was not a body specially devoted to contradiction; that it would not contradict, unless compelled by the public interest to do so; but he had repeated these protestations in a manner and tone designed to belie their sincerity, and manifest the intention of systematic opposition which he was taking such pains to deny.

Riouffe, the tribune, known for his faithful and courageous friendship for the proscribed Girondins, was one of those whom the horrors of '93 had so shocked, that they were ready to throw themselves blindly into the arms of the new government, whatever that government might do. He, therefore, rose to repel the attacks, in his opinion indecorous, of M. Constant.

"Distrust," said he, "so offensive as that manifested yesterday, would be sufficient to break off all further communication in the intercourse between man and man; and it would be impossible that authorities destined to live together could long treat with one another, if courtesy were not a sacred duty, from which they must never depart."

The speaker then declared, that, for his part, he had an

absolute confidence in the government; and he entered upon a panegyric of the First Consul, true, but too long, and in terms not sufficiently measured. "When one speaker," said he, "here praises Camille Desmoulins, and another the National Convention, I will not confine myself to a *conspiratory silence*; I too will praise him whom the whole world praises; having hitherto eulogised proscribed virtue alone, I will assume a new kind of courage, that of celebrating genius in the bosom of power and of victory; I shall congratulate myself on beholding, at the head of the Republic, him who has gained for the French nation the title of the Great Nation; I will proclaim him great, clement, just. . . ." Proceeding thus, M. Riouffe compared General Bonaparte with Cæsar and Hannibal; and, by this avowal of a legitimate but unseasonable admiration, he provoked a very unlucky manifestation. Several voices interrupted him. "Keep to the question," they cried. "I," replied M. Riouffe, "will speak of the man whom the whole world admires. . . ." "Question, question," repeated the interrupters; and he was obliged to confine himself to the subject under consideration.

Whether M. Riouffe had provoked the impatience of the interrupters by the sincere, but diffuse and unskilful exposition of his sentiments, or whether the admiration which he felt was not shared in the same degree by the members of the Tribunal, the effect produced by his speech was not happy.

M. de Chauvelin endeavoured to correct it by a speech in favour of the proposed law.

He acknowledged its defects. "But the circumstances," said he, "the circumstances in which we are placed, the state of several departments, which may call for prompt, nay, even urgent measures; important political considerations; calumny, which is watching us; the divisions, which she already takes delight in supposing the existence of; the pressing need of union between the powers—all induce us to vote the adoption of the bill (*projet*) that has been laid before us."

The bill was, in fact, put to the vote, and adopted by a majority which ought to have satisfied and encouraged the government; 54 votes against 26 decided that the orators of the Tribunal, commissioned to speak before the Legislative Body, should support the proposed law. The Legislative Body received it still more favourably, and adopted it by a majority of 203 voices against 23. This was as much as could be wished: for a majority of two-thirds, after all, in the Tribunal (a body whose opposition decided nothing, since it did not vote the laws), and a majority of nine-tenths in the Legislative Body (the only body whose vote was decisive) ought to have satisfied the First Consul and his adherents, and rendered them indifferent to this last manifestation of liberal spirit, and indulgent

towards breaches of form, which, after all, were a right of liberty itself. But the First Consul, who could not be seriously alarmed, appeared, nevertheless, touched to the quick, and expressed himself in the strongest terms. He began to make frequent use of the press, and, though he was not fond of it, he was, nevertheless, glad to employ it for his own interest. He caused an article to be inserted in the *Moniteur* of the 8th of January (18th Nivôse), which was wholly improper, and in which he himself undertook to demonstrate the insignificance of that opposition, to show that it was no part of a systematic plan to thwart the government, and attributed it, in some minds, to a desire of visionary perfection in human laws, in others to a wish to make a noise. "Thus," added the official journal, "everything authorises us to conclude that there does not exist in the Tribunal any combined and systematic opposition, in short, any real opposition. But every one is athirst for glory, every one wishes to consign his name to the hundred tongues of Fame; and some men have yet to learn that one arrives with less certainty at consideration by the ambition of making fine speeches, than by perseverance in serving usefully, nay, obscurely, that public which applauds and judges."

This manner of treating a great body of the State was far from becoming; it proved, on the part of the First Consul, a disposition to do just what he pleased, and, on the part of France, a disposition to put up with everything.

These impressions, however, soon gave place to others. The vast labours of the government, in which the Legislative Body and the Tribunal were called to participate, soon attracted the attention of all parties, and occupied them exclusively. The First Consul caused two bills (*projets de loi*) of very great importance to be submitted to the Legislative Body. One related to the departmental and municipal administration, and became the famous law of the 28th Pluviose, year VIII., which established the administrative centralisation in France: the other had for its object the organisation of justice—an organisation which still exists. To these two bills (*projets*) were added others relative to emigrants, whose condition it was urgently necessary to regulate; to the right of making wills, the re-establishment of which was demanded by all families; to the prize court, which it was requisite to establish on account of our relations with neutrals; to the appointment of new collectors of taxes, who were found to be needed; lastly, to the receipts and expenditure of the year VIII.

The administration of France, as we have shown above, was in frightful disorder in 1799. In all countries there are two kinds of business to be despatched; that of the State, which comprehends recruiting, taxes, works of public utility, the

enforcement of the laws; and that of the provinces and communes, which consists in the management of the local interests of every kind. If a country is left to itself, that is to say, if it is not governed by a general administration, at once intelligent and strong, the first kind of business, that of the State, is not done at all; the second finds, in the provincial or communal interest, a principle of zeal, but of a zeal that is capricious, unequal, unjust, and rarely enlightened. The provincial or communal administrations are assuredly not wanting in inclination to attend to what particularly concerns them; but they are wasteful, annoying, and always hostile to the common rule. The tyrannical singularities of the middle age in Europe had no other origin. As soon as the central authority withdraws from a country, there is no kind of disorder to which the local interests are not ready to abandon themselves, their own ruin included. In 1789, wherever the communes had enjoyed any liberty, they were in a state of bankruptcy. Most of the free cities of Germany, when they were suppressed in 1803, were completely ruined. Thus, without a strong, general administration, the business of the State is not done at all, and local business very ill done.

The Constituent Assembly and the National Convention, after they had successively remodelled the administrative organisation of France, arrived at a state of things which was anarchy itself; collective administrations of all degrees, perpetually deliberating, never acting, having at their side commissioners of the central government, charged to press forward either the despatch of the business of the State, or the execution of the laws, but denied the power of acting themselves—such was the departmental and municipal system in force on the 18th Brumaire. As for the municipal system, in particular, there had been formed a sort of cantonal municipalities, which only increased this administrative confusion.

The number of the communes had been found too large, for it exceeded 40,000. The superintendence over such a number of petty local governments, already very difficult in itself, became impossible for authorities constituted as the authorities at that time were. The prefects are now adequate to it, with the assistance of the sub-prefects, on condition that they are very assiduous. But let us suppose that there were no prefects and sub-prefects, but in their place petty deliberative assemblies, and we shall comprehend what disorder must prevail in such an administration. These forty and odd thousand communes were, therefore, reduced to five thousand cantonal municipalities, composed of the union of several communes into one. It was intended, in thus uniting several communes under one government, to give them a government in the first place, and,

in the next, to place them nearer to the central authority, and more under its eye. The consequence soon was, a still more frightful confusion than that which this measure was designed to put an end to. These five thousand cantonal municipalities were too numerous, and too far distant from the central authority to be under its eye; and, without being brought nearer to the government, they were mischievously removed farther from the population which they were destined to govern. The communal administration is made to be placed as near as possible to the spot. The magistrate, who registers the births, the deaths, and the marriages, who attends to the police and the salubrity of the place, who keeps in repair the fountain, the church, and the hospital, of the village or town, ought to reside in the village or the town itself, to live, in short, amidst his fellow-citizens. These cantonal municipalities had, therefore, led to a useless displacement of the domestic authority, without having brought the local affairs sufficiently within the ken of government for it to watch them. Add to this, that nothing was then properly done, owing to the disorder of the time, and the reader may form some conception of the confusion that must have resulted from the vice of the institution, aggravated by the vice of circumstances.

A last cause of disorder had associated itself with all the others. It is not only necessary to carry on the business of the State and of the communes; it is also requisite to judge; for the citizens may have reason to complain, sometimes that, in marking out a street or a road, their property has been encroached on; at others, that, in the valuation of their possessions for the purpose of taxing them, they have been unjustly valued. Under the ancient government, the ordinary justice, the only curb at that time to the executive authority (as was so well expressed in the resistance of the parliaments to the court), the ordinary justice had assumed cognisance in all cases of *contentieux administratif* (points at issue between the authorities and private individuals). This was a serious inconvenience, for civil judges are bad dispensers of administrative justice, being in a manner strangers to the subject. Our first legislators, during the Revolution, perfectly sensible of this inconvenience, imagined that they could resolve the difficulty by relinquishing the whole of the *contentieux administratif* to the petty local assemblies, to which they had consigned the administration. Now, figure to yourself these collective administrations superseding what, at this day, we call prefects, sub-prefects, *maires*, charged to do all that they do, and to decide, moreover, all questions that are now submitted to the councils of prefecture, and you will have a tolerably just idea of the confusion which then reigned. Even with the spirit of order which now prevails, the result would be a chaos:

add to this the revolutionary passions, and you will comprehend how much worse a chaos this must be. Hence it was that the assessments of the contributions were never finished, that the collection of the taxes was several years in arrear, that the finances were in ruin, the armies in distress. The recruiting alone was sometimes carried into execution, owing to the revolutionary passions, which had produced the evil, but which had contributed to remedy it in part; for, having for their principle an inordinate but ardent love of France, her greatness, and her liberty, they impelled the populace eagerly to join the army.

In such a posture of affairs the First Consul may be said to have been a special envoy of Providence. His simple, clear understanding, guided by an active and resolute character, was destined to lead him to the solution of these difficulties. The Constitution had placed at the head of the State an executive power and a legislative power: the executive power concentrated almost entirely in a single hand; and the legislative power divided into several deliberative assemblies. It was natural to place, at each step of the administrative ladder, a representative of the executive power, specially charged to act; and, at his side, merely to check or to enlighten, but not to act in his stead, a small deliberative assembly, such as a council of department, of *arrondissement*, or of *commune*. To this simple, luminous, fertile idea we owe the excellent administration which exists at this day in France. The First Consul decided to have in each department a *prefect*, charged not to urge a collective administration to the despatch of the business of the State, but to do it himself; charged, at the same time, to manage the departmental affairs, but conjointly with a council of department, and from the resources voted by that council. As the system of cantonal municipalities was universally condemned, and M. Sieyès, author of all the circumscriptions of France, had, in the new Constitution, laid down the principle of the circumscription by *arrondissement*, the First Consul resolved to employ it, in order to dispense with cantonal administrations. To begin with, the communal administration was replaced where it ought to be, that is, in the *commune* itself, town, or village; and between the *commune* and the department there was created an intermediate administrative step, that is, the *arrondissement*. Between the *prefect* and the *maire* there was to be a sub-*prefect*, charged, under the superintendence of the *prefect*, with directing a certain number of *communes*, sixty, eighty, a hundred, more or fewer, according to the importance of the department. Lastly, in the *commune* itself there was to be a *maire*, with executive power, and possessing further, a deliberative voice in the municipal council—a *maire*, a direct and dependent agent of the general authority for the despatch of the business of the State; the agent



of the commune in all local affairs, managing the interests of the latter jointly with it, under the superintendence, however, of the prefect and of the sub-prefect, and consequently of the State.

Such is that admirable hierarchy, to which France owes an administration incomparable for the energy, the precision of its action, and the accuracy of its accounts, and which is so excellent, that, in six months, as we shall see by-and-by, it was sufficient to restore order in France, under the impulsion, it is true, of a unique genius, the First Consul, and under a favour of circumstances unique also; for there prevailed everywhere a horror of disorder, an ardent longing for order, disgust with prating, and a liking for prompt and positive results.

There was still left the question of the *contentieux*, that is to say, of the administrative justice, charged to take care that the tax-payer should not be burdened beyond his ability; that those having property on the bank of a rivulet or in a street, should not be exposed to encroachments; that the contractor for works to be paid for by the town or the State should find a judge of his contracts with the commune or the government—a difficult matter, the ordinary tribunals being admitted to be improper for deciding this kind of case. The principle of a judicious division of powers was again applied here with great advantage. The prefect, the sub-prefect, the *maire*, charged with the administrative action, might be suspected of partiality, inclined to make their will prevail, for the injured applicant for justice usually has to complain of their own acts. The councils of department, of arrondissement, and of commune, might and ought to appear objectionable also, for they most frequently have a contrary interest to the plaintiff. The administration of justice, moreover, is a long and continual labour, and neither the councils of department nor the communal councils were meant hereafter to be permanent. The First Consul wanted them for about a fortnight in the year, just long enough to submit their affairs to them, to take their advice, to make them vote their expenses. What was wanted, on the contrary, was an administrative tribunal sitting without interruption. A special court was, therefore, instituted, a tribunal of four or five judges, sitting by the side of the prefect, judging with him, a sort of miniature Council of State, expounding the law to the prefect, as the Council of State lends its legal knowledge to ministers, subject, moreover, to the jurisdiction of this Supreme Council by way of appeal. These are the tribunals still called at the present time councils of prefecture, and the equity of which has never been disputed.

Such was the provincial and communal government in France: a single head, prefect, sub-prefect, or *maire* transacting all the business; a deliberative council, the council of department, of

arrondissement, or of commune, voting the local expenses; then a small judicial body, placed beside the prefect merely to dispense administrative justice; a government subordinate, in an absolute manner, to the general government in all affairs of the State, superintended and directed, but having its own views in all departmental and communal affairs. Order has not ceased to reign, any more than justice, since this excellent and simple institution has existed among us, that is to say, for nearly half a century: be it understood, however, that the words order and justice, like all the words of human language, have but a relative value, and signify that there have been in France, in the administrative department, as little disorder, as little injustice, as can possibly be wished in a great country.

The First Consul naturally desired that the prefects, sub-prefects, and *maires* should be in the nomination of the executive power, for they were its direct agents; they ought to be fraught with its will; and even in local affairs which they had to manage, according to local views, it was requisite that they should render them subservient to the general policy of the State. But it would not have been natural for the executive power to nominate the members of the councils of department, of arrondissement, and of commune, charged to check the agents of the administration, and to vote them supplies. It was the Constitution which led him to this claim, and which justified it. "Confidence must come from below," said M. Sieyès; "power must come from above." According to this maxim, the nation gave its confidence by inscription in the lists of notability; the supreme authority conferred power by choosing its agents out of these lists. The Senate was charged to elect all the political deliberative bodies. Now the councils, engaged with local interests, being considered as forming part of the general administration of the Republic, the executive power, according to the Constitution, was to nominate them, and to select them out of the lists of notability. By virtue, therefore, of the spirit, and even of the letter of the Constitution, the First Consul was to choose out of the lists of the departmental notability the members of the councils of department; out of the lists of the notability of arrondissement the members of the councils of arrondissement; lastly, out of the lists of the communal notability the members of the municipal councils. This power, excessive in ordinary times, was necessary at this moment. Election, in fact, was as impossible for the formation of the local councils, as it was for the formation of the great political assemblies. It would but have given rise to mischievous agitations, and yielded petty triumphs to all the extreme parties, instead of producing a peaceful and salutary fusion of all the moderate parties—a fusion which was

indispensable for founding a new society with the collected wrecks of the old.

The judicial organisation was planned with equal skill. It had the twofold object of placing justice nearer to those who needed it, and, at the same time, of ensuring to them, above the local justice, if they chose to have recourse to it, tribunals of appeal, distant, but placed high, and possessing intelligence and impartiality, in proportion to the height of their position.

Our first revolutionary legislators, owing to the aversion excited by the parliaments, had suppressed the courts of appeal, and placed in each department a single tribunal, presenting a first step of jurisdiction for litigants (*justiciables*) of the department, and a second step of jurisdiction, a tribunal of appeal, for the neighbouring departments. The appeal was made, not from an inferior tribunal to a superior tribunal, but from a neighbouring tribunal to a neighbouring tribunal. Below, were the justices of peace; above, the Court of Cassation. The single tribunal for the department being found too far distant for those who had occasion to resort to it, the competence of justices of peace had been extended, so as to dispense the citizens from going too often to the chief town. There had also been instituted four or five hundred correctional tribunals, charged with repressing petty misdemeanours. The criminal jury sat at the chief town, the seat of the central tribunal.

This judicial organisation had not succeeded better than the cantonal municipalities. The justices of peace, whose competence had been extended too far, were not equal to their task. The courts of the first class, being seated at the chief town, were placed too far off; the courts of appeal became nearly illusory, for appeal is useless, unless it be to a tribunal of superior intelligence. Supreme courts, like the parliaments formerly, like the royal courts at the present day, numbering among their members many eminent magistrates, and around them a renowned bar, present a superiority of knowledge to which one may be tempted to recur; but to appeal from one tribunal of first instance to another tribunal of first instance is preposterous. The tribunals of correctional police were likewise too numerous, and confined, moreover, to a single purpose. It was evidently necessary to reform this judicial organisation. The First Consul, adopting the ideas of his colleague, Cambacérès, to whom he lent, on this occasion, the support of his sound sense and of his courage, caused that organisation to be adopted, which exists at the present day.

The circumscription of *arrondissement*, which had just been devised for the departmental administration, offered very great facility for the judicial administration. It presented the means of creating a first local court, placed very near to the

litigants, without prejudice to the right of recurring to a court of appeal, placed farther off, and higher. There was instituted, therefore, a tribunal of first instance for each *arrondissement*, forming a first degree of jurisdiction; then, without fear of appearing to re-establish the ancient parliaments, the government determined to create tribunals of appeal. One for each department would be too much in point of number, too little as regarded the elevation of jurisdiction. Twenty-nine were created: this gave them nearly the importance of the ancient parliaments, and they were stationed in places which had formerly enjoyed the presence of those supreme courts. This was a restoration of an advantage to the localities which had been deprived of it. They were old depositaries of judicial traditions, the wrecks of which deserved to be collected. The bars of Aix, Dijon, Toulouse, Bordeaux, Rennes, and Paris, were so many constellations of science and of talent, which it was necessary to light up again.

The tribunals of first instance, established in each department, were charged, at the same time, with the correctional police, which rendered them doubly useful, and placed civil and repressive justice at the first step in the *arrondissement*. Criminal justice, always confided to the jury, was to be administered in the chief town of the department only, by means of judges detaching themselves from the tribunals of appeal, and coming to direct the jury; in short, to hold assizes. This part was not completed till a later period.

The department of justice, called the justice of peace, was to be reduced to a more limited competence, by means of the preceding arrangements. The law destined to reform it was deferred till the following session, for it was impossible to do everything at once. But the determination was to retain, not without improving it, that justice of the people, paternal, expeditious, and not expensive. Above the judicial edifice was kept, with some modifications, and a repressive jurisdiction over all the magistrates, the Tribunal of Cassation, one of the best institutions of the French Revolution—a tribunal which is not destined to decide a third time what the tribunals of first instance and appeal have already tried twice, but which, disregarding the merits of the suit, intervenes only when any doubt arises relative to the construction of the law, determines that construction by a series of decrees, and thus adds to the unity of the text, emanating from the legislature, the unity of interpretation emanating from a supreme jurisdiction, common to the whole territory.

It is, therefore, from this year 1800—a year so eventful—that our judicial organisation takes date: it has since consisted of nearly two thousand *juges de paix*, popular magistrates,

dispensing justice to the poor at little expense; of nearly three hundred tribunals of first instance, one for each *arrondissement*, dispensing civil and correctional justice at the first step; of twenty-nine supreme tribunals,\* dispensing civil justice on appeal, and criminal justice by means of detached judges, who repair to the chief town of each department to hold assizes; lastly, of the Court of Cassation, placed above the whole judicial hierarchy, interpreting the laws, and completing the unity of legislation by the unity of jurisprudence.

The two laws in question were too urgently required, and too ably conceived to meet with serious obstacles. They had, nevertheless, to sustain more than one attack in the *Tribunate*. Paltry objections were raised against the administrative system proposed. Little complaint was made of the concentration of authority in the hands of prefects, sub-prefects, *maires*, for that was in unison with the ideas of the day, and copied from the Constitution, which placed one sole chief at the head of the State; but there were persons who complained of the creation of three steps in the administrative ladder—the department, the *arrondissement*, the commune. They alleged, in particular, that the commune ought not to be reconstituted, because there would not be found *maires* sufficiently well informed. It was, however, the restoration of domestic authority, and, in this point of view, the most popular conception that could be devised. As for the judicial organisation, some said it was a restoration of parliaments; they complained, in particular, of the jurisdiction attributed to the *Tribunal of Cassation* over the inferior magistrates—all of them objections scarcely worth remembering. The two laws proposed were nevertheless adopted. Twenty or thirty voices, composing the bulk of the opposition in the *Tribunate*, voted against these laws, but three-fourths declared in favour of them. By the Legislative Body they were adopted almost unanimously. The law relative to the departmental administration took the date, so celebrated ever since, of the 28th *Pluviôse*, year VIII. That relating to the judicial organisation was dated 27th *Ventôse*, year VIII.

The First Consul, having no intention to leave them a dead letter in the *Bulletin des Lois*, nominated forthwith the prefects, sub-prefects, and *maires*. He was liable to commit more than one mistake, as must invariably happen when a great number of functionaries are hastily chosen at once. But an enlightened and vigilant government soon rectifies any errors in its first appointments. It is sufficient if the general spirit of them has

\* We here give only approximative numbers, because the number of the tribunals has varied incessantly since that period, in consequence of the changes of territory which France has undergone. At the present time, for instance, there are but twenty-seven royal courts, or tribunals of appeal.

been good. Now, the spirit of these appointments was excellent; it was at once firm, impartial, and conciliatory. The First Consul picked out from among all parties men reputed to be honest and capable, excluding only such as were violent, and even selecting some of the latter, if experience and time had led them back to moderation, which then formed the essential characteristic of his policy. He called to prefectures—which were important and well-paid offices, for to some of them were attached salaries of 12,000, 15,000, and as much as 24,000 francs; equivalent to double what these amounts would be at present—to prefectures he called persons who had figured with credit in the great political assemblies, and who clearly indicated the tendency of his selections; for men, if they are not either things or principles, represent them, at least, in the eyes of the people. The First Consul appointed at Marseilles, for example, M. Charles Lacroix, ex-minister of foreign affairs; at Saintes, M. Français, of Nantes; at Lyons, M. Verninhac, formerly ambassador; at Nantes, M. Letourneur, late a member of the Directory; at Brussels, M. de Pontécoulant; at Rouen, M. Beugnot; at Amiens, M. Quinette; at Ghent, M. Faypoult, formerly minister of the finances. All these persons, and others, who were picked out from among the Constituent Assembly, the Legislative Assembly, the Convention, or the Five Hundred, from among the ministers, directors, and ambassadors of the Republic, were fitted to confer lustre on the new administrative functions, and to give to the government of the provinces the importance which it deserves to have. Most of them retained their places during the whole reign of the First Consul and Emperor. One of them, M. de Jessaint, was still prefect four years ago. For the prefecture of Paris the First Consul chose M. Frochot. He gave him, for colleague at the prefecture of police, M. Dubois, a magistrate, whose energy was useful in clearing the capital of all the evil-doers whom the parties had vomited forth into its bosom.

The same spirit presided over the judicial appointments. Honourable names, chosen from the ancient bar, the ancient magistracy, were combined, as much as possible, with new names borne by men of probity. When he could adorn these posts with striking names, the First Consul never failed to do so, for he was fond of *éclat* in everything, and the time had arrived when it was possible, without too much danger, to borrow from the past. A magistrate of the name of d'Aguesseau was first on the list of judicial nominations, in quality of president of the tribunal of appeal of Paris, now the Royal Court. No sooner were these functionaries appointed, than they received orders to set out immediately to take possession of their posts, and to contribute, each in his line, to the work of reorganisation, which the young

general made his constant occupation, of which he purposed to make his glory, and which, even after his prodigious victories, has, in fact, remained his most solid glory.

It was necessary to attend to everything at once in that society, turned completely topsy-turvy. The emigrants, at the same time so criminal and so unfortunate, just objects alike of interest and aversion, for in their ranks were to be found men cruelly persecuted, and bad Frenchmen who had conspired against their country—the emigrants deserved the particular attention of the government. According to the last legislative enactment, a decree of the Directory or of the departmental administrations was sufficient to place any absent individual on the list of emigrants; from that moment all the property of such absent person was confiscated, and, if he was ever found upon the territory of the Republic, the law condemned him to death. A great number of persons, who had really emigrated, or only concealed themselves, not having been yet inscribed on the fatal list, either because they had been forgotten, or because no enemy happened to denounce them, were liable to be still inscribed there. Many lived in a state of perpetual alarm. To place them on that list at this time, it was sufficient for that enemy once to fall in with them, and they were then exposed to the operation of the laws of proscription. As for those who had been inscribed deservedly or not, they were arriving in great numbers to obtain their erasure. Their rash eagerness attested the confidence that was placed in the humanity of the government, but gave offence to certain revolutionists, some of whom had outrages against the returning emigrants to reproach themselves with, while others had acquired possession of their property. This was a new source of disorder; and, if it was necessary to cease to proscribe, it was equally necessary not to expose men who had taken part in the Revolution, even violently, to lead an uneasy life. To all those who had compromised themselves for it, the Revolution owed an entire security; for, unfortunately, men are in general either coldly selfish, or violent partisans of the cause which they have espoused, and, in this latter case, moderation is not their usual merit.

This state of things called urgently for a remedy. The government presented a bill (*projet de loi*), the first clause of which was designed to close the famous list of emigrants. From the 4th Nivôse, year VIII. (December 25, 1799), the day on which the Constitution was put in force, the list was declared to be closed; that is to say, the fact of absence posterior to that date could no longer be construed as emigration, and visited with the same penalties. People were permitted, in future, to absent themselves, to go from France to

foreign countries, to come from foreign countries into France, without its being a punishable offence; for it is true, that for ten years to absent oneself had been a crime. Liberty to go and come was thus restored to all the citizens.

To this first clause was added the following: persons who had incurred, more or less, the charge of emigration, some of whom had quitted the territory of the Republic but for a moment, others merely concealed themselves to escape persecution, and who had fortunately been omitted in the list of emigrants, could not thenceforward be inscribed, unless by virtue of a decision of the ordinary tribunals; that is to say, of the jury. This was closing the list, in some measure, for them also; for, with the present spirit of the tribunals, there was no danger of its being increased by new names.

Lastly, while those who had not yet been inscribed were handed over to the tribunals, and the guarantees of ordinary justice were thus ensured to them, those who, having been unduly inscribed, or, alleging that they had been so, claimed their erasure, were referred to the administrative authority. Here the indulgent intention of the new government in regard to them was perceptible; for the new administrative authorities chosen by it, full of its spirit, could not fail to lend a favourable ear to claims of this kind. It was sufficient, in fact, to produce certificates of residence in any place whatever in France, certificates frequently false, to prove that one had been unjustly declared absent, and get one's name erased. With the general disposition to violate tyrannical laws, this method of obtaining erasure could not fail of succeeding. Emigrants desirous of obtaining their erasure were, moreover, allowed to enter France, under the *surveillance* of the political police. In the language of the time, this was called obtaining *surveillances*; great numbers of them were delivered; and thus the emigrants who were in most haste were enabled to anticipate the moment of their erasure. These *surveillances* even became a definitive recall for most of those who availed themselves of them.

As for the emigrants whose names could not be removed from the fatal list, on account of the notoriety of their emigration, the existing laws in regard to them were retained. The spirit of the time was such, that no other course could be pursued; for, if one felt pity for unfortunate persons, one was irritated against guilty men, who had left the French territory to bear arms against their native country, or to bring upon it the arms of foreigners. For the rest, in all cases, the erased or not erased had no claim upon their properties which had been sold. The sales were irrevocable, both by virtue of the Constitution, and in consequence of the dispositions of the new law. Those who had obtained their erasure, and whose property had been



sequestered without being sold, could alone indulge a hope of its eventual recovery.

Such was the law proposed and adopted by an immense majority, notwithstanding some censures in the *Tribunate* from those who deemed that too much favour, or not enough, was shown in it to the emigrants.

Among the legal enactments then in force, which appeared intolerably tyrannical, was the interdiction of the right to bequeath property by will. The then existing laws allowed a dying person to dispose of no more than one-tenth of his fortune, if he had children, and of one-sixth, if he had none. These dispositions had been the result of the first revolutionary indignation against the abuses of the ancient French society, aristocratic society, in which paternal vanity, desirous sometimes to provide for an eldest son, sometimes to force the affections of his children by ill-assorted matches, despoiled some for the benefit of others. Giving way to one of those gusts of indignation so common to the human mind, the government, instead of reducing the paternal authority within just limits, had completely fettered it. A father could no longer reward or punish. He could, if he had children, dispose of nothing, or very little more, in favour of him who had deserved all his affection; and what is more extraordinary, if he had only nephews, near or distant, he could not give away more than an almost insignificant part of his fortune, namely, a sixth. This was a downright outrage on the right of property; and one of the severities of the revolutionary system that was most keenly felt; for Death sweeps off victims every day, and thousands expired without having the power to obey the dictates of their hearts in behalf of those who served, attended, cheered them in their old age.

It was not possible that such a reform as this could be delayed till the *Civil Code* should be drawn up. A law was proposed for re-establishing the right to dispose of property by will within certain limits. By virtue of this law, the dying father who had fewer than four children might dispose by will of a fourth of his fortune, of a fifth if he had fewer than five, and so on in the same proportion. He might dispose of half when he had only ascending or collateral relations, of the whole when he had no kindred qualified to inherit.

This measure was most attacked in the *Tribunate*, particularly by *Andrieux*, an honest, sincere man, but more sparkling than enlightened. He alleged that it was a return to the abuses of the right of primogeniture, to the violences practised under the ancient system upon children of rank, &c. This law passed, like the others, by an immense majority.

By another law the government instituted a tribunal of prizes, which had become indispensable for rendering impartial justice

to neutrals and for conciliating them by better treatment. Lastly, it called the attention of the two assemblies to the laws concerning the finances.

On this point there was little to say to the Legislative Body, the two legislative commissions having already passed the requisite laws. The administrative operations undertaken by the government in pursuance of these laws, with a view to reorganise the finances, were scarcely a subject for discussion. At any rate, it was necessary to settle, were it but for form's sake, the budget of the year VIII. If the collection had been regular, if the taxes imposed had been punctually paid, and not only paid by those on whom they were assessed, but faithfully handed over by the depositaries of the public money, the finances of the State would have been in a tolerable condition. The ordinary taxes might produce about 430,000,000 f.; and this was the amount to which the government hoped to reduce the public expenditure in time of peace; nay, it even flattered itself with the prospect of bringing it down considerably lower. Experience soon proved that it was not possible, even in time of peace, to keep it under 500,000,000 f.; but it proved also that it would be easy to raise that sum from the taxes, without increasing the rates. This estimate does not include the expenses of collection or the local expenses, which would raise the budget of that period, calculating as we now do, to 600,000,000 or 630,000,000 f.

It was only with reference to the war expenditure that the insufficiency of the receipts was great and certain; and in this there is nothing extraordinary, for it is the same everywhere. In no country whatever can war be carried on with the ordinary revenues of peace. If it could be done, it would be a proof that in time of peace the taxes were unnecessarily high. But, owing to the confusion of late years, nobody could tell, if, with war, the budget would amount to 600,000,000, 700,000,000, or 800,000,000 f. On this point each made different conjectures. Experience proved likewise that the addition of about 150,000,000 f. to the ordinary budget would be sufficient to defray the expenses of the war, that is, with victorious armies living in an enemy's country. The budget of the year was therefore estimated at 600,000,000 f. for receipts as well as expenditure. As the ordinary revenues amounted to 430,000,000 f., there was a deficiency of 170,000,000 f. But this was not the real difficulty. On emerging from a financial chaos, it would have been too much to have attempted to equalise, all at once, the receipts and the expenditure. It was first necessary to get in the ordinary taxes. If this first result could be attained, the government was sure to have speedily wherewithal to meet the most urgent necessities, for credit would very soon feel the effect, and, with the paper of different kinds enumerated elsewhere, which had been created,

it had in its hands the means of obtaining from moneyed men the funds requisite for all the services. Such was the object of the unremitting efforts of M. Gaudin, seconded against all the difficulties which he encountered by the resolute and persevering will of the First Consul. The agents of the direct contributions recently established displayed the greatest activity. The assessments were far advanced, and already in the course of collection. The bills of the receivers-general began to find their way into the coffers of the treasury, and to be discounted at a rate of interest that was not over usurious. The difficulty in carrying out this system of bills consisted always in the quantity of paper circulating, which it was difficult to ascertain, especially with reference to each general receipt. A receiver who ought to gather 20,000,000 f., for example, could not sign bills for that sum, if he had to take 6,000,000 or 8,000,000 f. in dead assets, in *bons d'arrérage*, *bons de réquisition*, &c. The minister applied himself to withdraw these papers, to estimate what amount in them was likely to figure in each general receipt, and to make the receivers-general sign bills for the sum in cash which, as he calculated, would come into their coffers.

During this same session, there was instituted a new class of accountable officers destined to ensure the more punctual transmission of moneys to the treasury; these were the receivers of *arrondissement*. Hitherto there had been no other intermediate person between the collectors placed near the tax-payers and the receiver-general residing in the chief town, than the clerks of receipts, agents of the receiver-general, dependents of his, telling the truth to him alone. It was, nevertheless, one of the points of passage where the payment of money into the public chests might be best watched and ascertained. This point had been unfortunately neglected. Particular receivers were now appointed in each *arrondissement*, dependent on the State, bound to report to it what they received and what they paid to the receiver-general, well-informed and disinterested witnesses as to the sums actually collected, for they made no profit by the stoppage of the public funds in the hands of the accountable officers. From this institution the government derived the advantage of being more accurately informed of the state of the receipts, and of getting into its hands new securities in ready money, which would be a matter of indifference now, but was not so then; lastly, it had the further advantage of introducing the system of circumscription by *arrondissement*, recently devised. Civil and correctional justice and a considerable part of the communal administration had been already established at the centre of the *arrondissement*; by fixing there also part of the financial administration greater benefit was derived from this circumscription, which certain persons alleged to be only an

arbitrary subdivision of territory. Since it had, on certain accounts, been deemed indispensable, one could not do better than multiply the use of it, and render it real, instead of artificial, as it was accused of being. The prefects and sub-prefects had orders to visit the receivers, and, by inspecting their books, to check the punctuality of their payments. For this there is now, fortunately, no occasion; but, at the period which we are describing, when everything was but roughly sketched, it was applying useful stimulants to accountable officers, to send prefects and sub-prefects to inspect their chests.

The reorganisation of the finances could not, therefore, proceed more rapidly. But public assemblies appreciate only realised results. People could not see all the truly useful things introduced into the interior of the administration. In the *Tribunate* they descanted endlessly on the great question of the equalisation of the receipts and the expenditure; they complained of the deficit; they brought forward a thousand schemes, and there were members so irrational as to propose to negative the financial measures under discussion, till the government should find some expedient for securing equilibrium between the receipts and the expenditure. But all these propositions led to no results. The proposed laws were adopted by a great majority in the *Tribunate*, and almost unanimously in the *Legislative Body*.

An institution, worthy of being mentioned in history, was added to those, the creation of which has already been recorded; this was the *Bank of France*. The old discounting establishments had perished amidst the disorders of the Revolution; it was not possible, however, for Paris to dispense with a bank. In every commercial centre, where a certain activity prevails, there is wanted a convenient circulating medium for payments, that is to say, a paper money, and an establishment discounting, on a large scale, the bills of merchants. These two branches of business, indeed, work well together; for the cash received, in exchange for circulating notes, furnishes the very funds that may be lent to the community in the shape of discounts. In fact, wherever there is any business doing, however inconsiderable, a bank must prosper, if it discounts none but good paper, and if it issues no more notes than are wanted; in short, if it confines its operations to the legitimate wants of the place where it is established. This was what required to be done in Paris, and what could not fail to succeed, if it were well done. This new bank was to do business not only with private persons, but also with the treasury, and thus if it made profits, it had also services to render. The government had recourse to the principal bankers of the capital; M. Perregaux, a financier whose name is connected with all the eminent services rendered at that time to the State, put himself at their head,

and an association of wealthy capitalists was formed for the establishment of a bank, called the Bank of France, the same that still exists. The capital was fixed at 30,000,000 francs. This bank was to be managed by fifteen directors, and a committee of three persons, since replaced by a governor. According to its statutes, it was to discount commercial paper, originating in legitimate and not fictitious transactions, to issue notes circulating like money, and to abstain from all speculations foreign to discount and bullion business. Adhering to its statutes, it has become the most flourishing establishment of the kind known in the world. We shall see presently what was done by the government to impart to the operations of this bank that energy and scope which caused it to prosper from the very first days of its existence.

While the consular government, in concert with the Legislative Body, was devoting itself to these vast labours of internal administration, the negotiations with the powers, friendly or belligerent, were continued without interruption. The letter of the First Consul to the King of England elicited an immediate answer. The First Consul had written on the 26th of December (5th Nivôse); the answer was dated the 4th of January (14th Nivôse). The resolution of the English cabinet was, in fact, taken beforehand, and it had no need to deliberate. In 1797, indeed, England might think of treating, and send Lord Malmesbury to Lille, when her finances were embarrassed, when Austria was obliged to sign the peace of the Continent at Campo-Formio: but now that the income-tax had more than replenished her exchequer, now that Austria, again at war with us, had pushed her armies to our frontiers, now that she was bent on wresting from us the important positions of Malta and Egypt, and on avenging the affront of the Texel, peace could not be very desirable to that power. She had, besides, a still stronger reason for refusing it: this was, that war suited the passions and the interests of Mr. Pitt. This celebrated head of the British cabinet had made the war with France his mission, his glory, the foundation of his political existence. If peace became necessary, he should, perhaps, be obliged to retire. He brought to the conflict that obstinacy of character which, combined with his rhetorical talents, had made him a powerful, but not very enlightened statesman. The reply could not be doubtful; it was negative and uncivil. The answer was not addressed directly to the First Consul; but, adhering to the custom, an excellent one, by-the-by, of communicating from minister to minister, the English cabinet replied in a note from Lord Grenville to M. de Talleyrand.

This note clumsily betrayed the displeasure caused to Mr. Pitt by this challenge, not to war, but to peace, addressed by the

First Consul to England. It contained a recapitulation, everlastingly repeated for several years, of the origin of the war; it imputed the first aggression to the French Republic; reproached it, in violent language, with the ravages committed in Germany, in Holland, in Switzerland, and in Italy; it made mention even of rapine practised by our generals in the latter country; and, coupled with this reproach, that of a design to overthrow, everywhere, the throne and the altar; and then, coming to the late overtures of the First Consul, the English minister said that these feigned pacific demonstrations were not the first of the same kind; that the various revolutionary governments, successively erected and overthrown for ten years past, had more than once made similar overtures; that his Majesty the King of Great Britain could not yet discover, in what was passing in France, a change of principles capable of satisfying and tranquillising Europe; that the only change which could give it complete security would be the re-establishment of the house of Bourbon; that then alone social order would appear to be out of danger; that, for the rest, the re-establishment of that house was not made the absolute condition of peace with the French Republic, but that, until new symptoms more significant and more satisfactory, England would persist in fighting as well for her own safety as for that of her allies.

This indecorous note, which was disapproved by sensible men in all countries, did little honour to Mr. Pitt; it indicated in him more passion than understanding. It proved that a new government needs many victories to make itself respected; for the present government had already gained numerous and signal victories, but evidently it needed still greater. The First Consul was not disconcerted, and, wishing to profit by the favourable position which the moderation of his conduct gave him in the eyes of the world, he returned a mild but firm answer, not again in the form of a letter to the king, but in the form of a despatch addressed to Lord Grenville, the minister for foreign affairs. Recapitulating, in a few words, the first events of the war, he proved, in very temperate language, that France had taken up arms solely for the purpose of resisting a European conspiracy, formed against her safety; admitting the calamities which the Revolution had brought upon the whole world, he insinuated, by the way, that those who had persecuted the French Republic with such rancour ought, by right, to reproach themselves with being the real cause of the violences so often deplored. "But," added he, "what is the use of reverting to these circumstances? Here is now a government disposed to put an end to the war; is the war to be endless, because this or the other was the aggressor? And, unless there is a desire to render it interminable, ought not an end to be put to these incessant

recriminations? Assuredly no one can hope to obtain from France the re-establishment of the Bourbons; is it, then, decorous to make insinuations such as those which have been indulged in? And what would be said, if France, in her communications, were to call upon England to replace on the throne that family of the Stuarts which descended from it only in the last century? But, setting aside all these irritating questions," added the note dictated by the First Consul, "if you deplore, like us, the evils of war, let us agree to a suspension of arms; let us fix upon a town, Dunkirk, for instance, or any other, at your option, where the negotiators shall meet; the French government places at the disposal of Great Britain passports for the ministers whom she shall have invested with her powers."

This calm attitude produced the effect usually produced by a cool man on an angry man; it drew from Lord Grenville a reply still more vehement, more acrimonious, more illogical, than his first note. In this reply, the English minister sought to palliate the blunder which he had committed in adverting to the house of Bourbon; answered that it was not for that house that war was waged, but for the safety of all governments, and again declared that hostilities would be prosecuted without relaxation. This last communication was dated the 20th of January (30th Nivôse). There was not another word to be said. General Bonaparte had done enough: confiding in his glory, he had not been afraid to offer peace; he had offered it, without much hope, but in perfect sincerity; and by this step he had gained the twofold advantage of unveiling the unreasonable passions of Mr. Pitt, as well to the eyes of France as to the eyes of the English opposition. Happy had it been, if he had at all times united with his power that moderation of conduct so skilfully turned to account!

The communications of Austria were more decorous, without affording more hope of peace. That power, not imagining that the intentions of the First Consul, though very pacific, could go so far as the relinquishment of Italy in her favour, was resolved to continue the war; but, acquainted with the conqueror of Castiglione and Rivoli, knowing that whoever had him for adversary must not be too confident of victory, she would not bar every way to ulterior negotiations.

As if Austria had an understanding with England respecting form, the answer of the emperor to the First Consul was a despatch from M. Thugut to M. de Talleyrand. This despatch was dated the 15th of January (25th Nivôse). The substance was the same as that of the English notes. If war was carried on, it alleged that it was only to preserve Europe from a general convulsion: Austria wished for nothing more than to see France disposed to peace; but what guarantee did she offer for her new

dispositions? It was admitted, however, that, under the First Consul, there was reason to hope for more moderation at home and abroad, more stability of purpose, more fidelity to engagements made; and that there would thence result more chances for a solid and lasting peace. This happy change was expected from his eminent talents; but, without saying so, it was insinuated that, when it should be completely effected, it would be time enough to think of negotiating.

The First Consul, acting with Austria as with England, was not to be put off with this evasive explanation. Without being discouraged by the vagueness of the answer, he resolved to reduce the cabinet of Vienna to the necessity of giving a positive explanation, and of refusing or accepting peace in a categorical manner. On the 28th of February (9th Ventôse), M. de Talleyrand was directed to write to M. de Thugut, and to offer to take for the basis of negotiations the treaty of Campo-Formio. This treaty, he said, had been an act of great moderation towards the Emperor of Austria on the part of General Bonaparte; for having it in his power, in 1797, to extort great sacrifices from that prince, owing to the threatening position of the French army at the gates of Vienna, he had, in the hope of a durable peace, preferred moderate advantages to more extensive advantages; he had even incurred the censure of the Directory, added the French minister, by his clemency to the imperial court. Lastly, M. de Talleyrand declared that Austria should receive in Italy the indemnifications which, by the treaty of Campo-Formio, were promised her in Germany.

To comprehend the drift of the propositions of the First Consul, we must recollect that the treaty of Campo-Formio gave, to France, Belgium and Luxemburg; to the Cisalpine Republic, Lombardy, Mantua, the Legations, &c.; and that Austria received, by way of indemnification, Venice and the greater part of the Venetian States. With respect to the line of the Rhine, embracing, besides Belgium and Luxemburg, the countries comprised between the Meuse, the Moselle, and the Rhine, in short, what we now call the Rhenish Provinces, Austria was to mediate for the purpose of obtaining the cession of them to France by the Germanic Empire. Austria, on her own part, ceded, henceforward, the county of Falkenstein, situated between Lorraine and Alsace, and engaged to open to the French troops the gates of Mayence, which she occupied on behalf of the Empire. By way of compensation, Austria was to receive the bishopric of Salzburg, contiguous to Bavaria, when the ecclesiastical provinces should be secularised. These various arrangements were to be negotiated at the congress of Rastadt, terminated so tragically in 1799 by the murder of the French plenipotentiaries. Such was the treaty of Campo-Formio.



In offering this treaty as the basis of a new negotiation, the First Consul, therefore, did not resolve the question of the line of the Rhine in regard to the Rhenish Provinces; he decided only the question respecting Belgium, irrevocably ceded to France, leaving the question of the Rhenish Provinces to an ulterior negotiation with the Empire; and, by offering in Italy the compensations formerly stipulated in Germany, he insinuated that the success obtained by Austria in Italy should be taken into consideration, and have the effect of placing her in a better position in that country. He added that, for the second-rate powers of Europe, there should be stipulated a system of guarantees, calculated to restore in its full force that law of nations, on which the safety and the happiness of nations essentially depend. This was an allusion to the invasion of Switzerland, of Piedmont, of Tuscany, of the Papal States, and of Naples, for which the Directory was so bitterly reproached, and which had been made the pretext for the second coalition; it was a pretty clear offer to re-establish those different States, and thus to make Europe easy concerning the alleged invasions of the French Republic.

More could not be granted: and nothing but the need which France then had of peace could have induced the First Consul to make such offers. And, as he never did things by halves, he addressed to Austria, as well as to England, the formal proposition of a suspension of arms, not only on the Rhine, where that suspension already existed, but also on the Alps and the Apennines, where it did not yet exist.

On the 24th of March (3rd Germinal), M. de Thugut replied, and in very moderate terms, that the treaty of Campo-Formio, violated as soon as concluded, did not contain a system of pacification capable of satisfying the belligerent powers; that the true principle, adopted in all negotiations, was to take for basis the state in which the fortune of arms had left each power; that this was the only basis on which Austria could treat. M. de Thugut added that, before proceeding any farther, he had an inquiry to make relative to the form of the negotiation; that it was important for him to know whether France would admit the negotiators of all the States at war, in order to arrive at a general peace, the only one which was fair and prudent, the only one to which Austria could accede.

This language proved two things: firstly, that Austria, in proposing for the point of departure the actual state, that is to say, the situation in which the last campaign had left each power, cherished high pretensions in regard to Italy: secondly, that she would not separate from England, to whom she was closely bound by subsidiary treaties. This fidelity to England was, on her part, a duty imposed by her position, which, as we shall see by-and-by, influenced the turn of the negotiations and of the war.

Such an answer, though civil in its terms, left little hope of coming to an understanding, since it made the conduct of a power disposed to listen to some words of peace, depend on the conduct of a power determined not to listen to any. General Bonaparte, nevertheless, directed a reply to be sent to this effect: that, in offering indemnifications in Italy, for those stipulated formerly in Germany, he proposed implicitly to start, not from the *status ante bellum*, but from the *status post bellum*, that is, to take into account the successes of Austria in Italy; that the overtures made by him to England proved his desire to render the peace general; that he had little hope, however, from a negotiation common to all the belligerent powers, as England was adverse to accommodation; but that he admitted purely and simply the propositions of Austria; that he awaited, in consequence, the designation of the place where they might treat; and that, as there was a determination to continue to fight, it ought to be fixed out of the theatre of the war.

Austria declared that, such being the intentions of the French cabinet, she would communicate with her allies; but that, till she had consulted them, it would be impossible to fix upon any particular place. This was deferring the negotiation for an indefinite term.

The First Consul, in addressing these overtures to England and Austria, had not indulged in any allusion as to their result; but he wished to try the effect of pacific advances, in the first place, because he desired peace, considering it as necessary for the organisation of the new government; secondly, because he judged that this step would raise him in the estimation of France and of Europe.

His calculations were completely justified by what passed in the English parliament. Mr. Pitt, by his uncourteous manner of replying to the overtures of France, drew upon himself violent and deserved attacks. Never had the opposition of Fox and Sheridan been more nobly inspired; never had it shed such lustre, and merited more justly the esteem of the honest men of all countries.

In fact, there was scarcely any motive to justify the continuance of the war; for England was then in a position to obtain all that she could reasonably wish. It is true that she would scarcely have obtained the relinquishment of Egypt; but, as she was willing, a few months afterwards, to leave it to us (the ulterior negotiations will prove this), she might have consented to it at once; and, at this price, she would have retained her conquests, the Indies included, and she would have spared herself the immense dangers to which her obstinacy exposed her at a later period. It was, therefore, at bottom, nothing but a ministerial interest which induced the British cabinet to prosecute the war with such rancour. The animadversions of the opposition were

strong, and incessantly repeated. They demanded and obtained copies of the papers relative to the negotiation, and the most violent debates on the subject ensued. The ministers insisted that it was impossible to negotiate with the French government, because there was no safety in treating with it; that by its bad faith it had successively drawn upon itself war with the whole world, Denmark and Sweden excepted, and that its relations, even with these two countries, were impaired; that peace with this government was deceitful and ruinous, witness the States of Italy; that, after having been the aggressor towards all the princes of Europe, it designed to dethrone them all; for it was consumed by an incessant thirst for conquest and destruction; that General Bonaparte offered no more guarantees than his predecessors; that, if the new French government was no longer terrorist, it was still revolutionary, and with the French Revolution no hope of peace or truce could be indulged; that, if it could not be annihilated, it must at least be exhausted, till it was so weakened that there was nothing further to be feared from it. The English ministers, especially Lord Grenville, made use of the most insulting language in speaking of the First Consul. They treated him much as they had done Robespierre.

Fox, Sheridan, Tierney, the Duke of Bedford, and Lord Holland, replied with the highest reason to these allegations. "You ask who was the aggressor," said they, "and what signifies that? You say that it was France; France says that it was England. Must we then continue to tear each other in pieces till we can agree about this point of history? And of what consequence is it who was the aggressor, if the one whom you accuse of being so makes the first offer to lay down arms? You say that it is impossible to treat with the French government; but you yourselves sent Lord Malmesbury to Lille to treat with the Directory. Prussia and Spain have treated with the French Republic, and have had no reason to complain of it. You talk of the crimes of that government; but your ally, the court of Naples, is committing crimes infinitely more atrocious than those of the Convention; for it has not the excuse of popular excitement. You talk of ambition; but Russia, Prussia, and Austria have partitioned Poland: but Austria has just reconquered Italy, without restoring their dominions to the princes whom France had dispossessed; you are yourselves seizing India, part of the Spanish colonies, and all the Dutch colonies. Who will dare to proclaim himself more disinterested than another in this conflict of rage and avidity, in which all the States are engaged? Either you will never treat with the French Republic, or you will never find a more favourable moment than the present; for an energetic man, a man who is obeyed, has just seized the supreme power, and seems disposed to exercise it with justice and

moderation. Is it worthy of the English government to cover with abuse an illustrious personage, the head of one of the first nations in the world, and who is at least a great captain, whatever may be the vices or the virtues which time shall hereafter develop in him? Unless we say that we are determined to exhaust Great Britain, her blood, her treasures, all her most valuable resources, for the re-establishment of the house of Bourbon, we can assign no good reason for refusing to treat at this moment."

To arguments so conclusive and so clear, no reply could be given. Mr. Tierney, seizing the occasion offered by the fault which the English administration had committed, in adverting, in its notes, to the re-establishment of the house of Bourbon, made a special motion against that house. He proposed the adoption of a formal resolution, declaring the separation of the cause of England from the cause of the Bourbons, a race so pernicious to both countries, he exclaimed, to Great Britain as well as to France! "I have heard," he continued, "I have heard many partisans of the administration of Mr. Pitt assert, that the French government, not having proposed a collective negotiation, there might be just cause for refusing a separate negotiation, which would weaken by severing us from our allies; but I have not met with one who did not severely censure this manner of fixing the term of the war at the restoration of the house of Bourbon." And it is true, as Tierney said, that everybody had censured that fault, and that the cabinet of Vienna, less influenced by passion than the British cabinet, had taken good care not to imitate it. The English ministers replied that they had not introduced that condition as absolute and indispensable, but they were told, and truly, that the mention of it constituted a violation of the law of nations—an attack on the liberty of nations. "And what would you say," cried Mr. Tierney (repeating here the argument of the French cabinet), "what would you say if General Bonaparte, when victorious, should declare that he would not treat unless with the Stuarts? Besides," added he, "is it out of gratitude to the house of Bourbon that you are lavishing our blood and our treasure? Recollect the American war! Or is it not rather for the principle that it represents? Will you, then, rouse against yourselves all the passions that excited France to rise against the Bourbons? Will you draw upon yourselves the animosity of all those who will not have any more nobles—of all those who will not have any more tithes or feudal rights—of all those who have acquired national domains—of all those who have borne arms ten years for the French Revolution? Will you, then, drain to the last drop the blood of so many Frenchmen, before you think of negotiating? I move," concluded Mr. Tierney, "that England separates her cause from that of the house of Bourbon."

On another occasion, the celebrated Sheridan, always the boldest and the most pungent of speakers,—Sheridan turned the debate upon a very sore point for the British cabinet—the expedition to Holland, in consequence of which the English and Russians, defeated by General Brune, had been obliged to capitulate. “It seems,” said Mr. Sheridan, “that if our government cannot conclude treaties of peace with the French Republic, it can at least conclude capitulations. I ask it to explain to us the motives of that which it has signed for the evacuation of Holland.” Mr. Dundas, thus challenged, assigned three motives for the expedition to Holland: the first, to detach the United Provinces from France; the second, to diminish the maritime strength of France, and to augment that of England, by taking the Dutch fleet; the third, to make a useful diversion for the allies; and he added, that the British cabinet had succeeded in two points out of the three, since it had possession of the fleet, and had contributed to the victory gained at Novi, by drawing to Holland the troops destined for Italy. No sooner had the minister finished, than Sheridan, closing upon him, retorted, with incomparable point: “Yes, you credited the reports of emigrants, and risked upon the continent an English army, to cover it with disgrace. You sought to detach Holland from France, and you have attached it to her more strongly than ever, by filling it with indignation at the iniquitous seizure of its fleet and of its colonies. You have possession, you say, of the Dutch fleet; but by an unheard of, an odious, proceeding, by exciting the crews to mutiny, by exhibiting a spectacle of the most mischievous kind, that of sailors revolting against their officers, violating that discipline which constitutes the strength of navies and the greatness of our nation. You have thus ignominiously seized on that fleet, not for England, at any rate, but for the stadtholder; for you have been obliged to declare that it was for him, and not for England. Lastly, you have rendered a service to the Austrian army at Novi; that is possible; but do you boast, then, ministers of the King of Great Britain, of having saved an Austrian army by giving up an English army to slaughter?”

These virulent attacks did not prevent Mr. Pitt from obtaining immense financial supplies, about £44,000,000 sterling (nearly double the budget of France at that period); the authorisation to grant subsidies to Austria, and to the States of Southern Germany: important additions to the income-tax, which already produced £7,200,000 sterling per annum: a new suspension of the Habeas Corpus; and, lastly, the important measure of a union with Ireland. But in England the public was deeply moved by so much sound reason and eloquence. Rational men throughout all Europe were struck by the wrongs done to

France, and, victory siding with justice, Mr. Pitt was destined ere long to atone, by severe humiliations, for the superciliousness of his policy towards the First Consul. Meanwhile, Mr. Pitt was enabled to furnish the coalition with the means for a new campaign; the last, it is true, on account of the exhaustion of the belligerent parties, and the most fiercely contested, precisely because it was to be the last.

In this critical juncture, the First Consul sought to derive from the court of Prussia all the utility that could be expected from it for the present. That court would not have been able, in the face of such powerful adversaries, to restore peace in any other way than by having recourse to an armed mediation, a part not impossible for it to play, but totally inconsistent with the views of the young king, who was applying himself to recruit his treasury and his army, while all around him were exhausting themselves. This prince had already sounded the belligerent powers, and had found them so far from the mark, that he had renounced the office of interposing between them. Besides, the Prussian cabinet had certain interested views of its own. It had no objection that France should exhaust Austria, and that she should exhaust herself, in a prolonged struggle; but it would have wished her to relinquish part of the line of the Rhine, and, contenting herself with Belgium and Luxemburg, in that quarter, not to lay claim to the Rhenish Provinces. It urged the First Consul to adopt these views, hinting that France and Prussia, if less close neighbours, would be the better friends, while the European cabinets, soothed by this moderation of France, would be the more inclined to peace. But, though the First Consul had used great reserve in explaining himself on this point, at bottom there was very little hope of deciding him to this sacrifice; and in all this the cabinet of Berlin could not perceive any prospect of such a peace as could alone satisfy Prussia, and merit her active intervention. It was, therefore, prodigal of advice, administered in a dogmatic though friendly shape, but it abstained from acting.

Still this cabinet might be useful in maintaining the neutrality of the north of Germany, in persuading as many German princes as possible to enter into that neutrality; lastly, in detaching the Emperor Paul from the coalition. As for these objects, it did labour with zeal to accomplish them, because it was solicitous to strengthen and extend the neutrality of the north of Germany, and particularly to bring over Russia to its views. Paul, ever extreme in his sentiments, became every day more exasperated against Austria and England; he declared publicly that he would certainly oblige Austria to replace the Italian princes on their thrones, which she had reconquered with the arms of Russia, and England to restore to the Order of Malta

that island fortress, which she was on the point of reducing; he manifested a strange passion for that ancient order of chivalry, and had made himself its Grand Master. He blamed the manner in which the overtures of the First Consul had been received in London and Vienna, and, from his communications with Prussia, which had become confidential, it might be perceived that he would have been glad if similar overtures had been addressed to himself. The First Consul, in fact, had not ventured upon this step, for fear of what might happen with a character such as that of the Czar. Prussia, apprised of all these particulars, communicated them to the French cabinet, which turned them to its advantage.

Before opening the campaign, for the season for military operations was approaching, the First Consul desired the attendance of M. Sandoz, the Prussian minister, and on the 5th of March (14th Ventôse) had a distinct and complete explanation with him. After recapitulating at length all that he had done for restoring peace, and all the invincible obstacles and want of courtesy which he had met with, he made known the extent of his military preparations, and, without unveiling his profound combinations, gave the Prussian minister a glimpse of the magnitude of the resources which France still possessed. He then declared that, full of confidence in Prussia, he expected her to make fresh efforts to reconcile the belligerent powers, while he should be engaged in fighting; that, in default of a general peace, of which there was little probability before a new campaign, he looked for two services from King Frederick William—the reconciliation of the Republic with Paul I., and a direct interposition with the Elector of Bavaria to withdraw that prince from the coalition. “Make up matters for us with Paul,” said General Bonaparte; “decide, at the same time, the Elector of Bavaria to refuse his troops and his territory to the coalition, and you will have rendered us two services which shall not be forgotten. If the Elector accedes to our requisitions, you may promise him all the consideration he can desire during the war, and the best treatment at the peace.”

The First Consul explained his ulterior views to the Prussian envoy. He declared to him that, the treaty of Campo-Formio being the basis offered for the future negotiation, our frontier on the side of the Rhine would be a question to be discussed afterwards with the Empire; that the independence of Holland, Switzerland, and the Italian States should be formally guaranteed. Without explaining himself upon the point where the Rhine should cease to bound the French frontier, he merely said that nobody could suppose that France would relinquish the left bank at all events above Mayence, but that, below that place, the Moselle or the Meuse might serve for boundary.

There could be no question as to France retaining Belgium and Luxemburg. He added, in conclusion, that, if Prussia rendered France the services which she was in a position to render her, he would engage to leave to the cabinet of Berlin a considerable influence in the negotiations for peace. This was, in fact, the point of which Prussia was most tenacious, for she wished to take part in these negotiations for the purpose of settling the German frontiers in the manner best suited to her views.

This communication, so seasonably and frankly made, produced the best effect in Berlin. The king replied that, with respect to the Emperor Paul, he had already employed his good offices, and would further employ them, to reconcile him with France; that, as for Bavaria, encompassed on all sides by Austria, he could do nothing; but that, if the Emperor Paul could be brought round, it might, perhaps, be possible, through the combined efforts of Prussia and Russia, to withdraw the Elector from the coalition.

After all these judiciously concerted proceedings, nothing remained but to open hostilities as speedily as possible. The season for them, however, had not yet quite arrived, and it was likely to arrive later than usual this year, because France had to reorganise her armies, in part disbanded, and Austria had to fill the chasm left by Russia in the ranks of the coalition. The First Consul thought that the moment was come for settling matters in La Vendée in the first place, for putting an end to the odious spectacle of civil war; and, in the second, for rendering disposable, and transferring to the Rhine and the Alps, the excellent troops which La Vendée detained in the interior of the Republic.

The intimations addressed to the insurgent provinces, concurrently with the offers of peace made to the foreign powers, had produced the greatest effect there. These intimations had been supported by an imposing force of about 60,000 men; drawn from Holland, from the interior, and even from Paris. The First Consul had had the boldness to stay in Paris, then full of the scum of every party, with a garrison of 2300 men: and this boldness he had carried to such a length as to publish the fact. In reply to the English ministers, who alleged that the consular government was not more solid than the preceding governments, he had printed a comparative statement of the troops in London and in Paris. The result showed that London was guarded by 14,600 men, Paris by 2300. This number was scarcely sufficient to supply the ordinary police guards, which are stationed at the great public establishments, and at the residences of the high functionaries. Evidently the name of General Bonaparte guarded Paris.

Be this as it may, the insurgent provinces found themselves



enveloped, before they were aware, by a formidable army, and thus placed between an immediate and generous peace and the certainty of a war of extermination. Messrs. d'Andigné and Hyde de Neuville, after their interviews with the First Consul, had dismissed all their illusions, and ceased to believe that he would some day re-establish the Bourbons. No more did they believe that there would be any chance of conquering such a man. M. Hyde de Neuville, who had been sent by the Count d'Artois to ascertain the state of things, determined to return to London, unwilling, for his own part, to forsake the cause of the Bourbons, but convinced of the impossibility of continuing the war, and leaving to all the leaders the advice to do what the necessity of times and places should command each of them, M. d'Andigné returned to Vendée, to report what he had seen.

The term of the suspension of arms was about to expire. It was requisite that the leaders of the royalist party should either sign a definitive peace, or decide to engage immediately in a mortal struggle with a formidable army. In 1793, in the first enthusiasm of the insurrection, they had not been able to conquer the 16,000 men of the garrison of Mayence, and had fought heroic and sanguinary battles, with no other result than to succumb at last. What could they now do against 60,000 men, the first troops in Europe, half of whom only had just been sufficient to drive the Russians and the English into the sea? Evidently nothing: and this opinion was universal in the insurgent provinces; at any rate, it was entertained, more or less, in each of them. On the left bank of the Loire, between Saumur, Nantes, and Les Sables, in short in old Vendée, drained of men and of everything, people were wearied out: there they estimated this last assumption of arms, occasioned by the weakness and the severities of the Directory, at its real value, that is to say, as a piece of folly. On the right bank, about Mans, a country which had also been the theatre of a desperate struggle, these sentiments predominated. In Lower Normandy, where the insurrection was of more recent date, where M. de Frotté, a young, active, crafty, and ambitious chief, was the leader of the royalists, a greater disposition was shown to continue the war. This was also the case in the Morbihan, where the distance from Paris, the vicinity of the sea, and the nature of the ground, offered more resources, and where Georges Cadoudal, a chief of ferocious and indomitable energy, upheld the courage of his partisans. In these two latter provinces, the more frequent communications with the English contributed to produce a more obstinate resistance.

From one end of La Vendée and Bretagne to the other, consultations were held respecting the course to be pursued. The emigrants paid by England, whose attachment to the cause was

expressed in going incessantly to and fro, and who had not to endure all the consequences of the insurrection, were in fierce quarrel with the country people, on whom the burden of the civil war pressed without intermission. The former insisted that the struggle should be kept up; the latter, on the contrary, that it should be relinquished. These representatives of an interest more English than royalist, said that the government of the Consuls must perish, like all the other revolutionary governments, after a few days of deceitful appearance; that it must perish from the disorder of the finances and of the administration; that the Russian and English armies were to send a detachment to Vendée, to lend a hand to the French royalists; that the latter, if they would but have patience for a few days, would be enabled to reap the fruit of ten years' efforts and combats; and that, by persisting, they would probably have the honour of conducting the victorious Bourbons to Paris. Those insurgents, who were not in the habit of running off to London, and living there upon English money, who stayed in the country with their peasants, who saw their estates laid waste, their houses burned, their wives and children exposed to hunger and to death—these said that General Bonaparte had never failed in what he had undertaken; that in Paris, instead of believing that all was falling into dissolution, people believed, on the contrary, that all would be retrieved by the lucky hand of the new chief of the Republic; that this Republic, which was said to be exhausted, had just shown them an army of 60,000 men; that those Russians and those English who were so extolled had recently laid down their arms before one-half of this very army; that it was easy enough in London to form fine plans, to talk of attachment and fortitude, when people were at a distance from the spot, from events, and from their consequences; that they ought to be guarded in what they said on this subject, in the presence of men who, for eight years, had borne alone the brunt of a most calamitous civil war. Some of these exhausted royalists even went so far as to insinuate that General Bonaparte, in his impulsion towards what was right, after restoring peace, putting an end to persecution, and raising the altars again, would, perhaps, re-establish the throne also; and they repeated the idle stories which had ceased to be current among the leading royalists, since the interviews between Messrs. d'Andigné and Hyde de Neuville with the First Consul, but which still found some credence among the lowest classes of the insurgent population, and contributed to reconcile their minds to the new government.

In the heart of old Vendée, there was an humble priest, the Abbé Bernier, *curé* of St. Laud, destined soon to take part in the affairs of the Republic and of the Empire, who, by superior intelligence and natural talents, had acquired a powerful

ascendency over the royalist chiefs. He had closely observed that long insurrection, which had led to nothing but calamities; he judged that the cause of the Bourbons was lost, at least for the moment; and he believed that it was not possible to save anything from the general wreck produced by the French Revolution, but the ancient altar of Christianity. Enlightened on this point by the acts of the First Consul, and by frequent communications with General Hédouville, he felt no further doubt; and he reckoned upon it that, in submitting, the royalists might ensure peace, the end of their persecutions, and toleration, at least, if not protection, for their religious worship. He, therefore, recommended submission to all the old chiefs of the left bank, and, by his influence, silenced the braggarts going and returning between La Vendée and London. A meeting took place at Montfaucon, and there, in a council of the royalist officers, the Abbé Bernier decided M. d'Autichamp, a young nobleman of distinguished bravery, but docile towards superior intelligence, to lay down arms on behalf of the province. The capitulation was signed on the 18th of January (28th Nivôse). The Republic promised an entire amnesty, respect for public worship, remission of the taxes for some time in the ravaged provinces, and erasure of all the chiefs from the list of emigrants. The royalists promised, in return, complete submission, and the immediate surrender of their arms.

On the same day, January the 18th, the Abbé Bernier wrote to General Hédouville, "Your wishes and mine are accomplished. This day, at two o'clock, peace was thankfully accepted by all the chiefs and officers of the left bank of the Loire. The right bank will undoubtedly follow this example, and the olive of peace will replace, on both banks of the Loire, the gloomy cypresses which war has planted there. I charge Messrs. de Baurollier, Duboucher, and Renou to carry you the happy tidings. I recommend them to the kindness of the government and to yours. Unjustly inscribed in the fatal list of 1793, they have been stripped of all their property. This sacrifice they have made to the necessity of circumstances, and have been on that account not the less desirous of peace. This peace is your work; maintain it, general, by justice and beneficence. Your glory and your happiness are linked to it. I will do all that lies in my power in fulfilment of your salutary intentions; wisdom commands, humanity wills it. My heart belongs entirely to the country wherein I dwell, and its happiness is the most ardent of my wishes.

BERNIER."

This example produced its effect. Two days afterwards the insurgents of the right bank, commanded by an old and brave nobleman, M. de Châtillon, and disgusted, like him, of serving

the views of England rather than the cause of royalism, submitted: all old Vendée was thus pacified. Extreme was the joy, both in the country, where royalism prevailed, and in the towns where reigned, on the contrary, the spirit of the Revolution. In several towns, such as Nantes and Angers, the royalist chiefs, wearing the tri-coloured cockade, were received in triumph, and entertained like brothers. In all quarters, people began to surrender their arms, and to submit in good earnest, under the influence of an opinion, which gradually became general, that war, without restoring the Bourbons, would lead to nothing but bloodshed and the devastation of the country; that submission, on the contrary, would ensure quiet, safety, and the re-establishment of religion, which, of all things, was most fervently desired.

In Bretagne and Normandy, however, the pacification met with greater obstacles. The war in these parts was more recent, as we have just observed, and had not so completely exhausted the courage of those engaged in it; besides, it produced there disgraceful emolument, while in La Vendée nothing accrued from it but sufferings. It was in the centre of Bretagne and towards Normandy, that all the Chouans, that is, men whom insurrection had habituated to plunder, and who could not now do without it, had taken refuge. They made war more fiercely upon the chests of the tax-collectors, upon the diligences, and upon the proprietors of national domains, than upon the Republic. They were in connection with a troop of persons of infamous character resident in Paris, and from these received the information which guided them in their expeditions. Lastly, in Le Morbihan, which was the seat of the most obstinate insurrection, Georges, the only implacable one of all the Vendean chiefs, received from the English, money and supplies of different kinds, to enable him to prolong his resistance; hence he was not at all disposed to submit.

But preparations had been made for crushing such of the royalist chiefs as would not submit. On the 21st of January (1st of Pluviôse), General Chabot, breaking the suspension of arms, marched against the bands in the centre of Bretagne, commanded by Messrs. de Bourmont and de la Prévalaye. Near the commune of Mélay, he overtook M. de Bourmont, who, at the head of 4000 Chouans, defended himself vigorously; but was, nevertheless, obliged to give way to the republicans, accustomed to put to rout other soldiers than peasants. It was not without great difficulty that he himself, after incurring the greatest danger, found means to escape. Being soon convinced that he could not do more for his own cause, he surrendered his arms on the 24th of January (4th Pluviôse).

General Chabot then marched upon Rennes, intending to proceed thence towards the extremity of Bretagne, where

General Brune was concentrating a large force. On the 25th of January (5th Pluviôse), several columns, setting out from Vannes, Auray, and Elven, under Generals Harty and Gency, fell in at Grandchamp with the bands of Georges. The two republican generals were escorting towards Vannes a convoy of corn and cattle, which they had seized in the insurgent district. The Chouans, having attempted to retake this convoy, the escorting columns enveloped them, and, in spite of the most vigorous resistance, killed 400 men and several chiefs, and completely routed them. Two days thereafter, on the 27th, 300 more Chouans perished in a very smart action at Hennebou, which utterly destroyed all the hopes of the insurrection. Very near the coast were lying an English 80-gun ship, and some frigates, which could see how chimerical were the illusions with which the British government had been amused. The truth was, each party had deceived the other, the British government in promising a new expedition like that to Holland, the Bretons in announcing a general rising. Royalists, recently landed, had great difficulty to get off in boats to the English squadron, and were received like emigrants who had promised much, but performed little. Georges was reduced to the necessity of laying down his arms, and gave up 20,000 muskets and twenty pieces of cannon, which he had just received from the English.

In Lower Normandy, Generals Gardanne and Chambarlhac, detached from the garrison of Paris, were in pursuit of M. de Frotté, a young chief full of devotion to the royalist cause, and who, like Georges, was bent on continuing the struggle. Some severe fighting took place at different points. At length, on the 25th January (5th Pluviôse), M. de Frotté was overtaken by General Gardanne, at the iron-works of Cossé, near La Motte-Fouquet, and lost many men. On the 26th (6th Pluviôse), Duboisgny, one of the chiefs, was attacked in his château of the same name, near Fougères, and like M. de Frotté, sustained considerable loss. Lastly, on the 27th (7th Pluviôse), General Chambarlhac surrounded some companies of Chouans in the environs of St. Christophe, not far from Alençon, and put them to the sword.

M. de Frotté, perceiving, like the others, but unfortunately too late, that all resistance was useless against the numerous columns which had assailed the country, M. de Frotté thought it high time to submit. He wrote, demanding peace, to General Hédouville, who, at that moment, was at Angers, and, while awaiting an answer, proposed a suspension of arms to General Chambarlhac. The latter replied that he had no powers to treat, that he would write to the government to obtain them, but that, in the meantime, he could not take it upon him to suspend hostilities, unless M. de Frotté consented to deliver up

the arms of his soldiers immediately. This was precisely what M. de Frotté had the greatest objection to do. He consented, indeed, to submit, and to sign a momentary pacification, but on condition of remaining armed, so that he might afterwards seize the first favourable occasion for recommencing the war. He even wrote letters to his lieutenants, in which, while enjoining them to surrender, he recommended to them to retain their arms. During this interval, the First Consul, irritated at the obstinacy of M. de Frotté, gave orders that no quarter should be given to him, and that an example should be made on his person. M. de Frotté, uneasy at receiving no answer to his propositions, wished to place himself in communication with General Guidal, commanding the department of the Orne, and was apprehended with six of his men while inquiring for him. The letters found upon him, which contained orders to his followers to surrender, but to keep their arms, were regarded as treachery. He was conducted to Verneuil, and given up to a military commission.

The news of his apprehension having reached Paris, a great number of intercessors beset the First Consul, and obtained an order for suspending the proceedings; this was equivalent to a pardon. But the courier bearing the order of the government arrived too late. The Constitution being suspended in the insurgent departments, M. de Frotté had been tried summarily, and, when the reprieve arrived, that young and valiant chief had already suffered the penalty of his obstinacy. The duplicity of his conduct, though clearly proved, was not so culpable but that we must deeply regret such an execution, the only one, by-the-by, which stained this happy conclusion of the civil war with blood.

From that day, the departments of the West were entirely pacified. The discretion of General Hédouville, the vigour and promptness of the means employed, the weariness of the insurgents, the mixture of confidence and fear infused into them by the First Consul, brought about this rapid pacification. It was completely finished by the end of February 1800 (the first days of Ventôse). The disarming was carried into effect everywhere. There were left only highway robbers, whom active and relentless justice was soon to overtake. The troops on duty in the West were put in march for Paris; they were required to carry out the vast designs of the First Consul.

The Constitution, suspended in the four departments of the Loire-Inférieure, Ille et Vilaine, Morbihan, and Côtes-du-Nord, was again put in force, and most of the chiefs who came to lay down their arms, were successively drawn to Paris, with the intention of placing them in communication with the First Consul. The latter was well aware that it was not sufficient to wrest the arms from their hands, but that it was necessary to master their

spirits, susceptible of enthusiasm, and to direct them toward some noble object. He wished to draw the royalist chiefs along with him in the immense career opened at that moment to all the French, to lead them to fortune, to glory, by the path of danger, which they were accustomed to travel. He sent them invitations to come to see him. His renown, which awakened a strong desire to approach him in all those who had opportunity for doing so; his beneficence, already much extolled in La Vendée, and to which there had been occasion to appeal in behalf of the numerous victims of the civil war, were, with the royalist chiefs, so many honourable motives for visiting him. The First Consul admitted, and favourably received, in the first place, the Abbé Bernier, then Messrs. de Bourmont, d'Autichamp, de Châtillon, and, lastly, Georges Cadoudal himself. He took particular notice of the Abbé Bernier, and resolved to attach him to himself, by employing him in difficult affairs of the Church. He conversed frequently with the military chiefs, touched them by his noble language, and induced some of them to serve in the French armies. He even found means to win the heart of M. de Châtillon, who returned to his retreat, married, and became the usual intercessor, and one always listened to, for his fellow-citizens, when they had any act of justice or humanity to solicit of the First Consul. It is by means of glory, clemency, and beneficence, that an end is put to revolutions.

Georges alone withstood this high influence. When he was conducted to the Tuileries, the aide-de-camp ordered to introduce him conceived such apprehensions from his look, that he deemed it unsafe to shut the door of the First Consul's cabinet, and went every now and then to steal a glance at what was passing. The interview was long. In vain General Bonaparte addressed the words "native country and glory" to the ears of Georges; in vain he held out even the bait of ambition to the heart of that fierce champion of the civil war; he had no success, and he felt convinced himself that he had failed when he looked at the face of his visitor. Georges, on leaving him, set out for England with M. Hyde de Neuville. Several times, when giving his fellow-traveller an account of this interview, he exclaimed, showing his vigorous arms, "What a blunder I committed in not strangling that fellow!"

This prompt pacification of La Vendée produced a strong effect on the public mind. Some malevolent persons, who would not account for it by its natural causes, that is to say, by the energy of the physical means employed, by the wisdom of the moral means, and by the influence of the great name of the First Consul, asserted that secret conventions had been made with the Vendéans, in which some important satisfaction had been promised them. They did not say plainly, but they insinuated.

that this would, perhaps, turn out to be much more than the re-establishment of the principles of the ancient system, that of the Bourbons themselves. It was the newsmongers of the revolutionary party who circulated these ridiculous stories: but sensible people, appreciating better the acts of General Bonaparte, said to themselves that men never did such great things for others, and felt convinced that, if he was not labouring solely for France, it was at least for himself, and not for the Bourbons. On the whole, the pacification of La Vendée was, in the estimation of all, one of the most fortunate events, foreboding a more important and more difficult peace—the peace of Europe.

Before opening the campaign this year, the First Consul hastened to close the session of the Legislative Body, and to press the adoption of the numerous bills (*projets de loi*) which he had presented. Some members of the Tribune complained of the rapidity with which they were required to discuss and vote. "We are," said Sedillez, an impartial and moderate man, "we are hurried away in a *whirlwind of urgency*, the rapid movement of which is directed towards the object of our wishes. Is it not better to give way to the impetuosity of this movement than to run the risk of impeding its progress? Next year we shall examine, with more deliberation, the bills (*projets*) presented, and we shall rectify what may need rectifying." Everything, in fact, was advancing hastily towards that goal which the First Consul had proposed to himself. The laws voted were carried into execution; the functionaries appointed were repairing to their posts. The new prefects entered upon office, and the administration resumed, in all its parts, a harmony, an activity, which it had never before had. The arrears of taxes flowed into the coffers of the treasury, since the completion of the assessments enabled the collectors to demand payment from the tax-payers in legal form. Every day, new measures denoted more clearly the political march of the government. A second list of proscripts had just obtained the favour of recall. Among these figured a number of writers. Messrs. de Fontanes, de la Harpe, Suard, Sicard, Michaud, Fiévée, were recalled from exile, or authorised to leave their retreats. The members of the Constituent Assembly, known for having voted the abolition of the feudal institutions, were exempted from all the severities launched at them under the Convention and the Directory. A famous proscript of the 18th of Fructidor, who negotiated and signed the first treaty of peace concluded by the Republic, the ex-director, Barthélemy, was, on the proposition of the Consuls, nominated Senator. Lastly, another proscript of the same date, Carnot, recently returned from exile, and since then appointed inspector of reviews, was now appointed minister of war, in lieu of General Berthier, who was setting out to take the command



of one of the armies of the Republic. The name of Carnot was then a great military name, with which was associated the recollection of the victories of the Convention in '93; and, though the name of General Bonaparte was sufficient to make the coalition tremble, still that of Carnot, added to his, produced an additional sensation among the foreign staffs.

The session drawing towards a close, the opposition in the Tribunate made a last effort, which caused some agitation, though it was repulsed by a great majority. The Legislative Body was to sit but four months. No term had been fixed for the sessions of the Tribunate. That body, therefore, was at liberty to meet, though the absence of the Legislative Body left it without occupation. A motion was made that it should create an employment for its time by means of the petitions which it alone was charged to receive, and the wishes which it was authorised to express concerning matters of general interest. M. Benjamin Constant proposed to refer these petitions to distinct commissions, to keep them continually at work, and to reserve for themselves, by this method, not only the discussion of all the acts of the government, a thing perfectly legitimate in itself, but their permanent discussion during the twelve months of the year. This proposition was negatived, in so far as it was objectionable. It was decided that the Tribunate should meet once a fortnight, to hear a report on petitions, and that this report should be drawn up by the bureau of the assembly, composed of the president and the secretaries. Confined within these limits, the proposition gave no cause for uneasiness.

With the exception of this last effort, the close of the session was perfectly peaceable, even in the Tribunate. The plans of the government had there obtained such a majority, that it required very great susceptibility to be angry with that body for the opposition of a score of its members. The First Consul, disposed as he was not to put up with anything unpleasant, resolved to let that pass. Thus this first session, termed that of the year VIII., realised, in no respect, the fears which certain propagators of bad news affected to entertain. If, at a later period, things had continued at this point, people would have made shift with this last semblance of deliberative assemblies. That alarmed generation and the chief whom it had adopted would alike have supported them.

Shortly before the close of the session, the First Consul took a measure relative to the periodical press, which would now-a-days be nothing less than utterly impracticable, but which, at that time, owing to the silence of the Constitution, was a measure perfectly legal, and, owing to the spirit of the time, nearly insignificant. The Constitution, in fact, took no notice

of the periodical press, and it will appear astonishing that so important a liberty as that of writing had not even obtained special mention in the fundamental law of the State. But, in those days, the tribune, as well that of the assemblies as that of the clubs, had been, with the revolutionary passions, the favourite channel for displaying themselves; and the liberty of speech had been so much used, that the liberty of writing was thought little of. At the epoch of the 18th of Fructidor, the press was rather more employed, but chiefly by the royalists, and it excited such irritation against itself among the revolutionists that they afterwards felt very little interest for it. It was, therefore, suffered to be proscribed on the 18th of Fructidor, and to be omitted in framing the Constitution of the year VIII., and thenceforth abandoned to the good pleasure of the government.

The First Consul, who had endured with little patience the attacks of the royalist journals, when he was merely general of the army of Italy, began now to be uneasy about the indiscretions committed by the press in regard to his military operations, and the virulent attacks against foreign governments in which it indulged. Applying himself in a most particular manner to reconcile the Republic with Europe, he was apprehensive lest the republican papers, launching out against foreign cabinets, especially since the refusal of the offers of France, should frustrate all his efforts at reconciliation. The King of Prussia, in particular, had found reason to complain of some French journals, and had expressed his displeasure. The First Consul, who was desirous to efface everywhere the traces of violence, and who, moreover, was not restrained, in regard to the liberty of the press, by any firm and established public opinion, such as exists in our days, took a decision by which he suppressed a great number of journals, and specified those which should have the privilege of continuing to appear. This arrangement was to remain in force till the general peace. The journals retained were thirteen in number. These were, the *Moniteur Universel*, the *Journal des Debats*, the *Journal de Paris*, the *Bien-Informé*, the *Publiciste*, the *Ami des Lois*, the *Clef du Cabinet*, the *Citoyen Français*, the *Gazette de France*, the *Journal des Hommes Libres*, the *Journal du Soir*, the *Journal des Défenseurs de la Patrie*, and the *Décade Philosophique*.

These favoured journals were, moreover, apprised that such of them as should publish articles against the Constitution, against the armies, their glory, or their interest, or should publish invectives against any foreign government, friends or allies of France, should be immediately suppressed.

This measure, which would appear so extraordinary at the present day, was received without murmur and without astonishment. for the value of things is dependent on the spirit that prevails.

The votes required of the citizens on the subject of the new Constitution had been collected and counted. The result of this operation was communicated to the Senate, to the Legislative Body, and to the Tribunate, by a message from the Consuls. None of the anterior Constitutions have been accepted by so large a number of votes.

In 1793, 1,800,000 votes had been recorded in favour of the Constitution of that epoch, and 11,000 against it; for the Directorial Constitution of 1795, the numbers were 1,057,000 favourable votes, and 49,000 negative votes. This time, more than 3,000,000 voters had come forward; of these 3,000,000 adopted the Constitution, and 1500 only rejected it.\* Most assuredly these vain formalities have no weight with serious minds. It is not from these vulgar and frequently lying signs, but from the moral aspect of a society, that its will is to be inferred. But the difference in the number of voters had, in this case, an incontestable signification. It proved, at least, how general was the sentiment that called for a strong and reparative government, capable of ensuring order, victory, and peace.

The First Consul, before his departure for the army, at length decided on an important step: he took up his abode in the Tuileries. Considering the disposition of many to find in him a Cæsar, a Cromwell, destined to put an end to the reign of anarchy by the reign of power, this removal to the palace of kings was a bold and delicate step, not on account of any resistance that it could provoke, but of the moral effect which it might possibly produce.

The First Consul caused it to be preceded by an imposing and skilfully contrived ceremony. Washington was just dead. The decease of this illustrious personage, who had filled the conclusion of the last century with his name, was a subject of regret for all the friends of freedom in Europe. The First Consul, judging that a manifestation on this subject would be opportune, addressed the following order of the day to the armies:—

“Washington is dead! That great man fought against tyranny; he consolidated the independence of his country. His name will ever be dear to the French nation, as to all the free men of both worlds, and especially to French soldiers, who, like him and his American soldiers, are fighting for equality and liberty.” In consequence, a ten days’ mourning was ordered. This mourning was to consist in a piece of black crape suspended from all the colours of the Republic. The First Consul did not stop there: he gave directions for a

\* The exact numbers were as follow: in 1793, 1,801,018 favourable votes, and 11,610 dissentient; in 1795, 1,057,390 favourable votes, and 49,955 dissentient; in 1800, out of 3,012,569 voters, 3,011,007 were favourable, and 1562 dissentient.

noble and simple ceremony to take place in the church of the Invalides, called in the ephemeral language of the time, "the Temple of Mars." The colours taken in Egypt had not yet been presented to the government. General Lannes was charged to deliver them, on this occasion, to the minister of war, beneath the magnificent dome erected by the great king for our country's veterans.

On the 9th of February (20th Pluviôse), all the authorities having assembled at the Invalides, General Lannes presented to Berthier, minister of war, ninety-six pair of colours, taken at the Pyramids, at Mount Tabor, and at Aboukir. He made a short martial speech, to which Berthier gave a similar reply. The latter was seated between two invalids a hundred years old, facing the bust of Washington, overhung by a thousand flags, trophies won from Europe by the armies of republican France.

Not far from this spot a tribune was prepared. A proscrip, who owed his liberty to the policy of the First Consul, ascended to it: this was M. de Fontanes; a pure and brilliant writer, the last who employed that French language, formerly so perfect, but now swept with the eighteenth century into the abyss of the past. In studied but splendid language, M. de Fontanes delivered a funeral oration on the hero of America. He celebrated the military virtues of Washington, his valour, his wisdom, his disinterestedness: he placed far above the military genius, which knows how to gain victories, the reparative genius, which understands how to put an end to civil wars, to close the wounds of the country, and to give peace to the world. Evoking the shade of Washington, he called also to witness the shades of Turenne, of Catinat, of Condé, and speaking, as it were, in the name of these great men, he delivered, in the most delicate and appropriate language, a panegyric, which for once was full of nobleness, because it was full of lessons of wisdom.

"Yes," he exclaimed in conclusion; "yes, thy counsels will be listened to, O Washington! O warrior! O legislator! O citizen without reproach! He who while yet young surpassed thee in battles, shall close, like thee, with his triumphant hands the wounds of his country. Ere long—we have pledges for it in his will, and in his martial genius, if that should unfortunately be necessary—ere long the hymn of peace will resound in this temple of war; then will a universal feeling of joy efface from memory all injustices and all oppressions . . . already the oppressed forget their sufferings and put their trust in the future! . . . The acclamations of all ages will celebrate the hero who shall confer this benefit on France, and on the world which she has too long shaken."

This speech being finished, black crape was fastened to all the colours, and the French Republic was deemed to be in

mourning for the founder of the American Republic, like the monarchies which put themselves in mourning for the losses sustained by each other. What did this ceremony still require, before it could equal in grandeur those funeral scenes at which Louis XIV. was wont to be present, and to hear the praise of one of his warriors from the lips of Flechier or of Bossuet? Of a surety it was neither in the greatness of the events or of the men that aught was lacking; for the orator was speaking of Washington before General Bonaparte, he was speaking amidst an audience which had also beheld Charleses ascending the scaffold, and even crowned female heads following them to it. He might introduce at choice the names of Fleurus, Arcole, Rivoli, Zurich, the Pyramids, and these magnificent victories would assuredly serve to impart not less grandeur to an harangue, than those of the Dunes and Rocroy! What, then, was wanting to render this solemnity truly grand? There was wanting what the greatest of men himself could not infuse into it; there was wanting, in the first place, religion; not that which men affect and strain to possess, but that which is sincere and spontaneous, and without which the dead are always but coldly celebrated; there was wanting the genius of Bossuet, for there are species of greatness which never reappear in nations, and if the Turennes and the Condés have successors, the Bossuets have none; lastly, there was wanting a certain sincerity, for this homage to a hero renowned above all for his disinterestedness was too visibly affected. Still, let us not believe, with the herd of vulgar interpreters, that on this occasion all was pure hypocrisy: no doubt there was some, but there were also the ordinary illusions of the time and of all times. Men, in fact, deceive themselves more frequently than they deceive others. Many Frenchmen, like the Romans under Augustus, still believed in the Republic, because its name was assiduously pronounced; and it is not very certain that the institutor of this funeral ceremony, that General Bonaparte himself, did not deceive himself while celebrating Washington, and fancy, in fact, that in France as in America, a man might be the first citizen, without being king or emperor.

This ceremony was the prelude to the installation of the three Consuls in the Tuileries. The repairs required by that palace had been for a considerable time in progress: the traces left by the Convention were effaced: the red caps, which it had ordered to be placed amidst the gilded ceilings, were removed. The First Consul was to occupy the apartments on the first floor, the same appropriated by the present reigning family for evening receptions. His wife and her children were to occupy apartments on the entresol. The gallery of Diana was, as at present, the vestibule, through which one was obliged to pass, in order to

reach the abode of the head of the State. The First Consul caused it to be adorned with busts representing a series of great men, and took pains to mark, by the choice of these busts, the predilections of his mind: there were Demosthenes, Alexander, Hannibal, Scipio, Brutus, Cicero, Cato, Cæsar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Condé, Duguai-Trouin, Marlborough, Eugene, Marshal Saxe, Washington, Frederick the Great, Mirabeau, Dugommier, Dampierre, Marceau, Joubert, that is to say, warriors and orators, champions of liberty and conquerors, heroes of the ancient monarchy and of the Republic; lastly, four generals of the Revolution, who had fallen in battle. To assemble around him the glories of all ages and of all countries, as he was desirous of assembling all the parties around his government—such was on all occasions the disposition which he was fond of manifesting.

But he was not to occupy the Tuileries exclusively. His two colleagues were to reside there too. Lebrun was lodged in the pavilion of Flora. As for Cambacérès, who ranked before Lebrun, he refused to take up his abode in this palace of kings. This personage, possessing consummate prudence, perhaps the only man of his time who had not given way to any illusion, this personage said to his colleague Lebrun, "It would be wrong for us to go and live in the Tuileries; it is not a fitting place for us, and, for my part, I shall not go. General Bonaparte will soon want to live there alone, and then we should have to move out. 'Tis better not to go there at all." Neither did he go, but he contrived to get a handsome house in the Place du Carrousel assigned to him, and this he retained as long as Napoleon retained the Empire.

When all was arranged, a few days after the funeral ceremony at the Invalides, the First Consul resolved to take possession of the Tuileries publicly. He did so, in great state.

On the 19th of February (the 30th Pluviôse), he quitted the Luxembourg to repair to his new palace, preceded and followed by an imposing escort. The fine regiments which had recently marched from Holland into La Vendée, from La Vendée to Paris, and which were soon to signalise themselves for the hundredth time on the plains of Germany and Italy, those regiments, commanded by Lannes, Murat, Bessières, opened the procession. Then came, in carriages almost all hired, the ministers, the Council of State, the public authorities; then in a handsome coach, drawn by six white horses, the three Consuls themselves. These horses were particularly suited to the occasion; they were the same that the Emperor of Germany had given to General Bonaparte on concluding the peace of Campo-Formio. The general had also been presented by that sovereign with a magnificent sword, which he took care to wear on that day. Thus he exhibited about him all that served to remind the

public of the warrior-peacemaker. The concourse of people collected in the streets and on the quays leading to the Tuileries hailed his presence with loud acclamations. These acclamations were sincere, for they greeted in him the glory of France and the commencement of her prosperity. On reaching the Carrousel, the coach of the Consuls was received by the consular guard, and passed between two guard-houses, erected, one on the right, the other on the left of the palace-yard. On one of these was still seen this inscription: "Royalty in France is abolished, and shall never be re-established."

No sooner had he entered the court than the First Consul mounted a horse and reviewed the troops drawn up before the palace. When opposite to the colours of the 96th, the 43rd, and the 30th demi-brigades, colours blackened, torn by balls, he saluted them, and was saluted in his turn by the shouts of the soldiers. After passing along their ranks, he stationed himself before the pavilion of Flora, and saw them defile before him. Over his head, on the balcony of the palace, were the other two Consuls, the principal authorities, lastly, his family, who began to have rank in the State. When the review was over, he went up to the apartments; the minister of the interior presented to him the civil authorities; the minister of war presented the military authorities; the minister of the marine all the naval officers who chanced to be in Paris. In the course of the day, entertainments were given in the Tuileries and in the houses of the ministers.

The service of the consular palace was regulated as follows: M. Bénézech, councillor of state, formerly minister of the interior, was charged with the general administration of this palace. The aides-de-camp, and Duroc in particular, were to do the honours, and to supply the place of that multitude of officers of all kinds that usually fill the spacious apartments of European sovereigns. Every fortnight, on the 2nd and 17th of each month, the First Consul received the diplomatic body. Once in the decade, on different days, but at fixed hours, he received the Senators, the members of the Legislative Body, of the Tribunal, and of the Tribunal of Cassation. The functionaries who wished to have audience with him had to address themselves to the ministers, to whose department they belonged, in order to be presented to him. On the 2nd Ventôse (the 21st of February), two days after his installation at the Tuileries, he gave audience to the diplomatic body. Surrounded by a numerous staff, he received the envoys of the States who were not at war with the Republic. Introduced by M. Bénézech, presented by the minister for foreign affairs, they delivered their credentials to the First Consul, who handed them to the minister, nearly in the same manner as sovereigns do in monarchical governments. The

foreign ministers who figured at this audience were M. de Musquiz, ambassador of Spain; M. de Sandoz Rollin, minister of Prussia; M. de Schimmelpenninck, ambassador of Holland; M. de Serbelloni, envoy of the Cisalpine Republic; lastly, the *chargés d'affaires* of Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, Baden, Hesse-Cassel, Rome, Genoa, &c. (*Moniteur*, 4th Ventôse, year VIII.)

The presentation over, these different ministers were introduced to Madame Bonaparte.

Every five days, the First Consul reviewed the regiments passing through Paris on their way to the frontiers. It was then that he showed himself to the troops and to the multitude, always eager to see him. Thin, pale, stooping upon his horse, he inspired not less interest than admiration by a severe and melancholy beauty, by an appearance of ill-health, which began to excite great uneasiness, for never was the preservation of any man so ardently wished for as his.

After these reviews, the officers of the troops were admitted to his table. The foreign ministers, the members of the assemblies, the magistrates and functionaries, were invited to entertainments, at which a moderate luxury prevailed. At this nascent court, there were not yet either ladies of honour or chamberlains: its tone was certainly austere, but already rather elegant. Care was taken to avoid the habits of the Directory, under which a ridiculous imitation of ancient costume, joined to licentiousness of manners, had taken away all dignity from the external representation of the government. There was little conversation; people observed one another; their eyes were fixed upon the extraordinary personage who had already achieved such great things, and who gave reason to hope for still greater. They waited for his questions; they answered with deference.

The day after he had taken up his abode at the Tuileries, General Bonaparte, going over the palace with M. de Bourrienne, his secretary, said to him, "Well, Bourrienne, here we are, then, in the Tuileries! . . . And here we must stay now."



## BOOK III.

### ULM AND GENOA.

AFTER addressing urgent overtures to Europe to obtain peace, overtures which would not have been befitting from any one but a general covered with glory, the First Consul had no course left but war, preparations for which had, indeed, been making with great activity during the whole winter of 1799–1800 (year VIII.). This war was at once the most legitimate, and one of the most glorious, of those heroic times.

Austria, though observing greater moderation in forms than England, had nevertheless come to the same conclusions, and refused peace. The vain hope of keeping in Italy the advantageous situation which she owed to the victories of Suwarow, the English subsidies, the erroneous opinion that France, drained of men and money, could not undertake another campaign, but above all, the fatal obstinacy of M. de Thugut, who represented the war party at Vienna, with as much infatuation as Mr. Pitt in London, and who, in regard to this question, was instigated much more by personal passion than by genuine patriotism—all these causes conjoined had induced the Austrian cabinet to commit one of the greatest political faults, that of not profiting by a favourable situation for negotiating. It required a most extraordinary blindness, to believe that such successes as had been owing to the incapacity of the Directory would continue to be obtained in the face of a new government, already completely organised, active even to prodigy, and directed by the first captain of the age.

The Archduke Charles, who united to real military talents great moderation and modesty, had pointed out all the dangers incident to the continuance of the war, and the difficulty of making head against the celebrated adversary, who was about to enter the lists. By way of answer, the command of the Austrian forces was taken from him; and the government had thus deprived itself of the only general who could command them with any chance of success. His disgrace had been disguised under the title of governor of Bohemia. The imperial army bitterly regretted that prince, though the Baron de Kray, who was appointed his successor, had highly distinguished himself

during the last campaign in Italy. Kray was a brave, able, and experienced officer, and proved himself not unworthy of the command that had been conferred upon him.

To fill the chasm left by the Russians in the ranks of the coalition, Austria, seconded by the subsidies of England, obtained from the States of the Empire a considerable addition to their contingents. A special treaty, signed on the 16th of March, by Mr. Wickham, British minister to the Elector of Bavaria, bound that prince to furnish, besides his legal contingent as a member of the Empire, a supplementary corps of 12,000 Bavarians. A treaty of the same kind, signed on the 12th of April, with the Duke of Würtemberg, procured another corps of 6000 Würtembergers for the army of the coalition. Lastly, on the 30th of April, the same negotiator obtained from the Elector of Mayence a corps of from 4000 to 6000 of his subjects, on the same financial conditions. Besides the expenses of recruiting, equipment, and maintenance of their troops, England guaranteed to the coalesced German princes, that no treaty should be made with France without them, and engaged to obtain restitution of their dominions, be the issue of the war what it might; and she made them promise in return not to listen to any proposition for a separate peace.

Of these German troops, the Bavarians were the best; next came those of Würtemberg; but the Mayence troops were but militia, without discipline and without valour. Independently of these regular contingents, the peasants of the Black Forest had been instigated to arm by frightful accounts of the ravages of the French, who, at this period, committed much less devastation than the Imperialists in the fertile fields of unfortunate Germany.

The imperial army in Swabia, including all these auxiliaries, amounted to nearly 150,000 men, 30,000 of whom were quartered in the fortresses, and 120,000 present with the active army. It was provided with a numerous artillery, good, though inferior to the French artillery, and, above all, with a superb cavalry, such as it is customary to have in the Austrian armies. The emperor had, moreover, 120,000 men in Lombardy, under Baron de Melas. An English squadron of considerable force, stationed in the Mediterranean, and cruising incessantly in the Gulf of Genoa, supported all the operations of the Austrians in Italy. It was to disembark an auxiliary corps of English and emigrants, then collected at Mahon, and amounting, it was said, to 20,000 men. It was agreed that this corps should be landed at Toulon itself, in case the imperial army, ordered to operate against the Apennines, should be fortunate enough to force the line of the Var.

There had been hopes of uniting some Russian with English troops, and landing them on the coast of France, in order to excite insurrections in Belgium, in Bretagne, and in La Vendée.

The perfectly voluntary inaction of the Russians, and the pacification of La Vendée, had thwarted that operation, from which the allies had expected much.

It was, therefore, a mass of nearly 300,000 men; 150,000 in Swabia, 120,000 in Italy, 20,000 at Mahon, supported by the whole English navy, that was to prosecute the war against France. This force, it must be allowed, would have been very inadequate against France, reorganised and in possession of all her means; but, against France, scarcely emerged from the chaos into which she had been plunged by the weakness of the Directory, it was a considerable force, with which her enemies might have obtained important results, had they known how to employ it. It must be added, that it was a real force, liable to suffer little diminution, because the 300,000 men of which it was composed were seasoned to hardship, and already upon the frontiers which they were to attack—an important circumstance, for every raw army finds it difficult to withstand the first shocks of war, and if it has, moreover, a long march to make before it meets an enemy, it decreases in proportion to the distance which must be traversed.

Let us now see how the allied troops were distributed, and the plan according to which they were to act.

M. de Kray, at the head of the 150,000 men whom he commanded, occupied Swabia, posted in the middle of the angle formed in that country by the Rhine, when, after running from east to west, from Constance to Basle, it turns abruptly to the north from Basle to Strasburg. In this position, Kray, having Switzerland on his left flank, Alsace on his right, observed all the passages of the Rhine by which the French might penetrate into Germany. He had not the presumption to cross that river, and to invade the territory of the Republic: his part, at the commencement of the campaign, required him to be less active. The initiative of the operations was reserved for the army of Italy, 120,000 strong, and posted, in consequence of the advantages which it had obtained in 1799, at the very foot of the Apennines. It was to blockade Genoa, to reduce it, if possible, then to cross the Apennines and the Var, and to march upon Toulon,—where the English, and the emigrants of the South, commanded by General Willot, one of the proscribers of Fructidor, were to join the Austrians. This new invasion of a province containing our principal naval establishment was particularly agreeable to the English; and to them must be, in a great measure, attributed this plan, afterwards so severely criticised. When the Austrian army in Italy, which, owing to the climate of Liguria, could commence the campaign before that in Swabia, should have penetrated into Provence, it was supposed that the First Consul would withdraw his troops from

the Rhine to cover the Var, and that Marshal Kray would then have the means of entering into action. Switzerland, being thus hemmed in, and, as it were, strangled between two victorious armies, must naturally fall, so that it would be unnecessary to renew against it the impotent efforts of the preceding campaign. The exploits of Lecourbe and Masséna in the Alps had given the Austrians a great distaste for any great operation, especially directed against Switzerland. In regard to that country, the intention was to confine themselves to mere observation. The extreme left of Marshal Kray was to take upon itself this duty in Swabia; the cavalry of Melas, useless in the Apennines, was to perform it in Lombardy. The plan of the Austrians consisted, therefore, in temporising in Swabia, in operating early in Italy, in advancing on that side to the Var; then, when the French, drawn towards the Var, should strip the Rhine, in crossing that river and afterwards advancing in two masses, one eastward by Basle, the other to the south by Nice, and in thus levelling, without attack, the formidable barrier of Switzerland.

Competent judges of military operations have severely censured Austria for having neglected Switzerland, as this permitted General Bonaparte to debouch from it, and to throw himself on the flank of Marshal Kray, and on the rear of Baron Melas. We are of opinion that, as the reader will presently be enabled to judge by the relation of the facts, no absolutely sure plan was possible, in presence of General Bonaparte, and with the irreparable disadvantage of Switzerland left in the hands of the French.

To obtain a clear conception of this memorable campaign, and to judge soundly of the precise designs of the belligerent parties, we must figure to ourselves exactly the position of Switzerland, and the influence which it must have upon the military operations, at that point in particular at which the operations had arrived.

It is towards the eastern frontiers of France that the Alps begin to rise in the centre of the European continent. They then run eastward, separating Germany from Italy; and from them descend on one side the Danube and its tributaries, on the other, the Po and all the streams of which that large river is composed. The part of the Alps nearest to France is that which forms Switzerland. Their prolongation constitutes the Tyrol, belonging for ages to Austria.

When Austrian armies advance towards France, they are obliged to ascend the valley of the Danube on the one hand, the valley of the Po on the other, divided into two acting masses by the long chain of the Alps. While they are in Bavaria and in Lombardy, these two masses can communicate

across the Alps by the Tyrol, which belongs to the emperor ; but, when they arrive in Swabia, on the Upper Danube, in Piedmont, on the Upper Po, they find themselves separated from one another, without any possible communication across the Alps, because Switzerland, independent and neutral, is usually closed against them.

This neutrality of Switzerland is a barrier which the policy of Europe has wisely placed between France and Austria, to diminish the points of attack between those two formidable powers. If, in fact, Switzerland is open to Austria, the latter may advance with her armies, communicating freely from the valley of the Danube to the valley of the Po, and threatening the frontiers of France from Basle to Nice. This is an immense danger to France, for she is obliged to be on her guard everywhere, from the mouths of the Rhine to the mouths of the Rhone ; whereas, if the Swiss Alps are closed, she can concentrate all her forces on the Rhine, regardless of the attack that comes from the south, since the Imperialists never succeeded in any operation upon the Var, on account of the length of the circuit. The advantage of the Swiss neutrality is, therefore, important for France.

But it is not less important for Austria, nay, perhaps even more so. If, in fact, Switzerland becomes the theatre of hostilities, the French army can overrun it first ; and, since its foot-soldiers are intelligent, agile, brave, and as fit for mountain warfare as for that of the plain, it has many chances of maintaining its footing there. A proof of this is exhibited in this very campaign of 1799. If, in fact, the Alps are attacked by the great chain, on the side next to Italy, it offers the resistance which Lecourbe offered to Suwarow, in the gorges of the St. Gothard ; if they are attacked on the German side, in the lower part, it offers, behind the lakes and rivers, the resistance which Masséna offered behind the Lake of Zurich, and which terminated in the memorable battle of that name. Now, when the French army retains possession of Switzerland, it has a most threatening position, of which it can avail itself to produce extraordinary results, as will be seen, by-and-by, in the account of the operations of General Bonaparte.

In fact, the two Austrian armies, which are, the one in Swabia, the other in Piedmont, separated by the whole extent of Switzerland, have no means of communicating with each other : and the French, debouching by the Lake of Constance, on the one hand, by the high Alps on the other, may throw themselves either upon the flanks of the army in Swabia, or on the rear of the army in Italy. This danger it is impossible to avoid, whatever plan may be adopted, unless, by retreating fifty leagues, retrograding as far as Bavaria on the one side, and as far as Lombardy on the other.

The Austrians, then, must do one of these things—either, giving up all the advantages of the last campaign, they must abandon to us both Swabia and Piedmont; or, refusing such a sacrifice, they must endeavour to carry Switzerland by a principal attack, in which they could not succeed, for it would be attacking in front an almost insurmountable obstacle, against which they had already failed; or they must divide themselves into two great armies, as they did, remaining separated by Switzerland, which would thus be placed on their flanks and on their rear. By this latter course they would have it in their power, it is true, to diminish one of their armies considerably, in order to strengthen the other, and, for instance, leave Baron Melas but few troops, only just sufficient to keep Masséna in check, and increase the army in Swabia to 200,000 men; or do the contrary, by collecting their principal force in Piedmont. But, in one case, it would be abandoning Italy—Italy, the sole object and the ardently desired prize of the war; in the other it would be giving up, without a battle, the Rhine, the Black Forest, the sources of the Danube, and shortening, by so much, the route of the French to Vienna; it would be, in fact, in either case, doing the most advantageous thing in the world for us; for, by the increase of one of the two armies to 200,000 men, the victory would be given to that power of the two which had General Bonaparte on its side. He was, in fact, the only general of that time capable of manœuvring 200,000 men at once.

There was then no perfectly safe plan for Austria, when the French were masters of Switzerland, which, be it observed by-the-by, proves that the Swiss neutrality is a very happy device for both powers. It adds, in fact, to their defensive means, by diminishing their offensive means; that is to say, it gives to their security all that it takes away from their aggressive power. Nothing better could be contrived for the preservation of general peace.

The Austrians, then, had not many courses to take, and, notwithstanding all that has been said, they took, perhaps, the only one they could take, by deciding to temporise in Swabia, to operate energetically in Italy, remaining separated by the barrier of Switzerland, which it was impossible for them to remove. But in this position there was more than one way of conducting themselves, and it must be acknowledged that they did not adopt the best; that they did not even foresee any of the dangers which threatened them. Persisting in their belief that the French armies were exhausted; not supposing that the army of Germany was capable of taking the offensive, and crossing the Rhine, before 150,000 Austrians posted in the Black Forest; still less supposing it possible to cross the Alps, without road, and in the snowy season; not seeing, besides,

the third army which might be tempted to cross them, they indulged a confidence which proved fatal to them. To do them justice, it must also be acknowledged that many persons would have made the same mistake which they did; for their security reposed on obstacles apparently invincible. But experience soon taught them that, before an adversary like General Bonaparte, all security, even though founded on insurmountable barriers, whether rivers or mountains of ice, was deceitful, and might become fatal.

France had two armies, that of Germany, increased by the junction of the armies of the Rhine and of Helvetia to 130,000 men; that of Liguria, reduced to 40,000 at most. In the troops of Holland, La Vendée, and the interior, there were the widely scattered elements of a third army; but superior administrative ability could alone assemble it, and on the sudden, at the point where its presence was wanted. General Bonaparte formed a plan for employing these various means as follows.

Masséna, with the army of Liguria, not augmented, merely supplied with provisions and ammunition, was ordered to keep on the Apennines, between Genoa and Nice, and there take post as at Thermopylæ. The army of Germany, under Moreau, strengthened as much as possible, was to make, along the whole course of the Rhine from Strasburg to Basle, from Basle to Constance, feigned demonstrations of crossing, then march rapidly behind the curtain formed by that river, ascend it to Schaffhausen, there throw over it four bridges at once, debouch in mass on the flank of Marshal Kray, surprise him, drive him in disorder upon the Upper Danube, outmarch him, if possible, cut him off from the route to Vienna, perhaps envelop him, and inflict on him one of those memorable disasters of which the present century has furnished more than one example. If the army of Moreau had not this luck, it might, at least, drive Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, oblige him thus to descend the Danube, and remove him from the Alps, so as to prevent him from ever sending succours thither. This done, it had orders to detach its right wing towards Switzerland, for the purpose of seconding there the perilous operation which General Bonaparte had reserved for himself to execute. The third army, called the army of reserve, the elements of which scarcely existed, was to form between Geneva and Dijon, and to await the issue of the first events, in readiness to succour Moreau, in case of need. But, if Moreau had succeeded in a part, at least, of his plan, this army of reserve, advancing under General Bonaparte to Geneva, from Geneva into the Valais, giving the hand to the detachment drawn from the army of Germany, then crossing the St. Bernard, over ice and snow, was, by a prodigy greater than that of Hamibal, to fall upon Piedmont, to take the Baron

de Melas, occupied with the siege of Genoa, in the rear, envelop him, bring him to a decisive battle, and, if it won it, to oblige him to lay down his arms.

Assuredly, if the execution were correspondent with such a plan, never would a finer conception have honoured the genius of a commander, ancient or modern. But it is the execution alone that gives their value to great military combinations, for, deprived of this merit, they are but vain chimeras.

The execution, in this case, consisted in an infinity of difficulties to be overcome—in the reorganisation of the armies of the Rhine and of Liguria, in the creation of the army of reserve, in keeping secret the creation and destination of that army; lastly, in the twofold passage of the Rhine and of the Alps,—the second equal to the most extraordinary things which the art of war has ever attempted.

The very first care of General Bonaparte had been to recruit the army. The desertions to the interior, disease, and battle, had reduced it to 250,000 men, which one would scarcely believe, at a moment when France made head against a general coalition, if the fact were not attested by authentic documents. Fortunately, these 250,000 men were perfectly inured to war, capable of withstanding an enemy double in number. The First Consul had demanded 100,000 conscripts of the Legislative Body, which had granted them with truly patriotic cheerfulness. The war was so legitimate, so evidently necessary, after the offers of peace were refused, that mere hesitation would have been criminal. Of this, however, there was no reason to be apprehensive, and the eagerness of the Legislative Body was carried to enthusiasm. These 100,000 young conscripts, combined with 250,000 old soldiers, could not fail to form an excellent composition for an army. The prefects recently instituted, and who were already at their posts, imparted to the recruiting an activity which it had never yet had. But it would take five or six months before these conscripts could join their corps, drilled and fit for service. The First Consul resolved to keep in the interior all the corps exhausted by the war, and to employ them as skeletons, in which the new levy should be placed. On the other hand, he moved towards the frontiers all the corps capable of taking the field, and took care to transfer all the soldiers fit for service from the ranks of those who were to remain in the interior into the ranks of those who were going to fight. If, in proceeding thus, he could find 200,000 men to place immediately in line, it was as much as he could do. Under his powerful and skilful hand, however, this number was sufficient.

He made an appeal, at the same time, to the patriotic sentiments of France. Addressing himself to the soldiers of the first requisitions, whom the general discouragement produced



by our reverses had brought back to their homes, he made those rejoin by force who had left their corps without leave, and he appealed to the zeal of those who had regular furloughs; he endeavoured to excite military tastes in all the young men whose imaginations were inflamed by the name of General Bonaparte. Though the enthusiasm of the first days of the Revolution had cooled, the sight of the enemy on our frontiers reanimated all hearts; and that assistance which was still to be derived from the devotedness of volunteers was an advantage not to be despised.

To this attention bestowed on the recruiting the First Consul added some useful reforms relating to the administration and the composition of the army. In the first place, he instituted inspectors of reviews, charged to ascertain the number of men present under arms, and to save the treasury from paying for soldiers who were present only on paper. In the artillery he made a change of the greatest importance. The horses which drew the gun-carriages were then driven by men belonging to the waggon-train, who, not being restrained by a sense of honour, like the other soldiers, cut the traces of their horses at the first danger, and fled, leaving their guns in the hands of the enemy. The First Consul justly thought that the driver, whose duty it is to bring the piece to the place of battle, renders as valuable a service as the gunner, whose business it is to work it; that he incurs the same danger, and needs the same moral motive, that is, honour. He therefore converted the artillery-drivers into soldiers, wearing the uniform, and constituting part of the regiments of that arm. They formed 10,000 or 12,000 horsemen, who were expected to show as much zeal in bringing up their guns before an enemy, or in carrying them off with speed, as those did whose duty it was to load, point, and fire them. This reform was only begun, and could not produce all its useful consequences till a later period.

The artillery and the cavalry were likewise in want of horses. The First Consul ordered a forced and extraordinary levy of every thirtieth horse, having neither time nor means to make purchases. It was a hard but inevitable necessity. The armies were first to supply themselves in the country around them, and then, by degrees, further and further off, in the contiguous provinces.

The First Consul had sent to Masséna such pecuniary supplies as could be spared, for the relief of the unfortunate army of Liguria. From 60,000 men, of whom it was composed by the junction of the army of Lombardy and that of Naples, after the sanguinary battle of the Trebbia, it was reduced by privations to 40,000 at most, presenting but thirty and some odd thousand fighting men. Corn, which could neither come from Piedmont, occupied by the Austrians, nor from the sea, guarded by the English, was very scarce. These unfortunate

soldiers had nothing to subsist upon but the crops of the Apennines, little better than nothing, as everybody knows. They would not go into the hospitals, destitute of the most needful articles of food; and they were seen, on the road from Nice to Genoa, wasted by famine and fever, exhibiting the most deplorable of sights—that of brave men left by the country which they were defending to perish for want.

Masséna, on receiving the money sent by the government, had made some purchases at Marseilles, bought up all the corn in that city, and shipped it for Genoa. Unfortunately, during this winter, the wind, not less rigorous than the enemy, continually retarded arrivals at Genoa from Marseilles, and replaced, in some measure, the blockade which the English could not keep up in the stormy season. A few vessels had, nevertheless, got in with their cargoes, and bread was again dealt out to the soldiers of Liguria. The government had sent them arms, shoes, some clothing, and hopes. As for military energy, nothing needed to be done to inspire them with that; for never had France seen soldiers endure such reverses with such fortitude. Those conquerors at Castiglione, at Arcole, at Rivoli, had borne unflinchingly the defeats of Cassano, of Novi, of the Trebbia; the temper which they had acquired could not be impaired under the strokes of Fortune. Besides, the presence of General Bonaparte at the head of the government, and of General Masséna at the head of the army, would have infused into them new courage, had they needed it. So they were but fed, clothed, and armed, the most important services might be obtained from them. In these respects the government did its best. Masséna, by some examples of severity, re-established discipline, shaken among them, and collected thirty and some thousand men, impatient to start again, under his command, for fertile Italy.

The instructions given by the First Consul for his guidance were ably conceived. Three narrow passages led across the Apennines from the inland slope to the maritime slope; these were the passage of the Bocchetta, debouching upon Genoa; that of Cadibona, upon Savona; that of Tende, upon Nice. The First Consul enjoined Masséna to leave only weak detachments at the Col de Tende and at the Col de Cadibona, just sufficient to observe them, and to concentrate a force of 25,000 or 30,000 men upon Genoa. That city being strongly occupied, an invasion of the south of France was scarcely to be presumed, and, at any rate, not much to be feared; for the Austrians would certainly not be rash enough to advance beyond the Var upon Toulon and the Bouches du Rhone, while Masséna was in their rear. Masséna might, moreover, fall, with his 30,000 assembled troops, upon those corps which

should have passed the defiles of the Apennines. It was not likely, considering the nature of the country, with its narrow ravines and steep precipices, that he should meet with more than 30,000 men at once. He had, therefore, the means of making head everywhere against the enemy. Unluckily, this plan could not be carried into execution but by a general possessing the prodigious dexterity of the conqueror of Montenotte. For the rest, the First Consul was sure of having in Masséna an obstinate defender of the steep heights of the Apennines, and who would find such employment for Melas as should detain him in Liguria during the whole time necessary for the combined movement of the French armies.

Nevertheless, it must be confessed, the army of Liguria was treated somewhat like a sacrificed army: not an additional man was sent to it; it was merely supplied with some *matériel*, and no more of that than was barely necessary. It was elsewhere that the principal efforts of the government were directed, because it was elsewhere that the great blows were to be struck. The army of Liguria was exposed to the risk of perishing, in order to give others time to be victorious. Such is that dire fatality of war, which passes from the head of the one to the head of the other, obliging these to die that those may live and triumph!

The army treated with most particular attention was that commanded by Moreau, and destined to act in Swabia. To this was sent all that could be spared, both in men and in *matériel*. The utmost efforts were made to ensure to it a complete artillery and abundant means of passage, that it might be able to cross the Rhine on a sudden, and, if possible, at a single point. General Moreau, of whom it has been said the First Consul was so jealous, was, therefore, about to have under his command the finest and most numerous army of the Republic, about 130,000 men, while Masséna was to have no more than 36,000, and the First Consul 40,000 at most. This was not, however, a mere compliment paid to the vanity of Moreau. More serious motives had determined this distribution of the forces. The operation destined to throw Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon was of the highest importance for the general success of the campaign: for, in presence of those two powerful Austrian armies, which were advancing towards our frontiers, it was requisite first to drive back the one before it was possible to cross the Alps in the rear of the other. This first operation, therefore, was to be attempted with decisive means, which should render the success infallible. The First Consul, highly as he estimated Moreau, estimated himself much higher; if either of them must dispense with great means, he thought that he could shift without them better than Moreau. The sentiment which guided him on this occasion was a nobler sentiment than even generosity in great affairs of

State; it was love of the public weal; this he preferred to the interest of every body, to that of others, and to his own.

This army of the Rhine, though wearing, like the other armies of the Republic, the rags of indigence, was superb. Some conscripts had joined it, but in small number, just sufficient to infuse youth into it. By far the greater part of it was composed of those old soldiers, who, under the command of Pichegru, Kleber, Hoche, and Moreau, had conquered Holland and the banks of the Rhine, crossed that river several times, and even penetrated to the Danube. It could not have been said, without injustice, that they were braver than the soldiers of Italy; but they exhibited all the qualities of accomplished troops—they were discreet, sober, well disciplined, intelligent, and intrepid. The officers were worthy of the men. The distribution of this army into detached divisions, complete in all arms, and acting in separate corps, had developed to the highest point the talents of each general of division. These generals had equal but diverse merits. There was Lecourbe, the ablest officer of his time in mountain warfare,—Lecourbe, whose glorious name was repeated by the echoes of the Alps: there was Richepanse, who combined rare intelligence with audacious bravery, and who soon afterwards rendered Moreau, in the fields of Hohenlinden, the most important service that lieutenant ever rendered to his general: there was St. Cyr, with a mind cool and profound, and a disposition not the most sociable, but endowed with all the qualities of commander-in-chief: there was, lastly, young Ney, whom heroic courage, guided by a happy instinct for war, had already rendered popular in all the armies of the Republic. At the head of these lieutenants was Moreau, a man of sluggish, sometimes indecisive, but solid mind, and whose indecisions terminated in wise and firm resolutions, when he was face to face with the danger. Experience had singularly formed and extended his military *coup d'œil*. But, while his military genius expanded in the school of war, his civil character, weak, yielding to all influences, had already succumbed, and was destined again to succumb, under the trials of politics, which strong and truly exalted minds alone are capable of surmounting. At any rate, the unhappy passion of jealousy had not yet stained the purity of his heart and corrupted his patriotism. From his experience, his habit of command, his high renown, he was, after General Bonaparte, the only man capable, at that time, of commanding 100,000 men.

The plan of operations prescribed to him by the First Consul consisted in debouching in Swabia, at the point which would best permit him to act on the extreme left of Marshal Kray, in such a manner as to outflank him, to cut him off from Bavaria, to shut him up between the Upper Danube and the Rhine; in

which case the Austrian army in Swabia would be undone. To accomplish this, it would be necessary to cross the Rhine, not at two or three points, but at one only, the nearest possible to Constance; an operation singularly bold and difficult, for it consisted in transporting across a river, and in presence of an enemy, 100,000 men, with all their *matériel*; and, it must be confessed that, before Wagram, no general ever crossed a river under the conditions stated. Accordingly, it required great address to deceive the Austrians as to the point that would be chosen; with great address, great boldness in the execution of the passage, and, lastly, what is always needed, good luck. The First Consul had ordered a considerable quantity of boats to be collected in the tributaries of the Rhine, and particularly in the Aar, that three or four bridges might be thrown over at once, at the distance of a few hundred fathoms from each other. The only point then was to gain access for these combinations to the cold and far from audacious mind of Moreau.

After these attentions paid with unremitting zeal to the troops of Liguria and Germany, the First Consul had applied his energies to the creation of an army which soon accomplished the greatest things, under the title of army of reserve.

In order that it might fulfil its object, it was requisite not only to create it, but to create it while encouraging an universal disbelief in the possibility of the thing. We shall show in what manner he proceeded to obtain this twofold result.

The First Consul had contrived to find in Holland, and in the forces accumulated in Paris by the Directory, the means of pacifying La Vendée at a seasonable time; he contrived to find in La Vendée, when pacified, the necessary resources for creating an army, which, thrown unexpectedly on the theatre of military operations, must change the destinies of war. In writing to General Brune, commander-in-chief in the West, he addressed to him these beautiful words, which so well express his manner of operating, and that of the great masters in the art of administration and of war:—"Let me know if, besides the five demi-brigades for which I have applied to you by my last courier, you can spare one or two demi-brigades more, on condition of their being sent back in three months. We must make up our minds to stride over France as we formerly did over the valley of the Adige; after all, it is only performing ten days' march in one." (14th of Ventôse, year VIII.; March 5, 1800. Archives in the State Paper Office.)

Though the English must have conceived an aversion to further descents on the continent since their adventure at the Texel, and particularly since the withdrawal of the Russians from the coalition, the immense extent of our coast from the Zuyder Zee to the Gulf of Gascony, could not be relinquished

to them without any means of defence, the pacification of La Vendée being moreover so recent. The First Consul, therefore, left in Holland a force half French, half Dutch, to guard that valuable country: he gave the command of it to Augereau. It was formed into active divisions, complete in all arms and ready to march. When it was pretty certain, from the course of the operations, that no landing was to be apprehended, this corps of Augereau's was to march up the Rhine, and to cover the rear of Moreau in Germany. Out of the 60,000 men collected on the coast of Normandy and Bretagne, the First Consul selected the thinnest demi-brigades, and charged them to guard the insurgent country. He took care still further to reduce their effective strength, by sending off to the active army the soldiers capable of serving, and thus fitted them for receiving a greater number of conscripts, whom they were to train at the same time that they guarded the coast. He formed them into five small camps, comprising artillery, cavalry, infantry, ready to march at the first signal, and commanded by good officers. Two of these camps were in Belgium, one at Liège, another at Maestricht, both destined to secure that country, agitated by the priests, and to co-operate, if need were, in the defence of Holland. There was one at Lille, ready to throw itself upon the Somme and Normandy, another at St. Lô, and a third at Rennes. This last was the most numerous: it contained from 7000 to 8000 soldiers. The others were from 4000 to 5000. The camps contained about 30,000 men. They were about to be doubled, at least, by the arrival of the fresh recruits. They were to perform the duty of the police both in the recently conquered countries, such as Belgium, and in the recently pacified countries, such as Normandy, Bretagne, and Poitou. The First Consul had ordered search to be made in the woods for concealed arms. He had begun to form, by the allurements of high pay, three or four battalions, composed of all those men who had contracted adventurous habits in the civil war; and he purposed, but without saying so, to send them to Egypt. As for the chiefs, he had assigned to them residences remote from the theatre of the civil war, and had soothed the mortification of this exile by pensions amply sufficient to make them truly comfortable.

These arrangements made, there remained, of the 60,000 men collected for the pacification of the interior, about 30,000 excellent soldiers, embodied in the demi-brigades which had suffered least. Some had returned to Paris, after the operations executed in Normandy against M. de Frotté. The others were in Bretagne and in La Vendée. The First Consul formed them into three fine war divisions, two in Bretagne itself, at Rennes and at Nantes, the third in Paris. These divisions were to prepare

for service with the utmost despatch, to provide themselves with such *matériel* as was at hand, and to procure the rest on their march, by such means as we shall presently specify. They had orders to repair to the eastern frontier, with rapid strides, to use the words of the First Consul, as the army of Italy formerly strode over the valley of the Adige. It was certain that they would arrive in Switzerland in the month of April.

There was another resource, namely, the depôts of the army of Egypt, stationed in the south of France, and which had never been able to send recruits to their corps, because it was impossible for them to cross the sea, incessantly watched by the English. By throwing a few conscripts into these depôts, there might be formed fourteen very fine battalions, quite capable of taking the field. Orders were given to despatch them towards Lyons, as soon as they should be equipped. This formed a fourth excellent division, and capable of rendering good service.

What is most difficult and takes the longest time in the composition of an army is the organisation of the artillery. The First Consul, by resolving to form this army of reserve in the east, had, in the depôts of Auxonne, Besançon, and Briçon, the means of collecting, in *personnel* and *matériel*, a force of sixty pieces of cannon. Two very able officers of artillery, Generals Marmont and Gassendi, and who were devotedly attached to the First Consul, were despatched from Paris with orders to get ready these sixty pieces of cannon in the different depôts, but without divulging where they were to be concentrated or used.

A place of rendezvous for all these scattered forces was yet to be indicated. If an attempt had been made to conceal such preparations by silence, that very silence would have had the effect of giving the alarm. The First Consul wished to deceive the enemy by the very noise that he was about to make. He inserted in the *Moniteur* a decree of the Consuls for the creation of an army of reserve, which was to be formed at Dijon, and to be composed of 60,000 men. Berthier set off post for Dijon, to commence the organisation of it. The reader will recollect that Berthier was more master of his time since the entry of Carnot upon the ministry of war. A warm appeal was made to the old volunteers of the Revolution, who, after one or two campaigns, had returned to their homes. They were beseeched to repair to Dijon. A small quantity of *matériel* and a few conscripts were sent thither with great parade. Old officers, despatched to that point, exhibited an appearance of skeletons, for commencing the instruction of the conscripts. The newspaper writers, who were not permitted to touch on military affairs without great circumspection, were allowed to say what they pleased about the army organising at Dijon, and to fill their columns with particulars concerning it. This was sufficient

to attract the spies of all Europe, and accordingly they did not fail to repair thither in great number.

If the divisions formed at Nantes, Rennes, and Paris, with the troops drawn from La Vendée; if the division formed at Toulon, Marseilles, Avignon, with the dépôts of the army of Egypt; if the artillery prepared at Besançon, Auxonne, and Briançon, with the resources of these arsenals, had been assembled at Dijon, it would have been all over with the secret of the First Consul: everybody would have been aware of the existence of the army of reserve. But he took good care not to act in that manner. Those divisions were marched off towards Geneva and Lausanne by different routes, so that the public attention was not particularly drawn to any one point. They passed for reinforcements destined for the army of the Rhine, which, being spread from Strasburg to Constance, might well appear to be the goal towards which these reinforcements were marching. The preparations in *matériel*, ordered in the arsenals of Auxonne and Besançon, passed for a supplement of artillery destined for the same army. Those making at Briançon were supposed to relate to the troops in Liguria. The First Consul caused a quantity of spirits to be sent to Geneva; but neither did this supply betray its real destination, since our army in Germany had its base of operations in Switzerland. He ordered 2,000,000 rations of biscuit to be made in the departments bordering on the Rhone: these were destined for the subsistence of the army of reserve amidst the sterility of the Alps; 1,800,000 rations were secretly sent up the Rhine to Geneva, and the other 200,000 despatched with ostentation to Toulon, to induce a belief that these unusual supplies were made for the navy. Lastly, the divisions in march, conducted slowly and without fatiguing them, towards Geneva and Lausanne—they had, in fact, half of March and the whole of April to perform the distance—received by the way such things as they were in need of—shoes, clothing, muskets, horses. The First Consul, having settled in his own mind the route which they were to follow, and carefully ascertained the nature of their wants, forwarded to every place through which they were to pass a supply, sometimes of one thing, sometimes of another, taking good care not to excite attention by a large assemblage of stores at a single point. The correspondence relative to these preparations was not carried on through the war-office, but confined between himself and the commanders of corps, and sent by trusty aides-de-camp, who travelled post to and fro, saw everything with their own eyes, did everything directly, furnished with the irresistible orders of the First Consul, and ignorant all the while of the general plan which they were furthering.

The secret, confined to the First Consul and Berthier, and



two or three generals of engineers and artillery, to whom it was absolutely necessary to communicate the plan of the campaign was strictly kept. None of them would have betrayed it, because secrecy is an act of obedience, which governments obtain in proportion to the ascendancy which they exercise. On this ground, that of the First Consul had no indiscretion to fear. The foreign spies who thronged to Dijon, finding there only a few conscripts, a few volunteers, and a few old officers, fancied themselves extremely shrewd in discovering that there was nothing serious in the matter; that the First Consul evidently made all this noise merely to frighten Baron de Melas, to prevent him from penetrating by the mouths of the Rhone, and persuading him that he should find in the south of France an army of reserve capable of stopping him. Such was the construction put upon the matter by all who believed themselves to be good judges of it; and the English newspapers were soon filled with thousands upon thousands of squibs. Among the caricatures of the day, was one on the army of reserve; it represented a child leading an invalid with a wooden leg.

This was just what the First Consul wanted: his only wish was to see himself laughed at for the moment. Meanwhile, his divisions were marching, his *matériel* was preparing towards the eastern frontiers, and, in the first days of May, an army, formed in a trice, would be ready either to support Moreau, or to throw itself on the other side of the Alps, and change the face of events there.

The First Consul had not neglected the navy. After the cruise which Admiral Bruix had made in the preceding year in the Mediterranean, with the combined forces of France and Spain, the grand fleet, under his command, had returned to Brest. It was composed of fifteen Spanish ships, and about a score of French, in the whole little short of forty sail. Twenty English ships were blockading it at the moment. The First Consul took advantage of the first financial resources which he had succeeded in creating, to send some provisions and part of the arrears of pay to this fleet. He enjoined it not to suffer itself to be blockaded; if it had but thirty sail against twenty to put to sea on the first occasion, were it even obliged to fight: and if it was possible to keep at sea, to pass the Straits of Gibraltar, to steer thence for Toulon, to take in convoy there some vessels laden with supplies for Egypt, and then to raise the blockade of Malta and Alexandria. The coast once clear, commerce alone would suffice for revictualling the French garrisons scattered along the shores of the Mediterranean.

Such was the attention paid by the First Consul to military affairs, while, with Messrs. Sieyès, Cambacères, Talleyrand, Gaudin, and other participators in his labours, he was engaged in

organising the government, in re-establishing the finances, in creating a civil and judicial administration, lastly, in negotiating with Europe. But it was not enough to conceive plans, to prepare for the execution of them; it was necessary to instil his ideas into the heads of his lieutenants, who, though amenable to his consular authority, were not so completely subservient then as they were afterwards, when, with the titles of marshals of the Empire, they obeyed an Emperor. The plan prescribed to Moreau, in particular, had turned his cold and timid head topsy-turvy. That general was frightened at the boldness of the operation which he was ordered to perform. We have already described the country on which he was to operate. The Rhine, we have said, runs from east to west between Constance and Basle, turns northward at Basle, passing by Brisach, Strasburg, and Mayence. In the angle which it thus describes is what is called the Black Forest, a woody and mountainous tract, intersected by defiles, which lead from the valley of the Rhine to that of the Danube. The French army and the Austrian army occupied, in some measure, the three sides of a triangle: the French army occupied two, from Strasburg to Basle, from Basle to Schaffhausen; the Austrian army one only, from Strasburg to Constance. The latter, therefore, had the advantage of a more easy concentration. Kray, having his left under Prince Reuss in the environs of Constance, his right in the defiles of the Black Forest, nearly to Strasburg, his centre at Donau-Eschingen, at the point of intersection of all the roads, could concentrate his forces speedily before the very spot which Moreau might choose for crossing the Rhine, whether between Strasburg and Basle, or between Basle and Constance. Such was the subject of the French general's uneasiness. He feared that Kray, presenting himself with his whole force at the point of passage, might render that passage impracticable, perhaps even disastrous.

The First Consul had no such apprehensions. He conceived, on the contrary, that the French army might very easily concentrate itself on the left flank of Kray, and thus turn it. On this account, he desired, as we have already said, that, taking advantage of the curtain which covered it, that is to say, of the Rhine, it should ascend that river on a sudden; that it should assemble between Basle and Schaffhausen; that, with boats secretly provided in the tributary streams, it should throw across four bridges on one and the same morning; and that it should debouch to the number of 80,000 or 100,000 men, between Stockach and Donau-Eschingen, falling upon the flank of Kray, cutting him off from his reserves and from his left, and driving him in disorder upon the Upper Danube. He thought that, if this operation were executed with promptness and vigour, the Austrian army in Germany might be destroyed. What he did at a later period,

setting out from a different point, but in the same parts, about Ulm; what he did this same year by the St. Bernard, proves that this plan had in it nothing but what was perfectly practicable. He was of opinion that the French army, not operating in an enemy's country, since it would ascend by the left bank, having only to march without fighting, might, with certain precautions, steal two or three marches upon Kray, and that it would be at the point of passage before that general had collected sufficient means to prevent it.

This was the plan which had disturbed the mind of Moreau, unaccustomed to these bold combinations. He was fearful that Kray, receiving timely intelligence, would advance with the mass of his forces to meet the French army, and would drive it into the river. Moreau would rather avail himself of the existing bridges at Strasburg, Brisach, and Basle, for debouching in several columns on the right bank; he proposed in this manner to divide the attention of the Austrians, to draw them principally towards the defiles of the Black Forest, corresponding with the bridges of Strasburg and Brisach, then, after enticing them into these defiles, slip away suddenly, march along the Rhine with the columns which should have crossed that river, and post himself before Schaffhausen, to cover the rest of the army while debouching there.

Moreau's plan was not without merit, but neither was it without serious inconveniences; for, if it tended to avoid the danger of a single passage executed in mass, it had, by dividing this operation, the inconvenience of dividing the forces, of throwing two or three detached columns upon the enemy's ground, of making them perform a dangerous flank march as far as Schaffhausen, where they were to cover the last and principal passage of the river. Lastly, this plan had the disadvantage of securing few or no results; for it did not throw the French army entire and all at once upon the left flank of Marshal Kray: which would have been the only way to overpower the Austrian general, and to cut him off from Bavaria.

It is a sight worthy of the attention of History, that of these two men, opposed to each other in an interesting circumstance, which exhibited so conspicuously their diversities in mind and character. The plan of Moreau, as is frequently the case with the plans of second-rate men, had only the appearances of prudence; but it might succeed in the execution, for, we must incessantly repeat it, the execution redeems everything: sometimes it causes the best combinations to miscarry, and the worst to succeed. Moreau persisted, therefore, in his ideas. The First Consul, wishing to persuade him by means of a chosen agent, summoned to Paris General Dessoles, chief of the staff of the army of Germany, possessing an acute, penetrating mind,

worthy of serving for a link between two powerful and susceptible men; for he had a desire to conciliate his superiors, which is not always found in subordinates. The First Consul, therefore, called him to Paris about the middle of March (end of Ventôse), and kept him there several days. After explaining his ideas to him, he made him perfectly comprehend them, and even prefer them to those of Moreau. General Dessoles, nevertheless, persisted in advising the First Consul to adopt Moreau's plan, because it was necessary, in his opinion, to leave the general who operates to act according to his own ideas and character, when he is moreover a man worthy of the command entrusted to him. "Your plan," said he to the First Consul, "is grander, more decisive, probably also more sure; but it is not adapted to the genius of him who is to execute it. You have a way of carrying on war, which is superior to any other; Moreau has his, inferior, no doubt, to yours, but yet excellent. Leave him to act; he will act well; slowly perhaps, but surely; and he will procure for you all the results that you need for the success of your general combinations. If, on the other hand, you insist on the execution of your ideas, you will upset him, you will even offend him, and you will obtain nothing from him, by wanting to obtain too much." The First Consul, as well versed in the knowledge of men as in that of his profession, appreciated the wisdom of the advice of General Dessoles, and gave way. "You are right," said he; "Moreau is not capable of appreciating and executing the plan which I have conceived. Let him do as he pleases, provided he throws Marshal Kray upon Ulm and Ratisbon, and afterwards sends back his left wing, in time, upon Switzerland. The plan, which he does not comprehend, which he dares not venture to execute, I will execute myself, on another part of the theatre of war. What he dares not do on the Rhine, I will do on the Alps. He may, by-and-by, regret the glory which he relinquishes to me." Proud and profound words, containing an entire military prophecy, as the reader will be able to judge presently.\*

The manner of crossing the Rhine being thus left to Moreau, there was still one point left to settle. The First Consul much wished that the right wing, commanded by Lecourbe, should remain in reserve on the Swiss territory, quite ready to support Moreau, if he needed it, but that it should not penetrate into Germany, if its presence there was not indispensable; in order that it might not have to retrograde for the purpose of cooperating among the Alps. He knew, however, what a difficult thing it is to take from a commander-in-chief a detachment of his army, when operations are once commenced. Moreau

\* I had the honour, in my youth, to receive this account from the lips of General Dessoles himself.

insisted on having Lecourbe, engaging to return him to General Bonaparte as soon as he should have driven Marshal Kray upon Ulm. The First Consul complied with this desire, resolved to concede everything to maintain harmony; but he required Moreau to sign an agreement, by which he engaged, after he had thrown the Austrians upon Ulm, to detach Lecourbe, with 20,000 or 25,000 men, towards the Alps. This agreement was signed at Basle, between Moreau and Berthier, the latter being officially considered as general-in-chief of the army of reserve.

General Dessoles had left Paris, after he had completely settled all the points in discussion with the First Consul. Their plans were concerted: everything was ready for opening the campaign, and it was important to commence operations immediately, in order that, Moreau having executed early the part of the plan which concerned him, the First Consul might throw himself to the other side of the Alps, and extricate Masséna before he was overwhelmed, for he was struggling with 36,000 men against 120,000. The First Consul wished that Moreau should open the campaign by the middle of April, or the end of that month at latest. But his solicitations were vain: Moreau was not ready, and he had neither activity, nor a mind fertile in resources, which make amends for the insufficiency of means. While he was delaying, the Austrians, adhering to their plan of taking the initiative in Italy, attacked Masséna, and commenced with that general a struggle which the disproportion of strength has rendered worthy of everlasting remembrance.

The army of Liguria comprehended, at most, 36,000 men fit for active service, and distributed in the following manner.

Thirteen or fourteen thousand men, under General Suchet, forming the left of the army, occupied the Col de Tende, Nice, and the line of the Var. A corps detached from that wing, about 4000 strong, under the command of General Thureau, was posted on Mont Cenis. There were consequently 18,000 men engaged in guarding the frontier of France, from Mont Cenis to the Col de Tende.

Ten or twelve thousand men, under General Soult, forming the centre of the army, defended the two principal debouches of the Apennines, that which descends from the Upper Bormida upon Savona and Finale, and that of the Bocchetta, which descends upon Genoa.

Seven or eight thousand men, very nearly, under the intrepid Miollis, occupied Genoa, and a col which debouches near that city, on the opposite side to that of the Bocchetta. Thus, the second half of this army, 18,000 men, or thereabouts, defended the Apennines and Liguria. The danger of a separation between these two portions of the army, that which occupied Nice, and that which occupied Genoa, was evident.

These 36,000 French had opposed to them the 120,000 Austrians under the Baron de Melas, perfectly recruited, fed, revictualled, thanks to the abundance of all things in Italy, and to the subsidies with which England furnished Austria. General Kaim, with the heavy artillery, the cavalry, and a corps of infantry, in all 50,000 men, had been left in Piedmont, to serve for rear-guard there, and to observe the debouches from Switzerland. Melas, with 70,000 men, the greater part infantry, had advanced towards the defiles of the Apennines. He had, besides the superiority in number, the advantage of concentric position; for Masséna was obliged with 30,000 men (the surplus occupying Mont Cenis) to guard the semicircle formed by the Maritime Alps and the Apennines, from Nice to Genoa—a semicircle not less than forty leagues in extent. General Melas, on the contrary, placed on the other side of the mountains, in the centre of this semicircle, between Coni, Ceva, and Gavi, had but a little way to go in order to reach one or the other of the points which he proposed to attack. He could easily make false demonstrations on one of these points, and then, striking off rapidly for the other, act upon it *en masse*. Masséna, threatened in this manner, had forty leagues to travel, in going from Nice to the relief of Genoa, or from Genoa to the relief of Nice.

It was upon these circumstances viewed as a whole that the instructions given by the First Consul to Masséna were founded—instructions already referred to in a general manner, but which it is necessary to recapitulate rather more in detail. Three roads, fit for artillery, led from one side of the mountains to the other: that which, by way of Turin, Coni, and Tende, debouches upon Nice and the Var; the second, ascending the valley of the Bormida, leads by the Col of Cadibona towards Savona; lastly, that of the Bocchetta, which, by Tortona and Gavi, descends, on the left of Genoa, into the valley of the Polcevera. The danger was lest Baron de Melas should bring his whole force to bear upon the second of these debouches, cut the French army in two, and throw half upon Nice and half upon Genoa. Perceiving this danger, the First Consul addressed to Masséna, in letters full of admirable foresight (March 5th and 12th), instructions, the substance of which I shall here give. “Beware,” said he, “of having too extended a line. Have few men upon the Alps and at the Col de Tende, where the snow will defend you. Leave some detachments about Nice and the surrounding forts; have four-fifths of your force at Genoa and in the environs. The enemy will debouch upon your right towards Genoa, upon your centre towards Savona, probably on both points at once. Refuse one of the two attacks, and fall with your whole united force upon one

of the enemy's columns. The ground will not permit him to avail himself of his superiority in artillery and cavalry; he will be able to attack you with infantry alone; yours is infinitely superior to his, and, favoured by the nature of the ground, it may make amends for deficiency in number. In this broken country, if you manœuvre well, you may, with 30,000 men, beat 60,000, and to carry 60,000 infantry into Liguria, M. de Melas must have 90,000, which presupposes a total army of 120,000 men, at least. M. de Melas has neither your activity nor your talents: you have no reason to be afraid of him. If he appears towards Nice while you are at Genoa, let him march; don't stir: he will not venture to push very far while you remain in Liguria, ready to fall upon his rear, or upon the troops left in Piedmont."

Various causes prevented Masséna from following this prudent advice. In the first place, he was surprised by the sudden irruption of the Austrians, before he had time to rectify the position of his troops, and to make his definitive arrangements: secondly, he had not sufficient provisions in the city of Genoa to concentrate his whole army there. Fearful of consuming the provisions, which the place would have great need of, in case of a siege, he wished to make use of the resources of Nice, which were much more abundant. Lastly, it must be confessed, Masséna did not sufficiently comprehend all the profundity of the instructions of his superior, to disregard the inconveniences, real enough, it is true, of a general concentration upon Genoa. Masséna was, perhaps, the first of the generals of his time on a field of battle: in point of character, he was equal to the most resolute generals of any age; but, though he had abundance of natural talent, the extent of his views fell short of the promptness of his *coup d'œil* and the energy of his mind.

Thus, for want of time, for want of provisions, for want also of being sufficiently impressed with the importance of the step, he did not concentrate his forces soon enough upon Genoa, and was surprised by the Austrians. The latter opened the campaign on the 5th of April (the 15th Germinal), that is to say, much earlier than one would have expected hostilities to be resumed. Baron de Melas advanced, with about 70,000 or 75,000 men, to force the chain of the Apennines. His lieutenants, Ott and Hohenzollern, were despatched with 25,000 men upon Genoa. General Ott, with 15,000, ascending the Trebbia, approached by the cols of Scoffera and Monte Creto, which debouch upon the right of Genoa; Hohenzollern, with 10,000, threatened the Bocchetta, which debouches upon the left of that city. Baron de Melas, with 50,000 men, ascended the Bormida, and attacked simultaneously all the positions of what we have called the middle road, which runs by way of Cadibona to Savona. His

intention, as the First Consul had foreseen, was to force our centre and to separate General Suchet from General Soult, who gave the hand to each other at about this point. A violent struggle ensued, from the sources of the Tarano and of the Bormida to the scarped summits overlooking Genoa. Generals Elsnitz and Melas sustained obstinate encounters with Suchet at Rocca-Barbena, Sette-Pani, Melogno, and Santo Jacobo; with Soult at Montelegino, Stella, Cadibona, and Savona. The soldiers of the Republic, profiting by this mountainous country, availing themselves of all the accidents of the ground, defended themselves with incomparable bravery, inflicted on the enemy a loss three times as great as their own, for their fire was poured down upon dense and deep masses; but, obliged to fight without ceasing against troops continually renewed, they were at length forced to fall back, vanquished by exhaustion and fatigue more than by the Austrians. Generals Suchet and Soult were compelled to separate, and to retire, the one upon Borghetto, the other upon Savona. The French line was thus broken, as might easily be foreseen; one-half of the army of Liguria was thrown upon Nice; the other doomed to shut itself up in Genoa.

On the side of Genoa itself, the success had been equally balanced. The attack on the Bocchetta, attempted by Count Hohenzollern, with too few troops to worst the French, that is, with about 10,000 men against 5000, was repulsed by Gazan's division. But, on the right of Genoa, that is, towards the positions of the Monte Creto and of Scoffera, which afford access to the valley of Bisagno, General Ott, having vanquished the division of Miollis, which had not 4000 men to oppose to 15,000, descended on the back slope of the Apennines, and, surrounding all the forts which covered the city, displayed the Austrian colours to the affrighted Genoese. The English squadron at the same time hoisted the British flag. If the inhabitants of the city were patriots and partisans of the French, the peasants of the neighbouring valleys, attached to the aristocratic party, as the Calabrese in the kingdom of Naples were to Queen Caroline, as the Vendéans in France were to the Bourbons, rose at the sight of the soldiers of the coalition. They rang the alarm-bell in all the villages. A Baron d'Aspres, attached to the imperial service, and possessing some influence in the country, excited them to revolt. In the evening of the 6th of April, the unfortunate inhabitants of Genoa, seeing the fires of the Austrians on the surrounding mountains, on the sea the English flag flying, began to be afraid that the oligarchy, already mad with joy, would in a few days re-establish its detested empire.

But the intrepid Masséna was amidst them. Though separated from Suchet by the attack directed against his centre, he still numbered from 15,000 to 18,000 men; and, supported by



such a garrison, he could defy any enemy whatever to force before his face the gates of Genoa.

To enable the reader to comprehend the operations executed by the French general during the memorable siege, it is necessary to describe the theatre on which it took place.

Genoa is seated at the very bottom of the beautiful gulf which bears its name, at the foot of a spur of the Apennines. This spur, running from north to south down to the very water, before plunging into it, separates into two ridges, one turning to the east, the other to the west, thus forming an inclined triangle, the apex of which is connected with the Apennines, while the base is supported upon the sea. It is at the base of this triangle, and, be it remarked, with the ordinary irregularity of nature, that Genoa spreads itself out in long streets, bordered with magnificent palaces. Nature and art had done much for its defence. On the side next the sea, two moles, running towards one another so as almost to cross, formed the port, and defended it against hostile squadrons. On the land side, a first bastioned rampart surrounds the densest and most populous part of the city. An outer rampart of vast extent, and bastioned like the preceding, was carried along the heights, which, as we have just said, describe a triangular figure around Genoa. Two forts, constructed storeywise, one above another, Spur Fort and Diamond Fort, were placed at the apex of this triangular figure, and covered by their commanding fire the whole of the fortifications.

But this was not all that was done to keep the enemy at a great distance. If you turn your back to the sea and your face to Genoa, you have the east on your right, the west on your left. Two small rivers, the Bisagno on the east, or the right, the Polcevera on the west, or the left, wash the two sides of the outer rampart. The Bisagno descends from those same heights of the Monte Creto and Scoffera, which you must cross when you come from the back of the Apennines, in ascending the Trebbia. That side of the valley of the Bisagno, which is opposite to the city, is called the Monte Ratti, and presents several positions, from the heights of which great mischief might have been done to Genoa, if they had not been occupied. Great care had, therefore, been taken to crown them with three forts, those of Quezzi, Richelieu, and St. Teale. The valley of the Polcevera, on the contrary, situated on the left of Genoa, and descending from the heights of the Bocchetta, offers no commanding position requiring works of art for the defence of the city. But a straggling suburb, on the seaside, that of San Pietro di Arena, presented a mass of building useful and easy to be defended.

Thus the fortification of Genoa presented a triangle, inclined fifteen degrees to the horizon, having an extent of 9000 fathoms, connected by its apex with the Apennines, washed at the base

by the sea, and bordered on its two sides by the Bisagno on the east, and the Polcevera on the west. The Spur Fort, and above that Fort Diamond, covered its summit. Forts Richelieu, St. Teclé, and Quezzi, prevented destructive fires from being poured from the flanks of Monte Ratti upon the city of marble palaces.

Such was Genoa at that day; such were its defences, which art, time, and contributions imposed upon France have since greatly improved.

Masséna had it still in his power to assemble 18,000 men. If, with such a garrison, in so strong a fortress, he had had a sufficient stock of provisions, he would have been invincible. We shall see what character can effect in war, for retrieving a fault of combination or of foresight.

Masséna, determined to oppose an energetic resistance to the enemy, purposed to do immediately two very important things; the first consisted in driving back beyond the Apennines the Austrians who pressed Genoa too closely; the second in effecting a junction with General Suchet, by a movement in concert with that general, along the line of the Corniche.

To execute the first design, it was requisite that he should dislodge the Austrians from the Bisagno on the one hand, and the Polcevera on the other, and that he should drive them, by the Monte Creto and the Bocchetta, to the other side of the mountains from which they had come. Without losing a day, on the very next after their first appearance, that is, on the 7th of April (17th Germinal), he sallied from Genoa, on the east side, and traversed the valley of the Bisagno, followed by the brave division of Miollis, which had been obliged, two days before, to withdraw from before the greatly superior forces of General Ott. He reinforced it with part of the reserve, and, placing himself at its head, marched in two columns: the right, under General d'Arnaud, kept close to the shore, and proceeded towards Quinto; the left, under Miollis, directed its course towards the acclivities of Monte Ratti. A third column, under General Petitot, followed, marching up the bottom of the valley of the Bisagno, which winds at the foot of Monte Ratti. Such was the precision of the movement of these three columns, that their fire was heard at the same moment on all the points at once. General d'Arnaud by one slope, General Miollis by the other, forced their way with the utmost vigour to the heights of the Monte Ratti.

The presence of Masséna himself, and the desire of revenging the surprise of the preceding day, animated the soldiers. The Austrians were hurled into the torrents, and lost all their positions. General d'Arnaud passed on, and, following the crest of the heights, reached the very summit of the Apennines, the Col of Scoffera. Masséna, followed by some companies of reserve, descended into the valley of the Bisagno, to join Petitot's

column. Thus reinforced, this latter column repulsed the enemy everywhere, and, ascending the river, lent its support to General d'Arnaud's movement on Scoffera. Entangled in the winding valleys, the Austrians left Masséna 1500 prisoners, and at their head that Baron d'Aspres, who had instigated the revolt of the peasants of La Fonte Buona.

When, on the evening of the same day, Masséna returned to Genoa, after delivering the Genoese from the sight of the enemy, and bringing back as prisoner that officer whose speedy triumphal arrival was announced, the joy of the patriotic, and most numerous, portion of the population, was extreme. He was greeted with acclamations. The inhabitants had provided litters for carrying the wounded, and wine and broth to refresh them, and they disputed the honour of receiving them into their houses.

After this act of vigour towards the east, the most important side to clear, because upon that only the city was closely pressed by the Austrians, Masséna resolved to take advantage of the respite procured him by the last success for making an effort towards the west, that is, towards Savona, and thereby re-establishing his communications with General Suchet. To secure Genoa from all attack during his absence, he divided the troops left him into two corps: the right under General Miollis, the left under General Soult. The corps of General Miollis was destined to guard Genoa with two divisions. D'Arnaud's division was to defend the east side, fronting the Bisagno; Spital's division, the west, fronting the Polcevera. The left corps, under General Soult, was charged to keep the field with the two divisions of Gardanne and Gazan. It was with this force, of about 10,000 men, that Masséna purposed to approach Savona, sending a secret express to Suchet, with orders to attempt a simultaneous movement upon the same point. Gardanne's division was directed along the shore, and Gazan's upon the crests of the Apennines, with the intention of inducing the enemy, by the appearance of two separate columns, to split his forces. Afterwards manœuvring rapidly on this ground, with which he was perfectly acquainted, Masséna meant, according to circumstances, to unite these two divisions into one, so as to cut to pieces, either on the tops of the Apennines, or along the coast, any corps of the enemy that might be most exposed to his attacks. He commanded Gardanne's division in person, and had consigned Gazan's to General Soult. His intention was to follow the coast by Voltri, Varaggio, and Savona: his lieutenant, General Soult, had orders to ascend by Aqua Bianca and San Pietro del Alba upon Sassello.

On the morning of the 9th of April, our troops commenced their movement. The Baron de Melas, after cutting the French army in two, purposed to shut up Masséna in Genoa, and at the same time to contract his own line, which was too extended,

for it embraced a space of at least fifteen leagues, from the valley of the Tanaro to that of the Trebbia. The two armies met in their movement, and upon this broken ground ensued a most obstinate and at the same time confused conflict. While Masséna marched in two columns, the Baron de Melas was marching in three, and Count Hohenzollern, forming a fourth, tried a new attack on the Bocchetta. Ten thousand French were about to meet more than 40,000 Austrians.

General Soult, defiling by Voltri, perceived on his right the Austrians, who had passed the Bocchetta, and crowned the surrounding heights. On arriving at a place called Aqua Santa they might threaten the rear of the French columns, and prevent their return towards Genoa. General Soult thought it prudent to drive them back: a brilliant action was the consequence; Colonel Mouton, since marshal, and Count Lobau, commanding the 3rd demi-brigade, displayed extraordinary valour. General Soult took some cannon and prisoners, and, in spite of a host of enemies, gained the mountain road to Sassello. The time spent in this action (which could not prevent the ulterior advance of the Austrians upon the rear of our columns), made it impossible for Soult to reach Sassello, on the other side of the Apennines, by the time that General Masséna was awaiting him there. The latter had marched along the sea, and next day, April the 10th, he was in the environs of Varaggio, formed into two columns, and seeking to enter into communication by the heights with the corps of General Soult, whom he supposed to be at Sassello. The enemy, whose force was ten times the number of ours, endeavoured to envelop Masséna's two small columns, and especially the left, which he commanded in person. Masséna, relying upon his right column and upon the movement of General Soult towards Sassello, resisted for a long time, with 1200 men, a corps of from 8000 to 10,000, and displayed extraordinary firmness on this occasion. Being obliged to retreat, and having lost sight of his right column, which had fallen behind, in consequence of a tardy distribution of provisions, he set out in search of it, amidst frightful precipices and bands of revolted peasants. Having at last fallen in with it, he ordered it to rejoin the rest of Gardanne's division, which had continued to follow the coast by Varaggio and Cogoletto. The difficulty of concerting his movements among this multitude of enemies, and in so broken a country, having prevented the timely meeting of General Soult's corps with the corps of General Masséna, the latter resolved to rally his troops, to ascend the crest of the Apennines on his right, to join his lieutenant, and then fall upon the Austrian corps scattered in those valleys. But our harassed troops had dispersed upon the roads, and could not be collected in time. Masséna then determined to send to General

Soult all who were capable of marching, to serve for a reinforcement; and with the rest, consisting of wounded and exhausted soldiers, he continued to follow the sea-coast, and regained the approaches of Genoa, in order to cover the retreat of the *corps d'armée*, and to ensure its re-entry into the place. Reduced to a handful of men, he had several times to sustain the most disproportionate conflicts; and, in one of these actions, a French battalion, taken unawares, having given way before a charge of Szekler hussars, he himself charged those hussars with thirty horse, and drove them back. He finally posted himself at Voltri, for the purpose of awaiting there the return of General Soult. The latter, thrown into the mountains, among detachments of the enemy five or six times as numerous, was exposed to great dangers there; and, after the most glorious efforts, he must have succumbed at last but for the succours so seasonably sent to him by Masséna. Reinforced in time, he was enabled to regain the road to Genoa, after sustaining with advantage a most arduous and most unequal contest. He at length rejoined his general-in-chief, and both re-entered Genoa, cutting their way, and bringing with them 4000 prisoners. General Suchet, on his part, had endeavoured to rejoin his general-in-chief, but he had found it impossible to penetrate the enormous mass of the Austrian army.

The Genoese were transported with admiration at the sight of the French general entering their city for the second time, preceded by columns of prisoners. His ascendancy had become all-powerful. The army and the population obeyed him with the profoundest submission.

Masséna might, from that moment, consider himself as definitively shut up in Genoa; but he had no intention to suffer himself to be pressed too closely. His design was to keep the enemy continually at a distance from the walls, to exhaust him by incessant fights, to occupy him in such a manner that he could neither force the Var, nor retire to Lombardy, nor oppose the projected march of the First Consul across the Alps.

No sooner had he returned, on the 18th of April (28th Germinal), than he directed his attention to the internal police and the provisioning of the place. Fearful lest the Genoese nobles might practise treachery, he took precautions against any surprise on their part. The national guard, composed of Ligurian patriots, supported by a French force, encamped in the principal square in the city, with lighted matches to the guns, the national guard was to assemble whenever the drums should beat to arms. Such of the inhabitants as did not belong to it were ordered to retire, at this signal, to their houses. The armed troops alone were authorised to traverse the streets. At ordinary times, the inhabitants were to be at home by ten o'clock at night, and assemblages at any time were strictly prohibited.

Masséna had collected the corn to be found in Genoa, promising to pay, and actually paying for it, when it was brought cheerfully; seizing it by means of domiciliary visits when the owners refused to deliver it. After securing all the corn, he put both army and populace upon rations, and had thus procured wherewithal to feed his soldiers and the poor inhabitants during the first fortnight of the siege. This fortnight had nearly elapsed; but there were still left provisions, which the money of the wealthy drew forth at a high price from certain secret stores, and for their sole use. By order of Masséna a fresh search was made, and there was found a sufficiency of the ordinary kinds of grain, rye, oats, and others, to supply the citizens and the army with coarse bread for another fortnight. It was hoped that some lucky gale of wind might drive off the English, and bring some cargoes of provisions into the harbour. Some assistance was expected from the Corsican and Ligurian privateers, which had been furnished with letters of marque for the capture of vessels laden with corn. In short, Masséna had determined to hold out to the last extremities, and he had resolved, rather than submit, to feed the troops upon the cacao with which the warehouses of Genoa were abundantly stocked. Being supplied with some money, sent by the First Consul, he hoarded this for extreme cases, and also made use of it for affording occasional relief to his unfortunate soldiers, under their cruel privations. Already, in this series of encounters, several thousand men had been put *hors de combat*, and a great number were in the hospitals. In the forts, upon the two ramparts of the place, and in reserve, there was left an active force of about 12,000 combatants.

In this desperate state of things, Masséna, appearing every day with calm and serene countenance, at length communicated to others the courage with which he was himself animated. His aide-de-camp, Franceschi, embarked in a small boat to proceed to the coast of Nice, and thence to repair to the First Consul, in order to acquaint him with the hardships, the exploits, and the pressing dangers of the army of Liguria.

On the morning of the 30th of April (10th Floréal), a general cannonade, thundering on all points at once; on the east towards the Bisagno, on the west towards the Polcevera, lastly, along the coast itself, proceeding from a division of gunboats, announced some grand attempt of the enemy's. The Austrians, in fact, brought forward a great force on that day. The Count of Hohenzollern attacked the plateau of the Two Brothers, on which Fort Diamond was erected. After some fierce efforts, he made himself master of the plateau, and summoned Fort Diamond. In reply to this summons, the brave officer who commanded it declared, that he would not surrender the post committed to his honour till he was compelled by main force. This fort was of the greatest

importance, since it commanded the Spur Fort, and, consequently, the whole ramparts. The Austrian camp of Coronata, situated on the banks of the Polcevera, towards the west front, opened a vehement fire on the suburb of San Pietro di Arena, and several attacks were made at the same time, for the purpose of cooping us in a narrower space than we occupied in this quarter. On the opposite side, that is to say, towards the Bisagno, the enemy surrounded Fort Richelieu, and unluckily took Fort Quezzi, which was not completely finished when the siege began. Lastly, he made himself master of the village of St. Martin d'Albaro, situated below Fort St. Teele, and he was near occupying a formidable position, that of La Madona del Monte, from which the city of Genoa might be cannonaded. The soldiers of General d'Arnaud had already abandoned the last houses of the village of St. Martin d'Albaro; scarcely any of them now kept their ranks, many having dispersed themselves in irregular parties. Masséna hastened to the spot, rallied them himself, renewed the fight, and arrested the enemy.

Half the day was already gone: it was high time to repair the mischief. Masséna instantly repaired to Genoa, and made suitable dispositions. He gave to General Soult the 73rd and 106th demi-brigades, and ordered him to retake the plateau of the Two Brothers. But, wishing first to recover Fort Quezzi, and to force the enemy to evacuate St. Martin d'Albaro, he himself led the Miollis division against that point, after reinforcing it with battalions borrowed from the 2nd and the 3rd of the line.

D'Arnaud's division, returning to the charge, turned St. Martin d'Albaro, drove back the enemy who had occupied it into the ravine of the Sturla, took from him some prisoners, and thus covered the right of the French columns advancing upon Fort Quezzi. While the brave Colonel Mouton, at the head of two battalions of the 3rd, attacked this Fort Quezzi in front, Adjutant-General Hector was directed to turn the Monte Ratti by the heights of Fort Richelieu. In spite of unparalleled efforts, the brave Colonel Mouton was repulsed, but he did not yield ground till he received a ball which went through his chest, and left him nearly dead on the field of battle. Masséna, who had no more than two battalions, pushed one upon the right flank of the position occupied by the enemy, and directed half of the other upon the left flank of the same position. A fierce encounter took place around this Fort Quezzi. Too close to fire, the combatants fought with stones and with the butt of the musket. Our soldiers were nearly overpowered by numbers. Masséna then took the half battalion which he had left, put himself at the head of it, and decided the victory. Fort Quezzi was retaken.

The Austrians, driven from position to position, left a great number of dead, wounded, and prisoners. At this instant

Masséna, who had deferred the attack on the plateau of the Two Brothers, profiting by the effect produced by these advantages, sent orders to General Soult to take it. The general of brigade, Spital, was sent to attack this plateau, which was long disputed. At length our soldiers retook it, and thus, after a whole day's fighting, they recovered at once the plateau of the Two Brothers, which commanded the extreme point of the place, Fort Quezzi, the posts of St. Martin d'Albaro and of La Madona del Monte, in short, all the important positions, without which the siege of Genoa was impossible for the Austrians. Masséna returned in the evening to Genoa, carrying with him the ladders which the enemy had provided for scaling the walls. The Austrians had lost on this day 1600 prisoners, 2400 killed and wounded—about 4000 men. Including these, Masséna had taken from them, or killed, 12,000 or 15,000 men since the opening of hostilities; and, what was a still more serious matter, he had exhausted the moral force of their army by the unparalleled efforts which he had obliged them to make.

No time was lost in setting about the repair of Fort Quezzi. This work, which seemed likely to take a month, was finished in three days, by means of five or six hundred barrels of earth, which were brought by the soldiers, and served to form the entrenchments. On the 5th of May (15th Floréal), a small vessel laden with corn brought a supply for five days. It was a most valuable addition to the stock of provisions, by this time reduced very low. But it became urgent to relieve the place, otherwise it could not hold out long. Of bread it was likely to be very soon destitute.

General Suchet, on his part, finding himself overpowered from the crests of the Apennines, had been obliged to quit the position of Borghetto, to abandon even the Roya, which was no longer tenable, the enemy marching at full liberty by the Col de Tende, and threatening Nice and the Var. Nice was even occupied by the Baron de Melas, who entered that city triumphantly, glad to tread a soil which the Republic had declared to be French territory. But General Suchet rallied behind the Var, in a position which has long furnished a study for our officers of engineers. The bridge of St. Laurent on the Var, covered by a *tête de pont*, presented a defile of 400 fathoms to pass, and might be considered as an insurmountable obstacle. The whole right bank, guarded by the French, was covered with batteries, from the mouth of the river to the mountains. The forts of Montalban and Vintimille, situated in advance of the Var, had been occupied by French garrisons at the moment of the evacuation of Nice. That of Montalban, situated on the rear of the Austrians, at an elevation which rendered it visible from the camp of the French, was surmounted by a telegraph,



by means of which General Suchet received notice of all the movements of the enemy. All the disposable troops of all arms had been brought together from the contiguous departments, so that he still numbered 14,000 men, who, screened by good entrenchments, were in a position difficult to be stormed.

On the receipt of these tidings from Liguria, the First Consul despatched urgent remonstrances to Moreau, to decide him to commence hostilities. It was a month since everything had been settled between them, and no further difficulty imputable to the government impeded the army of the Rhine. But Moreau, naturally rather slow, unwilling to commit himself upon an enemy's territory but with the full certainty of success, deferred wrongly the commencement of the operations. In fact, any delay made by him in opening the campaign was a delay to the opening of the campaign by the army of reserve, and a cruel prolongation of the extremities which Masséna and his brave soldiers were suffering. "Hasten"—such was the language addressed to Moreau from Paris—"hasten, by your successes, to accelerate the moment when Masséna may be relieved. That general is in want of provisions: for this fortnight he has been maintaining a desperate struggle with his emaciated soldiers. I address myself to your patriotism, to your own interest; for, if Masséna should be obliged to capitulate, it would be necessary to take from you part of your forces, and hurry to the Rhone, to the succour of the southern departments." At last a formal order was given to him, by the telegraph, to pass the Rhine.

The reasons which prevented Moreau from opening the campaign would have been good under less urgent circumstances. Alsace was exhausted; Switzerland, in particular, overrun for two years by the armies of all Europe, was totally drained of resources. The inhabitants, unable to support their children, were under the necessity of emigrating with them from the poor cantons into the rich ones. The ruined families thus consigned them to the bounty of families which still possessed some means of subsistence. Nothing could be demanded from such a country, which, besides, it would have been impolitic to exasperate, for it was the *point d'appui* of our two principal armies. Moreau, as we have seen, was living upon the stores provided for our fortresses on the Rhine, in case of siege. This, however, was not the real motive of his delay; it would have been a motive, on the contrary, for hastening, with all possible speed, to procure subsistence in an enemy's country; but his artillery and cavalry were in want of horses. He had no camp equipage, no implements; if he had materials for throwing a bridge, that was the utmost. Nevertheless, considering the urgency of the circumstances, he consented to make shift without such things as were yet wanting, hoping to procure

them by the way. So excellent was the composition of his army, that it could make amends for the deficiency of what it had not, dispense with it, or take it by force. At the end of April (the first days of Floréal), Moreau, therefore, decided to open this campaign, the most glorious in his life, and one of the most memorable in our annals.

He had at his disposal, as we have seen, about 130,000 men, rather more than fewer. About 30,000 men occupied the fortresses of Strasburg, Landau, Mayence, the *têtes de pont* of Basle, Brisach, Kehl, and Cassel. Out of these 30,000, 6000 or 7000, under General Moncey, guarded the valleys of the St. Gothard and the Simplon, to close them against the Austrians, in case they attempted to penetrate into them. The active army thus numbered 100,000 men, ready to take the field. The infantry, in particular, was superb; it numbered 82,000 men; the artillery 5000, with 116 pieces of cannon; the cavalry 13,000. As the reader will perceive, the numbers of the artillery and the cavalry were far below the usual proportions; but their composition was excellent; and, besides, the quality of the infantry enabled it to dispense with those auxiliary arms.

Moreau divided his army into four corps; Lecourbe commanded the right, 25,000 strong, and stationed from the Lake of Constance to Schaffhausen. A second corps, called the corps of reserve, amounting to nearly 30,000 men, and under the immediate command of Moreau, occupied the territory of Basle. A third, of 25,000 men, forming the centre, under St. Cyr, was distributed about Old and New Brisach. Lastly, General St. Suzanne, at the head of about 20,000 men, after ascending from Mayence to Strasburg, occupied Strasburg and Kehl, and formed the left of the army.

Moreau had for years past adopted this system of splitting his forces into separate corps, each complete in infantry, artillery, and cavalry, capable of shifting for themselves, wherever they might be, but subject to the inconvenience, as experience soon demonstrated, of readily parting company and acting by themselves, especially when the commander-in-chief did not exercise his authority with sufficient vigour to enforce at all times their co-operation in the general plan. This inconvenience was further aggravated by one step in particular, which Moreau adopted in this campaign; it was that of assuming to himself the direct command of one of the *corps d'armée*, under the name of reserve. St. Cyr, who had long served with Moreau, and who had great influence with him, strongly opposed this combination,\* alleging that it absorbed the general-in-chief. made him stoop to a part that was not his, and, above all, that it was injurious to the other portions of the army, rarely so well treated as the troops placed

\* See on this subject the *Mémoires du Maréchal Saint-Cyr*, campaign of 1800.

under the general staff. But these animadversions, the justice of which was more than once demonstrated in this campaign, did not prevail. Moreau persisted in his resolution, out of complaisance for the wishes of a coterie. Having already entrusted the direction of his staff to General Dessoles, and desirous, nevertheless, of creating an appointment for General Lahorie, one of those dangerous friends who, at a later period, contributed to his ruin, he made him second in command of the reserve. This circumstance produced a coolness between Moreau and St. Cyr, which soon waxed into open rupture.

M. de Kray, the adversary of Moreau, had, as we have said, 150,000 men, 40,000 of whom were in the fortresses on the Rhine and Danube, and 110,000 in the active army. The infantry, mixed with Bavarians, Wurtembergers, Mayencers, was middling. The cavalry was superb; it numbered 26,000 horse. The numerous and well-served artillery consisted of 300 pieces of cannon. The right of the Austrians, under the command of M. de Sztarray, observed the course of the Rhine, between Mayence and Rastadt, connecting itself with the levies of Mayence peasants commanded by the Baron d'Albini. General de Kienmayer covered the *débouché* of Strasburg, in advance of Kinzig. Major Giulay with a brigade, held the Höllengrund, and observed Old Brisach. The bulk of the Austrian army was encamped behind the defiles of the Black Forest, at Donau-Eschingen and Willingen, at the junction of the roads leading from the Rhine to the Danube. Forty thousand men were assembled at this point. M. de Kray had placed in the Forest Towns a strong advanced guard, under the Archduke Ferdinand, with directions to observe the Basle road; he had left a numerous rear-guard, under Prince Joseph of Lorraine, at Stockach, to cover the magazines established in that town, to guard the roads to Ulm and Munich, and to connect himself with the Lake of Constance, where Williams, an Englishman, commanded a flotilla. Lastly, Prince Reuss, at the head of 30,000 men, partly Austrian regiments, partly Tyrolese militia, occupied the Rheinthal, from the Grisons to the Lake of Constance. This was considered as the left of the imperial army. M. de Kray, at the centre of this net, spread around him, flattered himself that he should be informed of the slightest movement of the French.

The plan of Moreau already detailed, and which consisted in debouching by the three bridges of Strasburg, Brisach, and Basle, and in then stealing away and ascending the Rhine to Schaffhausen. had been adopted without modification.\* On the

\* Marshal St. Cyr, in his *Mémoires*, appears to be in error on this point. The First Consul had adopted the plan entire. This fact is attested by a letter of General Dessoles, contained in the *Mémorial de la Guerre*, and by the manuscript correspondence.

25th of April, Moreau put his troops in motion. He proceeded himself to Strasburg, where he joined the corps of St. Suzanne, that, by his presence at that point, he might cause it to be inferred that it was his intention to act by the direct road from Strasburg across the Black Forest. He had taken another precaution the better to mask his movements, which was not to assemble his forces beforehand. The demi-brigades marched from their very cantonments directly to the place where they were to pass the Rhine, and thus joined on their route the corps of which they formed part. Everything being thus arranged, three imposing heads of columns, acting simultaneously within a space of thirty leagues, crossed at the same instant the bridges of Strasburg, Old Brisach, and Basle. This was on the 25th of April.

General St. Suzanne, who commanded the extreme left and had crossed at Strasburg, swept all that he found before him. He fell in here and there with detached corps, which made no great resistance. However, not desiring to involve himself in serious actions, he halted between Renchen and Offenburg, threatening at once the valleys of the Renchen and of the Kinzig; but striving most especially to persuade the Austrians that his intention was to gain the Danube by way of the Black Forest, and by following the valley of the Kinzig. At the same instant, St. Cyr debouched from Old Brisach, and advanced to Freiburg, briskly driving the enemy's detachments before him; but observing, like St. Suzanne, the precaution not to push on too far. He experienced some resistance before Freiburg. The Austrians had entrenched the heights surrounding that town, and placed behind the entrenchments troops of peasants, raised in the mountains of Swabia, upon pretext of defending their homes against the ravages of the French. These could not keep their ground. Freiburg was occupied in a twinkling. Some of these unfortunate peasants were slaughtered, and the others were not again seen during the remainder of the campaign. St. Cyr posted himself in such a manner as to induce a belief that he had designs on the Höllengrund (Val d'Enfer).

The reserve debouched on the same day by the bridge of Basle, and, not meeting with any obstacle, pushed a division, that of Richepanse, towards Schlingen and Kandern, to give the hand to St. Cyr's corps, which, in two days, was to ascend the Rhine.

During the whole of the 26th of April (6th Floréal), St. Suzanne remained in position in advance of Strasburg, St. Cyr in advance of Brisach. The reserve, which had debouched from Basle, finished deploying, while awaiting the movement of the two corps destined to ascend the Rhine, till they were in a line with itself. Moreau left Strasburg, to return to his headquarters, which were in the centre of the reserve.

The 27th was likewise spent in misleading the enemy as to the direction of our columns. The Austrians might naturally expect a decided movement by the Kinzig and the Höllengrund. These two defiles are, in fact, the most direct route for an army advancing from the Rhine to the Danube, for they open at some distance from one another, run in the same direction, and at length unite between Donau-Eschingen and Hufingen, not far from Schaffhausen, at which point was the corps of General Lecourbe. It was natural to suppose that the two strong columns, of from 20,000 to 25,000 men each, which appeared at the entrance of these defiles, would really pursue that direction, to give the hand to Lecourbe. In order to guard them the better, M. de Kray detached twelve squadrons and nine battalions from Willingen, and sent them as reinforcements to General Kienmayer. He was obliged to weaken Stockach, to supply the place of the troops which he had detached from Willingen.

But, in the night of the 27th, and on the 28th, while M. de Kray was falling into the snare, the direction of the French columns was suddenly changed. St. Suzanne fell back upon Strasburg, recrossed the Rhine with his whole corps, and ascended the left bank, that he might not have to make too long a flank movement in an enemy's country. On reaching New Brisach, he again crossed to the right bank, and took the place of St. Cyr before Freiburg, as if he was about to enter the Höllengrund. St. Cyr, on his part, turning off to the right, but without quitting the German side, marched along the bank of the river with his artillery, his cavalry, and his baggage; and, while his heavy *matériel* thus followed the level country, a great part of his infantry marched on the flank of the mountains, by St. Hubert, Neuhoof, Todnau, and St. Blaise. Moreau's object in pursuing this course was to avoid encumbering the banks of the Rhine, to reconnoitre the heights of the Black Forest, full of Austrian detachments, and to cross nearer to their sources the rivers which descend from those heights to the Rhine, through the territory of the Forest Towns. These rivers are the Wiesen, the Alb, and the Wutach. Unluckily, St. Cyr had reckoned on finding roads where none really existed. He was obliged to traverse a frightful country, always near the enemy, and without artillery. Still he was not too long delayed, nor prevented from arriving at St. Blaise, on the Alb, by the appointed day.

At the same time, Moreau ascended the Rhine with the reserve, remaining, like St. Cyr, on the German bank. Richepanse, who commanded the advanced guard, after he had seen St. Cyr's artillery and cavalry debouch, which artillery and cavalry, as we have just said, followed the bank of the Rhine, set out for St. Blaise, to connect himself, in the mountains, with the infantry of the same corps. Generals Delmas and Leclerc, who

commanded the two other divisions of the reserve, were directed upon Söckingen, and then upon Alb, before the Bridge of Albruck. This bridge was covered by entrenchments. Adjutant-General Cohorn, marching at the head of a battalion of the 14th light, two battalions of the 50th, and of the 4th hussars, advanced in columns upon the entrenchments, and carried them. He then leaped upon the shoulders of a grenadier, passed the Alb in that manner, and did not leave the enemy time to destroy the bridge. He took some cannon and prisoners.

On the 29th of April (9th Floréal), the centre, under St. Cyr, and the reserve, under Moreau, were in line on the Alb, from the abbey of St. Blaise to the influx of the Alb into the Rhine. St. Suzanne arrived at New Brisach, by the left bank; on our extreme right, Lecourbe assembled his corps between Diesenhofen and Schaffhausen, ready to execute his passage, when St. Cyr and Moreau should have ascended the Rhine till they were on a line with him. On the 30th of April, St. Suzanne crossed the Rhine, and appeared at the entrance of the Höllengrund. St. Cyr remained in the environs of St. Blaise. Moreau advanced towards the Wutach. At length, on the 1st of May (11th Floréal), the army made its last and most decisive movement, and made it successfully. M. de Kray had begun to perceive his mistake, and now recalled the corps which had entered too far into the defiles of the Black Forest. St. Suzanne, who was to pass through the Höllengrund, which debouches upon the very positions that the French army was to occupy, when it should have completed its movement, found the troops of Kienmayer in retreat, and closely pursued them. St. Cyr kept on the skirts of the Archduke Ferdinand's corps, and pushed it from Bettmaringen to Stühlingen on the Wutach, where he arrived in the evening. The troops of Moreau crossed the Wutach without encountering much resistance, repaired the bridge, which wanted scarcely anything but a few planks, and endeavoured to connect themselves by their right with Schaffhausen, where Lecourbe was, and by their left with Stühlingen, where St. Cyr was. This was the moment that Lecourbe was to choose for crossing the Rhine. On the very morning of the 1st of May, thirty-one pieces of cannon were placed on the heights of the left bank of the river, to sweep by their fire the environs of the village of Reichlingen. Twenty-five boats transported General Molitor, with two battalions, to the right bank, to protect the construction of a bridge, long prepared in the Aar. In an hour and a half this bridge was thrown over. General Vandamme crossed, with a great part of the troops of Lecourbe's corps, and occupied in an instant the roads leading to Engen and Stöckach, important points of the enemy's line. He took the small town of Stein and the fort of Hohentwiel, reputed to

be impregnable, and well supplied both with provisions and artillery. Goulu's brigade, crossing at the same time towards Paradis, met with a very smart resistance at the village of Busingen, but soon overcame it. Lastly, Lorges' division entered Schaffhausen in the evening, and effected its junction with the troops of Moreau.

Thus, in the evening of the 1st of May, the whole army was beyond the Rhine. The three principal corps, under command of St. Cyr, Moreau, and Lecourbe, forming a mass of between 75,000 to 80,000 men, occupied a line which passed through Bondorf, Stühlingen, Schaffhausen, Radolfzell, to a point on the Lake of Constance. They were ready to march upon Engen and Stockach, threatening at once the line of retreat and the magazines of the enemy. St. Suzanne, with the left, 20,000 strong, pursued the Austrians in the defile of the Höllengrund, waiting till the bulk of the French army should, in advancing, have cleared the outlet of that defile, before he debouched on the Upper Danube and joined the other corps.

This movement, then, was effected in six days, and in the most successful manner. Moreau, presenting three heads of columns by the bridges of Strasburg, Brisach, and Basle, had drawn the enemy towards those three *débouchés*; then, stealing away all at once, and marching to the right along the Rhine, two of his corps on the German bank, one on the French bank, he had ascended as high as Schaffhausen, where he had covered Lecourbe's passage. Fifteen hundred prisoners, six field-pieces with their horses, forty pieces of ordnance in the fort of Hohentwiel, and some magazines, had been taken. The men had everywhere shown a steadiness, a resolution, which could only be expected of veteran troops, full of confidence in themselves and in their leaders.

All the objections urged against this plan are certainly silenced by its success. Rarely indeed do we see movements so complicated succeed more completely, the enemy fall into the snare with greater credulity, or the commanders of corps cooperate with more precision. At the same time, this plan of the prudent Moreau's was attended with at least as many dangers as that of the First Consul, which he rejected as too rash; for St. Cyr and Moreau had exposed their flank for several successive days, in their march along the Rhine, cooped up between the mountains and the river; St. Cyr had been for an instant separated from his artillery; and now St. Suzanne was engaged alone in the Höllengrund. If Marshal Kray, by a sudden inspiration, had thrown himself upon St. Cyr, Moreau on St. Suzanne, he would have had a chance of routing a detached corps, which might have caused a retrograde movement of the whole French army. But Moreau had two advantages in his favour:

in the first place, he took the offensive, which always disconcerts the enemy; secondly, he had excellent troops, who were capable of repairing any unforeseen accident by their firmness; who did even repair, as we shall see presently, more than one fault of the commander-in-chief's by their mettle in action.

The moment approached when the two armies, after manœuvring, one to pass the Rhine, the other to prevent that passage, were at length to meet beyond the river. On the 2nd of May (12th Floréal), Moreau prepared for this encounter; but, not supposing it to be so near as it really was, he neglected to take measures of precaution, either sufficiently prompt or sufficiently complete. He resolved to despatch Lecourbe, with his 25,000 men, for Stockach, where were at once the rear-guard of the Austrians, their magazines, their communications with the Vorarlberg, and Prince Reuss. This was following the letter of the plan concerted with the First Consul; for M. de Kray, cut off from Stockach, would be separated from the Lake of Constance, and consequently from the Alps. Moreau, therefore, ordered Lecourbe to set out on the morning of the 3rd of May (13th Floréal) to take Stockach from the Prince of Lorraine-Vaudemont, who with 12,000 men occupied that important point. As for Moreau, he advanced himself with all the reserve upon Engen, keeping an eye upon Lecourbe, and ready to fly to his assistance, if that should be necessary. He directed St. Cyr to advance, and occupy an extended position from Bettmaringen and Bondorf to Engen, so as to connect himself with him on one side, and to give a hand on the other to St. Suzanne, who was soon to issue from the Höllengrund (Val d'Enfer).

Moreau marched then, in order of battle, having his back to the Rhine, his right to the Lake of Constance, his left to the *débouchés* of the Black Forest, presenting a front of fifteen leagues, exactly parallel to the line of retreat which the Austrians must pursue if they retreated from Donau-Eschingen to Stockach, whither many interests summoned them. It was a very extended position, especially so near to the enemy, and which, before an active and resolute adversary, would have exposed the French army to serious consequences. Fortunately for us, the army of M. de Kray was still less concentrated than Moreau's. M. de Kray, whose position was at first better adapted than ours for a rapid concentration, since he occupied, from Constance to Strasburg, the base of a triangle, the two sides of which we occupied, M. de Kray, surprised now by our movement, having already upon his left flank three-fourths of the French assembled and transported across the river, was in a difficult situation. He had given to the detachments of the Austrian army which were near the Rhine hasty orders to fall back, by the Black Forest, upon the Upper Danube; but a prompt and



well-concerted operation could alone extricate them from the danger. In order the better to comprehend the manœuvres, let us take a survey of the theatre of these operations.

That mountainous and wooded tract called the Black Forest, around which the Rhine winds without penetrating into it, and which it leaves to pursue its course northward, this tract contains an insignificant spring which gives rise to a river, extremely modest at its birth, but destined to become one of the largest rivers in the world, namely, the Danube. It pours forth this stream to the east, in which direction it flows, inclining, it is true, a little to the north, being forced into that direction by the projecting foot of the Alps, which it skirts all the way to Vienna. It collects in its course all the streams that descend from this long chain of mountains, which is the cause of its sudden magnitude, after so humble an origin.

When an Austrian general defends against the French the valley of the Danube, the ordinary route to his country, he has two courses to pursue. He may, when the French have found means to penetrate into it by Switzerland and the Black Forest, —he may either skirt the foot of the Alps, supporting his left upon the mountains, his right upon the Danube, and successively defending all the rivers that run into it, such as the Iller, the Lech, the Isar, the Inn; or, quitting the Alps, place himself *à cheval* (i.e., occupy both banks) on the Danube, descend the river, making a stand at the important positions which it presents, as those of Ulm, Ratisbon, &c., ready to cover himself with its bed, which grows gradually wider, or to fall upon the imprudent adversary who shall make a false manœuvre. The latter course has been the more generally preferred by Austrian tacticians.

Marshal de Kray had it in his choice to adopt the one or the other; either to support himself upon the Alps, or to manœuvre on the Danube. In supporting himself upon the Alps, he would unknowingly thwart the plan of the First Consul, who, in order to descend in safety from those lofty mountains upon the rear of the Baron de Melas, wished to keep the Imperial army in Swabia aloof from Switzerland and the Tyrol; but he would sacrifice his right wing, too far advanced towards the Rhine, without knowing what would become of it. By adopting, on the other hand, the plan of manœuvring on both banks of the Danube, he would certainly rally his right wing, but would separate himself from his left wing, commanded by Prince Reuss, though without sacrificing it, for it had in the Tyrol an asylum and an employment for its forces. He would fall in, it is true, with the views of the First Consul, still without knowing it, by moving away from the Alps; this, however, was a minor evil, for, were he even to support himself upon them, he would probably never think of throwing himself into

Lombardy, to succour the Baron de Melas. The plan, then, which presented the least inconvenience, which was most accordant with the course usually pursued by the Imperial armies, was to concentrate himself on the Upper Danube. But, in order to succeed, it was requisite to adopt this course promptly and resolutely. Unfortunately for him, M. de Kray had immense magazines at Stockach, near the Lake of Constance, with a strong rear-guard of 12,000 men, under the command of the Prince of Lorraine-Vaudemont. He ought, then, to have transported his rear-guard immediately from Stockach to the Upper Danube, and to have repaired thither himself, sacrificing his magazines, which, at any rate, there would not have been time to evacuate. This was not what he did; but, with the intention, however, of manœuvring afterwards on the Danube, he sent M. de Nauendorff, with the centre of the Austrian army, upon Engen, to succour Stockach. He ordered Prince Ferdinand, who was in the Black Forest, to repair to the same point, and his right, under Messrs. Sztarray and de Kienmayer, to leave the Rhine and to rejoin him with the utmost expedition.

There is this great inconvenience attached to those vast magazines of provisions customary among the Germans, that the movements of an army must be thus regulated by them. The French dispense with magazines, and spread themselves in the evening over the country to procure subsistence, without discipline suffering to any extent from this practice. They are active, industrious, and contrive to be at one and the same time marauding and with their colours. The German troops are rarely exposed to this trial, without dispersing and becoming disorganised. There is certainly one advantage in possessing magazines, that of bearing less heavily upon the country occupied, and not exasperating it against the invading army.

Moreau, marching with his right upon Stockach, with his reserve upon Engen, while the corps of St. Cyr extended itself to give the hand to St. Suzanne, was likely, therefore, to meet with the rear-guard of M. de Kray at Stockach, with his centre at Engen, and to skirt the troops of Prince Ferdinand, who was in march to rejoin the main body of the Austrian army. An unexpected battle must result from this meeting, a circumstance which frequently happens in war, when plans have not been matured by superior minds, capable of foreseeing and directing events.

Ever since morning, Lecourbe had been in march for Stockach, throwing out Lorges' division on the left, to connect him with Moreau, pushing Montrichard's division, with Nansouty's reserve cavalry, straight forward on the highroad from Schaffhausen to Stockach; lastly, sending Vandamme's division to the right, between Stockach and the Lake of Constance. The latter was divided into two brigades; one under General Leval, manœuvring

in such a manner as to cut off Stockach from the Lake of Constance by Bodmann and Sernadingen, met with no resistance, for Prince Reuss, who might have shown himself there, took little pains to communicate with his commander-in-chief; the other, under General Molitor, directed by Vandamme in person, marched to the rear of Stockach by a cross-road, while Nansouty and Montrichard proceeded thither direct by the highroad from Schaffhausen. There were seen in the depths of the woods infantry falling back, and cavalry reconnoitring the country while falling back also. At length they arrived at the positions which the Austrians seemed disposed to defend. Montrichard found them in order of battle beyond the village of Steusslingen, covered by a large body of cavalry. The French infantry passed through that village in two columns, and deployed to the right and left, threatening the enemy upon his flanks. At the same moment, the cavalry of Montrichard's division, supported by the whole of Nansouty's reserve, debouched from Steusslingen, charged vigorously, and overthrew the Imperialists, who retreated to Neuzingen. This position was the second, and the principal of those which covered Stockach. It supported itself upon that of Wahlwyes, which Vandamme threatened at the moment with Molitor's brigade. A numerous infantry was perceived, barring the extremity of the village of Neuzingen, supported on the right and left upon woods, and covered by cannon. It would require a very vigorous effort to dislodge it. Montrichard caused it to be turned by a height called the Helleberg, while Vandamme, having passed Wahlwyes, debouched on the rear of Neuzingen. The position was carried, and Lecourbe's whole corps being united, debouched *en masse* upon Stockach, and took it. The Austrians endeavoured to make one more stand against us beyond Stockach, and to keep us in check. They presented 4000 men in order of battle, covered by all their cavalry. Nansouty's regiments charged this cavalry, and threw it in disorder upon the infantry, which this time thought only of surrendering. Lecourbe took 4000 prisoners, 8 pieces of cannon, 500 horses, and the immense magazines in Stockach. It could not be otherwise. Lecourbe, with troops capable of fighting an enemy greatly superior in number, had, moreover, twice the number of men that the Prince of Lorraine had, though he had detached Lorges' division to connect itself with Moreau. His task was finished early; and, had more vigour and unity been displayed in these operations, he might and he ought to have been employed elsewhere, as we shall see presently.

Lorges' division, destined to serve for a link between Lecourbe and Moreau, had separated into two brigades. Goulou's brigade had marched upon Aach, to scour the country between Stockach and Engen, and, finding no enemy to fight, had turned off to

Stockach, where it became useless. General Lorges, with the rest of his division, having joined Moreau's troops, accompanied them towards Engen.

Moreau, with all that was called the corps of reserve, had been marching ever since morning upon Engen. M. de Kray, at the same instant, passed through that place on his way to Stockach, to save his magazines. He soon perceived, from the number of troops deploying before him, that there would be a battle, instead of a reconnoissance; and he stopped short for the purpose of giving battle, trusting to the mass of 40,000 men which he had at hand, and to the strength of the positions to which chance had just conducted him. On leaving, towards Schaffhausen, the banks of the Rhine for those of the Danube, in that confused, broken country, where the declivities are inconsiderable, there is a small valley, that of the Aach, which conveys to the Lake of Constance those waters that do not run either into the Rhine or into the Danube. In this valley is seated the small town of Engen. To descend to Engen, you must first climb a series of wooded heights, very difficult of access. These heights the Austrians occupied with their infantry; they had their cavalry in the plain of Engen. It was requisite for Moreau to dislodge them from these heights, and then to descend into the plain and engage the imperial cavalry there. He marched himself at the head of Delmas' and Bastoul's divisions, and half of Lorges' division. He had directed Richepanse's division upon his left, along what is called the Blumenfeld road. The latter, passing through a series of valleys, was to turn the enemy's positions by less defended approaches; and all together, if they succeeded, were then to descend *en masse* upon Engen.

Lorges, who had outstripped a little the reserve troops, found a strong body of the enemy near Waterdingen, and, before attacking, he waited for Delmas' division, which soon came up. They then charged all together, and dislodged the Austrians. Having arrived at this point, they had to climb the heights which surround Engen, and for this purpose it was necessary for them to traverse rather steep plateaux, commanded on the right by a position called the Maulberg; on the left, by a very lofty peak, known by the name of the peak of Hohenhewen. Lorges was charged to attack the Maulberg. After a slight cannonade he charged that point. The enemy gave way. Delmas, then turning to the left, directed his course to a wood, which surrounded the peak of Hohenhewen, and which was occupied by eight battalions of the enemy's infantry. Two battalions of the 46th advanced upon this wood without firing, while General Grandjean, and Adjutant-General Cohorn turned it with a detachment. No sooner had the two battalions of the 46th received the enemy's fire, than they rushed upon him with bayo-

nets fixed. The eight Austrian battalions, finding themselves so vigorously attacked in front and turned on their right, abandoned the wood. Our troops, having taken the principal positions that defended the approaches to the valley of Engen, had only to descend into that valley, through which runs a large rivulet. The enemy had retired to the peak of Hohenhewen; he had placed his artillery and his infantry on the declivities, and drawn up 12,000 cavalry in order of battle in the plain of Engen. Moreau intended at first to take the peak of Hohenhewen, and immediately ordered Delmas' division to attack it. That division, on leaving the wood, of which it had gained possession, was exposed to a destructive fire, which it bravely endured. General Jocopin, putting himself at the head of the infantry, ascended the slopes of the peak, and received a ball in his thigh; but General Grandjean turned the position. Adjutant-General Cohorn, whom we have seen crossing the Alb on the shoulders of a grenadier, rushed to the summit with a battalion, and dislodged the Austrians. Our troops were then in possession of all the heights that commanded the plain of Engen, and could deploy there without difficulty. The enemy retired to the other side of the plain, beyond the rivulet which runs through it, and to the foot of a chain of hills that form the opposite confine. He had drawn up in front his numerous cavalry, with great part of his artillery, and, in rear, in the hollow of a valley, at the entrance of which stands the little village of Ehingen, a strong reserve of grenadiers. Such was the imposing force still to be overthrown ere the battle should be ours.

Meanwhile, a brisk fire was heard from beyond the peak of Hohenhewen, and a great distance beyond it, along that belt of wooded heights surrounding Engen. It was Richepanse's division, engaged with the troops to which M. de Kray had assigned this part of the field of battle. General Richepanse had been obliged to separate his division into two brigades, to take two positions, one called Leipferdingen, the other Waterdingen, at the very extremity of the valleys into which he had entered. There he maintained an obstinate action, alternately successful and repulsed, when, luckily for him, the vanguard of St. Cyr's corps began to make its appearance. These troops came very late, owing to a want of harmony in Moreau's dispositions. St. Cyr ought to have come to St. Suzanne's assistance with one of these divisions; he had been obliged to wait for Ney, who was delayed by the want of provisions, to wait even for his artillery, which had always been behind ever since the passage of the Rhine; he had, moreover, had incessant encounters with Prince Ferdinand during his march, and, having only one division out of three to oppose to him, he had been obliged to advance with care and caution. He came up at last to the

assistance of Richepanse, at the moment when M. de Kray was making a last vigorous effort against the latter, to prevent him from debouching upon Engen.

Moreau, judging of the danger of Richepanse from the briskness of the fire, resolved to draw the Austrians upon their left, and, to this end, he thought fit to attack the village of Ehingen, which formed the support of their position on the other side of the plain. Here, as we have just seen, the enemy had posted, at the foot of a chain of hills, his artillery, his cavalry, besides a reserve of grenadiers, in a valley the entrance to which was formed by the village of Ehingen. General Bontemps proceeded thither with the 67th demi-brigade, two battalions of the 10th light, and two squadrons of the 5th hussars. General d'Hautpoul followed him, with the reserve of the cavalry. These troops, marching in columns in the plain, under the fire of a battery of twelve pieces of cannon, dashed bravely upon the village of Ehingen, and carried it. But, all at once, the eight battalions of grenadiers in reserve charged them in turn. The Austrian cavalry supported these eight battalions of grenadiers by a vigorous charge, and this unexpected storm obliged our soldiers to give up the village. The cavalry of General d'Hautpoul was driven back by the great mass of Imperial cavalry. The brave General Bontemps received a severe wound amidst this confusion. At this moment, the firing on our left, beyond the peak of Hohenhewen, redoubled in violence, proclaiming the danger of Richepanse, who persisted, but thus far unsuccessfully, in the attempt to force the belt of heights.

Moreau, who in trying emergencies possessed the firmness of a truly martial spirit, instantly appreciated the gravity of this situation, and resolved upon a vigorous blow, that he might remain master of the field of battle. He caused the remnant of Bastoul's division to advance, placed himself at the head of a few companies of grenadiers, inflamed their courage, led them to the charge, overthrew all that came in his way, and restored Ehingen to our victorious troops. While he was deciding the day at that point, Richepanse, on his part, was performing prodigies of valour. St. Cyr, rejoined by Ney, and definitively delivered from the Archduke Ferdinand, sent forward General Roussel's brigade. This brigade vied in courage with the troops of Richepanse which had been so long engaged, and assisted them to storm the heights so obstinately contended for. In all directions our arms were successful, but at the cost of great efforts and much bloodshed. The 4th demi-brigade alone had lost from 500 to 600 men in these conflicts.

Night began to fall; the ardour of the French was redoubled, while the courage of the Austrians sank on learning the tidings of the rout of the Prince of Lorraine-Vaudemont at Stockach.

M. de Kray, fearful of being turned by Stockach, gave orders for retreat. He hastened to regain the Danube by Tuttlingen and Liptingen.

The losses of the French army in this series of obstinate actions were very considerable. In killed and wounded it had 2000 men *hors de combat*, but the Austrian army had more than 3000, besides 4000 or 5000 prisoners remaining in our hands. The French troops, by their extraordinary bravery, had corrected the defects of the general plan. This plan, in fact, was far from perfect, and its weak points can now be appreciated. In the first place, it is easy to judge, from the results themselves, the inconvenience of having passed the Rhine at several points. Owing to this manner of operating, there were no more than three corps ready to march together; and even then the third, that of St. Cyr, had been paralysed by the necessity of giving the hand to the fourth, which was left behind. To this system of crossing at several points was also chargeable the delay of St. Cyr's artillery, which had contributed not a little to retard the assistance given to Richepanse. As for the battle itself, Moreau, with 25,000 men, had been obliged to fight 40,000 at Engen, while Lecourbe with 20,000 had only 12,000 to fight at Stockach, while St. Cyr was nearly unoccupied, or confined to the part of mere observation. The latter, accused of having arrived too late, affirmed that he had not received during the day a single aide-de-camp from the headquarters. Never, or very rarely, will such things be seen on the fields of battle where the First Consul commanded. Still, a general must possess high merit to act as Moreau acted. Once in presence of danger, he had behaved with a calmness, a vigour, that never forsook him; and, seconded by the valour of the troops, he had, after all, won the victory, and acquired a decided superiority over the enemy.

He encamped with his army on the field of battle. If, on the following day, he had vigorously pushed M. de Kray on the road from Stockach to the Danube, he would probably have thrown him into disorder. But Moreau had not ardour enough in his character, and was too sparing of his troops, to execute such rapid movements, which, no doubt, fatigue men at the moment, but, in reality, save their blood and their strength, by accelerating the results. The 4th of May (14th Floréal) was employed in rectifying the position of the army and in marching slowly towards the Danube. St. Cyr marched by Tuttlingen, Moreau and Lecourbe by Mösskirch, keeping an eye continually upon their right, and upon the *débouchés* from the Vorarlberg, by which Prince Reuss might have arrived.

M. de Kray was not yet resigned to the idea of giving up the ground without fighting. His army was already much disconcerted, and reduced, moreover, by nearly 10,000 men. It was

wrong in him to persist in exposing it to a new encounter with the French, before he had passed the Danube, and been joined by Generals Kienmayer and Sztarray, who were on march from the banks of the Rhine through the Black Forest, at the same time as the French corps of St. Suzanne. He needed the shelter of a great river, the respite of a few days, and reinforcements, that the moral energy of the Austrian army might recover itself. The position of Mösskirch, which Moreau allowed him time to reoccupy, inspired M. de Kray with the imprudent but courageous resolution to give battle once more.

This position of Mösskirch is, in fact, very strong. The high-road, which runs through Engen and Stockach to the Danube is exposed, a little before reaching Mösskirch, to the fire of a large and elevated plateau, called the plateau of Krumbach. It leaves it on the left, then enters a tract covered with wood, in which it forms a long defile. It afterwards debouches into open ground, at the extremity of which are seen the little town of Mösskirch on the right, and the village of Heudorf on the left. Behind Mösskirch runs a line of heights stretching continuously from Mösskirch to Heudorf, which latter place they also connect, in the rear and on the left, with the plateau of Krumbach; so that the road, passing first under the plateau of Krumbach, then burying itself in a wood, debouches at last uncovered, under the fire of the heights, extending from Mösskirch to Heudorf.

M. de Kray had crowned this position with a formidable artillery. The Prince of Lorraine, forming the left of the Austrians, occupied Mösskirch and the surrounding heights. M. de Nauendorf, forming their centre, was deployed above Heudorf, with a reserve of grenadiers in his rear. M. de Wrede, with the Bavarians, the Archduke Ferdinand, and General Giulay united, composed the right of the Imperial army on the plateau of Krumbach.

Moreau did not calculate much more on a battle at Mösskirch than he had calculated upon one at Engen. Suspecting, however, that he might meet with some resistance at Mösskirch, he had apprised Lecourbe of it, and sent him word that an effort would probably be necessary at that point, without, however, giving him the precise orders for concentration which comport with the imminence of a great battle. Lecourbe, keeping at the head of the army, and marching with three divisions, had thrown Vandamme's division to some distance on his right, to continue to observe the movements of Prince Reuss towards the Vorarlberg. Part of this division, under General Molitor, was to direct itself by the Pfüllendorf and Klosterwald road upon the flank of Mösskirch. Lecourbe, with Montrichard's and Lorges' divisions, and the reserve cavalry, was to advance by the high-road which we have just described, and which, after passing



beneath Krumbach, debouches through the woods in front of Mösskirch. Moreau followed the same road, keeping at some distance in the rear. St. Cyr flanked at a considerable distance the left of Moreau, occupying both banks of the Danube towards Tuttlingen. These assuredly were not fitting dispositions for a great battle. Vandamme ought not to have been thrown alone, with half a division, upon the flank of the position of Mösskirch. Lecourbe ought to have been directed with his whole corps upon this quarter. Moreau should not have set out so late, nor have crowded himself into the same road as Lecourbe, and into the defile of a wood. Lastly, St. Cyr should not have been left at such a distance.

Be this as it may, Lecourbe moved forward in the morning, conformably with the dispositions adopted. When opposite to Krumbach, he left that plateau on his left, and entered the defile of the wood. Some advanced guards met with in this defile were speedily driven back. He arrived at the *débouché*. Here was seen the uncovered ground at the extremity of which Mösskirch is situated, bordered on all sides by heights crowned with the artillery of the Austrians. As soon as the heads of columns appeared, five pieces of artillery, firing in front from the side next to Mösskirch, twenty others firing in flank, from the side towards Heudorf, poured forth a shower of balls and grapeshot. Two battalions of light infantry posted themselves on the margin of the wood, and three regiments of cavalry, the 9th hussars, the 12th chasseurs, the 11th dragoons, pushed forward rapidly to protect the establishment of our artillery. Under the fire of these twenty-five pieces, playing upon them in all directions, our squadrons were obliged to fall back. Fifteen pieces of cannon, which General Montrichard had endeavoured to oppose to the Austrian artillery, were partly dismounted. The light infantry itself was forced to take shelter in the woods. The Austrian cavalry attempted to charge us in its turn, but was vigorously repulsed. Still, as often as General Montrichard tried to debouch from the woods, a violent fire stopped his columns. It soon became evident that this was not the true point of attack for forcing Mösskirch; that, on the contrary, it was on the right, following the cross-road from Klosterwald, by which Vandamme was advancing. But the latter had not yet come up, on account of the distance that he had to march. Meanwhile, Lecourbe determined to make an attempt upon Heudorf by filing on his left along the skirt of the woods. In spite of a violent fire of artillery and musketry, the 10th light entered the village of Heudorf; but it was repulsed by superior forces; and, while the cavalry was hastening to its support, the Austrian artillery, placed on the slope behind Heudorf, compelled it to make a

retrograde movement. Thus this second attempt to debouch on the left was not more successful than that which had been made to debouch directly upon Mösskirch.

Encouraged by our check, the Austrians were then disposed to assume the offensive, and endeavoured to debouch from the village of Heudorf upon Lorges' division. But this was taking too great a liberty with such brave troops. The 38th formed into column and marched forward under a fire of grape-shot from eight pieces of cannon. It advanced with admirable coolness, and penetrated, with fixed bayonets, into Heudorf. On a steep, rising ground behind this village were woods, and in those woods dense masses of Austrian infantry. Superior forces rushed upon this gallant demi-brigade; overwhelmed by numbers, it fell back. The 67th came up to its assistance, and immediately rallied it. Both together again charged. The entire division hastened to the spot, carried the village, cleared those redoubtable heights, and made itself master of that woody retreat, from which the enemy had vomited upon us a terrific fire. While this severe combat was taking place on our left around the village of Heudorf, Vandamme, on our right, debouched at last upon Mösskirch, at the head of Molitor's brigade. He drew it up skilfully for the attack, in spite of the Austrian infantry, which opened a destructive fire from the suburb of Mösskirch. This brave band charged with fury, and penetrated into Mösskirch, while two battalions turned the position by the heights. Montrichard, still ensconced in the woods, chose this movement for debouching on the open ground, which had at first been so fatal to us. He threw himself upon four columns, and that in the face of the artillery of the Austrians, already somewhat staggered by the sight of these simultaneous attacks. Montrichard's four columns came up, passed a ravine which runs along the foot of the heights, gained the plateau of Mösskirch, at the moment when Vandamme's troops, which had entered Mösskirch, began to debouch from it. The Austrians were everywhere put to flight. Their reserve, stationed a little in the rear, at Rohrdorf, would then have acted in its turn, but was kept in check by the united divisions of Vandamme and Montrichard.

We were now masters of the whole line from Mösskirch to Heudorf. But M. de Kray, detecting with great judgment the vulnerable point of our position, moved off part of his forces in the direction of the plateau of Krumbach, on our left, whence he threatened our flank and our rear. Lorges' division, which occupied Heudorf, was in danger of being overpowered. The entire reserve of the Austrian grenadiers had assailed that unfortunate division, which, after taking and retaking Heudorf several times, was exhausted with fatigue. It could no longer

withstand the fire of the artillery and the mass of Austrian infantry. Luckily Moreau, apprised by the violence of the cannonade, had hastened his march. At length he arrived at the entrance of the wood with his corps, formed of Delmas', Bastoul's, and Richepanse's divisions. He lost no time in sending Delmas' division to the left upon Heudorf to the assistance of Lorges' division. This brave detachment changed the aspect of things, drove back the Austrian grenadiers, and retook Heudorf, as well as the woods above it. But if we received reinforcements, so did M. de Kray too. His right, composed of the Archduke Ferdinand and General Giulay, whom St. Cyr had followed, foot by foot, ever since the commencement of operations, but followed at too great a distance—this right, rapidly brought upon the field of battle, was directed between Heudorf and Krumbach, upon the very flank of Delmas' division, and put it in danger of being surrounded. Part of the latter instantly faced about to the left. The 57th, which had earned in Italy the surname of the Terrible, formed in order of battle, and disputed the ground for more than an hour against the Austrian masses, under the fire of sixteen pieces of artillery, to which General Delmas could oppose no more than five, that were soon dismounted. This tremendous fire that heroic band endured without flinching, and kept the enemy in check. Moreau, hastening from one corps to another, to place or to support them, led Bastoul's division to the assistance of Delmas' division. He came up at the moment when the Austrians, unable to overthrow Delmas' division, were seeking to deprive it of the aid of Bastoul's division, by deploying on the plateau of Krumbach, in order to intercept our communications. They were already descending from that plateau, and had even reached our waggon train. Thus the battle, after commencing at Mösskirch, extended to Heudorf, and from Heudorf to Krumbach, embracing the entire angle of that vast position, and covering it with fire, and blood, and devastation. At this critical moment, Bastoul's division worthily supported the efforts of Delmas' division; but it was liable to be surrounded, if the enemy should succeed in descending from the plateau of Krumbach, and gaining possession of the highroad by which our troops were arriving. Fortunately, Richepanse's division, brought up in time to the decisive point, formed in columns of attack, climbed the plateau of Krumbach under a destructive fire, and overwhelmed the Archduke Ferdinand, who intended to overwhelm us. After this effort, M. de Kray had no force left to act against Richepanse, and was obliged to give the signal for retreat. From Krumbach to Heudorf, from Heudorf to Mösskirch, we were everywhere victorious.

At this moment, St. Cyr's corps was but a few leagues off, at Neuhausen-ob-Eke. If he had debouched, the Austrian army

must have been destroyed, and, instead of an ordinary victory, we should have gained one of those splendid victories which put an end to a campaign. What fatal inaction, then, kept him useless, so near to the spot where he might have decided the issue of the war? This is a question which it is very difficult to resolve. St. Cyr alleged, on the following day, that no orders had been sent to him. Moreau replied that he had sent orders by several aides-de-camp. St. Cyr rejoined that he was so near the place where the battle was fought, that, if a single officer had been dispatched to him, that officer must have infallibly arrived. Moreau's coterie insisted that St. Cyr, with a spite unworthy of a brother in arms, had purposely left his comrades to be crushed at Mösskirch, as he had done at Engen.

Thus, in military life as in civil life, men are jealous of, accuse, calumniate one another! Human passions are everywhere the same, and war, most assuredly, is not capable of cooling them, moderating them, and rendering them just. The truth is, that St. Cyr, discontented with the coterie which had gained possession of Moreau's ear, affected to confine himself to the command of his own corps, at the head of which he operated with extraordinary perfection; but he never made amends for oversights of the commander-in-chief, and waited, before acting, for orders which a lieutenant ought to be able to anticipate, especially when he hears the cannon. St. Cyr, in alleging the proximity, to prove that, if orders had been sent to him, he must have received them, accused himself; for this proximity rendered him inexcusable for not hastening, with one division at least, to the spot where a tremendous cannonade indicated a violent conflict, and perhaps serious dangers. But whatever faults he committed upon this occasion were ere long to be redeemed by important services.

Both Austrians and French were exhausted at the close of this day. Amidst the confusion of battle, the number of dead and wounded is never accurately known. At Mösskirch that number must have been great. Three thousand men of the French must have fallen, and nearly twice as many in the Austrian army. But the French army was full of confidence; it had won the field of battle, and purposed to quit it next day, and to follow up that series of actions, which, without having yet procured it any decisive results, nevertheless ensured to it an uninterrupted superiority over the enemy. The Austrian army, on the contrary, severely shaken, was not capable of keeping up such a contest long.

After the account which we have just given, every reader may easily conceive what censures have been passed upon the operations of Moreau.\* He had marched upon a field of battle without first reconnoitring it; he had directed too few troops upon

\* See *Memoires de St. Cyr*, tom. vi. p. 215 *et seq.* Campaign 1800.

the true point of attack, which was the road from Klosterwald to Mösskirch, debouching on the flank of that little town; he had set out late, had made all his corps, one after another, pass through a wood, from which it was impossible to debouch without losing a great many men; lastly, he had not brought St. Cyr upon the ground, where his presence would have been decisive. M. de Kray, on his part, after he had judiciously directed his effort upon the vulnerable point, upon our left, had committed the fault of suffering Mösskirch to be taken; but it must be said, in his justification, that his troops were far from equalling the French troops in regard to intelligence and firmness. Besides, they began to lose confidence, and it was no longer easy to make them endure the sight and the attack of the French.

On the following day, the 6th of May (16th Floréal), M. de Kray hastened to get behind the Danube, in order to connect himself at last with that great line of operations. Now was the time for following him up, for rendering the passage of the river impossible, at least hazardous, for him. Moreau marched in line, his left to the Danube, quite close to the point where the Austrians were crossing, having it in his power to crush them, if he had suddenly wheeled to his left. St. Cyr formed, at the moment, the wing supported upon the Danube. Not having been engaged on the preceding day, he was in a state to act, and was desirous to act. He saw, with his own eyes, the Imperial troops crowding, with a sort of precipitation, upon the point of Sigmaringen. The Danube, making a bend there, formed a promontory, on which the Austrian army had flocked together, in its anxiety to get to the other side of the river. St. Cyr, distinctly perceiving it, at the distance of short cannon-range, crowded into a space scarcely sufficient for a division, and so much startled at the sight of the French, that, before the mere brigade of Ney, it suspended its passage, drew up in order of battle, and covered itself with the fire of sixty pieces of cannon—St. Cyr, seeing it thus accumulated and alarmed, felt sure he could drive it into the Danube by a single charge of his whole corps. He ordered forward a few pieces of cannon, every discharge of which swept away whole files, but which could not be expected to remain in battery before M. de Kray's sixty pieces of artillery. He hoped to draw the attention of Moreau by the report of this cannonade, and to bring him from the corps of reserve to the corps on the left. As he did not come, he sent an officer to apprise him of the circumstances, and to obtain his order for attacking. But their union was at an end. It was believed by the officers of the staff, or they affected to believe, that St. Cyr wished again to move to the left, with a view to detach himself more, and to act alone. He was answered by an order to move to the right, to connect himself more closely than he was accustomed to do with the

corps of reserve, which formed the centre of the army. This measure is indispensable, he was told, that the commander-in-chief may have it in his power to dispose of your troops in case of need.\* The drift of this order plainly indicated the humour of the general-in-chief and of those around him. It was evident that Moreau suffered himself to be engrossed by the command of a single corps, and that his weakness of character was giving birth to intestine divisions, mischievous in any place, but still more mischievous in armies than anywhere else.

M. de Kray could, therefore, flee without danger, and rally his army beyond the Danube. M. de Kienmayer rejoined him there with the troops arriving from the banks of the Rhine, and he was closely followed by M. de Sztarray.

Moreau's army had found vast magazines at Stockach and Donau-Eschingen: it was in want of nothing; it was inspired by success and by the continual offensive which it had taken. On the 7th and 8th of May (17th and 18th Floréal), Moreau continued to march with his left to the Danube, presenting a line of battle still too extended, and frequently halting, to give St. Suzanne time to come.

On the 9th (19th Floréal) Moreau, knowing that St. Suzanne, who had come along the left bank of the Danube, was at length opposite to the army, left his headquarters for a day, and crossed the Danube to inspect the troops which had just arrived. These troops formed thenceforward his left wing, while St. Cyr became the centre, and the corps of reserve was really to be used as a reserve, conformably with its appellation.

According to all probability, M. de Kray, intent on resting his army, would keep beyond the Danube, and we might continue on the 9th to make a march in advance, without encountering the enemy. Moreau directed the right, that is to say, Lecourbe, to proceed on the 9th to between Wurzach and Ochsenhausen, the reserve to advance to Ochsenhausen itself; lastly, the centre, that is to say St. Cyr, to proceed beyond Biberach, the left in observation on the Danube. In this order the army advanced very near to the Iller, describing a line parallel to that tributary of the Danube. Moreau set out on the morning of the 9th, thinking to devote an entire day to the corps of St. Suzanne.

Now, M. de Kray had been induced to take a new and unexpected resolution by the advice of a council of war, which had judged it prudent to save the immense magazines of Biberach, and not abandon them, like those of Engen and Stockach, to the French. He, therefore, crossed to the right bank of the Danube with his whole army, by Riedlingen, and posted himself in front and rear of Biberach. This place had already been the theatre of a battle gained in 1796 by Moreau, thanks more especially

\* *St. Cyr*, tom. vi. p. 201.

to St. Cyr. This field was again to witness the success of our troops, and of St. Cyr himself.

Biberach is situated in a valley overflowed by the Riess. This valley is so swampy that a man on horseback cannot attempt to pass through it without perishing, so that people are obliged to pass through Biberach itself, and over the little bridge contiguous to that small town. You penetrate into this valley by following a sort of defile, formed between the heights, those of the Galgenberg on the one hand, those of Mittelbiberach on the other. On clearing this defile, Biberach suddenly appears in view. You cross the marsh of the Riess over the bridge adjoining to the town, and beyond that marsh you perceive a superb position called the Mettenberg, upon which an army well provided with artillery might make a firm stand. M. de Kray could not think of posting himself in advance of the defile, having so narrow an outlet for retreat; he could only place himself in rear of Biberach, beyond the Riess, on the Mettenberg itself. Neither could he leave Biberach uncovered. Accordingly, after stationing the bulk of his army on the position of the Mettenberg, he placed a corps of eight or ten battalions and a dozen squadrons in advance of the defile of Mittelbiberach, to retard the march of the French, and to give time for evacuating or destroying the greater part of his magazines.

This plan was perilous, especially with a demoralised army. St. Cyr having received orders to go and pass the night a little beyond Biberach, soon discovered the position which the Austrians had taken. He was deeply mortified at not having the commander-in-chief, or at least the chief of his staff, near him, that he might obtain suitable orders, and turn this meeting to account. Moreau was absent; General Dessoles was not there. If St. Cyr had had his forces together, he would not have hesitated to risk an attack with his corps alone: unfortunately, they were partly dispersed. Being obliged to observe the Danube on his left, he had devoted to this object the best of his divisions, that of Ney. He dispatched several officers in search of General Ney, but in consequence of the latter having followed the winding banks of the river, and owing also to the frightful state of the roads, it was not easy to reach him or obtain any support from his division. To attack a mass of 60,000 men at least, St. Cyr had but the two divisions of Tharreau and Baraguay d'Hilliers, with the reserve cavalry of General Sahuc attached to his corps. The demoralisation of the enemy tempted him strongly, but the disproportion of strength made him hesitate, when, all at once, was heard the firing of General Richepanse, who, having orders to keep himself in communication with St. Cyr, and to cross the Riess by the bridge of Biberach, arrived at the same point by a cross-road, that of Reichenbach. St. Cyr, having at his disposal

the fine division of Richepanse, and being enabled to fill the gap left in his corps by the absence of Ney, hesitated no longer. He thought that, if the detachment left in advance of Biberach were overthrown, the defeat of this corps of from 8000 to 10,000 men would be rather more serious than the defeat of a mere advanced guard, and that the courage of the enemy might be severely shaken by it. Accordingly, without so much as halting to dispose his troops for an attack, he gave orders to the eighteen battalions and twenty-four squadrons which he had at hand to advance at quick step, and charge the 10,000 Austrians who barred the passage of the defile. Overthrown by this sudden shock, the Austrians rushed pell-mell to Biberach and into the valley of the Riess. It would have been easy to take almost all of them, but St. Cyr would not, fearing lest, if he allowed his soldiers to pursue them, he might not be able to rally his divisions, and make use of them in the principal operation. He contented himself with entering Biberach, establishing himself there, and ensuring the preservation of the magazines. Having strongly occupied that point, and provided a retreat for himself, let what might happen, he crossed the Riess. Richepanse had just arrived upon his right, by the Reichenbach road. Reinforced by this new division, St. Cyr crossed the Riess by the bridge of Biberach, and advanced himself to observe the position of the enemy. At this moment, the some odd thousand men, so suddenly thrown into the Riess, were ascending through the ranks of the Austrian army, which opened to let them pass, and at sight of him, it was easy to discover how much that army was alarmed. St. Cyr ordered forward a number of tirailleurs, who approached and bearded the enemy without any of his tirailleurs making their appearance to throw them into the ravine. These detached soldiers were answered by general discharges, such as proceed from an affrighted body of men, striving to keep up their courage by making a noise. St. Cyr was, in an action, one of the ablest of the tacticians that have appeared among us. On perceiving the state of the Austrian army, he instantly decided what was to be done. He ordered Tharreau's and Baraguay's divisions to be drawn up in two columns, formed a third of Richepanse's division, and placed the cavalry *en échelons* on the wings. These arrangements made, he put all his columns in motion at once. They ascended the acclivities of the Mettenberg with unparalleled steadiness. The Austrians at the sight of these soldiers climbing with such calmness a formidable position, and from which an army thrice their number might hurl them into the marshes of the Riess, were seized with astonishment and terror. M. de Kray ordered a retrograde movement; his soldiers did not execute it according to his intention, for, after a few volleys, they gave up the ground of the



Mettenberg, and at length fled in disorder, leaving to St. Cyr's corps several thousand prisoners and immense magazines, which served to victual the French army for a long time. Night prevented the pursuit. In the midst of these events, Moreau arrived, and though there was a coolness between him and St. Cyr, yet the next day, in the presence of Carnot, minister of war, he testified to him his sense of high satisfaction. Moreau, separated at this moment from the mischievous friends by whom he was beset at headquarters, could be just towards a lieutenant who had fought and conquered without his presence and without his orders.

The French army was completely victorious; the Austrians were no longer capable of making a stand, and it might now advance unopposed. M. de Kray had sent, one cannot comprehend why, a detachment to defend the magazines of Memmingen. Memmingen lay in Lecourbe's route. This place was occupied, the detachment routed, and the magazines were taken. This was the 10th of May (20th Floréal). On the 11th and 12th, M. de Kray retired definitely upon Ulm, and Moreau continued to march in an extended line nearly perpendicular to the Danube. On the 13th of May, he was beyond the Iller, without having encountered any serious resistance in the passage of that river. The right and the reserve were at Ungerhausen, Kellmüntz, Iller-Aicheim, and Illertissen. St. Cyr was placed at the conflux of the Iller and the Danube, *à cheval* upon the Iller, occupying the bridge of Unterkirchberg, and connecting himself with St. Suzanne, who was advancing along the left bank of the Danube. From the abbey of Wiblingen, where Ney's division was, and where St. Cyr had his headquarters, the Austrian troops might be distinctly seen in the vast entrenched camp of Ulm.

The two armies had just been rejoined by all their detached corps. Marshal de Kray had recalled M. de Kiennmayer to him in the preceding days, and afterwards M. de Sztarray. Moreau, having the corps of St. Suzanne at hand, was now in full force. Both armies had sustained losses, but those of the Austrians were far more considerable than ours. They were estimated at 30,000 men in prisoners, dead, and wounded. On this point history is reduced to conjectures; for, on days of battle, generals always diminish their losses, and when they apply to their governments for reinforcements, they as constantly exaggerate the number of the dead, wounded, and sick. Thus one never knows with perfect accuracy the total of the soldiers really present under arms. M. de Kray, having taken the field with 110,000 or 115,000 men, composing the active army, and 35,000 or 40,000 in the fortresses, could now have had but 80,000 at most, and those worn out with fatigue and completely demoralised.

The loss of the French army was estimated at 4000 killed,

6000 or 7000 wounded; some ill of fever, some prisoners; in all, 12,000 or 13,000 men actually unfit for service, 4000 or 5000 of whom were likely to be again fit for service after a little rest. This calculation reduced Moreau's active force, for the moment, to 90,000 men, or rather less. But he would soon be obliged to part with a strong detachment, according to the agreement signed with General Berthier at the opening of the campaign. It was stipulated in this agreement that, as soon as M. de Kray was driven to the distance of eight or ten marches from the Lake of Constance, Lecourbe should fall back upon the Alps, to join the army of reserve. The position of Masséna urgently required the execution of this engagement; and it was not any silly desire to check Moreau amidst his successes which caused Lecourbe's corps to be called off, but the most legitimate of reasons, that of saving Genoa and Liguria. The army of reserve, collected with such exertions, contained no more than 40,000 men belonging to troops inured to war: it certainly needed a reinforcement to place it in a condition to attempt the extraordinary operation which it was about to undertake beyond the Alps.

The First Consul, impatient to act in the direction of Italy, wishing at the same time to avoid offending Moreau, and yet to ensure the execution of his orders, made choice of the minister of war himself, of Carnot, to carry to the headquarters of the army of the Rhine the formal injunction to detach Lecourbe towards the St. Gothard. The letters which accompanied this order were full of cordiality and irresistible in argument. The First Consul was well aware that it was not Lecourbe and 25,000 men who would be sent him; but if 15,000 or 16,000 only were sent, he should be satisfied.

Moreau received Carnot with chagrin: he, nevertheless, punctually executed the orders which that minister brought him. Carnot, like a good citizen, took pains to remove any feeling of dissatisfaction on the part of the weak-minded general, ever so easily deceived, and revived his confidence towards the First Consul, which detestable busybodies were striving to destroy.

Some historians, flatterers of Moreau, but flatterers only since 1815, have raised the detachment taken from the army of Germany to 25,000 men. Moreau himself, in his reply to the First Consul, did not estimate it at more than 17,800; and this number was exaggerated. Not more than from 15,000 to 16,000 soldiers marched into Switzerland to climb the St. Gothard. Moreau then had about 72,000 fighting men left, and soon afterwards 75,000, through the recovery of his sick and disabled.\* It was more than were needed for beating 80,000 Austrians.

\* It is from Moreau's own correspondence that I extract these figures. All the calculations of that correspondence are exaggerated in Moreau's favour. He estimates the battalions retained by him at 650 men, and those belonging

M. de Kray had no more, in fact, and they were altogether dispirited, and incapable of standing the slightest serious encounter with the French.

In order that the enemy might remain ignorant of this diminution of his forces, Moreau determined not to alter the former distribution and positions of the army; but to take the 16,000 men whom he destined for the First Consul out of all the existing corps. Each of these corps furnished its contingent, and thus this reduction of strength was disguised in the best possible manner. Moreau wished to keep Lecourbe, who, singly, was worth many thousand men. Lecourbe was left him, and the command of the detachment given to the brave General Lorges. Carnot returned to Paris as soon as he had witnessed the departure of the troops destined to cross the St. Gothard.

This operation took place on the 11th, 12th, and 13th of May (21st, 22nd, and 23rd Floréal). The French army under Moreau numbered about 72,000 combatants, exclusively of the garrisons of the fortresses, the division of Helvetia, and what might be returned to it by the hospitals. It was, for the rest, of the same effective strength as before the arrival of St. Suzanne's corps, a strength which had been sufficient to make it invariably victorious.

M. de Kray had established himself at Ulm, where an entrenched camp had long been prepared for the purpose of affording a stronghold to the Imperial troops. Of the two systems of defence which we have described, that which requires the retreating army to skirt the foot of the Alps, covering itself with all the tributaries of the Danube, or to keep *à cheval* upon that river, in order to manœuvre upon both banks, the second had been preferred by the Aulic Council, and was skilfully followed by M. de Kray. The first would be judicious in case it were desirable to keep the two armies of Italy and Germany in permanent communication. It presents but little strength in its first stages; for the Iller, the Lech, the Isar, the Inn, become but successively obstacles of any consequence; and the last alone becomes a considerable obstacle, though not an invincible one, for there is none of that kind in war. But an army which, renouncing the communications with Italy, keeps to the Danube itself, having all the bridges at its disposal, destroying them successively as it retires, possessing the means of crossing from one bank to the other, while the enemy is fixed upon one only; able, if that enemy attempts to push on directly for Vienna, to follow him under shelter of the Danube,

to the detachment sent to Italy at 700. The calculation cannot be correct; for, if he sent the corps just as they were, and the battalions were reduced to 650 in his army, they could not have been 700 in the corps which were detached from it.

and throw itself upon his rear, to punish him for the first fault that he may commit; an army so placed is in the position generally regarded as the best for covering Austria.

M. de Kray, then, had posted himself at Ulm, where important works had been carrying on for his support. It is well known that, at this point, the left bank of the Danube, formed of the first acclivities of the mountains of Swabia, is always higher than the right bank. Ulm is at the foot of the heights of the left bank, on the Danube itself. Its walls had been repaired. A *tête de pont* had been constructed on the opposite bank. All the heights in the rear of Ulm, and particularly the Michelsberg, were covered with artillery. If the French approached by the right bank, the Austrian army, supporting one of its wings upon Ulm, the other upon the elevated convent of Elchingen, covered by the river, and sweeping with its fire the low ground of the right bank, would be unassailable. If the French approached on the left bank, then the Austrian army had a position quite as secure. To form a correct idea of it, the reader should know that the position of Ulm is covered on the left bank by the river Blau, which descends from the mountains of Swabia, and throws itself into the Danube quite close to Ulm, forming at the same time a deep ravine. If, then, the French crossed the Danube above Ulm to attack by the left bank, the Austrian army would change position. Instead of facing the banks of the Danube, it would turn its back on it, and cover itself by the course of the Blau. It would have its left wing upon Ulm, its centre at the Michelsberg, its right wing at Lahr and Jungingen. It would be necessary to make several marches upon the left bank, to turn this new position, and then to abandon the right bank entirely, which might frustrate all the combinations of the campaign, by uncovering the route to the Alps. Such was the camp in which the exhausted soldiers of M. de Kray found shelter for a time.

St. Cyr was at the convent of Wiblingen. From the windows of that convent he distinctly saw, even without telescope, the position of the Austrians. Full of confidence in the daring of the French, he offered, and several general officers along with him, to take the enemy's camp by main force. They answered for the success with their lives; and it must be confessed that if the audacity of some of them, such as Ney and Richepanse, might have excited mistrust, yet St. Cyr, the tactician, a man of cool, methodical, sure mind, deserved the highest confidence. But Moreau was too prudent to risk an attack of this kind, and to afford M. de Kray the chance of gaining a defensive battle. It is true that, if Moreau were successful, the Austrian army, thrown into the Danube, would be half destroyed, and the campaign finished. But if Moreau failed in his attack, he would

be obliged to fall back; the campaign of Germany would be endangered; and, worse than all this, the decisive campaign in Italy would perhaps be rendered impracticable. Moreau acted in war, not grandly, but safely. He let those brave men who engaged to throw the Austrians into the river talk on, and refused to attempt an attack by main force. The war of manœuvres was the course then left. The French might cross to the left bank above Ulm, a movement which we have just described; but, in order to turn the Austrians in this position, they would be obliged to proceed so far on the left bank, that Switzerland would cease to be covered, and that the detachment sent towards the Alps would be compromised. By continuing on the right bank, they might descend the Danube to a good distance below Ulm, cross it out of reach of the Austrians, and make themselves masters of their position, by cutting them off from the Lower Danube. But, by descending the river, the rear of the army would be exposed, and the route to Switzerland again left uncovered. Moreau, therefore, renounced all idea of dislodging M. de Kray by any of these means; and though, with troops such as his, he might have hazarded anything, yet he is not to be censured for such caution, and, above all, for being so scrupulous in pursuing the plan which most effectually covered the operations of the First Consul, his chief, but his rival.

He then resolved to adopt a manœuvre which was the true one, namely, to march for Augsburg, that is to say, to abandon the course of the Danube, to cross its tributaries, and to demolish all the lines of defence of the Austrians by a direct march upon the heart of the empire. This manœuvre, seriously executed, would infallibly have induced M. de Kray to leave the Danube and his camp at Ulm, and drawn him after the French army. It was very bold, yet did not uncover the Alps, since it placed Moreau constantly at their foot. But there was no half course to take: he ought either to have remained inactive before Ulm, or to have advanced resolutely upon Augsburg and Munich, for a mere demonstration was not capable of deceiving M. de Kray, and could only expose the corps left in observation near Ulm. Moreau here committed a fault which had well-nigh produced serious consequences.

On the 13th, 14th, and 15th of May he crossed the Iller. Leaving St. Suzanne by himself on the left bank of the Danube, and St. Cyr at the conflux of the Iller and the Danube, he pushed the corps of reserve upon the Guntz to Babenhausen, Lecourbe beyond the Guntz to Erkheim, and a corps of flankers to Kempten, on the route of the Tyrol. In this singular position, extending twenty leagues, touching Ulm on one side, threatening Augsburg on the other, he could not inspire M. de Kray with the slightest dread of a march upon Munich, and could at most

but tempt him to throw himself *en masse* upon the corps of St. Suzanne, remaining alone on the left of the Danube. Had M. de Kray yielded to this last temptation, and employed his whole force, it would have been all over with St. Suzanne.

The orders issued on the 15th (25th Floréal) to St. Cyr were executed on the morning of the 16th, when St. Suzanne was attacked at Erbach by a prodigious mass of cavalry. His right division, commanded by General Legrand, was at Erbach and Papelau, along the Danube; his left division, commanded by Souham, was at Blaubeuren, *à cheval* on the Blau; the reserve, under General Colaud, a little in the rear of the two divisions. The action commenced by a multitude of horse surrounding our columns on all sides. While our soldiers were charged by numerous squadrons, masses of infantry, sallying from Ulm and ascending the Danube, threatened us with a more serious attack. Two columns of infantry and cavalry advanced, the one upon Erbach, to attack and envelop the two brigades composing Legrand's division, the other on Papelau, to cut off Legrand's division from Souham's division. General Legrand then made his troops perform a retrograde movement. They fell back slowly through the woods, and then had to debouch on the plateaux between Donaurieden and Ringingen. The troops executed this retreating movement with remarkable steadiness. They were several hours giving up a small tract of ground, halting every moment, forming in squares, and harassing with their terrible fire the cavalry which pursued them. Souham's division, attacked on both flanks, was obliged to execute a similar movement, and to concentrate itself upon Blaubeuren, behind the Blau, driving into the deep ravine formed by that river such of the Austrians as pressed them too closely.

It was Legrand's division that was in most danger, because it was placed near the Danube, and for this reason the enemy wished to overwhelm it, in order to intercept all the succours that might arrive from the other side of the river. The two brigades of which it was composed continued valiantly to defend themselves, till, at the moment when the infantry was retiring, and the light artillery replacing its pieces on the forepart of the carriages, to retire also, the enemy's cavalry, returning to the charge, dashed suddenly upon that unfortunate division. The brave adjutant-general, Levasseur, who had been dismounted in a charge, sprung upon a horse, galloped to the 10th regiment of cavalry, which was leaving the field of battle, brought it back to the enemy, charged the Austrian squadrons, ten times superior in number, and checked their progress. The artillery had time to carry off their guns, to take a position in the rear, and in its turn to protect the cavalry which had come to its rescue.

During this interval, General St. Suzanne had come up, with

part of Colaud's division, to the assistance of Legrand's division. General Decaen, with the remainder, had gone to Blaubeuren, to succour Souham's division. The action was therefore renewed; but, in spite of this effort, it might terminate in a disastrous manner; for there was reason to fear that the Austrian army would fall *en masse* upon the corps of St. Suzanne. Fortunately, St. Cyr, posted on the other side of the Danube, did not leave his comrades to be routed this time, as he had been frequently accused of doing: he hastened up with all possible expedition. Hearing the cannonade on the left bank, he had sent off aides-de-camp after aides-de-camp, to bring his divisions from the banks of the Iller to the banks of the Danube. He had ordered no time to be lost, the advanced posts to fall back immediately, but the bulk of the troops to be dispatched at the instant, without waiting for those posts. A corps left behind was to collect them. As for himself, stationed on the bridge of Unterkirchberg, which is upon the Iller, as soon as a corps arrived, whether infantry, cavalry, or artillery, he sent it with all speed towards the Danube, preferring a momentary disorder to loss of time. He had then repaired in person to the very bank of the Danube. The enemy, fearing lest St. Suzanne might be succoured, had destroyed all the bridges as high as Dischingen. Seeing St. Cyr endeavouring to find a ford or to repair a bridge, he had drawn up part of his troops along the left bank, to make head against those of St. Cyr, posted upon the right bank. He had, moreover, commenced a brisk cannonade, and St. Cyr had lost not a moment in replying to it. This combat with artillery, kept up from one side of the river to the other, excited in the Austrians who had sallied from Ulm some fears for their retreat, caused them to fall back, extricated St. Suzanne a little, and infused into the ranks of our unfortunate soldiers, who had for above twelve hours maintained a desperate conflict, the most lively joy and quite new ardour. They applied to St. Suzanne for permission to advance, which was granted them. All our divisions then moved at once; they drove back the Austrians under the cannon of Ulm; but, in traversing the field of battle, which they were overjoyed to recover, they found it strewed with our dead and wounded. For the rest, the loss of the Austrians was not less than ours. Fifteen thousand French had fought all day against 36,000 men, 12,000 of whom were cavalry. M. de Kray was present the whole time on the field of battle.

But for the bravery of the troops and the energy and talents of the generals, the fault which Moreau had committed would have been punished by the loss of our left wing. Moreau immediately repaired to that wing; and, as if his thoughts had been suddenly drawn to that quarter by mere accident, he resolved to make his whole army cross to the left bank of the river.

On the 17th (27th Floréal), leaving St. Suzanne to rest himself in the positions of the preceding day, he led back St. Cyr's corps between the Iller and the Danube. He pushed the reserve, which was under his own command, to Unterkirchberg on the Iller itself, and ordered Lecourbe to fall back between the Guntz and Weissenhorn. On the 18th, the army made a second movement towards its left; St. Suzanne was moved to beyond the Blau; St. Cyr to beyond the Danube; the reserve to Gocklingen, on the Danube itself, ready to cross the river. On the 19th, the manœuvre was still more decided; St. Suzanne had completely turned Ulm; he had his headquarters at Urspring; St. Cyr was on both banks of the Blau, his headquarters being at Blaubeyren; the reserve had passed the Danube between Erbach and the Blau; and Lecourbe was ready to cross that river.

Everything seemed to denote an attack by main force on the entrenched camp of Ulm. In this new position, M. de Kray had his left at Ulm, his centre on the Blau, his right at Elchingen. He had, therefore, his back to the Danube, and defended the reverse of the position of Ulm. Moreau, after he had made an attentive reconnoissance, disappointed the expectations of his lieutenants, who fancied that they discovered a serious plan in this movement upon his left, and who, moreover, were desirous of a bold attempt on the camp of the Austrians, because they considered success as infallible. St. Cyr again insisted, but he was not listened to. Moreau resolved to be gone, unwilling to risk an attack by main force along the Blau, equally unwilling entirely to turn the position by its left, for fear of uncovering Switzerland too much. He ordered the whole army to cross once more to the right bank. On the 20th of May and the following days, the army decamped, to the great vexation of the soldiers and of the generals, who reckoned upon an assault, and to the great astonishment of the Austrians, who were in dread of one.

These false movements were attended with the great disadvantage of somewhat raising the courage of the Austrian army, without, however, abating that of the French army, which it was difficult to shake, so conscious was it of its own superiority. Moreau might have attempted a movement which we have described above, and which, executed subsequently, obtained him a glorious triumph. This was to descend the Danube, to threaten M. de Kray with a passage below Ulm, and to oblige him to decamp, by making him uneasy about his line of communication. But Moreau was still fearful of uncovering the route to the Alps. He, therefore, had some thoughts of making a second demonstration upon Augsburg, to endeavour once more to deceive the Austrians, and to persuade them that, leaving Ulm behind him, he was marching definitely upon Bavaria, perhaps even upon



Austria. On the 22nd of May (2nd Prairial), the whole French army had recrossed the Danube; Lecourbe, with the right wing, threatened Augsburg by Landsberg; and St. Suzanne, with the left wing, kept at some distance from the Danube, between Dellmensingen and Achstetten. That same day, the 22nd, Prince Ferdinand, at the head of 12,000 men, half of them, at least, cavalry, with a view either to keep us near Ulm or to discover our intentions, made an attack on St. Suzanne, which was warmly repulsed. The troops behaved with their accustomed vigour, and General Decaen distinguished himself. On the following days, Moreau continued his movement. On the 27th of May (7th Prairial), Lecourbe, with equal boldness and intelligence, made himself master of the bridge of Landsberg on the Lech, and, on the 28th, entered Augsburg. M. de Kray was not to be shaken by this demonstration, and remained obstinately in Ulm. This, it must be confessed, was the best of his determinations, and that which did most honour to his firmness and his judgment.

From that moment, Moreau confined himself to a calculated inaction. He rectified his position, and rendered it better. Instead of forming a long line, the extremity only of which touched the Danube, a position which exposed our left corps to unequal combats with the whole Austrian army, he executed a change of front, and, henceforward facing the Danube, he ranged himself parallel to that river, but at a considerable distance, his left supported upon the Iller, his right upon the Guntz, his rear-guard occupying Augsburg, and a corps of flankers observing the Tyrol. The French army thus formed a mass sufficiently dense to have nothing to fear from a separate attack on one of its wings, and could not incur any other risk but that of a general engagement, which all in our ranks wished for, because it would result in the utter ruin of the Imperial army.

In this position, now irreproachable, it was Moreau's intention to await the issue of the campaign which the First Consul was at that moment undertaking beyond the Alps. His lieutenants strongly urged him to resume active operations; he persisted in replying that it would be imprudent to do more till he had news from Italy; that, if General Bonaparte succeeded in that part of the theatre of war, they should then try a decisive manœuvre against M. de Kray; that, if the French army was not successful beyond the Alps, they should be greatly embarrassed by the very progress which they should have made in Bavaria. The enterprise of General Bonaparte, of which Moreau was in the secret, had in it something extraordinary for a mind like his; it is not, therefore, surprising that he should have felt anxiety, and have determined not to advance farther, before he knew for certain how it fared with the army of reserve.

In consequence of this determination, Moreau had warm altercations with some of his lieutenants, especially with St. Cyr. The latter complained of the inaction to which they were confined, and more particularly of the partiality that prevailed in the distribution of rations to the different corps of the army. His, he said, was often without bread, while that of the commander-in-chief, beside which it was posted, wanted for nothing. Not that there was any want of supplies since the capture of the enemy's magazines, but of the means of conveyance. St. Cyr had more than one altercation on this subject; he had evidently fallen out with the staff which was about Moreau, and this was, at bottom, the cause of those unfortunate misunderstandings. General Grenier had just arrived. St. Cyr wished Moreau to give that general the command of the army of reserve, that he might be able to release himself from prepossessions and partiality—inevitable consequences of commanding in person. Unluckily, Moreau would not do anything of the kind: St. Cyr then retired, upon the pretext of health, and deprived the army of the ablest of its general officers. For the rest, St. Cyr was made to command himself, not to obey. General Suzanne retired also, in consequence of similar misunderstandings. He was sent upon the Rhine, to form a corps destined to cover the rear of the army of Germany, and to check the force under Baron d'Albini. General Grenier took the place of St. Cyr, and Richepanse that of St. Suzanne. Moreau, whose soldiers were well supplied with provisions, and who was strongly established in his new position, resolved to wait, and wrote to the First Consul in the following terms, which perfectly express his situation and his intentions:—

“BABENHAUSEN, 7th Prairial, year VIII. (May 27th, 1800).

“We are looking with impatience, citizen Consul, for tidings of your success. M. de Kray and I are fumbling here—he, to keep about Ulm—I, to make him leave the post.

“It would have been dangerous, particularly for you, if I had transferred the war to the left bank of the Danube. Our present position has forced the Prince de Reuss to move off to the *débouchés* of the Tyrol, and to the sources of the Lech and the Iller; so that he cannot inconvenience you.

“Pray let me hear from you, and let me know how I can best serve you. . . .

“Should M. de Kray move forward, I shall again fall back to Memmingen; I shall make General Lecourbe join me there, and we shall fight. Should he march upon Augsburg, I shall march thither too; he will lose the support of Ulm, and then we shall see what is to be done to cover you.

“It would be more advantageous for us to operate upon the left bank of the Danube, and make Wurtemberg and Franconia contribute

to our support ; but that would not suit you, since the enemy might send detachments into Italy, while leaving us to ravage the territory of the empire.

“ Be assured of my attachment.

(Signed)      “ MOREAU.”

A month and two days had elapsed, and if Moreau had not obtained those prompt and decisive results which terminate a whole campaign at one blow, as he might have done by passing the Rhine at a single point, towards Schaffhausen, by throwing himself *en masse* upon the left of M. de Kray, and by fighting the battles of Engen and Mösskirch with his undivided force ; or as he might likewise have done by throwing the Austrian army into the Danube at Sigmaringen, by dislodging it, by main force, from the camp at Ulm, or by obliging it to decamp by a serious manœuvre upon Augsburg ; still he had fulfilled the essential condition of the plan of the campaign ; he had passed the Rhine without accident, in the teeth of the Austrian army ; he had fought two great battles with it, and, though the concentration of his forces had been very defective, he had gained those battles by his firmness and his superior generalship in the hour of action ; lastly, notwithstanding his *fumbling* before Ulm, he had shut up the Austrians around that place, and kept them blockaded there, cutting them off from the route to Bavaria and the Tyrol, and having it in his power to await himself, in a good position, the turn of events in Italy. If we do not find in him those superior, decided talents, which distinguish great captains, we find at least a prudent, calm mind, repairing, by its coolness, the faults of too confined an understanding and too irresolute a character ; in a word, we find an excellent general, such as other nations would fain have possessed, and such as Europe had none to equal ; for it was the lot of France, at that period,—of France, which already had General Bonaparte, to possess also Moreau, Kléber, Desaix, Masséna, St. Cyr, that is to say, the best second-rate generals ; and be it borne in mind that she had already produced Dumouriez and Pichegru ! Time of marvellous memory ! which ought to inspire us with some confidence in ourselves, and prove to Europe that all our glory in the present century is not due to a single man, that it is not the result of that very rare chance which begets such geniuses as Hannibal, Cæsar, and Napoleon.

What might chiefly be alleged against Moreau was a want of vigour in command ; his suffering himself to be surrounded, controlled, by a military coterie ; his allowing misunderstandings to arise around him, depriving himself, in consequence, of his best officers, and not knowing how to correct, by force of character, a vicious organisation of the army, which disposed his lieutenants to

part company, and to acts of bad military brotherhood. Moreau's chief fault, as we have said several times, as we shall too often have occasion to repeat, lay in his character. Would that there were a veil to conceal from our view, and capable of concealing from others, the sad sequel in after years! Would that there were nought to damp our admiration of the noble and wary exploits of that warrior, whose heart jealousy and exile had not yet estranged!

We must now transport ourselves to a different theatre, to witness also a very different spectacle. Providence, so rich in contrasts, will there exhibit to us a different mind, a different character, a different fortune, and, for the honour of our country, soldiers still the same, that is to say, still intelligent, devoted, and intrepid.

## BOOK IV.

### MARENGO.

THE First Consul was only waiting for news of the success of the army of the Rhine to descend into the plains of Italy: for unless Moreau were successful, he could not spare a detachment of his troops, and M. de Kray was not so completely separated from M. de Melas as to render it safe to manœuvre with freedom on the rear of the latter. The First Consul, therefore, waited with extreme impatience, resolved to leave Paris and to take the command of the army of reserve as soon as he should have certain and perfectly satisfactory intelligence concerning the operations of Moreau. Time pressed, in fact, for Masséna was reduced in Genoa to the most cruel extremities. We left him there, struggling against the whole force of the Austrians, with an army worn out with fatigue, and, in spite of its prodigious inferiority, daily inflicting on the enemy considerable losses. On the 10th of May, General Ott, having indulged in an indecorous bravado, and informed Masséna that he should fire his guns for a victory gained over General Suchet—a piece of news which was false, by-the-by—the illustrious defender of Genoa made an energetic reply to this bravado. He sallied from Genoa in two columns. The left, commanded by General Soult, ascended the Bisagno, and turned the Monte Ratti; the other, under Miollis, attacked the Monte Ratti in front. The Austrians, vigorously assailed, were thrown into the ravines, and lost that important position and 1500 prisoners. In the evening, Masséna returned triumphant to the city of Genoa; and, on the following morning, he wrote to General Ott, that he was firing his guns for his victory on the preceding day: an heroic revenge, and worthy of his noble soul!

But this was the last of his successes, for his debilitated soldiers could scarcely support the weight of their arms. On the 13th of May (23rd Floréal) this energetic officer, yielding to the advice of his generals, consented, almost in spite of himself, to an operation, the result of which was most disastrous. The object of this operation was to take the Monte Creto, an important position, which it would certainly have been most desirable to wrest from the Austrians, because they would then

have been removed to a considerable distance from Genoa: but, unfortunately, there was little chance of its success. Masséna, though he had the greatest confidence in his army, for he daily required and obtained of it the most strenuous efforts, did not think it capable of carrying a position which the enemy would defend with all his forces. He would have preferred an expedition to Porto Fino, along the sea-coast, to seize a considerable store of provisions which he knew there was in that quarter. Contrary to his custom, however, he gave way to his lieutenants, and, on the morning of the 13th, marched upon the Monte Creto. The battle was at first extremely brilliant; unluckily, a terrible storm, which lasted some hours, broke the energies of our troops. The enemy had concentrated a large force on this point, and he drove back our soldiers, dying of hunger and fatigue, into the valleys. General Soult, making it a point of honour to succeed in an expedition which he had advised, rallied around him the third demi-brigade, led it back against the enemy, and might, perhaps, have triumphed, had not a ball, fracturing his leg, extended him on the field of battle. His men would have carried him off, but they had not time; and this general, who had zealously seconded Masséna during the whole siege, was left in the hands of the enemy.

The army returned much mortified to Genoa; but still it brought back some prisoners. During the engagement, a riot of women had taken place in the city. These wretched creatures, urged by want, ran through the streets ringing bells, and demanding bread. They were soon dispersed, and the French general was thenceforward almost wholly occupied in providing subsistence for the population of Genoa, which showed, in other respects, the noblest devotedness. There had been successively procured, as we have seen, corn for a fortnight at first, and afterwards for another fortnight. Subsequently, a vessel entering the harbour of Genoa unexpectedly, had brought enough for five days, so that supplies had been obtained for above a month. The place had been blockaded ever since the 5th of April, and these resources had lasted till the 10th of May. Seeing the store of provisions diminish, he had reduced the ration allowed daily to the people and to the army. Soup, made with herbs and a small quantity of meat still left in the city, was substituted for it. The wealthy inhabitants, indeed, found means to supply themselves, at a most exorbitant price, with victuals, which had escaped the search made by the police, for the purpose of applying them to the general use. Thus Masséna had occasion to trouble himself about the poor only, by whom the dearth was particularly felt. He had imposed a contribution on the opulent class for their benefit, and had thus won them to the side of the French. For the rest, the majority of the population, dreading

the Austrians, and the political system of which they were the champions, were determined to second Masséna by their resignation. Struck by the energy of his character, their obedience to him was equal to their admiration. Nevertheless, the oligarchic party, making tools of some famishing wretches, strove to annoy him by all possible contrivances. To overawe them, Masséna made his battalions bivouac in the principal places of the city, with lighted matches to their guns. But the bread upon which the people were still subsisting, and which was made of oats, beans, and all the sorts of grain that could be procured, was on the point of being exhausted: of meat, too, the city was likely to be destitute. On the 20th of May, there would be left only such articles as it was almost impossible to use for food. It was, therefore, urgent to raise the blockade of the place before the 20th of May, in order to prevent Masséna being made prisoner, with his whole army, and Baron Melas, who would then have 30,000 men more at his disposal, from returning to Piedmont, to close the *débouchés* of the Alps.

The aide-de-camp Franceschi, charged to carry this intelligence to the government, and who had contrived, by means of address and audacity, to pass through the Austrians and the English, had communicated to the First Consul the deplorable state of the fortress of Genoa. In consequence, the First Consul redoubled his efforts to put the army of reserve in a condition to cross the Alps. It was on this account that he had sent Carnot to Germany, with a formal order of the Consuls, to send off the detachment destined to pass the St. Gothard. He himself, occupied day and night, corresponding with Berthier, who was organising the divisions of infantry and cavalry, with Gassendi and Marmont, who were organising the artillery, with Marescot, who was making reconnaissances along the whole line of the Alps, he urged them all with that persuasive ardour, which enabled him to lead the French from the banks of the Po to the banks of the Jordan, from the banks of the Jordan to those of the Danube and the Borysthenes. He was not to quit Paris himself till the last moment, unwilling to relinquish the political government of France, and to leave free scope to intriguers and plotters, any longer than he could possibly help. Meanwhile, the divisions which had set out from La Vendée, Bretagne, Paris, and the banks of the Rhone were traversing the vast extent of the territory of the Republic, and their heads of columns already made their appearance in Switzerland. There were still at Dijon the depôts of the corps, besides some conscripts and some volunteers, sent to that city, to give currency in Europe to the opinion that the army of Dijon was a mere fable, destined solely to frighten M. de Melas. Thus far all had proceeded according to wish: the illusion

on the part of the Austrians was complete. The movements of troops that were making towards Switzerland, scarcely perceived, owing to the dispersion of the corps, passed for reinforcements sent to the army in Germany.

At length, everything being ready, the First Consul made his last arrangements. He received a message from the Senate, from the Tribunate, and from the Legislative Body, conveying to him the wishes of the nation that he might soon return *conqueror and peacemaker*. He replied with a studied solemnity. His answer was intended to concur with the articles of the *Moniteur* in proving that his journey, announced with so much parade, was, like the army of reserve, a feint, and nothing more. He charged Cambacérès, the Consul, to preside in his place over the Council of State, which at that time was, in some measure, the entire government. Lebrun, the Consul, was commissioned to supervise the administration of the finances. He said to each of them: "Be firm; if any event happens, be not uneasy. I will come back like lightning, to crush the audacious wretches who shall dare to lay hands upon the government." He particularly charged his brothers, who were attached to him by a more personal interest, to inform him of everything, and to give him a signal to return, if his presence should become necessary. While he was ostentatiously publishing his departure, the Consuls and the ministers, on the contrary, were to tell the newsmongers, in confidence, that the First Consul was leaving Paris for a few days, and merely to review the troops ready to take the field.

For the rest, he set out full of hope and satisfaction. His army contained many conscripts, but it contained also, and in much greater number, soldiers inured to war, accustomed to conquer, commanded by officers trained in his school; he had, moreover, absolute confidence in the profound conception of his plan. According to the most recent intelligence, M. de Melas continued advancing into Liguria, half his forces against Genoa, half against the Var. On these tidings, the First Consul had not the least doubt of the success of his enterprise, nay, he already fixed, in his ardent imagination, the very point where he should meet and overwhelm the Austrian army. One day, before he set out, lying upon his maps, and placing upon them marks of different colours, to denote the position of the French and the Austrians, he said before his secretary, who listened with surprise and curiosity, "Poor M. de Melas! He will pass through Turin, fall back upon Alexandria. . . . I shall cross the Po, overtake him on the road to Piacenza, in the plains of the Scrivia, and I will beat him there, just there:" and, at these words, he laid down one of his marks at San Giuliano. The reader will presently be able to judge what an extraordinary vision of the future this was.

He left Paris on the morning of the 6th of May, before it was



light, taking with him his aide-de-camp, Duroc, and his secretary, M. de Bourrienne. On reaching Dijon, he reviewed the dépôts, and the conscripts, who had been assembled there, but without *matériel*, without any of the accessories indispensable for an army ready to take the field. After this review, which was designed to confirm the spies still more in the belief that the army of Dijon was a pure invention, he proceeded to Geneva, and from Geneva to Lausanne, where all was really serious, where everything that was done would tend to undeceive the incredulous, but would undeceive them too late for them to send off information that could still be useful to Vienna.

On the 13th of May, General Bonaparte reviewed part of his troops, and conferred with the officers whom he had appointed to meet him, for the purpose of giving him an account of what they had done, and of receiving his last orders. General Marescot, charged with the reconnoissance of the Alps, was the one whom he was most impatient to hear. On a comparison of all the passes, it was in favour of the St. Bernard that this officer of engineers decided; but he considered the operation as extremely difficult. "Difficult, granted; but is it possible?" replied the First Consul. "I think so," rejoined General Marescot, "but with extraordinary efforts." "Then, let us start," was the only answer of the First Consul.

It is time to explain the motives which decided him to choose the St. Bernard. The St. Gothard was reserved for the troops coming from Germany, and led by General Moncey. This passage was situated on their route, and was capable of furnishing subsistence for 15,000 men at most; for the valleys of Upper Switzerland were totally spoiled by the presence of the belligerent armies. There were left the passes of the Simplon, the Great St. Bernard, and Mont Cenis. These were not, as at the present day, crossed by highroads. It was necessary to dismount the carriages at the foot of the mountain, to forward them upon sledges, and to remount them on the other side. These passes presented all three nearly the same difficulties. Still, Mont Cenis being more frequented, more beaten than the others, presented, perhaps, on that account, fewer material obstacles; but it debouched upon Turin, that is to say, in the midst of the Austrians, too near them, and was not sufficiently adapted to the plan for enveloping them. The Simplon, on the contrary, the most distant of all from the point of departure, presented the opposite inconveniences. It debouched, it is true, in the environs of Milan, in a rich country, far enough from the Austrians, and quite in their rear; but it presented one very great difficulty, namely, that of the distances. To get to it, in fact, it would have been necessary to ascend the whole length of the Valais with the *matériel* of the army, which would have required

means of transport that we had not at our disposal. Amidst the arid and ice-covered valleys, which the troops would have to traverse, they would be obliged to carry everything with them, and it was not a matter of indifference to have a score leagues more to travel. In the case of the passage of the St. Bernard, on the contrary, there was no farther to go than the road from Villeneuve to Martigny, that is, from the extremity of the Lake of Geneva, the point where the means of navigation ceased, to the foot of the mountain. It was a very little distance across. Besides, the St. Bernard debouched in the valley of Aosta upon Ivrea, between the two roads of Turin and Milan, in a very favourable direction for enveloping the Austrians. Though more difficult, perhaps more dangerous, it deserved the preference, on account of the shortness of the passage.

The First Consul, therefore, decided to lead the principal mass of his forces over the St. Bernard itself. He took with him all that was best in the army of reserve, about 40,000 men, 35,000 infantry and artillery, 5000 cavalry. At the same time, wishing to draw off the attention of the Austrians, he conceived the idea of making some detachments, which could not be united with the bulk of the army, descend by other passes. Not far from the Great St. Bernard is the Little St. Bernard, which, from the heights of Savoy, debouches also in the valley of Aosta. The First Consul directed General Chabran, with the 70th demi-brigade, and some battalions of the East, full of conscripts, upon this pass. This division, numbering from 5000 to 6000 men, was to rejoin the principal column about Ivrea. Lastly, General Thurreau, who, with 4000 men, troops of Liguria, defended Mont Cenis, had orders to perform that passage, and to attempt to penetrate to Turin. Thus the French army was to descend from the Alps by four passes at once, the St. Gothard, the Great and Little St. Bernard, and Mont Cenis. The principal mass, 40,000 strong, acting in the centre of this semicircle, had the certainty of being joined by the 15,000 troops coming from Germany, as well as by the troops of General Chabran, and, perhaps, those of General Thurreau, which would compose a total force of about 65,000 men, and disconcert the enemy, not knowing, from the appearance of all these corps, towards which point to direct his resistance.

The points of passage being fixed upon, it was necessary to turn attention to the operation itself, which consisted in throwing 60,000 men, with their *matériel*, to the other side of the Alps, without beaten roads, across rocks and glaciers, at the most formidable season of the year, that of the melting of the snow. It is a very troublesome thing to have a park of artillery only to drag with you, for each piece of cannon requires several carriers after it, and, for sixty pieces of cannon, it would be

necessary to have about 300; but, in those elevated valleys, some of them doomed to sterility by everlasting winter, others scarcely large enough to feed their scanty inhabitants, no means of subsistence were to be found. Bread would have to be carried for the men, and even forage for the horses. The difficulty, therefore, was immense. From Geneva to Villeneuve all was easy, thanks to Lake Lemán, and a navigation, equally commodious and rapid, of eighteen leagues. But from Villeneuve, the extreme point of the lake, to Ivrea, the *debouché* by which you enter the rich plain of Piedmont, you have forty-five leagues to travel, ten of them over the rocks and the glaciers of the great chain. The route to Martigny, and from Martigny to St. Pierre, was good for the carriages. There they would begin to ascend tracks covered with snow, scarcely more than two or three feet wide, bordered by precipices, liable, in the heat of the day, to be overwhelmed by frightful avalanches. In these tracks, they would have about ten leagues to march, ere they reached, on the other side of the St. Bernard, the village of St. Remy, in the valley of Aosta. There they would find a road passable for carriages, which led through Aosta, Chatillon, Bard, and Ivrea into the plain of Piedmont. Of all these points, one only was mentioned as being capable of presenting any difficulty; this was that of Bard, where, it was said, there existed a fort, which some Italian officers had heard talked of, but which did not seem likely to offer any serious obstacle. They had, therefore, as we have just said, forty-five leagues to travel, carrying everything with them, from the Lake of Geneva to the plains of Piedmont, and, of these forty-five leagues, ten without any roads passable for carriages.

The following were the dispositions devised by the First Consul for the conveyance of the *matériel*, and executed under the direction of the Generals Marecôt, Marmont, and Gassendi. Immense stores of corn, biscuit, and oats, had been sent by the Lake of Geneva to Villeneuve. General Bonaparte, knowing that, with money, the assistance of the robust mountaineers of the Alps might easily be obtained, had sent to the spot a considerable sum in hard cash. All the *chars-à-banc* of the country, all the mules, and all the peasants, had therefore been drawn, at a high price, to this point, but during the last days only. By these means, bread, biscuit, forage, wine, brandy, had been conveyed from Villeneuve to Martigny, and from Martigny to St. Pierre, at the foot of the mountain. A sufficient quantity of live cattle had been driven to the same place. The artillery, with its waggons, had been removed thither. A company of workmen, stationed at the foot of the col, at St. Pierre, was employed in dismounting the guns and taking the carriages to pieces, which pieces were marked with numbers, in order that they might be carried by mules. The guns themselves,

separated from their carriages, were to be placed on sledges with low wheels, prepared at Auxonne. As for the ammunition of the infantry and artillery, there had been provided a multitude of small chests, which might easily be placed upon mules and conveyed, like all the rest, by means of the beasts of burden of the country. A second company of workmen, provided with camp-forges, was to cross the mountain with the first division, to establish itself in the village of St. Remy, where the beaten road began again, to put the gun-carriages together, and to remount the pieces. Such was the enormous task that was undertaken. There had been added to the army a company of pontonniers, unprovided with materials requisite for forming bridges, but destined to employ such as could not fail to be obtained by conquest in Italy.

The First Consul had, moreover, taken care to gain the assistance of the monks residing in the Hospice of the Great St. Bernard. The whole world knows, that pious recluses, settled there for ages, live in these frightful solitudes, above the inhabited regions, for the purpose of saving travellers overtaken by bad weather, and sometimes buried in the snow. The First Consul had sent them, at the last moment, a sum of money, that they might collect a great quantity of bread, cheese, and wine. An hospital was prepared at St. Pierre, at the foot of the col, and a second on the other side of the mountains at St. Remy. These two hospitals were to forward the wounded and the sick, if there were any, to larger hospitals established at Martigny and at Villeneuve.

All these arrangements being completed, the troops began to appear. General Bonaparte, established at Lausanne, inspected them all, spoke to them, animated them with the ardour that filled himself, and prepared them for the glorious enterprise, which History would place beside the great expedition of Hannibal. He had taken care to order two inspections, a first at Lausanne, a second at Villeneuve. There every infantry and cavalry soldier was to be inspected, and, by means of temporary magazines formed in each of those places, the men were furnished with such shoes, clothing, and arms as they needed. The precaution was useful, for, notwithstanding all the pains that he had taken, the First Consul saw veterans arrive whose clothes were worn out and whose arms were unserviceable. He complained vehemently on this subject, and caused the omissions, arising from the hurry or the negligence of the agents, always inevitable to a certain degree, to be supplied. He had even carried his foresight to such an extent as to cause saddlers' workshops to be placed at the foot of the col, for repairing the harness of the artillery. He had himself written several letters on this subject, apparently so trivial; and we mention this

circumstance for the instruction of generals and the governments to whom the lives of men are entrusted, and who have frequently either the idleness or the vanity to neglect such details. Nothing, in fact, that can contribute to the success of operations and to the safety of the soldiers is beneath the genius or the rank of the officers who command.

The divisions marched *en échelon* from the Jura to the foot of the St. Bernard, to avoid confusion. The First Consul was at Martigny, in a convent of Bernardines. There he issued all orders, and was in constant correspondence with Paris, and with the other armies of the Republic. He received intelligence from Liguria, that M. de Melas, still swayed by the greatest illusions, was most zealously exerting himself to take Genoa, and to force the bridge of the Var. Satisfied on this important point, he at length gave orders for the passage. As for himself, he remained on this side of the St. Bernard, that he might correspond as long as possible with the government, and despatch everything himself across the mountains. Berthier, on the contrary, was to proceed to the other side of the St. Bernard, to receive the divisions and the *matériel*, which the First Consul was to send to him.

Lannes passed first, at the head of the advanced guard, in the night between the 14th and 15th of May (24th and 25th Floréal). He commanded six regiments of picked troops, perfectly armed, and which, under this fiery leader, sometimes insubordinate, but always so able and so valiant, gaily commenced this adventurous march. They set out between twelve o'clock and two in the morning, to gain the start of the moment when the heat of the sun, melting the snow, brings down mountains of ice upon the head of the rash travellers who venture into these frightful gorges. It took eight hours to reach the summit of the col, on which the Hospice of St. Bernard is situated, and two hours only to descend to St. Remy: consequently, there was time to pass before the moment of the greatest danger. The soldiers surmounted with ardour the difficulties of this route. They were heavily laden, for they had been obliged to carry biscuit for several days, and along with the biscuit a great quantity of ball cartridges. They climbed those steep tracks, singing amidst the precipices, dreaming of the conquest of that Italy where they had so often tasted the delights of victory, and having a noble presentiment of the immortal glory which they were about to acquire. The labour was not so great for the infantry as for the cavalry. These walked themselves, leading their horses by the bridle. There was no danger in ascending, but in the descent, the path being very narrow, obliging them to walk before the horse, they were liable, if the animal made a false step, to be dragged by him into the abyss. Some accidents of

this kind, not many, did actually happen, and some horses perished, but scarcely any of the men. Towards morning, they reached the hospice, and there a surprise, provided by the First Consul, renewed the strength and the good humour of those brave troops. The monks, having supplied themselves with the requisite provisions, had prepared tables, and served out a ration of bread, cheese, and wine to every soldier. After resting for a moment, they resumed their march, and descended to St. Remy without any unpleasant accident. Lannes immediately established himself on the back of the mountain, and made all the necessary dispositions for receiving the other divisions, and particularly the *matériel*.

One of the divisions of the army was to pass every day. The operation would, therefore, last several days, especially on account of the *matériel*, which it was requisite to forward with the divisions. While the troops were successively coming up, others fell to work. The provisions and ammunition were moved off first. For this part of the *matériel*, which might be divided, and placed on the backs of mules in small chests, the difficulty was not so great as for the rest. It consisted only in the insufficiency of the means of transport; for, notwithstanding the lavish expenditure of money, there were not so many mules as were required for the enormous weight that was to be carried to the other side of the St. Bernard. However, the provisions and ammunition, having crossed along with the divisions of the army, and with the assistance of the soldiers, the artillery at length demanded attention. The gun-carriages and the ammunition waggons had been taken to pieces, as we have said, and placed upon mules. The cannon themselves were still left, and their weight could not be reduced by the division of the load. With the twelve-pounders, in particular, and with the howitzers, the difficulty was greater than had been at first expected. The sledges upon wheels, constructed in the arsenals, could not be used. A method was contrived, tried immediately, and found to answer; this was, to split the trunks of fir-trees in two, to hollow them out, to encase each piece of artillery within two of these half trunks, and to drag it thus covered along the ravines. Owing to these precautions, no collision could damage it. Mules were harnessed to this singular load, and served to draw several pieces to the summit of the col. But the descent was more difficult: that could only be effected by strength of arms, and by incurring infinite dangers, because it was necessary to keep hold of the piece, and, while holding, to prevent it from slipping down the precipices. Unfortunately, the mules began to be knocked up. The muleteers also, a great number of whom were required, were exhausted. It was then proposed to have recourse to other means. The peasants of the

environs were offered so much as a thousand francs for every piece of cannon which they should agree to drag from St. Pierre to St. Remy. It took a hundred men to drag each, one day to get it up and another to get it down. Some hundreds of peasants came forward, and actually took several pieces of cannon across, under the direction of artillerymen. But even the allurements of gain was not strong enough to induce them to repeat the effort. All of them disappeared, and though officers were sent in quest of them, and made large offers to bring them back, these were of no avail, so that it was found necessary to ask the soldiers of the divisions to drag their artillery themselves. From such devoted soldiers, anything might be obtained. To encourage them, they were promised the money which the disheartened peasants would not earn; but they refused it, saying that it was a point of honour for a body of troops to save their cannon, and they laid hold of the forsaken pieces. Parties of one hundred men, successively quitting the ranks, dragged them, each in its turn. The band played enlivening airs at difficult points of the passage, and encouraged them to surmount obstacles of so novel a nature. On reaching the summit of the mountain, they found refreshment prepared by the monks of St. Bernard; and they took some rest before they made greater and more perilous efforts in the descent. In this manner, Chambarlhac's and Monnier's divisions dragged their artillery themselves; and, as the advanced hour did not permit them to descend the same day, they chose rather to bivouac on the snow than to leave their cannon. Luckily, the weather was serene; so that they had not its inclemency to endure, in addition to the difficulties of the ground.

On the 16th, 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th of May, the divisions continued to cross, with the provisions, ammunition, and artillery. The First Consul, still quartered at Martigny, urged the forwarding of the *matériel*; Berthier, on the other side of the St. Bernard, received it, and had it repaired by the workmen. The First Consul, whose foresight was ever active, bethought him immediately of pushing Lannes, who already had his division collected, and some four-pounders ready to start, upon the *débouché* of the mountains, for the purpose of securing it. He ordered him to advance to Ivrea, and to take that town, with a view to make himself master of the entrance to the plain of Piedmont. Lannes marched, on the 16th and 17th of May, upon Aosta, where he found some Croats, who were driven into the bottom of the valley; he then proceeded towards the little town of Châtillon, where he arrived on the 18th. A battalion of the enemy, which happened to be there, was put to rout, and lost a good number of prisoners. Lannes then entered the valley, which, as the troops descended, gradually widened and exhibited

to the delighted eyes of our men habitations, trees, cultivated fields, all the forerunners, in short, of Italian fertility. These brave fellows marched gaily forward, when the valley again contracting, presented a narrow gorge, closed by a fort bristling with cannon. This was the fort of Bard, already pointed out as an obstacle by several Italian officers, but as an obstacle that might be surmounted. The officers of engineers attached to the advanced guard went forward, and, after a hasty reconnoissance, declared that the fort completely obstructed the road through the valley, and that it could not be passed without forcing this barrier, which seemed nearly insurmountable. This intelligence, circulated in the division, excited the most painful surprise. The nature of that unforeseen obstacle was this:—

The valley of Aosta is traversed by a river, which receives all the streams from the St. Bernard, and which, by the name of Dora Baltea, discharges itself into the Po. On approaching Bard the valley contracts; the road, running between the foot of the mountains and the bed of the river, becomes gradually narrower, and, at length, a rock, which seems to have fallen from the neighbouring heights into the middle of the valley, closes it almost completely. The river then runs on one side of the rock, the road on the other. This road, bordered by houses, composes the whole town of Bard. On the summit of the rock, a fort, impregnable from its position, though ill-constructed, sweeps with its fire, on the right, the course of the Dora Baltea, on the left, the long street which forms the very little town of Bard. Drawbridges closed the entry and the outlet of this single street. A garrison, not numerous, but well officered, occupied the fort.

Lannes, who was not a man to be daunted, immediately despatched a few companies of grenadiers, who let down the drawbridges, and entered Bard, in spite of a very brisk fire. The commandant of Bard poured forth a shower of balls, chiefly howitzer, upon the unfortunate town; but, at length, he paused, out of consideration for the inhabitants. Lannes' division posted itself outside. It was evidently impossible for the *matériel* of an army to pass under the fire of the fort, which swept the road in all directions. Lannes immediately made his report to Berthier, who hastened to the spot, and perceived with horror how difficult the obstacle which had just revealed itself was to overcome. General Marescot was sent for; he examined the fort, and declared it to be almost impregnable, not on account of its construction, which was indifferent, but its position, which was completely detached. The steepness of the rock scarcely admitted of escalade; as for the walls, though they were not covered by any earthworks, they could not be battered in breach, because there were no means of establishing a battery suitably



placed for reaching them. Still, it was possible, by dint of strength, to hoist upon the neighbouring heights a few pieces of small calibre. Berthier gave orders accordingly. The soldiers, who were made for arduous enterprises, laboured to get up two four-pounders, and even two eight-pounders. They at length succeeded in hoisting them up on the mountain of Albaredo, which commands the fort and rock of Bard; and a downward fire suddenly opened, excited some astonishment in the garrison. Not disheartened, however, it replied, and dismounted one of our pieces, which was of too small calibre.

Marescot declared that there was no hope of taking the fort, and that they must think of some other way of overcoming the obstacle. Reconnaissances were made on the left, along the windings of the mountain of Albaredo, and at length there was found a path, which, amidst many dangers—many more than the St. Bernard itself had presented—led to the highroad of the valley, which rejoined below the fort, at St. Donaz. This path, though crossing a mountain of the second order, was at least as difficult to traverse as the St. Bernard, because it was frequented only by shepherds and their flocks. If it should be necessary to go through a second operation like that which had just been executed, and pass this new col by again dismounting and remounting of the artillery, and dragging it along with similar efforts, the strength of the army might prove inadequate, and this *matériel*, so often taken to pieces and put together, might likewise be rendered unfit for use. Berthier, in alarm, instantly issued counter-orders to the columns that were successively arriving, and caused the advance of the men and the *matériel* to be everywhere suspended, that the army might not come any further, lest it should at last have to turn back. In a moment, an alarm was spread upon the rear, and the troops imagined that they were stopped in this glorious enterprise. Berthier sent several couriers to the First Consul, to apprise him of this unexpected disappointment.

The latter was still at Martigny, purposing not to cross the St. Bernard till, with his own eyes, he had seen the last portions of the *matériel* despatched. These tidings of an obstacle deemed insurmountable gave him at first a kind of shock; but he soon recovered himself, and obstinately refused to entertain the idea of a retrograde movement. Nothing in the world could have induced him to submit to such an extremity. He thought that, if one of the highest mountains of the globe had not stopped him, a secondary rock would not be capable of baffling his courage and his genius. "They will take the fort," said he, "by a bold stroke: if it is not to be taken it must be turned. Besides, provided the infantry and cavalry can pass with a few four-pounders, they will proceed to Ivrea, at the entrance of the

plain, and there wait till the heavy artillery can follow them. If this heavy artillery cannot clear the obstacle that has presented itself; and if, to replace it, they must take that of the enemy, the French infantry is numerous and brave enough to fall upon the Austrian artillery, and to carry off their guns." Again he resorted to the study of his maps; he questioned a great number of Italian officers, and, learning from them that other roads led from Aosta to the surrounding valleys, he wrote letter after letter to Berthier, forbidding him to interrupt the movement of the army, and indicated with astonishing precision the reconnaissances that ought to be made around the fort of Bard. Satisfied that no serious danger could arise, except from the arrival of a hostile corps to close the *débouché* of Ivrea, he enjoined Berthier to send Lannes on by the path of Albaredo, and to make him there take a strong position, covered from the Austrian artillery and cavalry. "Provided Lannes keep the door of the valley," added the First Consul, "no matter what may occur—at worst we can but lose a little time. We have a sufficient quantity of provisions to wait, and we shall gain our point at last, either by turning, or by overcoming the obstacle which stops us at this moment."

Having given these instructions to Berthier, he addressed his last orders to General Monecy, who was to debouch from the St. Gothard; to General Chabran, who, crossing the Little St. Bernard, would come right upon the fort of Bard; and he at length determined to cross the mountains himself. Before he set out, he received intelligence from the Var, that, on the 14th of May (24th Floréal), the Baron de Melas was still at Nice. As it was now the 20th of May, it was not to be supposed that the Austrian general had hurried, in the space of six days, from Nice to Ivrea. He set out, therefore, to cross the col, before daylight on the 20th. He was accompanied by Duroc, his aide-de-camp, and de Bourrienne, his secretary. Artists have delineated him crossing the Alpine heights mounted on a fiery steed. The plain truth is, that he ascended the St. Bernard in that grey surtout which he usually wore, upon a mule, led by a guide belonging to the country, evincing, even in the difficult passes, the abstraction of a mind occupied elsewhere, conversing with the officers scattered on the road, and then, at intervals, questioning the guide who attended him, making him relate the particulars of his life, his pleasures, his pains, like an idle traveller, who has nothing better to do. This guide, who was quite young, gave him a simple recital of the details of his obscure existence, and especially the vexation he felt, because, for want of a little money, he could not marry one of the girls of his valley. The First Consul, sometimes listening, sometimes questioning the passengers with whom the mountain was

covered, arrived at the hospice, where the worthy monks gave him a warm reception. No sooner had he alighted from his mule than he wrote a note which he handed to his guide, desiring him to be sure and deliver it to the quartermaster of the army, who had been left on the other side of the St. Bernard. In the evening, the young man, on returning to St. Pierre, learned with surprise what powerful traveller it was whom he had guided in the morning, and that General Bonaparte had ordered that a house and a piece of ground should be given to him immediately, and that he should be supplied, in short, with the means requisite for marrying and for realising all the dreams of his modest ambition. This mountaineer died not long since, in his own country, the owner of land given to him by the ruler of the world. This singular act of beneficence, at a moment when his mind was engaged by such mighty interests, is worthy of attention. If there were nothing in it but a mere conqueror's caprice, dispensing at random good or evil, alternatively overthrowing empires or rearing a cottage, it may be useful to record such caprices, if only to tempt the masters of the earth to imitation; but such an act reveals something more. The human soul, in those moments when it is filled with ardent desires, is disposed to kindness; it does good by way of meriting that which it is soliciting of Providence.

The First Consul halted for a short time with the monks, thanked them for their attentions to his army, and made them a magnificent present, for the relief of the poor and of travellers.

He descended rapidly, suffering himself, according to the custom of the country, to glide down upon the snow, and arrived the same evening at Etroubles. Next day, after paying some attention to the park of artillery and to the provisions, he set out for Aosta and Bard. Having ascertained that all he had been told was true, he resolved to send the infantry, the cavalry, and the four-pounders by the path of Albaredo, which would be possible if the path were repaired. All the troops were to go and take possession of the *débouché* of the mountains in advance of Ivrea, and the First Consul designed, meanwhile, to make some attempt on the fort, or at least find means to turn this obstacle, by making his artillery cross one of the neighbouring cols. He ordered General Lecchi, at the head of the Italians, to ascend on the left, to penetrate by the Grassoney road into the valley of the Sesia, which terminates near the Simplon and Lake Maggiore.

The object of this movement was to keep the Simplon road open, to give the hand to a detachment that was descending by it, and to reconnoitre, in short, all the roads passable for wheel-carriages.

The First Consul, at the same time, directed his attention to the fort of Bard. The French were in possession of the only

street composing the town, but could only pass through it under such a shower of balls that it would be scarcely possible to get through with artillery, though the distance was but two or three hundred fathoms. The commandant was summoned, but he replied with firmness, like a man fully sensible of the importance of the post entrusted to his courage. Force alone, then, could make us masters of the pass. The artillery which had been planted on the mountain of Albaredo produced no great effect; an escalade was attempted on the outer inclosure of the fort; but some brave grenadiers, and Dufour, an excellent officer, were uselessly wounded or killed. All the while, the troops were proceeding along the path of Albaredo. Fifteen hundred labourers had done the most urgent repairs required by that path. In places where it was narrow, it had been widened by the removal of gravel from the sides; too rapid slopes had been diminished by cutting steps to prevent the feet from slipping; in other places, trunks of trees were thrown over ravines, which it would otherwise have been too difficult to cross, and used as bridges. The army advanced successively, man by man, the cavalry leading their horses by the bridle. The Austrian officer commanding the fort of Bard, seeing our troops filing in this manner, and mortified at not having it in his power to stop their march, sent word to M. de Melas, that he had witnessed the passage of a whole army, infantry and cavalry, without possessing the means of obstructing it, but he pledged his life that it would arrive without a single piece of cannon.

Meanwhile, our artillery made a remarkably bold attempt; this was, to pass with a piece beneath the very guns of the fort, under favour of the night. The enemy, unluckily warned by the noise, threw pot-grenadoes, which lighted the road as though it had been broad day, and enabled them to pour upon it a shower of projectiles. Out of thirteen artillerymen who had volunteered to draw that piece of cannon, seven were killed or wounded. This was sufficient to dishearten the bravest men; when an ingenious method, though withal a very dangerous one, was thought of. The street was covered with straw and dung; tow was fastened about the pieces, so as to prevent the slightest sound from the jar of those masses of metal upon their carriages; the horses were unharnessed, bold artillerymen, dragging them by main strength, ventured to pass under the batteries of the fort, along the street of Bard. This contrivance succeeded completely. The enemy, who fired from time to time, by way of precaution, hit some of our gunners; but very soon, in spite of this fire, all the heavy artillery was removed beyond the defile, and this formidable obstacle, which had given the First Consul more concern than the St. Bernard itself, was overcome. The artillery horses had taken the path of Albaredo.

While this bold operation was performing, Lannes, marching at the head of his infantry, carried, on the 22nd of May, the town of Ivrea, which had not been repaired since the wars of Louis XIV., and which, from a singular but tardy presentiment, the Austrian staff had just set about arming. The defences of Ivrea consisted in a citadel, detached from the body of the place, and in bastioned ramparts. The brave General Watrin, at the head of his division, attacked the citadel; Lannes himself advanced against the body of the place, and the soldiers took both by escalade. Five or six thousand Austrians, half of them cavalry, who were there, retired in the utmost haste. Lannes made some prisoners, drove them out of the valley, and took up a position at the entrance of the plain of Piedmont, at the points designated by the First Consul. Some days later, and the town of Ivrea, defended by the Austrians, would have been not an insuperable obstacle, but a serious annoyance. Cannon and provisions were found there; Lannes completed its armament, and victualled it, so as to make it, in case of reverse, one of the supports of our line of retreat.

While these events were passing, General Chabran was descending with his division by the Little St. Bernard; and, as that division contained many conscripts recently incorporated, it was employed in the blockade of the fort of Bard, which would not hold out long, when it should see itself without resource, and the artillery beyond its reach, so that it could no longer stop its march. General Thurreau, at the head of a corps of 4000 men, carried the *débouché* of Susa, made 1500 prisoners, and took some cannon. He was obliged to halt at the entrance of the valley, between Suza and Bussolino. General Lecchi, with the Italians, turning the valley of the Sesia, repulsed de Rohan's division, took some hundreds of men from it, disengaged the *débouché* of the Simplon, and gave a hand to a detachment of the division left in Switzerland at the commencement of the campaign. Lastly, the corps of General Monecy, distributed *en échelon* over a great space in the valley of the St. Gothard, began to ascend the heights.

Thus the general movement of the army was effected upon all points with complete success. It was time to leave the valley of Aosta. Lannes, always at the advanced guard, quitted that valley on the 26th of May (6th Prairial), and no longer hesitated to show himself in the plain. The Austrian general, Haddick, was charged to watch this *débouché* of the Alps with some thousand infantry and his numerous cavalry. He was covered by a little river, the Chiusella, which falls into the Dora Baltea. A bridge served for crossing this stream. Lannes marched briskly thither with his infantry. A fire of artillery, sudden and well directed, received our battalions, but did not prevent them from advancing. The brave Colonel Macon entered the bed of the

river with his demi-brigade, crossed it above and below the bridge, and clambered up the opposite bank. The Austrian cavalry, commanded by General Palfy, then determined to charge this demi-brigade. The general fell dead, and his men were dispersed. The French, rejoined by the rest of Lannes' division, advanced, pursuing the enemy with their accustomed vivacity. General Haddick, taking advantage of the disorder of this pursuit, pushed on his squadrons at the most seasonable moment. The 6th light was obliged to halt; but the 22nd, formed in close column, repulsed by its fire alone this new charge of the Austrian cavalry. Some thousand horse then dashed forward at once to try a last effort against our infantry. The 40th and 22nd demi-brigades, formed in square, sustained with extraordinary firmness this formidable shock. Three times they were charged, and three times the enemy's squadrons were foiled by their bayonets. General Haddick, finding himself unable to withstand the advanced guard of the French army, gave orders for retreating, and, after losing many men, killed or wounded, and some prisoners, he relinquished the plain of Piedmont to Lannes, and retired behind the Orco. Lannes continued his march, and, on the 28th of May (8th Prairial), proceeded towards Chivasso, on the bank of the Po. The Austrians, alarmed at this sudden invasion, hastened to evacuate Turin. Barks were descending the Po, laden with corn, rice, ammunition, and wounded. Lannes seized all these convoys. The abundance prepared by the Austrians for their army was soon to give delight to ours.

Thirteen days had elapsed, and the stupendous enterprise of the First Consul had completely succeeded. An army of 40,000 men, infantry, cavalry, artillery, had crossed, without beaten roads, the highest mountains in Europe, dragging by main strength its artillery over the snow, or pushing it under the murderous fire of a fort, and almost close to the muzzle of its guns. A division of 5000 men had descended the Little St. Bernard; another of 4000 had debouched by Mont Cenis; a detachment occupied the Simplon; lastly, a corps of 15,000 French, under General Moncey, was on the top of the St. Gothard. There were thus in all sixty and odd thousand soldiers about to enter Italy, still separated, it is true, from one another by considerable distances, but certain of soon rallying around a principal mass of 40,000 men, who were debouching by Ivrea, at the centre of the semicircle of the Alps. And this extraordinary march was not a whim of a general who, to turn an adversary, ran the risk of being turned himself. Master of the valley of Aosta, of the Simplon, and of the St. Gothard, General Bonaparte was certain that, if he lost a battle, he should have it in his power to return to the point from which he had set out; at the worst, he could only sacrifice some of his artillery, if he were closely pressed on

his march. Having thenceforward nothing to conceal, he repaired in person to Chivasso, harangued the troops, congratulated them on their firmness before the Austrian cavalry, announced the important results which he foresaw, showed himself not only to his soldiers, but to the Italians, to the Austrians, that he might now scare, by his formidable presence, the enemy whom before he wished to lull into profound security.

What was Baron de Melas about in the meantime? Made quite easy, by the cabinet of Vienna and by his own agents, respecting that fabulous army of reserve, this general continued the siege of Genoa, and the attack on the bridge of the Var. He had suffered considerable losses at these two points; but, for the rest, he persisted in believing that the assemblages made at Dijon were but a rabble of conscripts, destined to fill the gaps in the ranks of the two armies of the Rhine and of Liguria. Intelligence, which reached him about the middle of May, gave him some uneasiness about his rear; nevertheless, he soon dismissed his apprehensions, and resumed the notion that the troops collected at Dijon were to march direct down the Saone and the Rhone, to join the corps of General Suchet on the Var. Instead of sending troops by the Col de Tende into Piedmont, he kept all his forces, under General Elsnitz, before the bridge of the Var. At length the French columns, debouching from all the valleys of the Alps at once, seen and described with the most complete certainty by General Wukassowich, roused him at last from his illusions, but still without entirely undeceiving him. He left General Ott with 30,000 men before Genoa, General Elsnitz with 20,000 before the bridge of the Var; the latter were to be reinforced by the troops of General St. Julien, which became disposable after the reduction of Savona; and he turned back, with a detachment of 10,000 men, across the Col de Tende, for Coni. On the 22nd of May, he reached the latter place. Till this moment, the Austrian general had conceived that the French troops which had been met with were only bodies of conscripts, employed to make a demonstration on his rear, to induce him to break up the siege of Genoa; and he could not yet think that it was General Bonaparte himself, at the head of a large army. But this last illusion of his speedily vanished. One of his officers, who was perfectly acquainted with the person of General Bonaparte, was sent to Chivasso, on the bank of the Po. This officer beheld with his own eyes the conqueror of Castiglione and Rivoli, and despatched intelligence to that effect to his commander-in-chief, who, not till then, could estimate the whole extent of his danger; for it was not of an assemblage of conscripts that the First Consul would have deigned to take the command. This was not all: it was doubted whether the French had cannon, but the report of their artillery had just

been heard at the Chiusella. The estimable old general, who had displayed incontestable ability during the preceding campaign, was thenceforth a prey to the most cruel anxiety. Every day added to his alarm, for he soon learned that General Moncey's heads of columns were descending from the St. Gothard.

He was, in fact, in a situation peculiarly critical. Out of 120,000 men, he had lost at least 25,000 men before Genoa and the Var. Those which he had left were dispersed: General Ott, with 30,000 men, was before Genoa; General Elsnitz, with 25,000, before the bridge of the Var; General Kaim, charged to guard the *débouchés* of Susa and Pignerol with about 12,000 men, had lost Susa, and was retiring upon Turin. General Had-dick, who, with nearly 9000, was to guard the valleys of Aosta and the Sesia, had just fallen back before Lannes; General Wukassowich, who, with 10,000 men, was observing the valleys of the Simplon and of the St. Gothard—what was to become of him before Moncey? Baron de Melas himself was at Turin, with a corps of 10,000 men, brought back from Nice. Was it not General Bonaparte's intention to sweep down amidst all these scattered corps, to beat them one after another, and to destroy them? Perhaps there would still have been time to take salutary resolutions, provided they had been planned and executed immediately; but the Austrian general lost some days in recovering himself, in coming to a definitive opinion respecting the plans of his adversary, in forming his own, and in making up his mind to the sacrifices that must attend a concentration of his forces; for he should be obliged to abandon at once the Var, perhaps Genoa, and certainly a great part of Piedmont.

While he was yet deliberating, General Bonaparte, on his part, had formed his determinations with his accustomed promptness and resolution. The determinations which he had to take were not less grave than those of his adversary. If the Austrians were scattered, so were the French; for they were descending by Mont Cenis, by the Great and Little St. Bernard, by the Simplon, and by the St. Gothard. It was necessary to unite them, then to cut off all retreat from Baron de Melas; and, lastly, to raise the blockade of Masséna, who, at that moment, must be reduced to the last extremity.

When he had descended the St. Bernard, General Bonaparte had on his right Mont Cenis and Turin, on his left the St. Gothard and Milan, and, fifty leagues before him, Genoa and Masséna. What course was he to take? To appy on the right upon Mont Cenis, in order to call in the 4000 men under General Thurreau, would be of little advantage. He would thus run the risk of meeting immediately with M. de Melas, which, to be sure, would not be very dangerous, dispersed as his forces were; but, by appying to the right, he should relinquish to



him on the left the Milan or Piacenza road to retreat by. It was, indeed, not worth while to have made such great efforts to throw himself across the Alps upon the communications of the enemy, if, after having occupied them, he were to leave them open. To proceed straight forward, to cross the Po, to fly to Genoa, amidst dispersed corps of the Austrian army, neglecting General Thurreau on his right, General Moncey on his left, and endangering all his own communications, would not be wise, not worthy of the prudence which had combined all the parts of this plan with as much reflection as boldness. He knew not what assemblage of forces might be met with upon that route; he should sacrifice his line of retreat towards the Alps, by leaving to themselves Generals Thurreau and Moncey, who would most probably be obliged to fall back on Mont Cenis and the St. Gothard, God knows after what adventures. It had been better to succour Masséna direct by Toulon, Nice, and Genoa. From all these considerations, there was evidently left but one course to pursue; namely, to appuy to the left towards the St. Gothard and Milan, and to give the hand to General Moncey's 15,000 men. In that manner he should unite with himself the principal detachment of the army, which would raise its number to 60,000 fighting men: he should occupy the capital of Upper Italy; he should raise the people on the rear of the Austrians; he should take all their magazines; he should make himself master of the line of the Po, and of all the bridges over that great river; lastly, by putting himself in a condition to attack upon either bank, he should stop M. de Melas, by whichever route he should attempt to escape. It is true that, by this plan, the succour to be sent to Masséna would be delayed for eight or ten days, which was unfortunate. But General Bonaparte imagined that his presence in Italy would be sufficient to extricate the army of Liguria; for he believed that M. de Melas would lose no time in calling in to him the corps which were investing Genoa and the bridge of the Var. At any rate, Generals Masséna and Suchet had accomplished the object assigned to them, by detaining M. de Melas on the Apennines, by fatiguing him, by exhausting him, but, above all, by preventing him from closing the *débouchés* of the Alps. The defender of Genoa, if he must succumb, would but consummate the long series of sacrifices imposed upon the noble and unfortunate army of Liguria, for the success of a vast combination.

Having formed his resolution, General Bonaparte made his arrangements with the utmost promptness, and directed his whole army upon the left bank of the Po. He called in his park of artillery, which had just been put in order: he enjoined Lannes to collect all the boats taken at Chivasso, to place them as if he was about to throw a bridge, and to cross into Piedmont.

His intention was to deceive M. de Melas a second time in regard to his plans, and he was as successful as the first time. On seeing the movements ordered by General Bonaparte, M. de Melas, striving to flatter himself till the last moment, was fain to hope that the French had been able to cross the Alps in very small number only. He thought that General Bonaparte, as everything induced him to suppose, had no other motive for crossing the Po but to enter Turin, and to give the hand towards Mont Cenis to General Thurreau; he thought that he might keep him in check by breaking down all the bridges, and by disputing the passage of the Po with about 30,000 men. He conceived, therefore, a hope to defend himself on this line, without making the twofold sacrifice of the positions occupied on the Var and of the advantages gained before Genoa. In consequence, M. de Melas assembled General Haddick, who had returned from the valley of Aosta, General Kaim, posted at the *débouché* of Susa, the 10,000 men brought with him from Nice, besides a fresh detachment drawn from the Var; amounting, when united, to 30,000 men; and supposing that we had no more, he hoped with this force to dispute the river which separated the two armies.

The First Consul took no pains to destroy this new illusion of his adversary's, and, leaving him occupied towards Turin with this concentration of force, he all at once fell back upon Milan. Lannes, who was apparently destined to ascend the Po, in order to march from Chivasso upon Turin, on the contrary, suddenly descended it. He advanced by Crescentino and Trino upon Pavia, where the Imperialists had immense magazines of provisions, ammunition, artillery, and the most important of their communications, since it commanded the passage both of the Po and of the Tessino. Murat marched by Vercelli upon the point of Buffalora. The entire army followed this general movement upon Milan; it arrived on the 31st of May before the Tessino. That river is broad and deep. The French had no craft for crossing, and on the other side appeared a numerous cavalry belonging to the corps of Wukasowich, which was guarding the Simplon and that part of the *débouchés* of the Alps. Behind the Tessino runs the Naviglio Grande, a large canal, which crosses the country to Milan. This canal runs, for a certain distance, parallel to the course of the river, from which it branches off; it is, moreover, very near it. The enemy's cavalry, cooped up on a narrow slip of ground between the Tessino and the canal, was extremely cramped in its movements, and could scarcely use its force. Adjutant-General Girard took some craft, which the peasants of the environs had concealed near Galiate, and with which they were eager to furnish the army. He crossed with a small

body of men, and fell upon the Austrian advanced guard. Successively reinforced by these barks, which kept going and returning, and supported by the fire of the artillery, he repulsed the cavalry, which durst not advance too far on ground so disadvantageous for it, and obliged it to recross the Naviglio Grande at a point called the bridge of Turbigo. Thus, at one blow, he cleared the Naviglio and the Tessino. But General Wukassowich came up with Laudon's brigade of infantry, and endeavoured to penetrate into the village of Turbigo. Girard then had upon his hands four or five thousand infantry, while he had no more than a few hundred men to oppose to them. He kept his ground for several successive hours with great presence of mind and courage, and finally saved the bridge of Turbigo, the loss of which would have thrown the French on this side of the Naviglio Grande, and, perhaps, even the Tessino. While he was thus gallantly defending himself, General Monnier, who had found means to cross a little below, came to his assistance, and charging Laudon's troops, drove them from Turbigo. This line, which was to check the French army, was thus passed at the cost of a mere advanced guard action. Next day, the 1st of June (12th Prairial), Boudet's division crossed near Buffalora, and the whole army advanced upon Milan. Wukassowich, apprehensive of being caught between the main army, which was advancing in Lombardy, and Moncey's corps, which was descending the St. Gothard, retired precipitately, and ordered Dedovich's brigade, which was at the foot of the mountains, to fall back behind the Adda by Cassano. He himself went to seek refuge behind the Adda, by Milan and Lodi, after leaving a garrison of 2800 men in the citadel of Milan. There was now no obstacle to check the French army. It could enter the capital of Lombardy, which had groaned for above a year under the yoke of the Austrians. Thus far those unfortunate Italians had heard talk of nothing but the successes of M. de Melas and the distress of the French. The caricatures on the army of reserve had circulated in Milan, as well as in Vienna and London. They represented it as a crew of old men and boys, armed with bludgeons, mounted on asses, and having two blunderbusses for artillery. While derision, harmless enough, it is true, was thus poured forth upon the French Republic, the unfortunate Italians were the victims of the most cruel oppression. All the men in Lombardy most distinguished by fortune and talents were in prison or in exile, especially if they had taken any part in the affairs of the Cisalpine Republic. It was remarkable enough that persecution had pressed less heavily upon the hot-headed patriots, upon those who corresponded with the French Jacobins, than upon the moderate men, whose example might be more contagious for the people.

Excepting some very few creatures of the Austrian government, and some nobles belonging to the oligarchic party, all were sighing for the return of the French. But they durst scarcely hope for their return, especially when they saw the Baron de Melas so far advanced into Liguria, so near taking Genoa and passing the Var, and the First Consul so occupied, at least apparently, with the dangers of invasion, which threatened France upon her frontiers of the Rhine. A report was even circulated among the people, that the General Bonaparte, so well known in Italy, had died in Egypt; that, a modern Pharaoh, he had been engulfed by the Red Sea; and that he whose name was then figuring in Paris was one of his brothers.

It is easy to conceive the surprise of the Italians, when, all at once, they were told that a French army had appeared at Ivrea, that it was even debouching beyond that town, that it was in march for the Tessino; lastly, that it had crossed that river. Let the reader figure to himself the agitation which prevailed in Milan, the affirmations, the contradictions, which succeeded each other for forty-eight hours; lastly, the joy which burst forth when the intelligence was confirmed by the appearance of General Bonaparte himself, marching with his staff at the head of the advanced guard. On the 2nd of June (13th Prairial), the entire population, thronging to meet the French army, recognised the illustrious general, whom they had so often seen within their walls, welcomed him with transports of enthusiasm, and received him as a saviour come down from heaven. The sentiments of the Italians, always so strong, so demonstrative, had broken forth with such force, because so many circumstances had never before concurred to render the joy of the people sudden and profound. The French general, on entering Milan, hastened to throw open the prisons, and to restore the government of the country to the friends of France. He gave a provisional administration to the Cisalpine Republic, and composed this administration of the most respected men. Adhering, however, in Italy to the system which he followed in France, he would not permit either violence or reaction; and, in replacing power in the hands of the Italians of his party, he did not allow them to exercise it against their countrymen of the opposite party.

After these first attentions paid to the affairs of the Milanese, he hastened to push his columns in all directions, to the lakes, to the Adda, to the Po, so as to spread the insurrection for the advantage of the French, to seize the enemy's magazines, to cut off his communications, and to bar all retreat against him. Thus far everything had gone on most prosperously, for Lannes, directed upon Pavia, had entered that city on the 1st of June, and taken immense magazines. That general had found at Pavia the Austrian hospitals, considerable stores of corn, forage, ammuni-

tion, arms, above all 300 pieces of cannon, half of them field-pieces. He had procured there several bridge-equipages, which the companies of French pontonniers, who had come without *matériel*, were about to employ on the Po. Chabran's division, left before the fort of Bard, had taken it on the 1st of June, and found there eighteen pieces of cannon. General Chabran, after putting a garrison into it, as well as into Ivrea, proceeded to occupy the course of the Po, from the Dora Baltea to the Sesia. Lannes occupied from that point to Pavia. The corps of General B ethencourt, which had come from the Simplon, was posted before Arona, towards the point of Lake Maggiore. The Italian legion was despatched, by Brescia, after the Austrians, who were retiring in the utmost haste. At the same time, Duhesme's and Loison's divisions were crossing the Adda, and proceeding to Lodi, Crema, and Pizzighittone. General Wukassowich, who no longer pretended to guard the Adda, retired behind the Mincio, under the guns of Mantua.

Nothing now impeded the march of General Moncey, excepting the difficulty of finding subsistence in the sterile valleys of Upper Switzerland. His first columns were just appearing, but it was necessary to wait a few days longer for the others, and this was the greatest inconvenience of the situation, for it behoved the First Consul to make haste, if he would not see Genoa fall into the hands of the Austrians. General Bonaparte was now certain of uniting all his columns, with the exception of one—that was General Thurreau's, which was entrenched at the *d -bouch * of Mont Cenis, without being able to advance. For the rest, our army was strongly seated in the heart of the Milanese, having its retreat secured by Mont Cenis, the St. Bernard, the Simplon, and the St. Gothard, holding the Adda, the Tessino, the Po, living upon the magazines of the Austrians, cutting them off from all the routes, and capable of fighting a decisive battle with them, after which they would have no other resource, if they were beaten, but to lay down their arms. The surrender of Genoa, if it were to take place, would be an unfortunate circumstance—unfortunate in the first place, for the brave army which was defending it, unfortunate also because the Austrian besieging corps would not fail to reinforce General Melas, and would thus render the great battle that was to terminate the campaign more difficult. But, if General Bonaparte gained the victory, Genoa and Italy would be reconquered at one blow. He made, nevertheless, an especial point of saving Genoa; but he could not hope for the junction of Moncey's corps before the 5th or 6th of June, and he could not flatter himself that Genoa would hold out till then.

The Baron de Melas, whom the last news had completely enlightened, and who saw his adversary, after entering Milan, giving

the hand to all the columns in succession as they descended the Alps, now comprehended the vast plan projected against him. To add to his misfortune, he had received intelligence of the reverses of M. de Kray and his retreat upon Ulm. Abandoning, at length, the system of half-measures, he issued imperative orders to General Elsnitz to relinquish the bridge of the Var, and to General Ott to raise the siege of Genoa, and both of them to unite at Alexandria. This was just what General Bonaparte had hoped for the salvation of Genoa. But that noble and unfortunate army of Liguria was doomed to pay to the very last with its blood, with its sufferings, and finally with a mortifying surrender, for the triumphs of the army of reserve.

To the very last, Masséna maintained a noble countenance. "Before he will surrender," said the soldiers, "he will make us eat his very boots." The butchers' meat being consumed, they ate horse-flesh, and, when that too failed them, they fed upon the most loathsome animals. The wretched bread made of oats and beans was consumed also. Ever since the 23rd of May (3rd Prairial), Masséna had been collecting starch, linseed, and the cacao deposited in the warehouses of Genoa, and with these he had caused a bread to be made, which the soldiers could scarcely swallow, and which very few of them were able to digest. Almost all of them went to crowd the hospitals. The populace, having no other food but herb soup, experienced all the pangs of hunger. The streets were strewed with wretches expiring from inanition, emaciated women exposing to public charity the infants whom they could no longer support. Another sight alarmed the city and the army: it was that of the numerous prisoners whom Masséna had taken, and to whom he had no food to give. He would not release them on parole, since he had seen those who had been thus liberated appear again in the enemy's ranks. He had therefore proposed to General Ott, and afterwards to Admiral Keith, that they should furnish the provisions requisite for their daily consumption, giving his word of honour that nothing should be abstracted for the garrison. The word of such a man deserved to be depended on. But such was the inveteracy, that the enemy resolved to impose upon Masséna the charge of feeding the prisoners, even though they should have to suffer the most cruel privations. The hostile generals had, therefore, the barbarity to doom their soldiers to the severest pangs of hunger, in order to aggravate the dearth in Genoa by leaving there some thousand mouths more to feed. Masséna supplied the prisoners with the herb soup which he dealt out to the inhabitants. This was not nutritious enough for robust men, accustomed to abundance in the rich plains of Italy; they were always on the point of revolting, and, to cure them of all thoughts of that, he caused them to be confined in old hulls of ships, which were moored in the middle

of the port, and on which a numerous artillery, constantly pointed, was ready to pour destruction. So frightful was the howling raised by these unfortunate men, that it harrowed the feelings of a population already so deeply affected by its own sufferings.

The number of our soldiers diminished daily: they were seen expiring in the streets, and so debilitated were they that it had been found expedient to permit them to sit down while mounting guard. The dispirited Genoese had ceased to do the duty of the national guard, fearing lest they should be compromised when, by-and-by, the Austrians should bring back the oligarchic party. From time to time, vague rumours announced that the despair of the inhabitants was about to burst forth; and, to prevent the explosion, battalions, with loaded cannon, occupied the principal places.

Masséna awed the people and the army by his impassible bearing. The respect inspired by that hero, eating the same execrable bread as the soldiers, living with them under the enemy's fire, and submitting not only to their physical sufferings, but to all the duties and anxieties of commander, with unshaken firmness, the respect which he inspired kept all quiet; he exercised, amidst desolated Genoa, the ascendancy of a superior spirit.

A feeling of hope, nevertheless, still supported the besieged. Several of the general's aides-de-camp, after bold efforts, had passed through the blockading force, and brought some intelligence. Colonels Reille, Franceschi, Ortigoni, had passed, and had learned, at one time, that the First Consul was setting out, at another, that he was crossing the Alps. One of them, Franceschi, had left him descending the St. Bernard. But since the 20th of May no tidings of him had been received. Ten or twelve days passed in this situation appeared ages; and the officers asked themselves, with despair, how it could happen that, in ten days, General Bonaparte had not traversed the space which separates the Alps from the Apennines. "We know him well enough," said they, "to be certain that by this time he is either conqueror or conquered; if he does not arrive, he must have succumbed in this rash enterprise. Had he been able to debouch in Italy, he would already have grappled the Austrian general, and dragged him from the walls of Genoa." Others alleged, that General Bonaparte had considered the army of Liguria as a corps sacrificed to a great operation; that he had but one thing in view, that was, to detain Baron de Melas on the Apennines, and, that object attained, he no longer concerned himself about raising the blockade of Genoa, but was marching to execute some mightier plan. "Well!" added the Genoese, and even our own soldiers, "we have been sacrificed to the glory of France; but, now the end is attained, is it intended that we should perish to the last man? If it were in fight, with arms in our hands, well

and good! but of famine, of disease—'tis impossible! It is high time to surrender." Several soldiers, in their despair, proceeded so far as to break their muskets. At the same time, a plot of some men, irritated by suffering, was discovered. Masséna addressed to them an admirable proclamation, in which he reminded them of the duties of the soldier, which consist as much in enduring privations and hardships as in braving dangers; he pointed out to them the example of their officers, living upon the same food, and daily exposing themselves, at their head, to death or wounds. He told them that the First Consul was advancing with an army to deliver them; that, by capitulating to-day, they should lose in a moment the result of two months' efforts and devotedness. "A few days, perhaps a few hours longer," said he, "and you will be delivered, after having rendered eminent services to your country."

Accordingly, at every report, every sound towards the horizon, they imagined that they heard the cannon of General Bonaparte, and eagerly thronged to look out. One day, they persuaded themselves that cannon were firing at the Bocchetta; a mad joy burst forth on all sides; Masséna himself repaired to the ramparts. Vain illusion! It was the sound of a thunderstorm in the gorges of the Apennines. Again they sunk into the deepest dejection.

At length, on the 4th of June, there would be left but two ounces of that horrid bread, made of starch and cacao, to each man per day. The surrender of the place could be no longer deferred; our unfortunate soldiers could not be reduced to such straits as to devour one another, and there was an inevitable term to resistance in the material impossibility to support life. Besides, the army was conscious that it had done all that could be expected of its courage. It felt thoroughly convinced that it no longer covered the Thermopylæ of France, but that it was made subservient to a manœuvre, which, at the moment, must have succeeded or miscarried. It began, in particular, to believe that the First Consul was more solicitous to extend his combinations than to afford it succour. Masséna shared this feeling, without avowing it; but he did not consider his task as completely accomplished till he had reached the last possible term of resistance. When the two miserable ounces of bread left to be dealt out to each man were consumed, he must surrender. He made up his mind to it, at least, with deep chagrin.

General Ott had sent a flag of truce, for the Austrians were as much pressed to bring the affair to a conclusion as the French. That general had, in fact, the most positive orders to raise the siege of Genoa, and to fall back upon Alexandria. The offers of the enemy, say some historians, ought to have enlightened Masséna. No doubt, he knew that if he stood out one or two days longer, he might, perhaps, be relieved; but he could not



wait. "Give me," said he to the Genoese, "two days' provisions, one day's only, and I shall save you from the Austrian yoke; I shall save my army from the mortification of surrender."

At length, on the 3rd of June, Masséna was obliged to negotiate. The Austrians talked of capitulation; he rejected the idea in such a manner, that they refrained from recurring to it. He insisted that the army should retire freely, with arms and baggage, with colours flying, and at liberty to serve and fight as soon as it should have passed the lines of the besiegers. "If not," said he to the Austrian officers, sent with the flag of truce, "I will sally from Genoa, arms in hand. With 8000 famished soldiers, I will appear before your camp, and I will fight till I force my way through." They agreed to allow the garrison to depart, but required that he himself should remain prisoner, because they were afraid lest, with such a commander, the garrison, proceeding from Genoa to Savona, might join Suchet's troops, and attempt some formidable enterprise in the rear of Baron de Melas. To allay the indignation of Masséna, they avowed the motive, so honourable to him, of this condition. He would not hear of it. They then insisted that the garrison should retire by sea, that it might not have time to join Suchet's corps. To all these propositions he returned his usual answer, that he would cut his way through. At length they consented to let 8000 men depart by land, in other words, all those who could still support the weight of their arms. The convalescents were to be successively embarked, and conveyed to the headquarters of General Suchet. There would be left behind 4000 sick, whom the Austrians engaged to victual, to take care of, and to restore afterwards to the French army. General Miollis was to be left in command of them. Masséna made stipulations in favour of the Genoese; he required, as an express condition, that none of them should be molested for opinions manifested during our occupation, that persons and property should be rigidly respected. M. de Corvetto, an eminent Genoese, afterwards minister in France, had been admitted to these conferences, that he might be able to attest the efforts made in behalf of his countrymen. Masséna wished, moreover, that they should be permitted to retain the form of government which they then had, and for which they were indebted to the French Revolution. On this point the Austrian generals refused to enter into any engagement. "Well, then," said Masséna, "do as you please; but I declare to you that, before the fortnight's end, I will be back again in Genoa"—a prophetic declaration, to which M. de St. Julien made this noble and delicate reply: "You will find in this place, general, men whom you have taught how to defend it."

The definitive conference was held on the morning of the 4th of June, in a chapel at the bridge of Cornigliano. The article,

stipulating that part of the army should be allowed to retire by land, gave rise to a last difficulty. But Masséna, leaving the Austrian generals no other alternative than to consent to what he desired, or to expect a desperate battle on the morrow, they yielded the point. It was stipulated that this convention of evacuation, from which the word capitulation was carefully banished, should be concluded that same evening. The enemy's officers, we may add, filled with admiration for the French general, paid him all possible attention and marks of respect.

Evening having arrived, he still hesitated to sign, even then hoping that he might be delivered. At length, when it was impossible to delay any longer without breaking his word, he affixed his signature. On the following day, our troops marched out, with General Gazan at their head, and found rations at the advanced posts. Masséna himself embarked, that he might reach the headquarters of Suchet the more expeditiously. He left the port in a vessel carrying the tricoloured flag, and under the guns of the English squadron.

Thus ended that memorable siege, during which the French army had signalised itself by such eminent virtues and such eminent services. It had made more prisoners, and slain more enemies, than it numbered soldiers. With 15,000 men, it had taken or put *hors de combat* more than 18,000 Austrians. It had, above all, destroyed the confidence of the Austrian army, by compelling it to make incessant and extraordinary efforts. But would the reader like to know at what cost this brave garrison of Genoa had held out so long? Out of 15,000 combatants, it had lost 3000 in fight; 4000 others were wounded, more or less severely; 8000 only were fit to rejoin the active army. Soult, the second in command, had fallen into the hands of the enemy, after having had his leg broken. Out of three generals of divisions, one, Marbot, died of epidemic disease; another, Gazan, was dangerously wounded. Out of six generals of brigade, four were wounded, Gardanne, Petitot, Fressinet, and d'Arnaud. Out of twelve adjutant-generals, six were wounded, one taken, one killed. Two officers of the staff were killed, seven taken, fourteen wounded. Eleven colonels, out of seventeen, were put *hors de combat*, or made prisoners. Three-fourths of the officers had met with the like fate. Thus we see that it was by setting an example of devotedness that the leaders of this brave army supported it amidst such cruel trials. In a word, it proved itself worthy of those who commanded it, and never did the French soldier display more fortitude and heroism. Honour, then, to the unfortunate bravery, which, by its unbounded steadfastness, contributed to the triumphs of that fortunate bravery, the exploits of which it is now our province to record!

While, urged to raise the siege of Genoa, General Ott was granting to Masséna the honourable conditions which we have just specified, General Elsnitz, recalled by the orders of the Baron de Melas, abandoned the bridge of the Var. The attacks of the Austrians upon that bridge had been delayed, because their heavy artillery, conveyed by sea, had been long in coming. Various attempts had been successively made on the 22nd and the 27th of May; the last, in particular, was a real effort of despair, on the part of General Elsnitz, who was determined not to spare any exertion before he withdrew. These attacks were gallantly repulsed. General Elsnitz, convinced that there was no chance of success, then thought of recrossing the mountains. Suchet, forming a prompt and just conception of the intentions of the Austrian general, laid his plans so as to prevent him from executing his retreat in security. He clearly perceived that, by continuing to manœuvre by his left along the mountains, he should place the Austrians in a perilous situation, and should probably be enabled to take from them some detached corps. Now, outside the line of the Var, which had stayed the invasion, runs in a parallel direction the line of the Roya, the source of which is situated at the Col de Tende itself. If the French, proceeding beyond the Var, were to reach the sources of the Roya before the Austrians, they would oblige their adversaries to move along the crests of the Apennines, in quest of a pass through them. This correct conception of General Suchet, executed with vigour, was crowned with complete success. He began by dislodging General Gorupp from Ronciglione, continued to march briskly by his left, on the shaken right of the Austrians, took successively the Col de Rauss, which affords a pass from the valley of the Var into that of the Roya, and the famous camp of Mille Fourches, and, master of the Col de Tende, he found himself, on the 1st of June, upon the line of retreat of General Elsnitz. General Gorupp, thrown in disorder on the Upper Roya, had still time to gain the Col de Tende, but left many dead and prisoners by the way. General Elsnitz, with the rest of his army, had no other course but to follow the maritime slope, as far as Oneglia, and to return by Pieve and St. Jacques into the valley of the Tanaro. He had to cross tremendous mountains, with soldiers already demoralised by this species of flight, and having at his heels a foe who passed with joy from the defensive to the offensive. For five whole days the Austrians were pursued without intermission, experiencing continual checks; and, at length, on the 6th of June, General Elsnitz, on his arrival at Ormea, numbered not so many as 10,000 men. On the 7th, he was at Ceva. General Gorupp had retired upon Coni, with a weak division. The loss sustained by the Austrian corps, since leaving the Var, was estimated at 10,000 men.

General Suchet, so long separated from Masséna, found him again, in proceeding along the coast, in the environs of Savona. The 12,000 French who had come from the Var, united with the 8000 from Genoa, composed a corps of 20,000 men, advantageously placed for falling upon the rear of M. de Melas. But Masséna had received, in landing, a very dangerous wound, which prevented him from mounting on horseback; the 8000 men whom he was leading were emaciated with fatigue; and, it must be confessed, all the defenders of Genoa harboured in their breasts a secret irritation against the First Consul, who was known to be triumphing at Milan, while the army of Liguria was reduced to the necessity of capitulating. Masséna was unwilling that General Suchet should run the risk of a descent into Italy, while in ignorance of the movements about to be made beyond the Alps by the two generals opposed to each other. The Baron de Melas, rejoined by all his lieutenants, Haddick, Kaim, Elsnitz, and Ott, might be at the head of a formidable force, fall upon Suchet, and crush him before he went to meet General Bonaparte. Masséna permitted his lieutenant, Suchet, to cross the Apennines, to post himself in advance of Acqui, and ordered him to remain in that position, observing, harassing the Austrian army, and hanging over its head like the sword of Damocles. We shall see presently what further services the army of Liguria rendered by its mere presence on the summit of the Apennines.

Masséna thought that this brave army, in terminating by a threatening movement the memorable defence of Genoa, had done enough for the triumph of the First Consul, and that it could not do more without imprudence: this great captain was right. He turned over the Austrians, exhausted, reduced by above one-third, to General Bonaparte. Of the 70,000 men who had crossed the Apennines, there returned not more than 40,000, including the detachment brought back by M. de Melas to Turin. The 50,000 left in Lombardy were also much reduced, and, moreover, widely dispersed. Generals Haddick and Kaim, who guarded, the one the valley of Aosta, the other the valley of Susa, had sustained very considerable losses. General Wukassowich, thrown beyond the Mincio, and separated from his commander-in-chief by the French army which descended from the St. Bernard, was paralysed for the rest of the campaign. A corps of some thousand men had ventured into Tuscany. By immediately uniting Generals Elsnitz and Ott, who were returning from the banks of the Var and from Genoa, with Generals Haddick and Kaim, who were coming from the valleys of Aosta and Susa, M. de Melas might still form a mass of about 75,000 men. But it was requisite that he should leave garrisons in the fortresses of Piedmont and Liguria, such as Genoa, Savona, Gavi, Acqui, Coni, Turin, Alexandria, and Tortona; so

that there would not be left him more than fifty and some odd thousand soldiers to place in line on a day of battle, supposing that he did not sacrifice too great a number to the guarding of the fortresses, and that the junction of his generals was effected without accident.

The situation of the Austrian generalissimo was, therefore, extremely critical, even after the reduction of Genoa. It was critical, not only on account of the dispersion and the diminution of his forces, but also on account of the route to be pursued, in order to get out of the cramped enclosure of Piedmont, in which General Bonaparte had confined him. He would be obliged, in fact, to recross the Po before the face of the French, and to regain, through Lombardy, which they occupied, the highroad to Tyrol and to the Friule. The difficulty would be immense in presence of an adversary, who excelled, particularly in war, in the art of great movements.

M. de Melas had remained master of the Upper Po, from its source to Valenza. It would be easy for him to cross that river at Turin, Chivasso, Casale, or Valenza, no matter which; but if he crossed at one of these points, he would fall upon the Tessino, which General Bonaparte occupied, and upon Milan, the centre of all the French forces. He had, therefore, but little chance of escape in that quarter. Still he would have this course left—to appuy on his right, to proceed towards the lower part of the Po, that is, march to Piacenza or Cremona, in order to gain the highroad to Mantua. If he pursued this plan, Piacenza would become for both adversaries the capital point to occupy. For M. de Melas, it would be almost the only way to escape the Caudine Forks; for General Bonaparte, it would be the means of reaping the reward of his audacious march across the Alps. If, in fact, the latter suffered the Austrians to escape, though he should have delivered Piedmont, this would be but a meagre result, in comparison with the perils which he had braved; he should even incur some ridicule in the eyes of Europe, attentive to this campaign; for his manœuvre, the intention of which was now manifest, would be baffled. Piacenza was, consequently, the key of Piedmont; it was indispensable, as well to him who wanted to get out of it, as for him who wished to shut up his adversary there.

From these considerations M. de Melas fixed upon two points for the concentration of his troops: Alexandria for the troops which were in Upper Piedmont; Piacenza for those which were about Genoa. He ordered Generals Haddick and Kaim to march from Turin, by Asti, upon Alexandria: General Elsnitz, who had returned from the banks of the Var, to proceed thither by Ceva and Cherasco. These three corps, once united, were to move from Alexandria to Piacenza. He enjoined General

Ott, returning from Genoa, to descend direct, by the Bocchetta and Tortona, upon Piacenza. A corps of infantry, relieved from all the incumbrances of an army, had orders to proceed thither still more directly by the route of Bobbio, which runs along the valley of the Trebbia. Lastly, General O'Reilly, who was already around Alexandria with a strong detachment of cavalry, received instructions not to await the concentration of the troops from Upper Piedmont, but proceed to Piacenza at the utmost speed of his horses. The little corps hazarded in Tuscany likewise received instructions to repair thither, through the duchy of Parma, and by the road of Fiorenzuola. Thus, while the principal part of the Austrian army was concentrating itself upon Alexandria, for the purpose of thence marching to Piacenza, the corps nearest to Piacenza itself had orders to march thither in a direct line and instantaneously.

But it was doubtful whether it would be possible to anticipate General Bonaparte in so important an object. He had lost at Milan five or six days in waiting for the corps coming from the St. Gothard—most valuable time, since Genoa had fallen in that interval. But now that General Moncey, with the troops detached from Germany, had crossed the St. Gothard, he was not going to lose another minute. Placed on the route of the couriers despatched from Vienna to M. de Melas at Turin, and sent back by M. de Melas from Turin to Vienna, he was now initiated in all the plans of the imperial government. He had read, for example, the singular despatches, in which M. de Thugut, cheering up the Austrian general, recommended to him to be easy, and not suffer himself to be diverted from his object by the fable of the army of reserve; to possess himself as speedily as possible of Genoa and of the line of the Var, that he might be able to spare a detachment to reinforce the army of Marshal de Kray, driven back upon Ulm. He had read also the despatches of M. de Melas, at first full of confidence, and very soon of anxiety and uneasiness. This satisfaction, however, was somewhat disturbed on the 8th of June, when he learned from this same correspondence that Masséna had been obliged to surrender Genoa on the 4th. This intelligence, it is true, made no change in his plan for the campaign; for, having determined to get upon the rear of the enemy, in order to envelop him, and to oblige him to lay down his arms, if he succeeded, Italy and the city of Genoa would be reconquered at one blow. The really serious inconvenience resulting from the reduction of Genoa was, that he should have on his hands the disposable troops of General Ott. But the intercepted despatch brought consolation with it; for this despatch said that Masséna's soldiers were not prisoners of war. If, therefore, on the one hand, a more considerable Austrian force was about to descend from the

Apennines; on the other, French troops, which he could not reckon upon at first, were to descend from the Apennines, at the heels of the Austrian troops.

The First Consul, now that Genoa had opened its gates, was in less hurry to meet M. de Melas. But it was most urgent for him to occupy the line of the Po, from Pavia to Piacenza and Cremona; and he made dispositions quite as active as those of M. de Melas, to possess himself of such important points, and especially of Piacenza. While he was occupied at Milan in collecting the troops which had come from the different points of the Alps, he marched the troops which had come with him by the St. Bernard upon the Po. Lannes had already taken possession of Pavia with Watrin's division. This general was directed to cross the Po a little below its junction with the Tessino: that is to say, at Belgiojoso. Murat, with Boudet's and Monnier's divisions, had orders to cross it at Piacenza; Duhesme, with Loison's division, at Cremona.

On the 6th of June, Lannes, having collected at Pavia, in the Tessino, all the disposable craft, took them into the Po, and, on arriving between Belgiojoso and San Cipriano, set about crossing. General Watrin, who was placed under his command, crossed the river with a detachment. No sooner had he reached the right bank, than he was attacked by the troops which had come from Valenza and Alexandria, and were hastening to Piacenza. He was in danger of being thrown into the river; but General Watrin stood firm, till the boats going and returning had brought him reinforcements, and he was finally left master of the ground. The remainder of Watrin's division, led by Lannes, then passed over, and took a position a little farther on, threatening the highroad from Alexandria to Piacenza.

The same day Murat arrived before Piacenza. The Austrian commissariat was established in that town, with some hundreds of men to guard the stores. On the approach of the danger, the Austrian officer ordered cannon to be planted at the *tête du pont* of Piacenza, situated on the left bank of the Po, and endeavoured to defend himself there, till the corps, which were advancing on all sides, should have come to his aid. The advanced guard of Monnier's division, conceiving that it was approaching an undefended position, was received with a tremendous discharge of grape-shot, and could make no impression on it by attacking in front. It was therefore determined to wait till next day to make a regular attack.

On the following day, the 7th, General O'Reilly, who had received orders from M. de Melas to ride with all speed to Piacenza, arrived there with his cavalry. The other Austrian corps, that which was ascending from Parma by Fiorenzuola, that which was descending with General Gottsheim by Bobbio, and that

coming with General Ott by Tortona, had not yet arrived. General Oreilly alone, with his squadrons, could scarcely be equal to the defence of Piacenza. The few hundred men who had attempted to resist at the *tête du pont* had lost one-fourth of their number. In this situation the Austrian commandant ordered all the artillery to be taken away, and the bridge of Piacenza, formed of boats, to be cut; and when General Boudet hastened up to repair the check of the preceding day, he found the *tête du pont* evacuated, and the bridge itself destroyed. But part of the boats employed in its construction were still left. Murat took possession of them, and caused Monnier's brigade to be conveyed to the other side of the Po by successive trips, a little lower down, at Nocetto. This brigade fell upon Piacenza, and penetrated into it, after a very warm contest. General Oreilly hastily fell back, that he might be in time to save the park of artillery coming from Alexandria, and which would be in danger of falling into the hands of the French, if it appeared before Piacenza. He retreated, in fact, with such expedition as to prevent that park from falling into the hands either of Murat or of Lannes. He had to make more than one charge of cavalry against the advanced troops of Lannes, which had crossed the Po at Belgiojoso; but he disengaged himself, and had time to issue counter-orders to the park, which shut itself up in Tortona. While General Oreilly, passing almost scathless through our advanced posts, was returning to Alexandria, the advanced guard of the infantry of General Gottesheim, which had descended along the Trebbia, by Bobbio, appeared before Piacenza. It was Klebeck's regiment, which had thus come upon Boudet's entire division, and got cut to pieces. This unfortunate regiment, assailed by superior forces, lost a great number of prisoners, and fell back in disorder upon Gottesheim's principal corps, which it preceded. General Gottesheim, alarmed at this rencontre, re-ascended in all haste the slope of the Apennines, to return across the mountains to Tortona and Alexandria, which caused him to lose his way, and wander about for several successive days. Lastly, the regiment returning from Tuscany, by the route of Parma and Fiorenzuola, arrived the same day before the suburbs of Piacenza. The consequence was a fresh rout of that detached corps, which, falling unawares into the midst of an enemy's army, was thrown back in disorder upon the Parma road. Thus, out of the four corps marching upon Piacenza, three—the least important, it is true—had been overthrown and fled, leaving prisoners behind them. The fourth and most considerable, that of General Ott, having a longer circuit to make, was still behind, and was soon to fall in with Lannes, in advance of Belgiojoso. From this moment the French were masters of the Po, and had in their possession the two principal passages, that of Belgiojoso,



near Pavia, and that of Piacenza itself. They soon occupied a third; for, on the following day, General Duhesme, at the head of Loison's division, took Cremona from a detachment which General Wukassowich had left in that city when he retired. He took there a great quantity of *matériel* and 2000 prisoners.

General Bonaparte directed all these operations from Milan. He had sent Berthier to the bank of the Po, and, day by day, frequently hour by hour, prescribed, in an incessant correspondence, the movements that were to be executed.

Though, by possessing himself of the Po from Pavia to Piacenza, he was master of the line of retreat which M. de Melas might be expected to attempt to follow, yet other points claimed consideration: for what rendered the route of Piacenza the real line of retreat for the Austrians was the presence of the French behind the Tessino and about Milan. The French, in fact, in this position closed the passage which the Austrians would have had it in their power to open by crossing the Po between Turin and Valenza; but if now, for the purpose of going to meet M. de Melas, the French were to cross the Po between Pavia and Piacenza, and thus to abandon Milan and to weaken the Tessino, they might again hold out to M. de Melas a temptation to cross, either at Turin, or at Casale, or at Valenza, to harass our uncovered rear, enter the city of Milan itself, and to serve us nearly as we had served him in descending from the Alps.

Neither was it impossible that M. de Melas, sacrificing part of his baggage and of his heavy artillery, which, besides, he could leave in the fortresses of Piedmont, might retire upon Genoa, then, ascending again by Tortona and Novi, as far as the Bocchetta, and there striking into the valley of the Trebbia, might contrive to reach the Po, below Piacenza, in the environs of Cremona or Parma, and succeed in gaining Mantua and the Austrian States by this out of the way route. This march across Liguria and along the back of the Apennines, the same that had recently been prescribed to General Gottesheim, was the least probable, for it presented great difficulties, and would occasion the sacrifice of part of the *matériel*; but it was strictly possible, and it was necessary to provide against it as well as the others. The whole attention of General Bonaparte was now engrossed in securing himself against these various contingencies; and History furnishes perhaps no example of combinations so skilful, so profoundly conceived, as those which he devised on this decisive occasion.

He had this triple problem to solve: to close by a barrier of iron the principal route, that leading direct from Alexandria to Piacenza; to occupy, in such a manner as to be able to hasten thither in case of need, that which, passing along the Upper Po, fell upon the Tessino; lastly, to retain the faculty of

descending timely upon the Lower Po, if the Austrians, seeking to fly along the back of the Apennines, should attempt to cross the river below Piacenza, towards Cremona or Parma. General Bonaparte, incessantly poring over the map of Italy to find a post which fulfilled these three conditions, made a choice worthy of being for ever admired.

If we examine the course of the chain of the Apennines, we shall see that, in consequence of the curve which it forms to embrace the Gulf of Genoa, it runs northward, and throws out branches which approach very closely to the Po, from the position of La Stradella to the environs of Piacenza. In all this part of Piedmont and the duchy of Parma, the foot of the heights advances so near to the river as to leave but a very narrow space for the highroad to Piacenza. An army posted in advance of La Stradella, at the entrance of a sort of defile several leagues in length, its left upon the heights, its centre upon the road, its right along the Po and the marshy grounds that border it, is difficult to dislodge. It must be added that the route is studded with hamlets and villages, built of stone, and very capable of resisting cannon. Against the imperial army, which was strong in cavalry and artillery, this position, therefore, independently of its natural advantages, possessed the property of annulling those two arms.

It had, moreover, other most peculiar advantages. It is very near this position that the tributary streams on the other side of the Po, most important to occupy, such as the Tessino and the Adda, effect their junction. Thus the Tessino falls into the Po, a little below Pavia and above Belgiojoso, nearly opposite to La Stradella, at the distance of two leagues at most. The Adda, running beyond and for a greater distance before it unites with the Po, discharges itself into that river between Piacenza and Cremona. The reader will at once comprehend that, placed at La Stradella, and master of the bridges of Belgiojoso, of Piacenza, and of Cremona, General Bonaparte would be in possession of the most decisive points; for he would bar the principal road, that from Alexandria to Piacenza, and he would have it in his power, at the same time, by a long march, to hasten to the Tessino, or to redescend the Po to Cremona, and to fly towards the Adda, which covered his rear against the corps of Wukassowich.

It was in this species of net, formed by the Apennines, the Po, the Tessino, and the Adda, that he distributed his forces. He resolved first to proceed to La Stradella himself, with the 30,000 best soldiers of his army, Watrin's, Chambarlhac's, Gardanne's, Boudet's, and Monnier's divisions, placed under Murat, Victor, and Lannes, in the position that we have described, the left to the mountains, the centre upon the highroad, the right along

the Po. Chabran's division, which had come by the Little St. Bernard, and had at first been directed to occupy Ivrea, was afterwards sent on to Vercelli, with orders to fall back upon the Tessino, in case of the enemy's approach. Lapoype's division, which descended the St. Gothard, was posted on the Tessino itself, in the environs of Pavia. These were from 9000 to 10,000 men, who were to fall back upon one another, to dispute the passage of the Tessino to the last extremity, and to give General Bonaparte time to hasten in one day to their assistance. The detachment of the Simplon guarded, under General B ethencourt, towards Arona, the route of the St. Gothard, the retreat of the French army in case of disaster. Gilly's division was to guard Milan: this was rendered necessary by the presence of an Austrian garrison in the citadel of that city. There were three or four thousand more men destined for this twofold purpose. Lastly, Lorges' division, which had come from Germany, had orders to establish itself at Lodi on the Adda. Loison's division, which formed part of the army of reserve, was commissioned, under the command of General Duhesme, to defend Piacenza and Cremona. This was another force of 10,000 or 11,000 men employed on these two last points.

Such was the distribution of the fifty odd thousand soldiers whom General Bonaparte had at his disposal at the moment; 32,000 were at the central point of La Stradella, from 9000 to 10,000 on the Tessino, 3000 or 4000 at Milan and Arona, lastly, from 10,000 to 11,000 on the lower course of the Po and of the Adda, all placed in such a manner as to support one another reciprocally with extreme promptness. In fact, on receiving notice from the Tessino, General Bonaparte could in a day fly to the succour of the 10,000 French who guarded it. On notice from the Lower Po, he could, in the same space of time, descend upon Piacenza and Cremona, while General Loison, defending the passage of the river, would give him time to hasten up. All and each of them, on their part, could march upon La Stradella and reinforce General Bonaparte in as short a time as it would take him to reach them.

General Bonaparte seemed here to deviate from his usual principle, that of concentrating his forces on the eve of a great battle. If such a concentration passes for a masterpiece of art when it is effected seasonably, at the moment of a decisive action, and in the case of two adversaries anxious to measure their strength, totally different tactics should be employed when one of the two is attempting to escape, and the art consists in seizing before fighting him! Such was the case here. It was requisite, in fact, that General Bonaparte should spread a net around the Austrian army, and that this net should be strong enough to detain it; for, if there had been on the Tessino or the Lower

Po nothing but advanced guards, proper at most for giving notice, not for barring the road against an enemy, the aim would have been totally missed. There were needed at all the points posts capable at once of giving warning and of keeping the Austrians in check, whilst a principal mass was retained at the centre ready to hasten to any quarter with decisive means. It was impossible, then, to combine with more profound art the employment of his forces, and to modify more skilfully the application of his own principles, than General Bonaparte did on this occasion. It is in their manner of applying, according to circumstances, a true but general principle, that we recognise superior men of action.

This plan once decided upon, General Bonaparte gave his orders accordingly. Lannes, with Watrin's division, had been despatched to La Stradella by Pavia and Belgiojoso. It was of importance that Chambarlhac's, Gardanne's, Monnier's, and Boudet's divisions should carry to him the succour of their forces before the Austrian corps—which, repulsed from Piacenza, might join General Ott's force towards Tortona—should have time to press him. This was what General Bonaparte had foreseen with his prodigious sagacity. Being unable to leave Milan till the 8th and to reach La Stradella before the 9th, he despatched the following instructions to Berthier, Lannes, and Murat. "Concentrate yourselves," said he, "at La Stradella. On the 8th, or the 9th at latest, you will have upon your hands 15,000 or 18,000 Austrians, coming from Genoa. Go, meet them, rout them. There will be so many the fewer Austrians to fight on the day of the decisive battle which awaits us with the whole army of M. de Melas." Having given these orders, he set out on the 8th from Milan to cross the Po in person and to be the next day at La Stradella.

It was impossible to divine more accurately the movements of the enemy. We said just now that three Austrian detachments had appeared uselessly before Piacenza; that the detachment which had arrived from Tuscany by Fiorenzuola had been driven back; that the detachment of General Gottesheim, who had descended with infantry by the valley of the Trebbia, had been thrown back into that valley; lastly, that General Oreilly, hastening from Alexandria with cavalry, had been forced to return towards Tortona. But General Ott, on his part, marching by the road from Genoa to Tortona, arrived at La Stradella on the morning of the 9th of June, as General Bonaparte had foreseen. He brought along before him Generals Gottesheim and Oreilly, whom he had met retreating, and determined to make a vigorous effort upon Piacenza, not imagining that nearly the whole French army could be posted *en échelon* in the defile of La Stradella. Including the troops that had just rejoined him, he had 17,000

or 18,000 men. Lannes could not collect, on the morning of the 9th, more than 7000 or 8000; but in consequence of the repeated warnings of the commander-in-chief, from 5000 to 6000 more were to rejoin him in the course of the day. The field of battle was that which we have described. Lannes presented himself—his left on the heights of the Apennines, the centre on the *chaussée* towards the hamlet of Casteggio, the right on the plain of the Po. He had been wrong in proceeding a little too far in advance of La Stradella, towards Casteggio and Montebello, just where the road ceases to form a defile, owing to the extent of the plain. But the French, full of confidence, though inferior in number, were capable of the greatest efforts of devotedness, especially under a leader like Lannes, who possessed in the highest degree the art of inducing them to follow him anywhere.

Lannes, directing with vigour Watrin's division upon Casteggio, beat back the advanced posts of Oreilly. His plan consisted in making himself master of the hamlet of Casteggio, lying before him on the road, either by attacking it in front, or by turning it by the plain of the Po on the one hand, by the acclivities of the Apennines on the other. The numerous artillery of the Austrians, established on the road, swept the ground in all directions. Two battalions of the 6th light strove to take this murderous artillery by turning it by the right; while the 3rd battalion of the 6th and the whole 40th endeavoured to gain the neighbouring hills, situated on the left, and the rest of Watrin's division marched upon Casteggio itself, where the centre of the enemy was. An obstinate combat ensued at all these points. The French had well-nigh carried the attacked positions, when General Gottesheim, hastening up with his infantry to support Oreilly, overthrew the battalions which had climbed the heights. Lannes, under a tremendous fire, supported his troops, and prevented them from yielding to numbers. They were, nevertheless, ready to succumb, when Chambarlhac's division, forming part of General Victor's corps, arrived. General Rivaud, at the head of the 43rd, climbed the heights afresh, rallied the French battalions which had been repulsed from them, and, after incredible efforts, finally maintained himself there. At the centre, that is, on the highroad, the 96th came to the assistance of General Watrin in his attack on the hamlet of Casteggio; and the 24th, extending itself to the right in the plain, endeavoured to turn the left of the enemy, in order to silence the fire of his artillery. During this combined effort on the wings, the brave Watrin had to sustain a furious combat in Casteggio; he lost and retook the hamlet several times. But Lannes, present everywhere, gave the decisive impulsion. By his orders, General Rivaud, on the left, having remained master of the heights and crossed them, descended on the rear of

Casteggio; the troops, sent into the plain on the right, turned the hotly contested hamlet; both marched to Montebello, while General Watrin, making a last effort on the enemy's centre, broke through it, and at length proceeded to beyond Casteggio. The Austrians, finding themselves at this moment repulsed in all quarters, fled to Montebello, leaving in our hands a considerable number of prisoners.

The action had lasted from eleven in the forenoon till eight in the evening. It was the Austrians who had blockaded Genoa, trained by Masséna to the most furious fights, that were here, in the plains of Piedmont, struggling with desperation to force their way through. They were supported by a numerous artillery, and they had displayed more than ordinary bravery. The First Consul arrived at the very moment when the battle, the place and the day of which he had so correctly foreseen, was just finished. He found Lannes covered with blood, but intoxicated with joy, and the troops enchanted with their success. They felt, as he has since said, that they had behaved well. The conscripts had proved themselves worthy to vie with the veteran soldiers. We had taken 4000 prisoners, wounded or killed nearly 3000 men. The victory had been difficult for us to gain, since 12,000 combatants, at most, had been opposed to 18,000.

Such was the battle of Montebello, which gave to Lannes and his family the title that distinguishes it among the French families of the present time—a glorious title, which his descendants ought to be proud to bear!

This first rencontre was a promising beginning, but it intimated to M. de Melas the difficulty he would have in forcing his way. General Ott, with a force diminished by 7000 men, retired in consternation upon Alexandria. The courage of the French army was raised to the highest degree of hardihood.

The First Consul lost no time in collecting his divisions, and in strongly occupying that road from Alexandria to Piacenza, which, in all probability, M. de Melas would follow. Lannes having advanced too far, the First Consul fell back a little to the very point which is called La Stradella, because the defile, narrowed in this place by the approximation of the heights and the river, renders the position more secure.

The 10th and 11th of June were passed in observing the movements of the Austrians, in concentrating the army, in giving it a little rest after its rapid marches, in organising the artillery in the best possible manner; for, till now, not more than forty field-pieces could be brought together at this point.

On the 11th, one of the most distinguished generals of that period, Desaix, who, perhaps, equalled Moreau, Masséna, Kléber. Lannes, in military talents, but who surpassed them all in the rare perfections of his character, arrived at headquarters. He

had just returned from Egypt, where Kléber had committed political faults, which we shall soon have the chagrin to record, which Desaix strove in vain to prevent, and, to escape the painful sight of which, he had fled to Europe. These faults, however, had afterwards been gloriously retrieved. Desaix, stopped near the coast of France, had been treated by the English in the most shameful manner. He loved the First Consul with a sort of passion; and the First Consul, touched by the affection of such a noble heart, requited it by the warmest friendship that he ever felt in his life. They passed a whole night together, in relating to each other what had happened in Egypt and in France, and the First Consul immediately gave him the command of Monnier's and Boudet's united divisions.

On the following day, June 12th, General Bonaparte, surprised at seeing nothing of the Austrians, could not help feeling some apprehensions. Astonished that, in such a situation, M. de Melas should hesitate, lose time, and suffer all the outlets to be closed around him, measuring his adversary too closely by his own standard, he said that M. de Melas could not have wasted such precious hours, and that he must have escaped, either by ascending towards Genoa, or by crossing the Upper Po, with the intention of forcing the Tessino. Tired of waiting, he left, in the afternoon of the 12th, his position of La Stradella, and advanced, followed by the whole army, to the height of Tortona. He gave orders for the blockade of that fortress, and established his headquarters at Voghera. On the morning of the 13th, he crossed the Scrivia, and debouched in the immense plain extending between the Scrivia and the Bormida, which, at the present day, has no other name but the plain of Marengo. It was the very same which, several months before, his imagination marked out for the theatre of a great battle with M. de Melas. At this place, the Po flows at a distance from the Apennines. The intervening country is intersected by the Bormida and the Tanaro, whose currents have become less rapid, and uniting near Alexandria, afterwards discharge themselves into the bed of the Po. The road skirting the foot of the Apennines to Tortona separates from it opposite to that place, turns off to the right, passes the Scrivia, and debouches in a vast plain. It runs across it to a first village called San Giuliano, proceeds to a second called Marengo, at length crosses the Bormida, and leads to the celebrated fortress of Alexandria. "If the enemy meant to follow the highroad from Piacenza to Mantua, it is here that he would wait for me," said General Bonaparte to himself; "here his numerous artillery, his fine cavalry, would have great advantages, and he would fight with all his united means." Having made this reflection, General Bonaparte, in order to confirm himself in his conjectures, ordered the country

to be scoured by light cavalry, which did not fall in with a single Austrian outpost. Towards evening, he sent forward General Victor's corps, composed of Gardanne's and Chambarlhac's divisions, to Marengo. At this point we encountered a detachment, that of Oreilly, which defended for a moment the village of Marengo, then abandoned it, and recrossed the Bormida. A reconnaissance, not made with due care, even afforded room to suppose that the enemy had no bridge upon the Bormida.

From all these signs, General Bonaparte ceased to doubt that M. de Melas had, as he expressed it, given him the slip. He would not have abandoned the plain, and particularly the village of Marengo, which forms the entrance to it, if he had meant to cross it, to fight a battle, and to conquer the route from Alexandria to Piacenza. Misled by this most just reflection, General Bonaparte left General Victor, with his two divisions, at Marengo; he placed Lannes *en échelon* in the plain with Watrin's division, and galloped off for his headquarters at Voghera, to get intelligence from General Moncey, stationed on the Tessino, from General Duhesme, stationed on the Lower Po, and thus ascertain what had become of M. de Melas. Officers of the staff, starting from all points, were directed to meet him at his headquarters. But the Scrivia was overflowed, and very fortunately he was obliged to stop at Torre di Garofolo. Accounts from the Tessino and the Po, dated that very day, intimated that all was perfectly quiet. M. de Melas had attempted nothing in that quarter. What could have become of him? . . . General Bonaparte conceived that he had marched back upon Genoa, by Novi, with the intention of passing into the valley of the Trebbia, and again falling upon Cremona. It seemed, in fact, that, as he was not at Alexandria, as he was not on march for the Tessino, he could not have taken any other course. It might also be conjectured that, following the example of Wurmser at Mantua, he had gone and shut himself up in Genoa, where, supplied by the English, having a garrison of 50,000 men, he would have the means of protracting the war. These ideas had taken such strong hold of the mind of the First Consul, that he directed Desaix to march upon Rivalta and Novi with Boudet's single division. It was, in fact, through Novi that M. de Melas would have to pass, in going from Alexandria to Genoa.

However, from a lucky presentiment, he kept Monnier's division, and the second of Desaix's divisions, at headquarters, and he provided as far as possible for all contingencies, by leaving Victor at Marengo with two divisions, Lannes with one in the plain, Murat at his sides with all the cavalry. If we consider the general distribution of the French forces at this moment, spread partly on the Tessino, partly on the Lower Po and the Adda, partly on the route to Genoa, we shall be struck with



their dispersion. This was the necessary consequence of the general situation and of the circumstances of the day.

The night of the 13th, which preceded one of the most glorious days in history, General Bonaparte passed at the village of Torre di Garofolo, and fell asleep, expecting to receive tidings on the morrow.

Meanwhile, confusion reigned in Alexandria. The Austrian army was in despair. A council of war had just been held, and none of the resolutions which the French general was afraid of had been adopted. There had indeed been some talk of retiring by the Upper Po and the Tessino, or shutting themselves up in Genoa, but the Austrian generals, like brave men, as they were, had preferred following the suggestions of honour. After all, said they, we have been fighting for these eighteen months, like good soldiers; we had reconquered Italy; we were in march for the frontiers of France; our government urged us forward; it was but yesterday that it gave such orders: it behoved it to apprise us of the danger which threatened our rear. If any blame attaches to our situation, to the government that blame belongs. All the means proposed for avoiding an engagement with the French army are complicated, difficult, hazardous; there is but one simple and honourable course, it is to break through. To-morrow we must open a way for ourselves at the price of our blood. If we succeed, we will regain, after a victory, the road to Piacenza and Mantua; if not, after we have done our duty, the responsibility for our disaster will fall upon others, not upon ourselves.

The First Consul could not comprehend how so much time could be thrown away in deliberating in such an emergency. But there was none who equalled the promptness of his determinations, and M. de Melas was in a position sufficiently desperate to cause the cruel perplexities which delayed his definitive resolution to be forgiven. In deciding to give battle, the Austrian general behaved like a soldier full of honour; but he might be reproached for having left 25,000 men in the fortresses of Coni, Turin, Tortona, Genoa, Acqui, Gavi, and Alexandria, especially after the loss which Ott had sustained at Montebello. With 25,000 men in the fortresses, 3000 in Tuscany, 12,000 between Mantua and Venice, he had left 40,000 men at most to bring upon the field of battle, where the issue of the war was to be decided. To this number had dwindled that fine army 120,000 strong, which, at the commencement of the campaign, was to force the southern frontiers of France! 40,000 had perished, 40,000 were scattered, 40,000 were about to fight, in order to escape the Caudine Forks; but among these last were a powerful cavalry and 200 pieces of cannon.

It was decided that, on the following day, the whole army

should debouch by the bridges of the Bormida, for there were two, covered by one and the same *tête du pont*, notwithstanding the false intelligence given to General Bonaparte; that General Ott, at the head of 10,000 men, half cavalry, half infantry, should debouch from the Bormida, and, turning to the left, proceed towards a village called Castel Ceriolo; that Generals Haddick and Kaim, at the head of the main body of the army, about 20,000 men, should carry the village of Marengo, which forms the entrance to the plain; and that General O'Reilly, with 5000 or 6000 soldiers, should turn to the right and ascend the Bormida. A powerful artillery was to support this movement. A considerable detachment, particularly strong in cavalry, was left in the rear of Alexandria, on the Acqui road, to observe Suchet's troops, of whose arrival vague accounts had been received.

We have described that vast plain, traversed throughout its whole extent by the highroad from Alexandria to Piacenza, and enclosed between the Scrivia and the Bormida. The French, marching from Piacenza and the Scrivia, came first to San Giuliano, then, three-quarters of a league further, to Marengo, which was very near the Bormida, and formed the principal *débouché* that the Austrian army had to gain possession of, in order to get out of Alexandria. Between San Giuliano and Marengo ran, in a straight line, the road that was about to be disputed, and on either side extended a plain covered with corn-fields and vineyards. Below Marengo, and on the right of the French, on the left of the Austrians, was Castel Ceriolo, a large hamlet, through which General Ott would have to pass, in order to turn the corps of General Victor stationed in Marengo. Upon Marengo, then, the principal attack of the Austrians was to be directed, since that village commanded the entrance to the plain.

At daybreak, the Austrian army crossed the two bridges of the Bormida. But its movement was slow, owing to its having but a single *tête du pont* to debouch by. O'Reilly passed first, and fell in with Gardanne's division, which General Victor, after he had occupied Marengo, had sent forward. This division consisted of only the 101st and the 44th demi-brigades. O'Reilly, supported by a numerous artillery, and having twice the force, obliged it to fall back and to seek shelter in Marengo. Fortunately he did not follow it into the place, but waited until the centre, under General Haddick, was able to support him. The tardiness of the march through the defile formed by the bridges caused the Austrians to lose two or three hours. At length, Generals Haddick and Kaim deployed in the rear of O'Reilly, and General Ott crossed the same bridges, to proceed to Castel Ceriolo. General Victor instantly united his two divisions to defend Marengo, and sent word to the First Consul, that the whole Austrian army was advancing, with the evident intention of giving battle.

A defence peculiar to the ground served most seasonably to second the intrepidity of our soldiers. In advance of Marengo, between the Austrians and the French, was a deep and muddy rivulet, called the Fontanone. It ran between Marengo and the Bormida, and emptied itself, a little lower down, into the Bormida. Victor placed towards his right, that is, in the village of Marengo, the 101st and 44th demi-brigades, under General Gardanne; to the left of the village, the 24th, the 43rd, and the 96th, under General Chambarlhac; a little further back, General Kellermann, with the 20th, 2nd, and 8th cavalry, and a squadron of the 12th. The rest of the 12th was sent to the Upper Bormida, to observe the distant movements of the enemy.

General Haddick advanced towards the rivulet, protected by twenty-five pieces of artillery, which played upon the French. He threw himself bravely into the bed of the Fontanone, at the head of Bellegarde's division. General Rivaud, instantly leaving the shelter of the village, with the 44th and the 101st, opened a point-blank fire upon the Austrians, who were endeavouring to debouch. A most obstinate conflict ensued along the Fontanone. Haddick made repeated attempts; but Rivaud,\* keeping his ground under the batteries of the Austrians, stopped Haddick's corps by a fire of musketry within short range, and drove it back in disorder to the other side of the rivulet. The unfortunate General Haddick received a wound, which afterwards proved mortal, and his soldiers retired. M. de Melas then ordered General Kaim's troops to advance, and directed Oreilly to ascend the bank of the Bormida to a place called La Stortigliona, with the design of charging our left with Pilati's cavalry. But at this moment General Kellermann was on horseback, at the head of his division of cavalry, observing the movements of the enemy's squadrons; and Lannes, who had lain, the preceding night, to the right of Victor, in the plain, had just placed himself in line between Marengo and Castel Ceriolo. The Austrians, then, made a second effort. Gardanne's and Chambarlhac's divisions, drawn up in a semicircle, around the semicircular bed of the Fontanone, were placed in such a manner as to pour a converging fire upon the point of attack. Their musketry spread havoc among the troops of General Kaim. Meanwhile, General Pilati, ascending higher, had succeeded in crossing the Fontanone, at the head of 2000 horse. The gallant Kellermann, who on this day added greatly to the glory he had acquired on the field of Valmy, dashed upon Pilati's squadrons as soon as they attempted to debouch, slaughtering and hurling them into the muddy bed of that little stream, which art could not have formed better for covering the position of the French.

At this moment, though our army, taken by surprise, had no

\* Olivier Rivaud.

more than the two corps of Victor and Lannes in line, that is to say, 15,000 or 16,000 men to resist 36,000, still, owing to the fault committed by the Austrians on the preceding day, in neglecting to occupy Marengo, a fault, however, which had been productive of advantages to them, inasmuch as it had led General Bonaparte into error, our army had time to wait the arrival of its commander, and of the reserves remaining behind, or sent by the route of Novi.

Such was the state of things, when M. de Melas determined to make a desperate effort to save the honour and the liberty of his army, and, gallantly seconded by his soldiers, all veterans, whose victories in the preceding campaign had heightened their courage, M. de Melas made another attack on the French line. General Ott, who had taken a good deal of time in filing off, began to be in a condition to act on the left of the Austrians. He manœuvred with a view to turn us, passed through Castel Ceriolo, and fell upon Lannes, who, placed beside Victor, between Marengo and Castel Ceriolo, formed the right of our line. While General Ott's corps occupied the attention of Lannes, the corps of Oreilly, Haddick, and Kaim, having united, were directed anew upon the Fontanone, in front of Marengo. A formidable artillery supported all their movements. Lattermann's grenadiers entered the brook, crossed it, and gained the other bank. Chambarlhac's division, posted on the left of Marengo, and on the flanks of the Austrian grenadiers, kept up a destructive fire upon them. A battalion of these grenadiers, nevertheless, contrived to maintain its ground beyond the Fontanone. M. de Melas redoubled the cannonade on Chambarlhac's division, which was not covered by the houses of the village, like that which defended Marengo itself. Meanwhile the Austrian pioneers hastily constructed a bridge on trestles. The gallant Rivaud, at the head of the 44th, issuing from the village of Marengo, and marching up to the assailants, in spite of the grape-shot, was on the point of driving them into the Fontanone, when tremendous discharges of artillery stopped the 44th, exhausted by this obstinate struggle, and Rivaud himself was wounded. Availing themselves of this advantage, Lattermann's grenadiers advanced *en masse*, and penetrated into Marengo. Rivaud, covered with blood, placed himself once more at the head of the 44th, made a vigorous charge on these grenadiers, and drove them out of Marengo; but received, as soon as he lost the shelter of the houses, by a fearful fire of artillery, he could not force them to recross the brook, which had hitherto so well protected our army. Weakened by loss of blood, and scarcely able to support himself, this brave officer was obliged to submit to be carried off the field of battle. The Austrian grenadiers therefore retained possession of the position which they had just carried. At the same instant,

Chambarlhac's division, which, as we have said, was not protected by any shelter, but completely exposed to the grape-shot, was well-nigh mowed down. General O'Reilly repulsed the 96th, which formed our extreme left, and then began to act on the offensive. Towards the right, Lannes, who, having at first the single corps of General Kaim only to deal with, had been on the point of driving it into the bed of the Fontanone, perceived that he was all at once turned by General Ott, debouching from Castel Ceriolo with a large body of cavalry. Champeaux's brigade of cavalry, drawn up in rear of Lannes' corps, as was Kellermann in rear of Victor's, made, but in vain, several brilliant charges. The unfortunate Champeaux received a mortal wound. Our army, severely pressed on both wings, separated from Marengo, the point to which it had at first so strongly clung, and, having no longer any support, ran the risk of being forced back into the plain in the rear, where it could make no stand against two hundred pieces of cannon and an immense cavalry.

It was ten o'clock in the morning. The carnage had been frightful. A considerable mass of wounded encumbered the road between Marengo and San Giuliano. Already part of Victor's troops, overwhelmed by numbers, were retiring in disorder, crying that all was lost. All must have been lost, in fact, without a reinforcement of troops, which were not exhausted, and, more especially, without a great captain, capable of regaining the victory wrested from us.

General Bonaparte, on receiving intelligence that the Austrian army, which he so feared might escape him, had, on the contrary, taken his army by surprise, in that very plain of Marengo, so deserted on the preceding day, hastened from Torre di Garofalo, congratulating himself on the lucky inundation of the Scrivia, which had prevented him from passing the night at Voghera. He brought with him the consular guard, a body not very numerous, but of incomparable valour, and which became subsequently the imperial guard; he brought Monnier's division, composed of three excellent demi-brigades; he was followed at a little distance by a reserve of two regiments of cavalry; and he further sent orders to Desaix to march with the utmost expedition for San Giuliano.

The First Consul, at the head of these reserves, proceeded at a gallop to the field of battle. He found Lannes attacked on the right by the infantry and cavalry of General Ott, and endeavouring, nevertheless, to support himself on the left around Marengo. Gardanne was defending himself in the hedges of that village, the object of such a furious struggle; and, on the other side, Chambarlhac's division was dispersing under the heavy discharges of the Austrian artillery. A glance sufficed for his military eye to perceive what was fitting to be done in

order to retrieve the day. His mutilated left was absolutely routed; but his right, which was only threatened, still maintained its ground; it was that, therefore, which ought to be reinforced. By keeping a firm hold of Castel Ceriolo he should have a point of support amidst that extensive plain; he should be able to make a pivot of his strengthened wing, and bring his beaten wing into the rear, where it would be out of the reach of the enemy. If he should lose by this movement the highroad from Marengo to San Giuliano, the evil would be reparable; for, behind his new position, there would be another road, leading to Salé, and from Salé to the banks of the Po. His line of retreat to Pavia would thus be still secured. Placed, moreover, on the right of the plain, he would be on the flank of the Austrians, who would take the highroad from Marengo to San Giuliano, if they meant to follow up the victory.

Having made these reflections with the rapidity of lightning, General Bonaparte put instantly into execution the resolution which he had just conceived. He sent forward into the plain, to the right of Lannes, the 800 grenadiers of the consular guard, ordering them to stop the Austrian cavalry till the arrival of Monnier's three demi-brigades. These brave fellows, formed in square, received with admirable coolness the charges of the Lobkowitz dragoons, and stood unbroken by the repeated assaults of a multitude of horse. A little on their right, General Bonaparte ordered two of Monnier's demi-brigades, which arrived at the moment, to proceed towards Castel Ceriolo. These two demi-brigades, headed by General Carra St. Cyr, marched forward, and, sometimes drawn up in square to stop the cavalry, sometimes in columns of attack to charge the infantry, they at length recovered the lost ground, and lodged themselves in the hedges and gardens of Castel Ceriolo. At the same moment, General Bonaparte, at the head of the 72nd, lent his support to the left under Lannes, while Dupont, the chief of the staff, went to rally in the rear the wrecks of Victor's corps, pursued by Oreilly's horse, but protected by Murat with the reserve of cavalry. The presence of the First Consul, the sight of the bearskin caps of his horse-guard, infused fresh spirit into the troops. The battle recommenced with new fury. The brave Watrin, of Lannes' corps, with the 6th of the line and the 22nd, drove Kaim's soldiers into the Fontanone at the point of the bayonet. Lannes, firing the 40th and the 28th with his own heroic spirit, pushed both of them upon the Austrians. The battle raged fiercely over the whole of the immense plain. Gardanne strove to reconquer Marengo; Lannes endeavoured to make himself master of the rivulet which, at first, had so usefully covered our troops; the grenadiers of the consular guard, still in square, like a living citadel amidst that field of battle, filled the gap between Lannes and the columns of

Carra St. Cyr, which had entered the first houses of Castel Ceriolo. But Baron de Melas, with the courage of despair, bringing up his united masses upon Marengo, debouched at last from the village, and drove back the exhausted soldiers of Gardanne, who, in vain, took advantage of all obstacles. Oreilly continued to overwhelm with grape-shot the division of Chambarlhac, which was still left exposed to the fire of an immense artillery.

It was impossible for the French to keep their ground; they were obliged to give way. General Bonaparte ordered them to fall back by degrees, at the same time keeping up a firm countenance. But, while his left, deprived of Marengo, and thenceforward without support, retreated rapidly to San Giuliano, where it might find shelter, he continued to hold the right of the plain, and drew away from it slowly, thanks to the point of Castel Ceriolo, thanks to the energy of the consular guard, and thanks above all to Lannes, who made unparalleled efforts. Provided only he holds his position on the right, the First Consul still retains a line of retreat by Salé towards the banks of the Po; and, if Desaix, sent the preceding day upon Novi, should come up in time, he may still reconquer the field of battle and bring back victory to his side.

It was at this moment that Lannes and his four demi-brigades made efforts worthy of the admiration of posterity. The enemy, who had debouched *en masse* from Marengo into the plain, poured forth a shower of balls and grape-shot from eighty pieces of cannon. Lannes, at the head of his four demi-brigades, was two hours in retiring three-quarters of a league. When the enemy approached and became too pressing, he halted and charged with the bayonet. Though his artillery was dismounted, a few light pieces, drawn by the best horses, and manœuvred with equal skill and boldness, were brought up, and assisted by their fire the demi-brigades that were too much cramped, and dared to place themselves in battery against the formidable Austrian artillery. The consular guard, which could not be broken by charges of cavalry, was now attacked with cannon. The enemy strove to batter it in breach, like a wall, and then charged it with Frimont's horse. It sustained considerable loss, and fell back, but unbroken. Carra St. Cyr fell back also, and abandoned Castel Ceriolo, still retaining, however, a last support in the vineyards in rear of that village. We, nevertheless, remained masters of the road from Castel Ceriolo to Salé. On all sides, the plain exhibited a vast scene of carnage, where the roar of explosions mingled with that of the artillery; for Lannes blew up the ammunition-waggons which he could not carry off.

Half the day was spent. M. de Melas fancied himself sure of the victory, which he had so dearly purchased. This old warrior, who, for courage at least, proved himself worthy of his adversary

on that memorable day, returned to Alexandria, worn out with fatigue. He left the command to M. de Zach, the chief of his staff, and sent off couriers to all Europe, to proclaim his victory and the defeat of General Bonaparte at Marengo. This chief of the staff, invested with the command, then formed the bulk of the Austrian army into marching column, on the highroad from Marengo to San Giuliano. He put at the head two regiments of infantry, and then the column of Lattermann's grenadiers, followed by the baggage train. He placed General Oreilly on the left, and Generals Kaim and Haddick on the right, and endeavoured to gain in this order that highroad to Piacenza, the object of so many efforts, and the salvation of the Austrian army.

It was now three o'clock. If no new circumstance intervened, the battle might be considered as lost by the French, unless they could, on the morrow, with the troops shifted from the Tessino and the Adda to the Po, retrieve the misfortune of the day. Desaix, however, with Boudet's whole division, had not yet come up: would he arrive in time? On this circumstance depended the issue of the battle. The aides-de-camp of the First Consul had been galloping in quest of him ever since morning. But, long before they reached him, Desaix, on the first cannon-shot fired in the plain of Marengo, had instantly wheeled about. Hearing this distant report, he had concluded that the enemy, whom he had been sent in search of to Novi, on the Genoa road, was at Marengo itself. He had immediately despatched Savary, with a few hundred horse, to Novi, to see what was going forward, and had waited with his division, listening intently to the cannon of the Austrians and the French, which never ceased thundering in the direction of the Bormida. From Savary having discovered no trace of the enemy in the environs of Novi, Desaix was confirmed in his happy conjecture, and, without further delay, marched for Marengo, sending before him several aides-de-camp to apprise the First Consul that he was coming. He had marched the whole day, and, at three o'clock, his heads of columns at length appeared at the entrance into the plain, in the vicinity of San Giuliano. He himself, preceding them at a gallop, rode up to the First Consul. Happy inspiration of a lieutenant equally intelligent and attached! happy fortune of youth! If, fifteen years later, the First Consul, now so well seconded by his generals, had found a Desaix on the field of Waterloo, he would have preserved the empire, and France her preponderant position among the powers of Europe.

The presence of Desaix changed the aspect of things. He was surrounded; he was made acquainted with the occurrences of the day. The generals formed a circle about him and the First Consul, and discussed with warmth the critical position of the army. Most of them advised retreat. The First Consul



was not of this opinion, and he earnestly pressed Desaix for his. Desaix, surveying the devastated field of battle, then drawing out his watch and looking at the hour, replied to General Bonaparte in these simple and noble terms: "Yes, the battle is lost; but it is only three o'clock; there is time enough to gain another." General Bonaparte, delighted with the opinion of Desaix, prepared to avail himself of the succour brought him by that general, and of the advantages ensured to him by the position taken ever since morning. He was, in fact, in the plain, on the right, while the enemy was on the left, in marching column, on the highroad, advancing towards San Giuliano. Desaix, arriving from San Giuliano, with 6000 fresh troops, and facing the Austrians, might stop them short, while the bulk of the rallied army should fall upon their flank. Orders were forthwith issued in accordance with this plan.

The three demi-brigades of Desaix were formed in advance of San Giuliano, a little to the right of the highroad; the 30th deployed in line; the 9th and 59th in close columns on the wings of the former. A slight undulation of the ground concealed them from the enemy. On their left were the rallied and somewhat recovered wrecks of Chambarlhac's and Gardanne's troops under General Victor; on their right, in the plain, Lannes, whose retreating movement was suspended, then the consular guard, then Carra St. Cyr, who had kept as near as possible to Castel Ceriolo. The army then formed a long oblique line from San Giuliano to Castel Ceriolo, and between Desaix and Lannes, and a little in rear, was placed Kellermann's cavalry in the interval. A battery of twelve pieces, the sole remnant of the whole artillery of the army, was spread upon the front of the corps of Desaix.

These dispositions made, the First Consul rode through the ranks of his soldiers, and addressed the different corps. "My friends," said he, "we have fallen back far enough: recollect that I am accustomed to lie on the field of battle." Having reanimated the troops, who, inspired by the arrival of the reserves, burned with impatience to resume the fight, he gave the signal for attack. A charge was beaten along the whole line.

The Austrians, in order of march rather than in order of battle, were proceeding along the highroad. The column under the command of M. de Zach came first. A little in rear came the centre, half deployed in the plain, and making front to Lannes.

General Marmont all at once unmasked twelve pieces of cannon. A thick shower of grape-shot fell upon the head of the surprised Austrian column, which expected no further resistance; for the enemy believed that the French were decidedly retreating. Scarcely had it recovered from this sudden shock, when Desaix set the 9th light in motion. "Go and inform the First Consul," said he to Savary, his aide-de-camp, "that I am charging, and

that I am in want of cavalry to support me." Desaix, on horseback, led on this demi-brigade. He ascended with it the slight rise of the ground which hid it from the view of the Austrians, and abruptly revealed himself to them by a fire of musketry discharged within a few paces of them. The Austrians returned it, and Desaix fell, pierced by a ball in the chest. "Conceal my death," said he to General Boudet, his chief of division; "it might dishearten the troops." Useless precaution of that hero! His fall had been observed, and his soldiers, like those of Turenne, insisted, with loud shouts, on avenging their leader. The 9th light, which on that day earned the title of *incomparable*, which it bore till the termination of our wars—the 9th light, having poured forth its fire, formed in column, and fell upon the dense mass of the Austrians. At sight of it, the first two regiments which opened the march, taken by surprise, fell back in disorder on the second line, and disappeared in its ranks. The column of Lattermann's grenadiers was then alone at the head, and received this shock like crack troops. It stood firm. The conflict extended on both sides of the highroad. The 9th light was supported on the right by Victor's rallied troops, on the left by the 30th and 59th demi-brigades of Boudet's division, which had followed the movement. Lattermann's grenadiers were defending themselves with difficulty, when an unforeseen storm suddenly burst over their heads. General Kellermann, who, on the application of Desaix, had received orders to charge, set off at a gallop, and, passing between Lannes and Desaix, placed part of his squadrons *en potence*, to make head against the Austrian cavalry, which he saw before him; then, with the rest, he fell upon the flank of the column of the grenadiers, already attacked in front by Boudet's infantry. This charge, executed with extraordinary vigour, cut the column in two. Kellermann's dragoons slaughtered to the right and to the left, till, pressed on all sides, the unfortunate grenadiers laid down their arms. Two thousand of them surrendered. At their head, General Zach himself was obliged to deliver his sword. The Austrians were thus deprived of their commander during the conclusion of the battle; for M. de Melas, as we have seen, thinking himself sure of the victory, had retired to Alexandria. Kellermann did not stop there; dashing upon the Lichtenstein dragoons, he put them to flight. The latter fell back upon the centre of the Austrians, which was deploying in the plain, in face of Lannes, and threw it into some disorder. Lannes then advanced, and attacked the shaken centre of the Austrians with vigour; while the grenadiers of the consular guard and Carra St. Cyr again moved towards Castel Ceriolo, from which they were not far distant. Along the whole line from San Giuliano to Castel Ceriolo the French had resumed the offensive; they marched forward, intoxicated with joy and





enthusiasm, on perceiving victory returning to them. Surprise and discouragement had passed to the side of the Austrians.

Admirable determination of character, which persists, and, by persisting, brings back Fortune! From San Giuliano to Castel Ceriolo, that oblique line of the French advanced at the charge-step, driving back the Austrians, utterly astonished at having a new battle to fight. Carra St. Cyr had soon retaken the village of Castel Ceriolo, and General Ott, who had at first advanced beyond that village, fearful of being overpowered, thought of falling back, lest he should have his communication cut off. A panic was communicated to the cavalry; it fled at full speed, shouting, "To the bridges!" All, then, strove who should first reach those bridges of the Bormida. General Ott, recrossing at Castel Ceriolo with Vogelsang's troops, was obliged to force his way through the French. He succeeded, and regained in haste the banks of the Bormida, to which all hurried with furious precipitation.

Generals Kaim and Haddick strove in vain to keep their ground in the centre; Lannes did not allow them the means of doing so; he drove them into Marengo, and prepared to push them into the Fontanone, and, from the Fontanone, into the Bormida. But Weidenfeld's grenadiers made head for a moment, to give O'Reilly, who had advanced as far as Cassina Grossa, time to come back. The Austrian cavalry, on its part, attempted several charges to stop the progress of the French. But it was repelled by the horse grenadiers of the consular guard, led by Bessières and young Beauharnais. Lannes and Victor, with their united corps, at last fell upon Marengo, and threw O'Reilly's as well as Weidenfeld's grenadiers into disorder. The confusion on the bridges of the Bormida increased every moment. Foot, horse, artillery, were crowded together there in disorder. The bridges being insufficient for all, many threw themselves into the Bormida, for the purpose of fording it. An artillery-driver attempted to cross with his gun. He succeeded, and the whole of the artillery would then have followed his example, but part of the carriages stuck fast in the bed of the river. The French hotly pursuing them, took men, horses, cannon, and baggage. The unfortunate Baron de Melas, who, two hours before, had left his army victorious, had hastened to the spot on hearing of this disaster, and could not believe his eyes. He was a prey to vexation and despair. Such was the sanguinary battle of Marengo, which, as we shall presently see, had an immense influence on the destinies of France and of the world; it gave, in fact, at the moment, peace to the Republic, and, a little later, the Empire to the First Consul. It was cruelly disputed, and it was worth the disputing; for never was the issue of a battle more serious for both adversaries. M. de Melas fought to avoid a humiliating

capitulation; General Bonaparte staked on that day his whole fortune. The losses, considering the number of the combatants, were immense, and out of all the usual proportions. The Austrians lost about 8000 men in killed and wounded, and more than 4000 prisoners. Their staff was cruelly decimated. General Haddick was killed; Generals Vogelsang, Lattermann, Bellegarde, Lamar-saille, and Gottesheim were wounded; and with them a great number of officers. Thus they lost, in men *hors de combat* or taken, one-third of their army, if it was from 36,000 to 40,000 strong, as it is generally said to have been. As for the French, they had 6000 killed or wounded, and about 1000 of them were taken prisoners, which again exhibits a loss of one-fourth out of 28,000 soldiers present at the battle. Their staff suffered as severely as the Austrian staff. Generals Mainony, Rivaud, Malher, Champeaux, were wounded, the last mortally. The greatest loss was that of Desaix. France had not sustained one more to be regretted during a ten years' warfare. In the estimation of the First Consul, this loss was great enough to diminish the joy that he felt for the victory. His secretary, M. de Bourrienne, hastening to congratulate him on this miraculous triumph, said to him, "What a glorious day!" "Yes," replied the First Consul, "it would have been glorious indeed, could I but have embraced Desaix this evening on the field of battle. I was going," added he, "to make him minister of war; I would have made him a prince, if I could." The conqueror of Marengo had as yet no notion that he should, at no distant day, have it in his power to bestow crowns on those who served him. The body of the unfortunate Desaix was lying near San Giuliano, amidst that vast field of carnage. His aide-de-camp, Savary, who had been long attached to him, sought out his body from among the dead, and, recognising it by his profusion of hair, had it removed, and wrapped in an hussar cloak; then placing it on his horse, he conveyed it to the headquarters at Torre di Garofalo.

Though the plain of Marengo was drenched with French blood, joy pervaded the army. Soldiers and generals felt the merit of their conduct, and appreciated the immense importance of a victory gained on the rear of the enemy. The Austrians, on the contrary, were in consternation; they knew that they were enveloped, and had no alternative but to submit to the law of the conqueror. Baron de Melas, who, on this day, had two horses killed under him, and who, in spite of his great age, had behaved as well as the youngest and most valiant soldier in his army could have done—Baron de Melas was overwhelmed with the profoundest grief. He had returned to Alexandria, to rest himself a little, in the belief that he was the victor. Now he saw his army half destroyed, seeking flight by every outlet, abandoning its artillery to the French, or leaving it swamped in

the marshes of the Bormida. To complete the misfortune, Zach, the chief of his staff, who enjoyed his entire confidence, was at this moment a prisoner with the French. In vain he turned his eyes from one of his generals to another; none of them would give an opinion, but all cursed the cabinet of Vienna, which had kept them under such fatal illusions, and thus plunged them into an abyss. It was imperative, however, to come to some determination, but what? . . . To fight, in order to clear themselves a way? They had just tried that plan, but not succeeded. To retire upon Genoa, or to cross the Upper Po, for the purpose of forcing the Tessino? These courses, difficult before the battle, were impracticable since it had been fought and lost. General Suchet was a few leagues in rear with the army of Liguria, towards Acqui; General Bonaparte was in advance of Alexandria, with the victorious army of reserve. They were on the point of effecting their junction, and cutting off the road to Genoa. General Moncey, who, with the detachments which had come from Germany, was guarding the Tessino, might be succoured by General Bonaparte in as short a time as it would take to march to him. Thus there was no chance of escape on any side, and they were compelled to adopt the cruel idea of capitulating: happy if, in abandoning Italy, they could save the liberty of the Austrian army, and if they could obtain from the generosity of the conqueror the concession that those unfortunate troops should not be made prisoners of war. In consequence, it was resolved that a flag of truce should be sent to General Bonaparte, for the purpose of entering into negotiations. Prince Lichtenstein was selected to repair, next morning, June 15th (26th Prairial), to the French headquarters.

The First Consul, on his part, had many reasons for treating. His principal aim was attained, for Italy was delivered by a single battle. After the victory which he had just won, and which enabled him completely to hem in the Austrians, he was certain to obtain the evacuation of Italy; he might even, in strictness, require the vanquished to lay down their arms, and to surrender themselves prisoners. But, by wounding the honour of those brave men, he might, perhaps, urge them to an act of despair. It would be spilling useless blood, and, above all, it would be losing time. Having been absent from Paris for above a month, he was sensible how important it was that he should return as speedily as possible. We had a prisoner, who was capable of being a most useful medium of communication. This was General Zach. To him the First Consul opened his mind; he expressed, in his presence, his sincere desire to make peace, his disposition to spare the imperial army, and to grant it honourable terms. The Austrian flag of truce having meanwhile arrived, he manifested before that envoy the same sentiments

that he had expressed to M. de Zach, and charged both of them to return with Berthier to M. de Melas, to settle the bases of a capitulation. According to his custom in all cases of this kind, he declared irrevocably the conditions already fixed in his own mind, adding that no parleying would induce him to modify them. Thus he refrained from insisting that the army of the Austrians should be declared prisoners of war; he was willing to allow it to pass with the honours of war; but he required that all the fortresses of Liguria, Piedmont, Lombardy, and the Legations should be immediately given up to France, and that the Austrians should evacuate all Italy as far as the Mincio. The negotiators set out forthwith for the Austrian headquarters.

The conditions which they brought, though rigorous, were natural, one might even say generous. One only was mortifying, almost humiliating; this was the surrender of Genoa, after such effusion of blood, and after an occupation of a few days only; but evidently the conqueror could not waive this point. M. de Melas, nevertheless, sent his principal negotiator to the First Consul, to make some remonstrances against the proposed armistice. "Sir," said the First Consul, with warmth, "my conditions are irrevocable. It was not yesterday that I began my military life; your position is as well known to me as to yourselves. You are in Alexandria, incumbered with dead, wounded, sick, destitute of provisions; you have lost the best troops of your army, and are surrounded on all sides. There is nothing that I might not require, but I respect the grey hair of your general, and the valour of your troops, and I require nothing more than is imperatively demanded by the present situation of affairs. Return to Alexandria; do what you will, you shall have no other conditions."

The convention was signed at Alexandria on that same day, the 15th, according to the bases proposed by General Bonaparte. It was agreed, in the first place, that there should be a suspension of arms in Italy till the receipt of an answer from Vienna. If the convention was confirmed, the Austrians were to be at liberty to retire with the honours of war behind the line of the Mincio. They engaged, in retiring, to deliver up to the French all the fortresses which they occupied. The citadels of Tortona, Alexandria, Milan, Arona, and Piacenza were to be delivered up between the 16th and the 20th of June (27th Prairial, and 1st Messidor); the citadels of Ceva, Savona, the fortresses of Coni and Genoa, between the 16th and the 24th of June; and the fort of Urbino on the 26th. The Austrian army was to be divided into three columns, which were to retire one after another, as fast as the fortresses were delivered up. The immense stores of provisions, accumulated by M. de Melas in Italy, were divided equally; the artillery of



the Italian foundries was assigned to the French army, the artillery of the Austrian foundries to the imperial army. The Imperialists, after they had evacuated Lombardy as far as the Mincio, were to confine themselves behind the following line—the Mincio, the Fossa Maestra, the left bank of the Po, from Borgo Forte to the mouth of the river in the Adriatic. Peschiera and Mantua were left to the Austrian army. It was stipulated, without any explanation, that the detachment of that army, then in Tuscany, should continue to occupy that province. Concerning the States of the Pope and the King of Naples, no mention could be made in this capitulation, because those princes had nothing to do with events passing in Upper Italy. If this convention was not ratified by the emperor, ten days' notice of the resumption of hostilities was to be given. In the meantime, no detachment was to be sent off to Germany by either party.

Such was the substance of the celebrated convention of Alexandria, that in one day gained for France the restitution of Upper Italy, which involved the restitution of the whole of Italy. M. de Melas has since been censured much, and much too severely, for this campaign and this convention. We ought to be just towards misfortune, especially when it is redeemed by conduct full of honour. M. de Melas was deceived, respecting the existence of the army of reserve, by the cabinet of Vienna, which was incessantly feeding him with the most mischievous illusions. When once undeceived, he may be censured for not having collected his troops either soon enough, or completely enough, and for having left too many men in the fortresses. It was, in fact, not behind the walls of those places, but on the field of battle of Marengo, that they ought to have been defended. Admitting this fault, it must be acknowledged that M. de Melas conducted himself as brave men do when they are surrounded; he strove to cut his way through, sword in hand. The attempt was most gallantly made, and he was vanquished. From that time there was but one thing possible for him to do, and that was, to save the liberty of his army, for Italy was irrecoverably lost to him. He could not obtain more than he did obtain: he might even, had the conqueror so willed it, have been subjected to further humiliations. And the conqueror himself did well not to require more, since, had he determined to humble these brave men, he would have incurred the risk of driving them to desperate extremities, and of losing valuable time, his presence in Paris being at that moment indispensable. Let us, then, pity M. de Melas, and admire, without reserve, the conduct of the victor, who owed the prodigious results of this campaign, not to chance, but to the most profound and the most marvellously executed combinations.

Some detractors of General Bonaparte have pretended to attribute to General Kellermann the victory of Marengo and all the results which that memorable battle brought in its train. Why then, if General Bonaparte must be stripped of this glory, not ascribe it to that noble victim of the happiest inspiration, to that Desaix, who, anticipating the orders of his chief, sacrificed his life, but won the day? Or why not ascribe it to that intrepid defender of Genoa, who, by detaining the Austrians on the Apennines, gave General Bonaparte time to descend from the Alps, and delivered them up to him almost half destroyed? According to some people, Generals Kellermann, Desaix, and Masséna would be the real conquerors of Marengo—all, excepting General Bonaparte. But, in this world, the voice of nations has always decreed glory, and the voice of nations has proclaimed conqueror him, who discovered, with the glance of genius, the use that might be made of the High Alps for debouching on the rear of the Austrians, who deceived their vigilance for three successive months, who created an army which did not exist, who caused its formation to be disbelieved by all Europe, who crossed the St. Bernard without beaten road, appeared unexpectedly in the midst of Italy; confounded with astonishment, surrounded his unfortunate adversary with marvellous art, and fought with him a decisive battle, lost in the morning, regained in the evening, and sure to have been regained, if not on that day, yet on the next: for besides Desaix's 6000 men, 10,000 hastening up from the Tessino, and 10,000 posted on the Lower Po, would have furnished infallible means for destroying the hostile army. Let us suppose, in fact, the Austrians, victorious on the 14th of June, entering the defile of La Stradella, finding at Piacenza Generals Duhesme and Loison, with 10,000 men, ready to dispute with them the passage of the Po, and at their heels General Bonaparte, reinforced by Generals Desaix and Moncey; what would the Austrians have done in that dangerous place, stopped by a well-defended river, and pursued by an army superior in number? They would have succumbed more disastrously than in the plains of the Bormida. The real conqueror of Marengo was, therefore, he who chained Fortune by his combinations, profound, admirable, unequalled in the history of great captains.

For the rest, he was ably served by his lieutenants, and there is no need to sacrifice any glory for the purpose of building up his. Masséna, by an heroic defence of Genoa—Desaix, by the most happy determination—Lannes, by incomparable firmness in the plain of Marengo—Kellermann, by a splendid charge of cavalry—all aided him in his triumph. He rewarded them all in the most signal manner; and, as for Desaix, he evinced for his death the noblest sorrow. The First Consul decreed

magnificent honours to the man who had rendered France so important a service; he even adopted his military family and placed about his own person his two aides-de-camp, who were thrown out of employment by the death of their general: these were Colonels Rapp and Savary.

Before he left the field of battle of Marengo, the First Consul resolved to write another letter to the Emperor of Germany. Though the first had elicited only an indirect answer, addressed by M. de Thugut to M. de Talleyrand, he conceived that in the hour of victory he might condescend to renew his rejected overtures. At this moment he was most ardently desirous of peace: he felt that, to give peace to France abroad, as he had pacified it at home, was his real vocation, and that the accomplishment of this task would legitimatise his nascent authority much more than new victories could possibly do. Susceptible, moreover, of the strongest impressions, he had been most deeply touched on beholding that plain of Marengo, on which lay a fourth of two armies: under the influence of these sentiments, he wrote a singular letter to the emperor. "It is on the field of battle," said he, "amidst the sufferings of a multitude of wounded, and surrounded by 15,000 dead, that I beseech your Majesty to listen to the voice of humanity, and not to permit two brave nations to slaughter each other for interests which are foreign to both. It is for me to urge your Majesty; since I am nearer than you to the theatre of war, your heart cannot be so strongly impressed as mine."

The letter was long. The First Consul discussed in it, with the eloquence peculiar to himself, and in language which was not that of diplomacy, the motives which France and Austria could still have for continuing armed against one another. "Is it for religion that you are fighting?" said he. "In this case, make war upon the Russians and the English, who are the enemies of your faith, and be not their ally. Is it to check the progress of revolutionary principles? But the war has propagated them over half the continent, by extending the conquests of France, and it cannot but propagate them still farther. Is it for the balance of power in Europe? But the English threaten that balance more than we do; for they are become the masters and the tyrants of commerce, and nobody can now match them; whereas Europe will always be able to control France, if she were seriously to threaten the independence of nations. [A proposition unfortunately but too well founded, as a war of fifteen years has but too fully proved!] Is it," added the warrior diplomatist, "is it for the integrity of the Germanic Empire? But your Majesty has yourself given up to us Mayence and the German States on the left bank of the Rhine. Besides, the Empire is earnestly entreating you to give it peace. Is it.

lastly, for the interests of the house of Austria? Nothing is more natural; but let us carry out the treaty of Campo Formio, which secures to your Majesty large indemnities in compensation of the provinces lost in the Netherlands, and ensures them to you in that quarter where you had rather obtain them, that is, in Italy. Let your Majesty send negotiators whithersoever you please, and we will add to the treaty of Campo Formio stipulations capable of satisfying you relative to the existence of the secondary States, which the French Republic is charged with having shaken." The First Consul here alluded to Holland, Switzerland, Piedmont, the Roman States, Tuscany, and Naples, which the Directory had revolutionised. "On these conditions," he added, "peace is made; let us extend the armistice to both armies, and enter into immediate negotiations."

M. de St. Julien, one of the generals who possessed the confidence of the emperor, was to be the bearer of this letter and of the convention of Alexandria to Vienna.

Some days afterwards, his first impressions having somewhat worn off, the First Consul felt that species of regret which he often experienced, when he happened to write an important paper from the first impulse, and without consulting cooler minds than his own. In apprising the Consuls of the step he had taken, he said, "I have despatched a courier to the emperor with a letter which the minister of foreign affairs will communicate to you. *You will find it rather original*; but it was written on the field of battle. (June 22nd.)

Having taken leave of his army, he set out for Milan on the morning of the 17th of June (28th Prairial), three days after the victory of Marengo. He was awaited there with keen impatience. He arrived about dark. The population, forewarned, thronged the streets to see him pass. They raised shouts of joy, and threw flowers into his carriage. The city was illuminated with that brilliancy which the Italians alone understand the art of displaying on such occasions. The Lombards, who had just borne for ten or twelve months the Austrian yoke, rendered more galling by the war and the violence of circumstances, trembled for fear of being replaced under their insupportable authority. During the various phases of this short campaign, in which the most contrary reports reached them, they had experienced the most painful anxiety, and they were transported with joy to see their deliverance at last ensured. General Bonaparte ordered the re-establishment of the Cisalpine Republic to be immediately proclaimed, and hastened to introduce some order into the affairs of Italy, the aspect of which was completely changed by his recent victory.

We have already observed that the war, undertaken by the formidable coalition of the Russians, the English, and the Austrians,

to re-establish in their dominions the princes overthrown by the alleged encroachments of the Directory, had not replaced any of them. The King of Piedmont was at Rome, and the Grand Duke of Tuscany in Austria; the Pope had died at Valence, and his provinces were invaded by the Neapolitans. The royal family of Naples, entirely devoted to the English, was alone in its dominions. The Queen of Naples, Sir John Acton, and Lord Nelson permitted, if they did not order, abominable cruelties. The victory of the French Republic was destined to change all this: humanity was as much interested in the matter as policy.

The First Consul instituted a provisional government in Milan, till the Cisalpine could be reorganised, and definitive frontiers assigned to it, which would not be possible before peace. He did not conceive that he was obliged to pay more regard to the King of Piedmont than Austria had shown for him, and therefore he was in no hurry to re-establish him in his dominions. He appointed instead a provisional government, and nominated General Jourdan commissioner to this government, with the direction of which he was charged. The First Consul had long wished to employ, and to withdraw from his enemies, this wise and honest man, not at all fitted to be the head of the anarchists in France. Piedmont, therefore, was held in reserve, with the intention of disposing of it at the peace, either for the profit of the French Republic, or as a pledge of reconciliation with Europe, when reconstituting her secondary States, destroyed under the Directory. Tuscany was to continue occupied by an Austrian corps. The First Consul caused it to be watched, ready to lay hands on it if the English should land, or if more men should be raised against France. As for Naples, he said nothing, he did nothing, waiting to see the effect of his victory on the spirit of that court. The Queen of Naples, in affright, was already preparing to set out for Vienna, to solicit the support of Austria, and, more especially, that of Russia.

There remained the court of Rome: here temporal interests were bound up with the most important spiritual interests. Pius VI., as we have seen, had recently died in France, the prisoner of the Directory. The First Consul, true to his policy, had caused funeral honours to be paid to him. A conclave had assembled at Venice, and had, with great difficulty, obtained permission from the Austrian cabinet to appoint a successor to the deceased Pope. Thirty-five cardinals attended this conclave. A prelate was secretary: this was Monsignor Consalvi, a Roman priest, young, ambitious, remarkable for the pliancy, the penetration, the agreeable qualities of his mind, and who has since been mixed up with the most important affairs of the time. The conclave, as usual in all elections, political or religious, was divided. Twenty-two of its members sided with Cardinal Braschi, nephew of the late

Pope, and supported the pretensions of Cardinal Bellisomi, Bishop of Cesena. Those who were unwilling to perpetuate at Rome the all-powerful influence of the Braschi family joined Cardinal Antonelli, who was in favour of Cardinal Mattei, who signed the treaty of Tolentino. But they gave him only thirteen votes. For several months this silent but obstinate contest had been going on. Neither of the two competitors had as yet gained any votes from the other. At length the learned Cardinal Gerdil, who had figured in the controversies of the last century, was thought of. This new candidate was a native of Savoy, and had become, since the victories of the Republic, a subject of France. Austria exercised her right of exclusion against him. To put an end to the matter, two members of the conclave deserted Cardinal Mattei, and promised to support Cardinal Bellisomi, which ensured him twenty-four votes, that is, two-thirds, the number rigorously required by the laws of the Church to render an election valid. But, as the assembly was held in the dominions of Austria, it was thought proper first to submit to her this nomination, in order to obtain her tacit assent. The court of Vienna had the discourtesy to let more than a month elapse before returning an answer. The susceptibility of the princes of the Church was wounded; at the same time the plans of all parties were upset, and the election of Cardinal Bellisomi became impossible. This moment of disorder and fatigue the able secretary of the conclave, the prelate Consalvi, had been waiting for, to start a fresh candidate, the object of his long and secret meditations. Addressing himself to each party in that language which was most likely to touch it, he demonstrated to one the inconveniences of the preponderance of the Braschi; to another the little reliance that could be placed on Austria, or the other Christian courts: then, appealing to the old Roman interest, so profound, so sagacious, he unfolded to their astonished eyes a prospect absolutely new to them all. "It is from France," said he to them, "that we have suffered persecution for these ten years past. Well, it is from France that we may, perhaps, derive future support and consolation. France, ever since the days of Charlemagne, has always been the most useful, the least irksome of protectors. A young and very extraordinary man, of whom it is still very difficult to form a judgment, now rules that country, and, depend upon it, he will very soon have reconquered Italy. [The battle of Marengo had not then been fought.] Recollect that he protected the priests in 1797, and that he has, quite recently, paid funeral honours to Pius VI. Singular expressions which he has been heard to use, on the subject of religion and of the court of Rome, have been repeated to us by witnesses worthy of credit. Do not neglect the support which you may derive from that quarter. Let us make a final choice that cannot

be considered as an hostility to France ; that may even, up to a certain point, be agreeable to her ; and we shall, perhaps, do a thing more serviceable to the Church than applying for candidates to all the Catholic courts in Europe."

This was certainly a flash from that genius of the court of Rome which afterwards blazed forth at the commencement of the present century. Monsignor Consalvi then put forward the name of Cardinal Chiaramonti, Bishop of Imola. It was impossible to make a choice more consonant with the end which he had in view. Cardinal Chiaramonti, a native of Cesena, aged fifty-eight years, related to Pius VI., elevated by him to the Roman purple, had long been universally esteemed for his understanding, his learning, and his aimable character. With these attractive qualities he united great firmness ; and he had been seen at an earlier period struggling with a victorious fortitude against the annoyances of his Order, that of St. Benedict, and the persecutions of the Holy Office. His most recent and most celebrated act was a homily written in quality of Bishop of Imola, when his diocese had been united with the Cisalpine Republic. He had then spoken of the French Revolution with a moderation which had charmed the conqueror of Italy, and scandalised the fanatics of the old order of things. Respected, nevertheless, by everybody, he pleased the Braschi party, was not disliked by the contrary party, suited all the cardinals, weary of the length of the conclave, and was deemed a happy choice by those who hoped much from the good-will of France in future. The unexpected adhesion of an illustrious personage decided his election, which, in fact, met with no real difficulty but in his personal reluctance to accept such an honour. This adhesion was that of Cardinal Maury. This celebrated champion of the ancient French monarchy had retired to the court of Rome, where he lived, rewarded by a cardinal's hat for his struggles with Barnave and Mirabeau. He was an emigrant, but an emigrant endowed with a remarkable mind, extraordinary sense, and cherishing with secret satisfaction the idea of attaching himself again to the government of France, since glory redeemed the novelty of that government. He could dispose of six votes, and gave them to Cardinal Chiaramonti, who was elected Pope nearly at the moment of the arrival of General Bonaparte at Milan, after crossing the St. Bernard.

The new Pontiff was at Venice, having been unable to obtain from the court of Vienna permission to be crowned at St. Mark's, or from the court of Naples the restitution of Rome. However, having set out almost suddenly to proceed to Ancona, he negotiated in that city the evacuation of the States of the Church, and his own return to the capital of the Christian world. France, which had become friendly towards the Holy See, had it in her

power to afford him very timely support in this precarious position, and the singular foresight of Monsignor Consalvi might receive its fulfilment in a manner which was altogether unexpected. This meeting of Cardinal Chiaramonti and the First Consul, the one raised to the pontifical throne, the other to the republican dictatorship, nearly at the same time, was not one of the least extraordinary or the least fertile in consequences of the events of the present century.

Young Bonaparte, in 1796, the submissive general of the Directory, unable as yet to dare everything, and not as yet pretending to school the French Revolution, had maintained the Pope by the treaty of Tolentino, and had taken from him nothing but the Legations for the purpose of annexing them to the Cisalpine Republic. Having now become First Consul, having it in his power to do what he thought fit, determined to rectify many of the things which the French Revolution had accomplished, he could not hesitate as to his conduct towards the recently elected Pope. No sooner had he returned to Milan than he had an interview with Cardinal Martiniana, Bishop of Vercelli, a friend of Pius VII.'s, declared to him that he was resolved to live on good terms with the Holy See, to reconcile the French Revolution with the Church, even to support the latter against her enemies, if the new Pope showed himself reasonable, and thoroughly comprehended the then situation of France and of the world. This intimation, dropped into the ear of the aged cardinal, was not destined to be lost, and was soon to produce abundant fruit. The Bishop of Vercelli despatched to Rome his own nephew, Count Alciati, to open a negotiation.

To this overture General Bonaparte added an act which was still bolder, and in which he durst not have indulged in Paris; but he was delighted to make the news of it travel from a distance into France, as a token of his future intentions. The Italians had made preparations for a solemn *Te Deum* in the ancient cathedral of Milan. He determined to be present at the ceremony, and, on the 18th of June (29th Prairial), he wrote these words to the Consuls: "To-day, in spite of all that our Paris atheists may say, I am going in great state to the *Te Deum* which is to be sung in the cathedral of Milan." (Archives of the State Paper Office.)

After he had thus turned his mind to the general affairs of Italy, he made some indispensable arrangements for the distribution of the army in the conquered country, and for its subsistence and reorganisation. Masséna had just joined him. The ill-humour of the defender of Genoa was dispelled by the flattering reception which the First Consul gave him, and he was appointed to the command of the army of Italy, to which he was so well entitled. This army was composed of the corps which had



defended Genoa, of that which had defended the Var, of the troops which had crossed the St. Bernard, and of those under General Moncey, which had come from Germany. These together formed an imposing mass of 80,000 tried men. The First Consul quartered them in the rich plains of the Po, to give them rest after their fatigues, and to indemnify them for their privations by the abundance which they would there enjoy.

With his accustomed foresight, the First Consul ordered the forts and citadels which closed the passes between France and Italy to be blown up. In consequence, the demolition of the forts of Arona, Bard, and Seravalle, and of the citadels of Ceva and Ivrea, was prescribed and executed. He fixed the extent of the contributions, which were to serve for the subsistence of the army, and the mode in which they were to be levied: despatched the consular guard himself, calculating the days' marches in such a manner that it should arrive in Paris in time for the festival of the 14th of July,\* which, according to his intentions, was to be celebrated with great pomp. He took the trouble while yet at Milan to regulate the details of that fête. "It is necessary," he writes, "to study to make the solemnity of the 14th of July a brilliant one, and not to let it *ape* the rejoicings which have hitherto taken place. Chariot-races might be very well in Greece, where they fought in chariots. They are out of place and unmeaning in France." (Milan, June 22nd. State Paper Office.) He forbade triumphal arches to be erected for him, observing, that he wished for no other triumphal arch than the public satisfaction.

If the First Consul, notwithstanding the urgent interests that called for his presence at Paris, did tarry ten days at Milan, it was that he might thoroughly assure himself of the punctual execution of the convention of Alexandria. He mistrusted Austrian honesty, and even imagined that he perceived some delay in the delivery of certain places. He immediately stormed against the weakness of Berthier, and ordered the second and third columns of the army of M. de Melas to be detained. The first had already set out. There was reason for some fears respecting Genoa, in particular, which the Austrians might easily be tempted to deliver up to the English, before the French had time to take possession of it. In fact, the Prince of Hohenzollern, either of his own accord, or instigated by the English, refused at this moment to give up to Masséna's troops a place which the Austrians had found it so difficult to take. M. de Melas, when informed of these demurs, enjoined his lieutenant, in the most honourable manner, to fulfil the convention of Alexandria, threatening, if he resisted, to give him up to the consequences liable to be brought upon him by such

\* The anniversary of the storming of the Bastille in 1789.

an act of perfidy. The injunction of M. de Melas was obeyed, and Genoa was delivered to the French on the 24th of June, amidst the rejoicings of the Ligurian patriots, freed in so few days from the presence of the Austrians and the domination of the oligarchy. Thus was fulfilled the spirited declaration of Masséna, "I swear to you that I will be back again in Genoa before a fortnight is over!"

All this being done, the First Consul set out from Milan on the 24th of June, with Duroc, his favourite aide-de-camp, Bessières, commandant of the consular guard, M. de Bourrienne, his secretary, and Savary, one of the two officers whom he had attached to his person in memory of Desaix. He stopped a few hours at Turin, to give orders for works at the citadel, crossed Mont Cenis, and entered Lyons under triumphal arches, amidst the population, amazed at the prodigies which had been just accomplished. The Lyonnais, who were equally smitten with his glory and his policy, beset the Hôtel des Celestins, where he had alighted, and absolutely insisted on seeing him. He was obliged to show himself. Unanimous acclamations burst forth at sight of him. He was so earnestly solicited to lay the first stone of the Place Bellecour, the rebuilding of which was about to be commenced, that he could not help complying. He passed a day at Lyons, amidst the concourse of all the inhabitants of the environs. Having addressed the Lyonnais in terms which delighted them, relative to the speedy re-establishment of peace, order, and commerce, he set out for Paris. The inhabitants of the country thronged together at every place through which he passed. This man, so kindly treated by Fortune, keenly enjoyed his glory, and yet, conversing incessantly by the way with his travelling companions, he made this grand remark, which so finely expresses his insatiable thirst of renown. "Yes," said he, "in less than two years I have conquered Cairo, Milan, Paris; and yet, were I to die to-morrow, I should not have half a page in a Universal History." He arrived in the night between the 2nd and 3rd of July at Paris.

His return was necessary, for, having been away from the capital nearly two months, his absence, especially at the moment of the false news of Marengo, had given rise to some intrigues. It was even believed for a moment that he was either dead or vanquished, and ambitious persons had set themselves to work. Some thought of Carnot, others of M. de la Fayette, who had been released from Olmütz, through the kindness of the First Consul, and returned to France. They were for making Carnot or M. de la Fayette president of the Republic. M. de la Fayette had no hand in these intrigues; no more had Carnot. But Joseph and Lucien Bonaparte conceived, and most unjustly, a mistrust of the latter, which they infused also into their brother.

Hence that unlucky resolution, which the First Consul executed a little later, to take the portfolio of war from Carnot. Some even imagined that they could perceive in Messrs. de Talleyrand and Fouché, who hated one another, a tendency to be reconciled, no doubt for the purpose of concerting their schemes, and profiting together by recent events. On this occasion not the slightest symptom of stir was visible on the part of M. Sieyès, the man best entitled to lead the country, in case General Bonaparte should have disappeared from the scene. But he was the only one who showed so much reserve. All this, however, had scarcely time to betray itself, so speedily were the bad tidings superseded by good. But what had passed was greatly exaggerated in the relation, and the First Consul conceived against certain persons a resentment, which he had the good sense to conceal, and even to forget entirely, in regard to all those who had been mentioned to him, one only excepted, the illustrious Carnot. The First Consul, moreover, wholly engrossed by joy at his successes, was desirous that, at this moment, not the slightest cloud should arise to overshadow the public felicity. He gave a gracious reception to all, and was himself welcomed with transport, especially by those who had reason to reproach themselves. The populace of Paris, on hearing of his return, collected under the windows of the Tuileries, and thronged, during the whole day, the courts and the garden of the palace. The First Consul was several times obliged to show himself to the crowd. At night, the city of Paris was spontaneously illuminated. People were eager to celebrate a miraculous victory, the certain presage of an ardently desired peace. This day so deeply touched him who was the object of this homage that, twenty years afterwards, in loneliness, in exile, a prisoner amidst the solitude of the Atlantic Ocean, he mentioned it among his recollections as one of the happiest of his life.

On the following day, the bodies of the State waited upon him, and set the first example of those congratulations, the irksome spectacle of which we have since seen so often repeated, and in every reign. This spectacle was then new, and there was an adequate motive for it. There appeared successively at the Tuileries, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunal, the chief tribunals, the Prefecture of the Seine, the civil and military authorities, the directors of the Bank of France, lastly, the Institute, and the scientific societies. These great bodies hastened to compliment the conqueror of Marengo, and addressed him in such language as kings were formerly addressed, as they have since been addressed in. But it must be admitted that this language, though uniformly that of praise, was dictated by a sincere enthusiasm. In fact, the aspect of things changed in a few months: security succeeding deep alarm; an unparalleled

victory replacing France at the head of the powers of Europe; the certainty of a speedy peace putting an end to the anxieties of a general war; in short, prosperity already showing itself on all sides. How could such great results, so speedily realised, fail to transport the nation? The president of the Senate concluded his address, which may convey an idea of all the others, in these terms:—

“We take pleasure in acknowledging that to you the country owes its salvation; that to you the Republic will owe its consolidation, and the people a prosperity, which you have in one day made to succeed ten years of the most stormy of revolutions.”

While these things were passing in Italy and in France, Moreau, on the banks of the Danube, continued his glorious campaign against M. de Kray. We left him manœuvring about Ulm, to oblige the Austrians to quit that stronghold. He had posted himself between the Iller and the Lech, supporting his left and his right on those two rivers, turning his face to the Danube, his back to the city of Augsburg, ready to receive M. de Kray, if he chose to fight, and meanwhile barring the road to the Alps, which was the essential feature of the general plan. If the successes of Moreau had not been either prompt or decisive, they had been steady and sufficient to allow the First Consul to accomplish in Italy what he purposed to do there. But the moment was come when the general of the army of the Rhine, emboldened by time and by the success of the army of reserve, was resolved on trying a serious manœuvre, to dislodge M. de Kray from the position of Ulm. Now that, though he knew nothing about the battle of Marengo, he had heard, however, of the successful passage of the Alps, Moreau, no longer fearful of uncovering the mountains, had full liberty in his movements. Of the different manœuvres possible for effecting the fall of the position of Ulm, he preferred that which consisted in crossing the Danube below that place, and forcing M. de Kray to decamp, by threatening to cut off his line of retreat. This manœuvre was, in fact, the best; for that which consisted in pushing straight on by Munich for Vienna was too bold for the character of Moreau, and perhaps premature, in the general state of affairs. That which would have consisted in crossing above and quite close to Ulm, and storming the Austrian camp, was hazardous, like every attack by main force. But to cross below Ulm, and, by threatening, to cut off M. de Kray's line of retreat, to oblige him to retire and secure it, was at once the most prudent and the safest manœuvre.

From the 15th to the 18th of June, Moreau set himself in motion to execute his new resolution. The organisation of his army, as we have said, had been somewhat changed in consequence of the departure of Generals St. Cyr and St. Suzanne.

Lecourbe still formed the right, and Moreau the centre, at the head of the corps of reserve. The corps of St. Cyr, transferred to General Grenier, formed the left. The corps of St. Suzanne, reduced to the proportions of a strong division, and given to the daring Richepanse, was to perform the office of a corps of flankers, which, at this moment, was employed in observing Ulm, while the rest of the army was manœuvring below it.

There had been some fighting about Ulm, in particular on the 5th of June, when two French divisions had made head against 40,000 Austrians. This was an expedient of M. de Kray's to keep us before Ulm, by giving us plenty of occupation. On the 18th of June, Richepanse was in sight of Ulm; Grenier, with the left, at Guntzburg; the centre, composed of the corps of reserve, at Burgau; Lecourbe, with the right, extended to Dillingen. The enemy had cut all the bridges from Ulm to Donauwerth. But a reconnaissance made by Lecourbe had decided Moreau to choose the points of Blindheim and Gremheim for crossing the Danube, because at these two points the bridges were imperfectly cut, and might easily be repaired. Lecourbe was charged with this perilous operation. To facilitate it for him, he was reinforced by General Boyer with five battalions, and by the whole reserve of cavalry, under the command of General d'Hautpoul. The centre, under the general-in-chief, moved even from Burgau to Aislingen, to be at hand to support the passage. Grenier, with the left, had orders to make an attempt on his side to attract the attention of the enemy.

On the morning of the 19th of June, Lecourbe had posted his troops between the villages of Blindheim and Gremheim, the bridges of which were but half destroyed, and he took care to shelter himself behind some clumps of trees. He had no bridge equipage, in fact, nothing but a quantity of planks. He made up by daring courage for the want of everything else. General Gudin directed, under Lecourbe, this attempt to cross. Some pieces of artillery were planted on the bank of the Danube, to keep off the enemy; at the same time, the Adjutant Quenot bravely swam off, for the purpose of seizing two large craft, which were lying on the other side. This courageous officer brought them away under a shower of balls, and returned with only a slight wound on the foot. The best swimmers in the divisions were then selected; they deposited their clothes and their arms in the two barks, and plunged into the water under the enemy's fire. On reaching the other bank, without even taking time to put on their clothes, they seized their arms, dashed upon some companies of Austrians who guarded that part of the river, dispersed them, and took from them two pieces of cannon with the ammunition waggons. This done, our men hastened to the bridges, the props of which were still standing;

they worked away on both banks and made use of ladders and planks to re-establish some sort of communication. Some French artillerymen availed themselves of it to cross to the other side of the Danube, and turned against the enemy the two pieces of cannon which had been taken from him. We were soon masters of both banks; and the bridges were sufficiently repaired to afford passage to the greater part of the troops. The infantry and cavalry began to debouch. It was to be expected that numerous Austrian reinforcements would promptly ascend from Donauwerth, and others descend from all the upper positions, Gundelfingen, Guntzburg, and Ulm. Lecourbe, who had repaired himself to the spot, caused such infantry as he could spare, and some troops of horse, to be placed in the village of Schwenningen, which was on the road to Donauwerth. This was an important point; for it was that way by which the Austrians ascending the Danube must come. Accordingly, it was not long before 4000 infantry, 500 horse, and six pieces of cannon made their appearance, and attacked the village, which in less than two hours was several times lost and retaken. The numerical superiority of the Austrians, however, and their obstinate determination to recover an important position, had well-nigh triumphed over our troops, and obliged them to abandon the village, when Lecourbe received a seasonable reinforcement of two squadrons of carabineers. He united with them a few troops of the 8th hussars, which he had at hand, and pushed them upon the enemy's infantry, extended over the spacious plain to the banks of the Danube. This charge was executed with such vigour and promptness that the Austrians were driven back, and left us their artillery, 2000 prisoners, and 300 horses. Two battalions of Wurtembergers, endeavouring to keep their ground by forming into squares, were broken like the others. After this brilliant action, fought by Puthod's brigades, Lecourbe had nothing more to fear from the quarter of the Lower Danube. But that was not the side from which the greatest danger was likely to come. The bulk of the Austrians being posted above, that is to say, at Dillingen, Gundelfingen, and Ulm, it was necessary to turn towards that side, to face the enemy who was about to descend from it. Luckily, Montrichard's and Gudin's divisions and d'Hautpoul's reserve had crossed by the repaired bridges of Gremheim and Blindheim, and bordered the celebrated plain of Hochstett, rendered sadly famous for us in the time of Louis XIV. (13th of August 1704). The enemy, having hastened from the nearest points to Dillingen, at some distance from Hochstett, was drawn up near the Danube, the infantry on our left, along the marshes of the river, and behind some clumps of trees; the cavalry in very strong force on our right. They thus presented themselves in good order, awaiting

the reinforcements which were coming, and retiring slowly, to draw nearer to those reinforcements. The 37th demi-brigade and a squadron of the 9th hussars followed step by step the retrograde movement of the Austrians. Lecourbe, having rid himself by the action at Schwenningen of any enemy that could come from the Lower Danube, had arrived at a gallop, at the head of the 2nd regiment of carabineers, the cuirassiers, the 6th and 9th cavalry, and lastly, the 9th hussars. This was nearly the whole of General d'Hautpoul's reserve of cavalry. They were on level ground, and separated from the enemy by a streamlet, the Egge, on which was a village, that of Schrezheim. Lecourbe, at the head of the cuirassiers, galloped through the village, formed them on debouching, and pushed them upon the Austrian cavalry, which, surprised by this vigorous and sudden charge, fell back in disorder, leaving uncovered the 9000 infantry whom it was destined to protect. These foot-soldiers, thus abandoned, would have thrown themselves into the ditches which furrow the banks of the Danube about Dillingen; but the cuirassiers, judiciously commanded, cut the column, and separated 1800 men, who became our prisoners.

This was the second successful action that day, gained in part by the cavalry, and it was not the last. Lecourbe placed himself on the Egge, waiting for the rest of his reserves, which were to arrive by the bridge of Dillingen, which had fallen into our hands. But M. de Kray's cavalry hastened up with all possible expedition, outstripping the infantry, and formed in two great lines in the plain behind Lauingen. This was an opportunity for our cavalry to profit by the ardour which the successes of the morning had excited, and to measure themselves in the plain with the numerous and brilliant squadrons of the Austrian army. Lecourbe, having ordered his infantry to occupy Lauingen, united all the cavalry of his divisions with d'Hautpoul's, and deployed it in the plain, offering to the enemy a species of combat which was likely to tempt him, on account of the number and the quality of his horse. The first Austrian line charged ours at full speed, with a regularity and a steadiness natural to highly trained cavalry. It drove back, in fact, the 2nd regiment of carabineers, which had behaved with such intrepidity in the morning, and some squadrons of hussars, which had charged with it. Our cuirassiers then advanced, rallied the carabineers and the hussars, who faced about on seeing themselves supported, and all together dashed with vigour upon the Austrian squadrons, which they drove back in their turn. At this sight, the second line of the enemy's cavalry advanced, and, having the advantage of impulsion over our troopers, who had become separated in the charge, obliged them to fall back precipitately. But the 6th was in reserve. Manœuvring with skill and boldness, it took the

Austrian cavalry in flank, surprised, threw it into confusion, and secured to our victorious squadrons the plain of Hochstett.

The losses in killed, wounded, and prisoners could not be very considerable, for it is only encounters of cavalry with infantry that are very serious. But we remained in possession of the plain, and our cavalry had just assumed a real superiority over that of the Austrians, which it never had before. All our arms had from this moment a decided ascendancy over those of the enemy. It was eight o'clock, and, in the long days of June, there was still time left for the Imperialists to dispute with us the left bank of the Danube, so gloriously conquered in the morning. Eight thousand infantry advanced, in fact, to the assistance of the corps already beaten, and they were followed by a numerous artillery. Moreau came up, meanwhile, at the head of all his reserves. A new and more obstinate battle ensued. The French infantry, in its turn, attacked the Austrian infantry, under a fire of balls and grape-shot. The soldiers of M. de Kray, who fought for an important point, the preservation of the position of Ulm, displayed extreme vigour. Moreau was several times personally engaged in the thick of the fray; but his infantry, supported by the cavalry, which had returned to the charge, finally remained victorious about eleven at night. At the same moment, the 37th demi-brigade entered Gundelfingen, and then all the positions in the plain were in our hands. We had crossed the Danube, taken 5000 prisoners, twenty pieces of cannon, 1200 horses, 300 carriages, and the considerable magazines of Donauwerth. The fighting had lasted eighteen successive hours. This operation, which changed the melancholy recollections of Hochstett into recollections of glory, was, next to Marengo, the most brilliant operation of the campaign. It was equally honourable to Lecourbe and to Moreau. The latter had slowly warmed into boldness; but at length, stimulated by the examples set in Italy, he had displayed tactics of a higher order, and he had just plucked a laurel from that tree from which the First Consul had gathered such glorious wreaths. Happy and noble rivalry, had it never extended any further!

After so bold and so decided a manœuvre on the part of his adversary, M. de Kray could no longer remain at Ulm without being cut off from his communication with Vienna. To march direct upon the French, for the purpose of giving them battle, would be too hazardous, with soldiers whose courage had been again rudely shaken by the last engagements. He hastened, therefore, to decamp that same night. He sent off before him the park, consisting of nearly a thousand carriages, and followed next day, with the main body of the army, by the Nordlingen road. He marched in dreadful weather, and on roads which were in a shocking state from the rain. Such was,



nevertheless, the rapidity of his retreat, that in twenty-four hours he reached Neresheim. To cheer his dispirited troops, he put in circulation a report that a suspension of arms had just been signed in Italy, that it was to be extended to Germany, and that peace could not fail to follow. This intelligence diffused joy among his soldiers, and imparted a degree of energy. They arrived at Nordlingen.

Moreau had been apprised too late of the departure of the enemy. Richepanse was not able to perceive the evacuation of Ulm till the last detachments were retiring, and he immediately communicated the intelligence to the commander-in-chief. But the Austrians had meanwhile gained the start, and the bad weather, which prevailed for two days, prevented the French from overtaking them by a forced march. Moreau, nevertheless, arrived at Nordlingen on the 23rd of June, in the evening, closely pressing the rear-guard of M. de Kray, who continued to retreat. Finding that, owing to the badness of the roads, he should not gain sufficiently upon the Austrian army to overtake it, and that he might be drawn on in a fruitless pursuit to unknown distances, Moreau resolved to halt, and to choose a position adapted to the present state of things. M. de Kray, concealing the joyful tidings of the victory of Marengo, which were not yet known in the French camp, sent him word, however, of the suspension of arms concluded in Italy, and proposed the like for Germany. Moreau, suspecting from this that important events had taken place beyond the Alps, and not doubting that they were propitious, and expecting every moment to receive a courier to inform him of them, would not conclude anything before he was acquainted with the particulars, and, above all, before he had conquered better cantonnments for his troops. He resolved to recross the Danube, to charge Richepanse with the investment of the two principal places situated on that river, Ulm and Ingolstadt, to proceed with the bulk of his army beyond the Lech, to occupy Augsburg and Munich, and thus to secure part of Bavaria to draw provisions from, and, lastly, to make himself master of the bridges over the Isar and of all the roads leading to the Inn.

Moreau accordingly recrossed the Danube and the Lech, at Donauwerth and Rhain, and marched his different corps, by Pottmess and Pfaffenhofen, to the banks of the Isar. He occupied, on that river, the points of Landshut, Moosburg, and Freisingen; and detached Decaen to Munich, which the latter entered, as in triumph, on the 28th of June. While he was executing this movement, the two armies met for the last time, falling in with each other unexpectedly, and being thus involved in an aimless combat. It was at Neuburg, on the right bank of the Danube, while both were marching for the Isar. A

French division, having separated too far from the rest of the army, had to sustain a long and obstinate action, in which it finally triumphed, after suffering a most severe loss, that of the brave Latour d'Auvergne. This illustrious soldier, honoured by General Bonaparte with the title of First Grenadier of France, was slain by the thrust of a lance which pierced his heart. The army shed tears upon his grave, and did not leave the field of battle till they had raised a monument over his grave.

On the 3rd of July (14th Messidor), Moreau was in the heart of Bavaria, blockading Ulm and Ingolstadt on the Danube, and occupying Landshut, Moosburg, Freisingen, and Munich on the Isar. It was now high time to think of the Tyrol, and to wrest from Prince Reuss the strong positions which he held along the mountains, at the sources of the Iller, the Lech, and the Isar—positions by means of which he could always annoy the French. He was not dangerous, it is true, but his presence obliged us to detach a considerable force, as he was an object which our right wing could never lose sight of. To this end, General Molitor was reinforced, and furnished with means for attacking the Grisons and the Tyrol. The positions of Fussen, Reitti, Immenstadt, and Feldkirch were successively taken in a prompt and brilliant manner, and our establishment on the Isar was thus perfectly consolidated.

M. de Kray had recrossed the Isar, and moved beyond the Inn, occupying the camp of Ampfing, in advance of that river, and the *têtes du pont* of Wasserburg and Muhldorf. It was now the middle of July (the end of Messidor). The French government had authorised General Moreau to act for what he might consider the best, and to lay aside his arms whenever he should judge fit. He thought, and very reasonably, that it was not right for him to be left fighting alone. The rest enjoyed by the troops in Italy was envied them by their fellow-soldiers in Germany; besides, the army of the Rhine, stationed between the Isar and the Inn, had a much more advanced position than the army of Italy, and thus had one of its flanks uncovered. Though a stipulation of the convention of Alexandria forbade the French, as well as the Austrians, to send detachments to Germany, it was possible that this stipulation might not be punctually observed, and that the army of the Rhine might soon have an unexpected increase of enemies upon its hands. Moreau, who had received several proposals from M. de Kray, resolved at length to listen to them, and, on the 15th of July (26th Messidor), he consented to sign, at Parsdorf, a place situated in advance of Munich, a suspension of arms nearly to the same purport as that of Italy.

The two armies were to retire each behind a line of demarcation, which, commencing at Balzers, in the Grisons, skirted the

Tyrol, ran between the Isar and the Inn, at an equal distance from both rivers, and then to the Danube, at Wilshofen, ascended that river to the mouth of the Altmuhl, and followed the Altmuhl, the Rednitz, and the Mayn, to Mayence. The fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt continued blockaded, but they were to receive, every fortnight, a quantity of provisions, proportionate to the strength of their garrisons. The two armies had to give twelve days' notice, in case of the renewal of hostilities. The French army would thus draw its provisions from Franconia, Swabia, and a great part of Bavaria. Our soldiers, posted on the Mincio, on one side of the Alps, on the Isar, on the other side, were about to receive compensation, in the rich plains of Italy and Germany, for their toils and their privations. These brave fellows had earned it by the noblest exploits that had yet signalised the arms of France. The army of the Rhine, though it had not shed so bright a lustre as the army of Italy, had, nevertheless, distinguished itself by a campaign conducted with equal judgment and vigour. The last great event of this campaign, the passage of the Danube at Hochstett, might rank with the most glorious feats of our military annals. Public opinion, which, in 1799, was not favourable to Moreau, had become almost partial for him in 1800. Next to the name of General Bonaparte, at a great distance, it is true, but yet at such a distance that the distinction was still flattering, was incessantly placed the name of General Moreau; and, as public opinion is ever fickle, the fame of the latter eclipsed, this year, that of the conqueror of Zurich, by whom it had been eclipsed in the preceding year.

The tidings of the brilliant successes of the army of the Rhine crowned the satisfaction produced by the extraordinary successes of the army of Italy, and changed into certainty the hopes of peace that filled all minds. There was joy in every heart. The public funds, denominated the Five per Cents., which sold at thirteen francs before the 18th of Brumaire, had risen to forty. A decree of the Consuls announced to the stockholders that the dividends for the first six months of the year IX., and which fell due on the 22nd September 1800, should be paid entirely in cash: happy intelligence, such as had not for a long time been given to the unfortunate creditors of the State! All these benefits were attributed to the armies, to the generals who had led them to victory, but principally to young Bonaparte, who had shown that he could both govern and fight in a very superior manner. Hence the fête of the 14th of July, one of the two Republican solemnities retained by the Constitution, was celebrated with great pomp. Preparations were made for a magnificent ceremony at the Invalides. Mehul, the musician, had composed some appropriate pieces, and the first singers of Italy, which began at this time to be stripped

both of its masterpieces of art and of its artists, were brought to Paris to execute them. After the performance of these pieces under the dome of the Invalides, the First Consul, accompanied by a numerous staff, repaired to the Champ de Mars, to review the consular guard. It arrived that very morning, covered with dust and in tatters, having been on march ever since the day after the battle of Marengo, that it might be punctual at the rendezvous appointed by the First Consul for the 14th of July. It brought to the Invalides the colours taken during the last campaign, to be placed in the general repository of our trophies. The crowd which bordered both sides of the Champ de Mars rushed forward to gain a closer view of the heroes of Marengo. The public intoxication was carried to such a length as well-nigh to produce accidents. The First Consul was long pent up amidst this scene of popular confusion. He returned to the Tuileries surrounded by the multitude, who crowded about him. The whole day was devoted to public rejoicings.

A few days afterwards, on the 21st of July (2nd Thermidor), it was announced that Count de St. Julien, an officer in the confidence of the Emperor of Germany, was on his way to Paris; that he was the bearer of the ratification of the convention of Alexandria, and charged to confer with the First Consul on the conditions of the approaching peace. No doubt was any longer entertained of the conclusion of that so ardently desired peace, which was to put an end to the second coalition. France, it may be said, had never seen such happy days.

## BOOK V.

### HELIOPOLIS.

IN August 1799, General Bonaparte, being decided by news from Europe to leave Egypt suddenly, ordered Admiral Ganteaume to send out of the harbour of Alexandria the frigates *La Muiron* and *La Carrère*, the only ships left after the destruction of the fleet, and to cast anchor in the little roadstead of the Marabout. It was there, about two leagues westward of Alexandria, that he purposed to embark. He took with him Generals Berthier, Lannes, Murat, Andréossy, Marmont, and the two men of science to whom he was more attached than to any of the others belonging to the expedition, Monge and Berthollet. On the 22nd of August (5th Fructidor, year VII.), he proceeded to the Marabout, and precipitately embarked, in constant apprehension lest the English squadron should make its appearance. The horses on which the party rode thither, being left upon the beach, galloped back to Alexandria. The sight of these horses, completely saddled, but without riders, excited a sort of alarm; it was supposed that some accident had befallen some of the officers of the garrison, and a detachment of cavalry was despatched from the entrenched camp. Presently, a Turkish groom, who had been present at the embarkation, explained what had happened, and Menou, who alone had been initiated into the secret, made known in Alexandria the departure of General Bonaparte, and the appointment which he had made of General Kléber to succeed him. The latter had an appointment to meet him at Rosetta, on the 23rd of August, but General Bonaparte was so hurried to embark, that he had gone the day before. Besides, in imposing upon Kléber the heavy burden of the command, he was better pleased to leave him an absolute order, which admitted of neither objection nor refusal.

This intelligence caused a painful surprise throughout the army. At first, it was discredited; General Dugua, commandant of Rosetta, had it contradicted, not believing it himself, and fearful of the bad effect which it was likely to produce. However, it was not possible to doubt long, and Kléber was officially proclaimed the successor of General Bonaparte. Officers and soldiers were in consternation. It had needed the ascendancy exercised

over them by the conqueror of Italy to draw them after him into distant and unknown countries, and it had needed all his ascendancy to keep them there. Regret for home is a passion, which becomes violent, when the distance and the novelty of places, and fears founded on the uncertainty of return, concur to irritate it. In Egypt, this passion frequently burst forth in murmurs, sometimes in suicide. But the presence of the commander-in-chief, his language, his incessant activity, dispelled these gloomy vapours. Well knowing how to occupy himself, and how to occupy others, he captivated their minds to the highest point, and either dissipated around him, or prevented the generation of, those irksome feelings to which he was altogether a stranger. The men often said to themselves that they should never see France again, that they should never recross the Mediterranean, especially now that the fleet had been destroyed at Aboukir; but General Bonaparte was there; with him they could go anywhere, find their way back to their country, or make a new country for themselves. With his departure, the aspect of things was totally changed. The intelligence of it came, therefore, like a thunderbolt. The most opprobrious epithets were applied to this departure. They did not consider that irresistible impulse of patriotism and ambition, which, on the news of the disasters of the Republic, had urged him to return to France. They perceived only the forlorn state in which he left the unfortunate army, which had felt sufficient confidence in his genius to follow him. They said to themselves that he must then have convinced himself of the imprudence of that enterprise, of the impossibility of its success, since he had run away, and relinquished to others what seemed to him thenceforward impracticable. But to sneak off alone, leaving beyond sea those whom he had thus compromised, was cruelty, nay, cowardice, said some traducers; for he always had some, and very near to his person, even in the most brilliant epochs of his career.

Kléber was not fond of General Bonaparte, and endured his ascendancy with a sort of impatience. If he restrained himself in his presence, he indulged elsewhere in unbecoming expressions. A grumbler and whimsical man, Kléber had ardently desired to accompany the expedition to Egypt, that he might get out of that state of disgrace in which he had been left to live under the Directory; and he was now sorry that he had quitted the banks of the Rhine for the banks of the Nile. With a weakness unworthy of his character, he allowed that feeling to betray itself. This man, so great in danger, gave way to it as much as the meanest of his soldiers could have done. The chief command did not counterbalance the necessity of remaining in Egypt, for he was not fond of commanding. Encouraging the discontent against General Bonaparte, he committed the fault, which would

deserve to be called criminal, had it not been repaired by heroic actions, of contributing himself to produce in the army an impression which soon became general. After his example, everybody began to say that they could not stay any longer in Egypt, and must absolutely return to France at all hazards. Other feelings mingled with this passion for return to subvert the spirit of the army, and to produce in it the most mischievous dispositions.

An old rivalry then divided, and long continued to divide, the officers who had belonged to the armies of the Rhine and of Italy. They were jealous of one another, each class pretending to carry on war in a different and a superior manner; and, though this rivalry was repressed by the presence of General Bonaparte, it was the principal cause of the diversity of their opinions. All who had come from the armies of the Rhine showed but little partiality for the expedition to Egypt; on the other hand, the officers originally attached to the army of Italy, though sorry to be so far distant from France, were favourable to that expedition, because it was the work of the general-in-chief. After his departure, all restraint was thrown off. Kléber's partisans rallied tumultuously around him; they loudly repeated with him what, it is true, began to be the conviction of every one, that the conquest of Egypt was a mad undertaking, which ought to be abandoned as soon as possible. This opinion, however, found dissentients; some generals, such as Lanusse, Menou, Davout, Desaix in particular, dared to express other sentiments. The army was thenceforward split into two parties; the one was called the colonist, the other the anti-colonist party. Unluckily, Desaix was absent. He was completing the conquest of Upper Egypt, where he was fighting brilliant battles, and governing with admirable wisdom. His influence, therefore, could not be opposed at that moment to Kléber's. To crown the misfortune, he was not to remain in Egypt. General Bonaparte, wishing to have him about his person, had committed the fault of not appointing him commander-in-chief, and had left orders for him to return very soon to Europe. Desaix, whose name was universally cherished and respected in the army, whose administrative talents equalled his military talents, would have governed the colony most ably, and would have avoided all those weaknesses to which Kléber gave way, at least for a moment.

Kléber, however, was the most popular of the generals among the soldiery. His name was hailed by them with entire confidence, and somewhat cheered them for the loss of the illustrious commander who had just left them. The first impression once past, their minds, though they had not recovered their wonted tone, acquired more calmness and justice. Other language was used: they said to themselves that, after all, it behoved General Bonaparte to fly to the succour of France when in danger; and

that, the army once established in Egypt, the best thing he could do for it was to go to Paris, to represent strongly its situation and its wants, and to claim that assistance which he alone could extort from their supine rulers at home.

Kléber returned to Cairo, assumed the command with a sort of ostentation, and took possession of the fine Arabian mansion which his predecessor had occupied in the Ezbekyeh Place. He displayed a certain pomp, not so much to gratify his own taste, as to make an impression on the Orientals, and resolved to cause his authority to be felt, by exercising it with vigour. But it was not long before the solitudes of the chief command, which were insupportable to him, the new dangers with which the Turks and the English threatened Egypt, and the grief of exile, which was general, filled his soul with the most gloomy discouragement. A report of the state of the colony having been made to him, by his order, he addressed to the Directory a despatch full of errors, and accompanied it with a report of Poussielgue's, administrator of the finances—a report in which things were represented in the most false, and especially the most inculpatory light, in regard to General Bonaparte.

In this despatch and report, dated the 26th of September (4th Vendémiaire, year VIII.), General Kléber, and Poussielgue, the administrator, stated that the army, diminished by one-half, was at this moment reduced to about 15,000 men; that it was nearly naked, which in that climate was extremely dangerous on account of the difference of temperature between day and night; that they were in want of cannon, muskets, projectiles, powder, all which things it was difficult to replace, because cast-iron, lead, timber for building, and materials for making gunpowder were not to be had in Egypt; that there was a considerable deficit in the finances, for the sum of 4,000,000 (of francs) was due to the soldiers for pay, and 7,000,000 or 8,000,000 to the contractors for various supplies; that the resource of levying contributions was already exhausted, the country being ready to rise if new ones were imposed; that, the inundation having been scanty this year, and the crops being thus likely to prove deficient, the Egyptians would be alike destitute of the means and the will to pay the tax; that dangers of all kinds threatened the colony; that the two old chiefs of the Mamelukes, Murad Bey and Ibrahim Bey, still maintained their ground, the one in Upper Egypt, the other in Lower Egypt; that Djezzar, the celebrated pasha of Acre, was about to send to the Turkish army a reinforcement of 20,000 excellent soldiers, the former defenders of St. Jean d'Acre against the French; that the grand-vizir himself, having set out from Constantinople, was already in the environs of Damascus, with a powerful army; that the Russians and the English were to join a regular force to the irregular forces of



the Turks; that, in this extremity, they had but one resource left, namely, to treat with the Porte; and that, General Bonaparte having set the example, and given express authority in the instructions left for his successor, an attempt was about to be made to negotiate with the grand-vizir a mixed domination, by means of which the Porte should occupy the open country of Egypt, and levy the miri or land-tax, while France should occupy the towns and the forts, and levy the revenue of the customs. Kléber added, that the commander-in-chief had seen the crisis approaching, and this was the real motive for his precipitate departure. M. Poussielgue concluded his report with a calumny: General Bonaparte, when he left Egypt, had, he said, carried away two millions. To complete this picture, it should be known that General Bonaparte had heaped favours on M. Poussielgue.

Such were the despatches sent to the Directory by Kléber and M. Poussielgue. General Bonaparte was there treated as a man who is supposed to be ruined, and to whom one need not show indulgence. It was believed, in fact, that he was exposed to the twofold danger of being taken by the English, or severely condemned by the Directory for having quitted his army. What would have been the embarrassment of the writers of those despatches, had they known that they would be opened and read by the man who was the object of so many calumnies, and who had now become the absolute head of the government!

Kléber, too careless to ascertain himself the real state of things, not even taking the pains to examine whether the statements which he was sending agreed with his own assertions—Kléber did not think that he was advancing falsehoods; he transmitted, through negligence and ill-humour, the hearsays which passion had multiplied around him to such a degree as to give them a kind of public notoriety. These despatches were entrusted to a cousin of Barras's, the Director, and accompanied by a multitude of letters, in which the officers of the army gave vent to a despair as unfounded as it was imprudent. This cousin of Barras's was taken by the English; he hastily threw overboard the packet of despatches of which he was the bearer; but this packet floated, was perceived, picked up, and sent to the British cabinet. We shall soon see what was the result of these mischievous communications, which thus fell into the hands of the English, and were made public to all Europe.

Kléber and M. Poussielgue, however, had sent duplicates of their despatches to Paris. These duplicates, transmitted by a different channel, reached France, and were delivered to the First Consul.

What truth was there in this picture, drawn by morbid imaginations? Of this we shall soon be enabled to judge with

certainty by the events themselves ; but, meanwhile, we must rectify the false assertions just laid before the reader.

The army, according to Kléber, was reduced to 15,000 men ; yet the returns sent to the Directory made them amount to 28,500. When, two years later, it was brought back to France, it still numbered in its ranks 22,000 soldiers, and, in these two years, it had fought several great battles and innumerable actions. In 1798 there had left France, in various convoys, 34,000 men : 4000 were landed at Malta ; 30,000, therefore, arrived at Alexandria. Subsequently, 3000 sailors, wrecks of the crews of the fleet destroyed at Aboukir, reinforced the army, and again raised it to 33,000 men. In 1798 and 1799, it had lost from 4000 to 5000 soldiers ; it was, therefore, reduced to about 28,000, of whom 22,000, at least, were fit for duty.

Egypt is a healthy country, where wounds heal with extreme rapidity : there were, this year, few sick, and no plague. Egypt was full of Christians, Greeks, Syrians, or Copts, applying to be enlisted into our ranks, and capable of furnishing excellent recruits, to the number of 15,000 or 20,000. The Blacks of Darfur, bought and made free, added so many as 500 good soldiers to one of our demi-brigades alone. Egypt, moreover, was subdued. The peasants who cultivate it, accustomed to obey under all masters, never thought of lifting a musket. With the exception of a few insurrections in the towns, there was nothing to be feared but from undisciplined Turks, coming from a distance, or English mercenaries, transported with great trouble by sea. Against such enemies the French army was more than a match, if it were commanded, not with genius, but merely with ordinary judgment.

Kléber alleged in his despatches that the soldiers were naked ; but General Bonaparte had left cloth for clothing them, and, a month after the transmission of this despatch, they were entirely new clothed. At any rate, Egypt abounded in cotton stuffs ; it furnished all Africa with them. It could not be difficult to procure these stuffs by purchase, or by demanding them in part of the taxes. As for provisions, Egypt is the granary of the countries destitute of corn. Wheat, rice, beef, mutton, poultry, sugar, coffee, were then ten times as cheap there as in Europe. So low were the prices of necessaries, that the army, though its finances were not the most flourishing, was able to pay for all that it consumed. Kléber asserted that it was in want of arms ; and there were left 11,000 swords, 15,000 muskets, 1400 or 1500 pieces of cannon, 180 of which were field-pieces. Alexandria, which, according to him, was stripped of artillery ever since the siege of St. Jean d'Acre, contained more than 300 pieces of cannon in battery. As for

ammunition, there remained 3,000,000 cartridges for infantry, 27,000 gun-cartridges made up, and resources for making more; for there were still in the magazines 200,000 projectiles, and 1,100,000 pounds (500 tons) of powder. The subsequent events demonstrated the truth of these allegations, since the army continued to fight two years longer, and left the English considerable stores. What, in fact, could have become, in so short a time, of the immense *matériel* carefully accumulated by General Bonaparte on board the fleet which conveyed the army to Egypt?

In regard to the finances, Kléber's report was equally false. The soldiers were paid up. It is true that nothing had yet been decided respecting the financial system best adapted for provisioning the army, without draining the country; but the resources existed, and, by levying merely the taxes already imposed, the troops might live in abundance. There was due upon the imposts of the year sufficient to provide for all the current expenses; that is to say, above 16,000,000 f. There was, consequently, no need to drive the population to insurrection by the imposition of new taxes. The financial documents subsequently made public proved that Egypt was capable of furnishing 25,000,000 f. per year, and that with ease. At this rate it paid but half the amount wrung from it, with a thousand vexations, by the numerous tyrants who oppressed it by the name of Mamelukes. According to the price of things in Egypt, the army could be subsisted for 18,000,000 f. or 20,000,000 f. As for the chests, so far was General Bonaparte from having exhausted them that, at his departure, he had not even taken the whole of his pay.

As for the dangers with which the colony was threatened, the truth was this: Murad Bey, disheartened, was a fugitive in Upper Egypt with a few Mamelukes. Ibrahim Bey, who, under the government of the Mamelukes, shared the sovereignty with him, was then in Lower Egypt, towards the frontiers of Syria. He had not 400 horse, much less some thousands. Djezzar Pasha was shut up in St. Jean d'Acre. So far from preparing a reinforcement of 30,000 men for the army of the grand-vizir, he viewed, on the contrary, with high displeasure, the approach of a fresh Turkish army, now especially that his Pashalik was delivered from the French. As for the grand-vizir, he was not yet across the Taurus. The English had their troops at Mahon, and were thinking at this moment of employing them in Tuscany, at Naples, or on the coast of France. As for a Russian expedition, that was a mere fable. The Russians never had any idea of taking so long a voyage, for the purpose of furthering the policy of England in the East.

The inhabitants were not so disposed to insurrection as was

represented. By humouring the sheiks, who are the priests and the lawyers of the Arabs, as General Bonaparte had prescribed, their attachment might soon be gained. We had already begun to make ourselves a party among them. We had, moreover, on our side the Copts, the Greeks, the Syrians, who, being all Christians, behaved towards us as friends, and as useful auxiliaries. Thus nothing imminent from that quarter was to be apprehended. No doubt, if the French experienced disasters, the Egyptians, with the fickleness of conquered nations, would do as the Italians themselves had recently done, they would join the conqueror of one day against the conqueror of the preceding day. Still they appreciated the difference between the sway of the Mamelukes, who fleeced them, and never came but sword in hand, and that of the French, who respected property, and rarely struck off their heads.

Kléber, then, had indulged in dangerous exaggerations, the melancholy results of hatred, ennui, and exile. At his side, General Menou, viewing everything under the most favourable colours, believed the French to be invincible in Egypt, and regarded the expedition as the commencement of a near and momentous revolution in the commerce of the world. Men never can sufficiently divest themselves of their personal impressions in forming opinions of this kind. Kléber and Menou were both honest, upright men; but one wanted to leave Egypt, the other to stay in it: the clearest, and the most authentic returns, conveyed to them totally contrary significations—misery and ruin to one, abundance and success to the other.

At any rate, be the situation what it might, Kléber and his party rendered themselves seriously culpable in thinking of evacuation, for they had no right to do so. It is true that General Bonaparte, in his instructions replete with wisdom, examining all possible cases, had foreseen the very case in which the army might be obliged to evacuate Egypt. "I am going to France," said he, "either as a private man or as a public man; I will get succours sent to you. But if by next spring (he was writing in August 1799) you have received no succours, no instructions; if the plague has carried off more than 1500 men, independently of losses by war; if a considerable force, which you should be incapable of resisting, presses you hard, negotiate with the vizir; consent even, if it must be so, to an evacuation, subject to one condition, that of referring to the French government, and meanwhile continue to occupy. You will thus have gained time, and it is impossible that, during the interval, you should not have received succours." The instructions were very sound; but the case foreseen was far from being realised. In the first place, it would

have been requisite to wait till the spring of 1800; it would have been requisite that, at this period, no succours, no orders, should have arrived in Egypt; it would have been requisite that the army should have lost part of its effective force by the plague; and, lastly, that it should be pressed by superior forces: now, nothing of this sort had happened, or did happen. A negotiation opened without these conditions was a real transgression.

In September 1799 (Vendémiaire, year VIII.), Desaix, having completed the conquest and subjugation of Upper Egypt, had left two movable columns for the pursuit of Murad Bey, to whom he had offered peace on condition of his becoming a vassal of France. He had then returned to Cairo by order of Kléber, who wished to make use of his name in those luckless negotiations into which he was about to enter. During these proceedings, the army of the grand-vizir, so long announced, was slowly advancing. Sir Sidney Smith, who convoyed with his squadron the Turkish troops destined to be transported by sea, had just arrived off Damietta with 8000 Janissaries. On the 1st of November 1799 (10th Brumaire, year VIII.), the landing of the first division, of 4000 Janissaries, was effected, towards the Bogaz of Damietta, that is, at the entrance of that branch of the Nile which runs past this town. General Verdier, who had only 1000 men at Damietta, marched out with these troops, and proceeded beyond the fort of Lesbeh, to a narrow tongue of land, on the shore of which the Turks had disembarked, and, without giving time for the other 4000 Janissaries to arrive, attacked the 4000 who had already landed. In spite of the fire of the English artillery, advantageously placed upon an old tower, he beat them, drowned or put to the sword 3000, and took the rest prisoners. The landing craft, at this sight, returned to their ships, and did not land the remainder of the Turkish troops. The French had only twenty-two men killed and 100 wounded.

On the first tidings of this disembarkation, Kléber had despatched Desaix with a column of 3000 men; but the latter, uselessly sent to Damietta, had found the victory won, and the French filled with unbounded confidence. This brilliant achievement ought to have served to encourage Kléber; unfortunately he was swayed at once by his own chagrin and by that of the army. He had before influenced the troops, who in their turn hurried him into the fatal resolution of an immediate evacuation. General Bonaparte became the theme of fresh invectives. That rash young man, it was said, who had exposed the French army to perils, and exposed himself to other perils in braving the seas and the English cruisers in order to return to France, that rash young man could not have escaped the dangers of the passage. The wise generals trained in the

school of the Rhine ought to relinquish a mad scheme, and to carry back to Europe brave soldiers, indispensable to the Republic, now threatened in all quarters.

In this disposition of mind, Kléber had sent to the vizir, who had entered Syria, one of his officers to make new overtures of peace. General Bonaparte, with a view to embroil the vizir with the English, had previously entertained the idea of setting on foot negotiations, which, on his part, were nothing more than a feint. His overtures had been received with great distrust and pride. Kléber's met with a more favourable reception, through the influence of Sir Sidney Smith, who was preparing to play a prominent part in the affairs of Egypt.

This officer of the English navy had largely contributed to prevent the success of the siege of St. Jean d'Acree; he was proud of it, and had devised a *ruse de guerre*, according to the expression of the English agents, which consisted in taking advantage of a momentary weakness to wrest from the French their valuable conquest. Accordingly, as all the intercepted letters of our officers clearly showed their impatient desire to return to France, Sir Sidney Smith wished to induce the army to negotiate and to sign a capitulation, and, before the French government had time to give or to refuse its ratification, to ship it off immediately and to throw it upon the coast of Europe. With this view, he had disposed the grand-vizir to listen to the overtures of Kléber. As for himself, studying to load the French officers with civilities, he permitted the news from Europe to reach them, taking care, however, that only such intelligence should pass as was anterior to the 18th of Brumaire. Kléber, on his part, despatched a negotiator to Sir Sidney Smith, for as the English were masters of the sea, he wished to induce them to take part in the negotiation, so that the return to France might be rendered possible. Sir Sidney lent a willing ear to this message, and manifested a disposition to enter into arrangements, adding, moreover, that, by virtue of a treaty of the 5th of January 1799, negotiated by himself, there existed a triple alliance between Russia, England, and the Porte; that those powers had bound themselves to do everything jointly; that, in consequence, no arrangement with the Porte could be valid and carried into execution if it was not concurred in by the agents of all the three courts. In his communications, Sir Sidney Smith assumed the title of "Minister plenipotentiary of his Britannic Majesty to the Ottoman Porte, commanding his squadron in the waters of the Levant."

Sir Sidney Smith here attributed to himself a title which he had had, but which he had ceased to hold since the arrival of Lord Elgin as ambassador at Constantinople; and, in reality, he had at this moment no other power than what a military

commander always has—that of signing conventions of war, suspensions of arms, &c.

Kléber, without closer examination, without knowing whether he was treating with agents sufficiently accredited, entered blindly into that perilous track into which he was hurried by a sentiment common to the whole army, and which would have ended in ignominy, if, fortunately for him, Heaven had not endowed him with an heroic soul, which could not fail to retrieve itself with glory, as soon as he should discover the extent of his fault. He entered, then, into negotiation, and offered to Sir Sidney Smith, as well as to the vizir, who had advanced as far as Gaza in Syria, to appoint officers furnished with full powers to treat. Disliking to receive the Turks in his camp, and unwilling, on the other hand, to risk his officers amidst the undisciplined army of the grand-vizir, he resolved to propose Sir Sidney Smith's ship *Le Tigre* for the place of the conferences.

Sir Sidney, who was cruising with two ships only—which, be it observed by the way, sufficiently proved the possibility for France to communicate with Egypt—Sir Sidney had at this moment but one; the other, the *Thucæus*, was under repair at Cyprus. Boisterous weather frequently obliging him to stand off the coast, his communications with the land were neither regular nor prompt. It took some time to obtain his assent. At length his answer arrived: it intimated that he should appear successively off Alexandria and Damietta, to take on board the officers whom Kléber should send to him.

Kléber appointed Desaix and Poussielgue, the administrator, the same who had so clumsily slandered General Bonaparte, and whom the Egyptians, in their Arabic relations, have designated *Sultan Kléber's vizir*. Poussielgue was an advocate for evacuation, Desaix just the reverse. The latter had made the utmost exertions to withstand the torrent, to raise the spirits of his companions in arms, and he had undertaken the negotiation commenced by Kléber solely in the hope of protracting it, and gaining time for the arrival of succours and instructions from France. Kléber, in order to excuse himself to Desaix, told him that it was General Bonaparte who first began to parley with the Turks; that, moreover, he had himself provided for, and authorised beforehand, a treaty of evacuation, in case of imminent danger. Desaix, misinformed, still hoped that the first ship which should arrive from France would clear up these obscurities and perhaps change the deplorable dispositions of the staff of the army. He set out with M. Poussielgue, and, unable to join Sir Sidney Smith off Alexandria, he found him before Damietta, and went on board *Le Tigre* on the 22nd of December 1799 (1st Nivôse, year VIII.). It was just at this moment that General Bonaparte was invested with the supreme power in France.

Sir Sidney Smith, delighted to have on board such a plenipotentiary as Desaix, gave him a most flattering reception, and strove by all the means of persuasion to bring him into the idea of evacuating Egypt.

Desaix was perfectly competent to defend himself, and stood out for the conditions which his principal had instructed him to demand. These conditions, which were inadmissible by the English commodore, were particularly convenient to Desaix, who wished to gain time; on the part of Kléber they were extremely ill-advised, for their extravagance rendered any agreement impossible. But Kléber sought in that very extravagance an excuse for his fault. He demanded, for instance, that the army, retiring with the honours of war, with arms and baggage, should be allowed to land at any point of the continent that he might be pleased to select, in order to afford the Republic the aid of its presence, wherever it might be deemed most serviceable. He demanded that the Porte should restore to us immediately the Venetian islands, which had become French property by the treaty of Campo Formio, that is to say, Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, &c., and were occupied at the moment by Turco-Russian garrisons; that these islands, and above all, Malta, a much more important one, should be given up to France; that the possession of them should be guaranteed to her by the persons signing the treaty of evacuation; that the French army, on retiring, should have a right to reinforce and revictual the garrisons; lastly, that the treaty which united the Porte, Russia, and England should be instantly annulled, and the triple alliance of the East dissolved.

These conditions were unreasonable, it must be confessed: not that they were an exorbitant equivalent for what was given up in giving up Egypt, but because they were not feasible. Sir Sidney made Kléber sensible of this. Officers treating for a mere suspension of arms could not include other topics of such vast extent in their negotiation. Zante, Cephalonia, Corfu, were occupied by Turkish and Russian troops; it was requisite, therefore, to refer not only to Constantinople but also to Petersburg. Malta was held under the King of Naples as lord paramount: it could not be disposed of without the consent of that prince, who had always refused to cede it to France. To land French troops in the island at that moment would be in a manner deciding the question. There would be found there cruisers or garrisons of all the coalesced powers, who would not retire upon an order from Sir Sidney Smith or the grand-vizir. Besides, England would never consent to a condition ensuring Malta to France. To land a French army on a point of the continent, where it might derange the combinations of the war by its unexpected appearance, would be a step too bold



for a mere commodore to think of taking. Lastly, to demand the abolition of the triple alliance was requiring Sir Sidney Smith to undo by himself alone, on board his ship, a treaty ratified by three great powers, and which had acquired great importance for the East. Supposing that all these stipulations should be accepted by all the courts whose consent was requisite, it would be necessary to send to Naples, to London, to St. Petersburg, to Constantinople: of course this would no longer be a military convention of evacuation, like that which was signed at Marengo, and capable of being executed at the very instant. If it were referred to London, it must consequently be referred to Paris also, which Kléber had no wish to do. All this evidently far surpassed the bounds of a military capitulation.

Sir Sidney Smith had no difficulty to make the French negotiators feel the force of these reasons. But it was urgently necessary to settle two points immediately—the departure of the wounded, and of the scientific men attached to the expedition, for whom Desaix solicited safe-conducts, and secondly, a suspension of arms; for the army of the grand-vizir, though marching slowly, would soon be in presence of the French. It had actually arrived before the fort of El Arisch, the first French post on the frontiers of Syria, and had summoned it to surrender. Kléber, apprised of this circumstance, had written to Desaix and ordered him to require, as an indispensable condition of these conferences, that the Turkish army should halt on the frontier.

The first point, that relating to the departure of the wounded, and the men of science, rested with Sir Sidney Smith. He assented to it with great cheerfulness and courtesy. As for the armistice, Sir Sidney declared that he would willingly propose it, but he could not answer for obtaining it: for the Turkish army was composed of fanatic and barbarous hordes, and it was a difficult thing to make regular conventions with it, and still more so to ensure their execution. To remove this difficulty, he resolved to go to the camp of the grand-vizir, which was in the environs of Gaza. The negotiations, in fact, had been going on for a fortnight on board *Le Tigre*, while floating at the pleasure of the winds off the coasts of Syria and Egypt: the parties had said all that they had to say, and the negotiation could not be continued to any useful purpose but with the grand-vizir. Sir Sidney Smith, therefore, proposed to repair thither, to arrange there a suspension of arms, and to prepare for the arrival of the French negotiators, if he thought that he could ensure them safety and respect. This proposal was accepted. Sir Sidney, availing himself of a favourable moment, pushed off in a boat which landed him on the coast, after incurring some dangers, and ordered the captain of *Le Tigre* to

meet him in the port of Jaffa, where Poussielgue and Desaix were to be put ashore, if the conferences were to be transferred to the camp of the grand-vizir.

At the moment when the English commodore reached the camp, a horrible event had occurred at El Arisch. The Turkish army, composed, for the smaller part, of Janissaries, and for the greater part, of Asiatic militia, whom the Mussulman laws place at the disposal of the Sultan, presented a confused and undisciplined mass, extremely formidable to all who wore the European dress. It had been raised in the name of the Prophet; for the Turks were told that this was the last effort that would be required to drive the Infidels out of Egypt; that the redoubtable Sultan of Fire, Bonaparte, had left them; that they were weakened and disheartened; that they must be conquered if the Turks merely showed themselves; that all Egypt was ready to rise against their domination. These and other things, repeated everywhere, had collected around the grand-vizir an army of 70,000 or 80,000 fanatic Mussulmans. The Turks were joined by the Mamelukes. Ibrahim Bey, who had some time before retired to Syria, and Murad Bey, who had descended by a long circuit from the cataracts to the environs of Suez, had become the auxiliaries of their former adversaries. The English had made for this army a sort of field-artillery, drawn by mules. The Bedouin Arabs, in the hope of soon plundering the vanquished, whichever they might be, had placed 15,000 camels at the disposal of the grand-vizir, to assist him to cross the desert which separates Egypt and Palestine. The Turkish generalissimo had in his semi-barbarous staff some English officers, and some of those culpable emigrants, who had taught Djezzar Pasha how to defend St. Jean d'Acre. We shall now see what those wretched fugitives became the cause of.

The fort of El Arisch, before which the Turks were at this moment, was, according to the declaration of General Bonaparte, one of the two keys of Egypt: Alexandria was the other. According to him, too, an army arriving by sea could not land in great number anywhere but on the beach of Alexandria. An army advancing by land, and having to cross the desert of Syria, would be obliged to pass by El Arisch, to get water at the wells situated at that place. He had therefore ordered important works to be constructed about Alexandria, and the fort of El Arisch to be put into a state of defence. A body of 300 men, supplied with provisions and ammunition, kept garrison there, and it was commanded by a courageous officer named Cazals. The Turkish advanced guard, having reached El Arisch, Colonel Douglas, an English officer in the service of Turkey, summoned Cazals, the commandant, to surrender. A disguised French emigrant was the bearer of the summons. A

parley ensued, and the soldiers were told that the evacuation of Egypt was imminent; that it was already announced as resolved upon; that it would soon be inevitable; and that it was cruel to wish to oblige them to defend themselves. The culpable sentiments which the officers had too much encouraged in the army then burst forth. The soldiers in garrison at El Arisch, vehemently longing, like their comrades, to leave Egypt, declared to the commandant that they would not fight, and that he must make up his mind to surrender the fort. The gallant Cazals indignantly called them together, addressed them in the noblest language, told them that if there were cowards among them, they might leave the garrison and go to the camp of the Turks, that he gave them full liberty to do so, but that he would resist unto death with those Frenchmen who continued faithful to their duty. These words revived for a moment the feeling of honour in the hearts of the soldiers. The summons was rejected, and the attack commenced. The Turks were not capable of carrying a position that was ever so little defended. The batteries of the fort silenced all their artillery. Directed by English and emigrant officers, they nevertheless pushed their trenches to the salient angle of a bastion. The commandant ordered a few grenadiers to make a sortie, for the purpose of driving the Turks from the first branch of the trench. Captain Ferray, who was appointed to head the party, was followed by three grenadiers only. Finding himself abandoned, he returned to the fort. Meanwhile, the mutineers had struck the colours, but a sergeant of grenadiers had hoisted them again. A struggle ensued. During this contest, the recreants who insisted on surrendering threw ropes to the Turks; these ferocious enemies, once hoisted up into the fort, rushed, sword in hand, upon the dastardly beings who had given them admission into the fort, and slaughtered a great part of them. The others, brought back to reason, joined the rest of the garrison, defended themselves with desperate courage, and were most of them cut in pieces. Some, in small number, obtained quarter, thanks to Colonel Douglas, and owed their lives to the interference of that humane, gallant, and distinguished officer.

Thus fell the fort of El Arisch. This was a first effect of the deplorable disposition prevailing in the army, the first fruit reaped by the leaders from their own faults.

It was now the 30th of December (9th Nivôse): the letter written by Sir Sidney Smith to the grand-vizir, to propose to him a suspension of arms, had not reached him in time to prevent the melancholy catastrophe at El Arisch. Sir Sidney Smith was a man of generous feelings. This barbarous massacre of a French garrison horrified him, and, above all, it made him fearful of the rupture of the negotiations. He lost no time

in sending explanations to Kléber, both in his own name and in that of the grand-vizir, and he added the formal assurance that all hostility should cease during the negotiations.

At the sight of these hordes, which rather resembled a migration of savage tribes than an army going to battle, fighting among themselves at night over provisions or the possession of a well, Sir Sidney Smith felt alarmed for the safety of the French plenipotentiaries. He insisted that the tents destined for their reception should be pitched in the very quarter of the grand-vizir and the reis-effendi, who were both present with the army; and that a guard of picked men should be stationed about these tents; he had his own placed near them; and, lastly, he provided a detachment of English seamen, to secure from all violence both himself and the French officers committed to his honour. Having taken these precautions, he sent to Jaffa, to fetch Messrs. Poussielgue and Desaix to the place where the conferences were to be held.

Kléber, when informed of the massacre of El Arisch, did not manifest as much indignation as he ought to have done; he was aware that, if he was too warm upon that subject, all the negotiations might be broken off. He was more urgent than ever for a suspension of arms; and, at the same time, by way of precaution, and to be nearer to the theatre of the conferences, he left Cairo, and transferred his headquarters to Salahieh, on the very border of the desert, two days' march from El Arisch.

In the meantime, Desaix and Poussielgue, detained by contrary winds, had not been able to land at Gaza till the 11th of January (21st Nivôse), and to reach El Arisch before the 13th. The conferences commenced as soon as they arrived, and the indignation of Desaix had well-nigh broken off the negotiations. The Turks, ignorant and barbarous, interpreting in their way the conduct of the French, attributed their disposition to treat, not to an immoderate desire to return to France, but to fear of fighting. They required, therefore, that the army should surrender themselves prisoners of war. Desaix was for putting an end at once to all kind of communication, but Sir Sidney interposed, prevailed on both parties to moderate their terms, and proposed honourable conditions, if there could be such for a resolution of this nature. It was no longer possible to put forward the original conditions of Kléber. Of this he was himself convinced, from the letters which had been written to him from on board *Le Tigre*, and he said no more about the Venetian islands, Malta, and the revictualling of those islands. To give a colour, nevertheless, to his capitulation, he still adhered to one point—that the Porte should withdraw from the triple alliance. This point, strictly considered, was susceptible of being negotiated at El Arisch, since the grand-vizir and the reis-effendi were

at hand; but it could scarcely be demanded of the English negotiator, whose intervention, however, was indispensable. This condition, therefore, was set aside, like the others. It was a vain artifice, which Kléber and his advisers employed towards themselves, to conceal from their own eyes the indignity of their conduct.

The pure and simple evacuation, and its conditions, soon became the sole subject of negotiation. After long discussions, it was agreed that all hostility should cease for three months; that those three months should be employed by the vizir in collecting, in the ports of Rosetta, Aboukir, and Alexandria, the vessels requisite for the conveyance of our army; by General Kléber in evacuating the Upper Nile, Cairo, and the contiguous provinces, and in concentrating his troops about the points of embarkation; that the French should depart with arms and baggage, that is to say, with the honours of war; that they should take with them such military stores as they had need of, and leave the rest; that, from the day of the signature, they should cease to impose contributions, and should abandon to the Porte such as were still due; but that, in return, the French army should receive 3000 purses, equivalent at that time to 3,000,000 francs, and representing the sum necessary for its subsistence during the evacuation and the passage. The forts of Katieh, Salahieh, and Belbeis, forming the frontier of Egypt towards the desert of Syria, were to be given up ten days after the ratification; Cairo forty days after. It was agreed that the ratification should be given within eight days by General Kléber alone, and without any reference to the French government. Lastly, Sir Sidney engaged, in his own name, and in the name of the Russian commissioner, to furnish the army with passports, to prevent molestation from English cruisers.

The French commissioners here committed an error in form, which was of serious consequence. The signature of Sir Sidney Smith was indispensable, for, without that signature, the sea continued closed to them. They ought to have required Sir Sidney Smith, since he was the negotiator of that convention, to sign it. The mystery of his powers would then have been cleared up. It would then have transpired that the English commodore, though he formerly held powers to treat with the Porte, had none at this moment, Lord Elgin having arrived as minister at Constantinople: that he had no special instructions for the present case; that he merely had very strong presumptions to hope that his conduct would be approved in London. The French plenipotentiaries, not conversant with diplomatic usages, supposed that Sir Sidney Smith, offering passports, was qualified to give them, and that these passports would be valid.

The terms of the convention being arranged, there was nothing

more to be done but to sign it. The noble heart of Desaix revolted from what he was obliged to do. Before he placed his name at the foot of such a paper, he sent for Savary, his aide-de-camp, directed him to proceed to the headquarters at Salahieh, where Kléber was, to communicate to him the draft of the convention, and to declare that he would not sign it till he had received from him a formal order to that effect. Savary came, repaired to Salahieh, and delivered to Kléber the message with which he was charged. Kléber, who had a vague feeling of his fault, determined, in order to cover it, to assemble a council of war, to which all the generals of the army were summoned.

The council met on the 21st of January 1800 (1st Pluviôse, year VIII.). The minutes of it still exist. It is painful to see brave men, who had spilt their blood, who were going to spill it again for their country, heap up wretched falsehoods to colour a criminal weakness. This example ought to serve for a lesson to military officers; it ought to teach them that it is not sufficient to be firm in battle, and that the courage to brave balls and bullets is the least of the virtues imposed by their noble profession. In this council of war, great stress was laid on the intelligence which had then reached Egypt, that the great combined French and Spanish fleet had sailed out of the Mediterranean into the ocean; whence it was concluded that all hope of succour from France was at an end. In proof of this, it was argued that five months had elapsed since the departure of General Bonaparte—five months, during which no despatch had arrived. An argument was made of the discouragement of the army, which the very persons who used it had themselves contributed to produce. They adverted to what had recently happened at Rosetta and Alexandria, where the garrisons had behaved like that of El Arisch, threatening to revolt, if they were not immediately taken back to Europe. They alleged that the active army was reduced to 8000 men; they exaggerated, beyond measure, the force of the Turkish army; they talked of a pretended Russian expedition that was about to join the grand-vizir—an expedition which had no existence but in the heated imaginations of those who were desirous to forsake Egypt at any rate. They asserted, as a positive fact, the impossibility of resistance—an assertion which was so soon to be contradicted, in an heroic manner, by the very persons who so stoutly maintained it. Lastly, to keep as closely as possible within the instructions of General Bonaparte, they brought forward some cases of plague, extremely doubtful, and, for the rest, absolutely unknown in the army.

Notwithstanding all that was said, however, the partisans of the evacuation were far from adhering to the instructions left by General Bonaparte. He had laid down as conditions:—1.

That no succours, no orders, should have arrived by the spring of 1800. 2. That the plague should have carried off 1500 men, besides the losses from war. 3. That the danger should be so great as to render all resistance impossible; and, these circumstances being realised, he had recommended to his successor to gain time in negotiating, and not to consent to the evacuation, but on condition of its ratification by France. Now, it was still only January 1800; there was no plague, no pressing danger; and yet an immediate evacuation was the point to be decided, and without any reference to France.

A man who has exhibited in war something superior to courage, that is to say, character, General Davout, since marshal and Prince of Eckmühl, was the only one who durst withstand this culpable impulsion. He was not afraid to oppose Kléber, to whose ascendancy all the rest bowed, and combated with energy the proposed capitulation. But he was not listened to; and, from a mischievous complaisance, he consented to sign the resolution of the council of war, by suffering an entry to be made in the minutes that it had been adopted unanimously.

Davout, nevertheless, took Savary aside, and charged him to assure Desaix that if he chose to break off the negotiation he would find support in the army. Savary returned to the camp at El Arisch, and communicated to Desaix what had passed, and the message which Davout had desired him to deliver. Desaix, finding Davout's name subscribed to the deliberations, replied with warmth to Savary, "Whom then would you have me trust, when the very man who disapproves the convention dares not make his signature agree with his opinion! He would have me disobey, and yet dares not maintain to the end the sentiments which he has expressed!" Desaix, though deeply grieved, yet, on seeing the torrent, gave way to it himself, and affixed his signature on the 28th of January to that unlucky convention, afterwards celebrated by the title of the convention of El Arisch (8th Pluviôse).

When the thing was done, people began to be sensible of its importance. Desaix, on his return to the camp, spoke of it with grief, and did not conceal his deep mortification at having been selected for such a mission, and forced to fulfil it by an order from the general-in-chief. Davout, Menou, and some others launched out into bitter invectives: dissensions broke forth on all sides in the camp at Salahieh.

Meanwhile, preparations were making for departure: the great majority of the army were overjoyed at the prospect of leaving these distant lands, and soon beholding France again. Sir Sidney Smith had returned to his ship. The vizir advanced and took possession, consecutively, of the entrenched positions of Katieh, Salahieh, and Belbeis, which Kléber, in haste to

execute the convention, faithfully delivered up to him. Kléber returned to Cairo, to make his preparations for departure, to call in the troops that were guarding Upper Egypt, to concentrate his army, and then to direct it upon Alexandria and Rosetta, at the time stipulated for embarkation.

While these events were occurring in Egypt—baneful consequences of a sentiment which the chiefs of the army had fanned instead of stifling—other events, natural consequences of the same causes, were taking place in Europe. In fact, the letters and despatches, sent in duplicate, had, as we have seen, arrived at the same time in London and Paris. The accusatory despatch directed against General Bonaparte, and addressed to the Directory, had been delivered to General Bonaparte himself, who had become the head of the government. He was shocked at so many weaknesses and falsehoods; but he was sensible how much the army needed Kléber; he appreciated the great qualities of that general, and, not conceiving that his discouragement could proceed to such a length as to induce him to give up Egypt, he took no notice of his own grievances. He hastened, therefore, to despatch from France instructions and an intimation of the great succours which he was preparing to send.

The British government, on its part, having received a duplicate of Kléber's despatches, and a great number of letters written by our officers to their families, caused them all to be published, with a view to exhibit to Europe the situation of the French in Egypt, and to embroil Generals Kléber and Bonaparte. It was a perfectly natural calculation on the part of an hostile power. At the same time, the English cabinet had received advice of the overtures made by General Kléber to the grand-vizir and to Sir Sidney Smith. Believing that the French army was reduced to the last extremity, it lost no time in sending off an express order not to grant any capitulation, unless they surrendered themselves prisoners of war. Mr. Dundas even made use, in his place in parliament, of odious expressions. "An example," said he, "must be made of that army, which, in a time of profound peace, has dared to invade the dominions of one of our allies: the interests of mankind require that it should be destroyed."

This language was barbarous; it displays the violence of the passions which then filled the hearts of the two nations. The English cabinet had taken literally the exaggerations of Kléber and of our officers; it considered the French as reduced to submit to any conditions that might be imposed upon them; and, not foreseeing what was passing, it had the imprudence to give positive orders to Lord Keith, the admiral commanding in the Mediterranean, not to sign any capitulation but on the express condition that the French troops should become prisoners of war.

These orders, despatched from London on the 17th of December,



reached Admiral Keith in the island of Minorca in the first days of January 1800; and, on the 8th of the same month that admiral hastened to forward to Sir Sidney Smith the instructions which he had just received from his government. It took time, especially at that season, to cross the Mediterranean. The communications of Lord Keith did not reach Sir Sidney Smith before the 20th of February. The latter was deeply chagrined. He had acted without precise instructions from his government, reckoning upon it that his acts would be approved. He thus found himself in a false position with the French, for they might, with apparent reason, accuse him of breach of faith. Better acquainted, besides, with the real state of things, he was well aware that Kléber would never consent to surrender himself prisoner of war; and he saw the convention of El Arisch, so adroitly wrung from the weakness of a moment, wholly set aside. He lost no time in writing to Kléber, to express his mortification, to apprise him honestly of what was passing, to advise him to suspend immediately the delivery of the Egyptian fortresses to the grand-vizir, and to conjure him to wait for fresh orders from England before he took any definitive resolution.

Unfortunately, when these advices from Sir Sidney arrived at Cairo, the French army had already executed in part the treaty of El Arisch. It had delivered up to the Turks all the positions on the right bank of the Nile, Katieh, Salahieh, Belbeis, and some of the positions of the Delta, particularly the town of Damietta and the fort of Lesbeh. The troops were already on march for Alexandria, with their baggage and stores. The division of Upper Egypt had put the Turks in possession of the Upper Nile, and was falling back upon Cairo, for the purpose of rejoining the rest of the army towards the sea. Desaix, availing himself of the order which he had received to return to France, and disliking to have any hand in the details of that ignominious retreat, had set out with Davout, who, for his part, could not stay any longer with Kléber. Kléber, forgetting his bickerings with Davout, was anxious to retain him, and had offered him the rank of general of division, which he had authority to confer as governor of Egypt. Davout refused it, saying that he should not like his promotion to bear the date of such a deplorable event. But, when Desaix and Davout were embarking, M. de Latour Maubourg, arriving from France, with the despatches of the First Consul, met them on the beach, informed them of the Revolution of the 18th of Brumaire, and of the elevation of General Bonaparte to the supreme power. Thus Kléber, at the moment when he had just given up the fortified positions, learned that the convention of El Arisch would not be executed, and received the intelligence, not less momentous to him, of the establishment of the consular government.

But there had been sufficient weakness for a great character: an ignominious offer was now about to recall Kléber to himself, and to make him what he really was—a hero. He was obliged either to surrender himself prisoner, or to defend himself in a much worse situation than that which he had declared to be untenable in the council of war at Salahieh; he was obliged either to submit to dishonour, or to engage in a desperate struggle. Kléber did not hesitate, and we shall see that, notwithstanding his much worse situation, he contrived to do what a few days before he judged to be impossible, and thus gave the noblest of contradictions to himself.

Kléber instantly countermanded all the orders previously given to the army. He brought back from Lower Egypt to Cairo part of the troops that had already descended the Nile; he ordered his stores to be sent up again; he urged the division of Upper Egypt to make haste to rejoin him, and gave notice to the grand-vizir to suspend his march towards Cairo, otherwise he should immediately commence hostilities. The grand-vizir replied that the convention of El Arisch was signed; that it must be executed; that, in consequence, he should advance towards the capital. At the same instant, an officer sent from Minorca with a letter from Lord Keith to Kléber, arrived at the headquarters. Among other expressions, that letter contained the following: “I have received positive orders from his Britannic Majesty, not to consent to any capitulation with the army under your command, unless the troops lay down their arms, surrender themselves prisoners of war, and give up all the ships in the harbour of Alexandria.”

Kléber, fired with indignation, caused Lord Keith’s letter to be inserted in the order of the day, adding to it these few words: “Soldiers, to such insults, there is no other answer than victory. Prepare for action.”

This noble language found an echo in every breast. The situation was greatly changed since the 28th of January, the day on which the convention of El Arisch was signed. The French then held all the fortified positions in Egypt; they ruled the Egyptians, who were quiet and submissive; the grand-vizir was on the other side of the desert. Now, on the contrary, the most important posts were given up; they had possession of the plain only; the population was everywhere awake; the inhabitants of Cairo, excited by the presence of the grand-vizir, who was at the distance of five hours’ march, was waiting only for the first signal to rise. The dismal picture drawn in the council of war, in which the convention of El Arisch was discussed—that picture, then false, was now strictly true. The French army was about to fight in the plain which borders the Nile, having in front the vizir, with 80,000 men, and on its

rear the 300,000 inhabitants of Cairo ready to revolt; and it was without fear! Glorious reparation of a great fault!

Agents of Sir Sidney Smith's had hastened up, to interpose between the French and the Turks, and to make fresh proposals of accommodation. Letters, they said, had just been written to London; when the convention of El Arisch was known there, it would be ratified to a certainty; in this situation, it would be right to suspend hostilities, and wait. To this the grand-vizir and Kléber consented, but on conditions that were irreconcilable. The grand-vizir insisted that Cairo should be given up to him; Kléber, on the contrary, that the vizir should fall back to the frontier. In this state of things, fighting was the only resource.

On the 20th of March 1800 (29th Ventôse, year VIII.), before daybreak, the French army marched from Cairo, and deployed in the rich plains which border the Nile, having the river on the left, the desert on the right, and in front, but at a distance, the ruins of ancient Heliopolis. Night, almost luminous in this climate, facilitated the manœuvres, but without rendering them distinct to the enemy. The army formed itself into four squares; two on the left, under General Reynier, two on the right, under General Friant. They were each composed of two demi-brigades of infantry, drawn up in several lines. At the angles and outside were companies of grenadiers, with their backs to the squares, serving to reinforce them during the march and in charges of cavalry, and separating from them to attack defended positions when the enemy attempted to make a stand. At the centre of the line of battle, that is to say, between the two squares on the left and the two squares on the right, the cavalry was disposed in a deep mass, having light artillery on its wings. At some distance in the rear, and on the left, a fifth square, smaller than the others, was destined to act as a reserve. The number of the troops that Kléber had collected in this plain of Heliopolis might be estimated at somewhat less than 10,000 men. They were firm and tranquil.

Day began to dawn. Kléber, who, since he had been commander-in-chief, had displayed a sort of magnificence, in order to make an impression on the Egyptians, was dressed in a rich uniform. Mounted on a horse of great height, he exhibited to the soldiers that noble countenance which they so much loved to behold, and the manly beauty of which filled them with confidence. "My friends," said he, as he rode through their ranks, "you possess in Egypt no more than the ground under your feet. If you recoil but a single step, you are undone!" His presence and his words were everywhere hailed with the greatest enthusiasm; and, as soon as it was quite light, he gave orders for marching forward.

As yet, only part of the army of the grand-vizir was in sight. In that plain of the Nile which extended before us appeared the village of El Matarieh, which the Turks had entrenched. Here was an advanced guard of from 5000 to 6000 Janissaries, very good soldiers, escorted by some thousand horse. A little beyond, another body appeared to harbour a design to glide between the river and our left wing, for the purpose of raising Cairo in our rear. In front, and at a much greater distance, the ruins of ancient Heliopolis, a wood of palm-trees, and considerable undulations of the ground, hid the bulk of the Turkish army from the view of our soldiers. The total number of all these forces, including the principal body, the corps placed at El Matarieh, and the detachment on march to penetrate into the city of Cairo, might be computed at 70,000 or 80,000 men.

Kléber first ordered a squadron of mounted guides to charge the detachment manœuvring on our left, for the purpose of introducing itself into Cairo. The guides dashed off at a gallop upon this confused mass. The Turks, who never feared cavalry, received and returned the shock. They completely enveloped our horse, which was in danger of being cut to pieces, when Kléber sent to their relief the 22nd regiment of chasseurs and the 14th of dragoons, who, charging the dense mass by which the guides were, in a manner, surrounded, used their swords so well as to disperse and put them to flight. The Turks then retired out of sight.

This done, Kléber hastened to attack the entrenched village of El Matarieh, before the main body of the enemy's army had time to come up. This duty he assigned to General Reynier, with the two squares on the left; and he himself, with the two squares on the right, wheeling about, posted himself between El Matarieh and Heliopolis, to prevent the Turkish army from coming to the assistance of the attacked position.

Reynier, having reached the village of El Matarieh, detached the companies of grenadiers which lined the angles of the squares, and ordered them to charge the village. These companies advanced, forming two small columns. The brave Janissaries would not wait for them to come up, but went to meet them. Our grenadiers, receiving them firmly, poured upon them, when close to the muzzles of their pieces, a discharge of musketry, which struck down a great number, and then charged with fixed bayonets. While the first column was attacking the Janissaries in front, the second took them in flank, and completed their dispersion. The two columns united then fell upon El Matarieh, amidst a shower of balls. They rushed with the bayonet on the Turks, who resisted, and, after a great carnage, made themselves masters of the position. The Turks fled into the plain; and, joining those whom the guides, chasseurs, and

dragoons had just before dispersed, ran in disorder towards Cairo, with Nassif Pasha, the lieutenant of the grand-vizir, at their head.

The village of El Matarieh, full of spoils in the Oriental fashion, presented an ample booty to our soldiers. But they did not stop there; both generals and soldiers were aware how important it was not to be surprised, in the midst of a village, by the mass of the Turkish troops. The army, resuming by degrees the same order as in the morning, advanced into the plain, still formed into several squares, with the cavalry in the middle. It passed the ruins of Heliopolis, and perceived beyond them a cloud of dust rising on the horizon, and rapidly advancing towards us. On the left appeared the village of Seriaqous; on the right, amidst a wood of palms, the village of El Merg, situated on the margin of a small lake, called the Lake of the Pilgrims. A slight elevation of ground ran from one to the other of these villages. All at once, this moving cloud of dust stood still, and was presently dispersed by a breeze, leaving the Turkish army exposed to view; it formed a long, floating line from Seriaqous to El Merg. Placed on the elevation just mentioned, it somewhat overlooked the ground upon which our troops were deployed. Kléber then gave orders to advance. Reynier, with the two squares on the left, marched towards Seriaqous; Friant, with the two squares on the right, moved upon El Merg. The enemy had sprinkled a considerable number of tirailleurs in advance of the palm-trees which surround El Merg. But a fight of tirailleurs could scarcely be successful against such soldiers as ours. Friant sent a few companies of light infantry, which soon obliged these detached Turks to rejoin the confused mass of their army. The grand-vizir was there, in the midst of a group of horsemen, whose bright armour glistened in the sun. Our howitzer fire soon dispersed this group. The enemy brought forward his artillery, with the intention of replying: but his shot, ill-directed, passed over the heads of our soldiers. His pieces were soon dismounted by ours, and put *hors de combat*. The thousand colours of the Turkish army were then seen waving, and part of its squadrons rushed out of the village of El Merg upon the squares of Friant's division. The deep fissures in the ground, the ordinary effect of a hot sun upon a soil long inundated, fortunately checked the impetuosity of the horses. General Friant, suffering these Turkish horse to advance nearly to the muzzles of the guns, gave orders for a sudden discharge of grape-shot, which swept them down by hundreds. They retired in confusion.

This was but the prelude to a general attack. The Turkish army was visibly preparing for it. Our squares waited with firmness, two on the right, two on the left, the cavalry in the centre.

facing both before and behind, and covered by two lines of artillery. At a signal given by the grand-vizir, the entire mass of the Turkish cavalry set itself in motion, rushed upon our squares, spread itself upon their wings, turned them, and soon surrounded the four fronts of our order of battle. The French infantry, unmoved by the shouts, the bustle, the tumult of the Turkish cavalry, remained calm, with bayonet presented, keeping up a continued and well-directed fire. In vain these thousand groups of horse whirled round it: they fell under the grape-shot and the balls, rarely coming up to its bayonets, expired at its feet, or turned about and fled, never to show themselves again.

After a long and frightful confusion, the sky, darkened by smoke and dust, suddenly became clear; the sun burst forth, and our victorious troops beheld before them a mass of men and horses, dead or dying; and, at a distance, as far as the eye could reach, bands of fugitives running away in all directions.

The main body of the Turks was retiring, in fact, towards El Kangah, where they had encamped the preceding night, on the road to Lower Egypt. A few groups only went to rejoin those parties which, under Nassif Pasha, lieutenant of the grand-vizir, had in the morning directed their steps towards Cairo.

Kléber resolved not to allow the enemy any rest. Our squares, preserving their order of battle, crossed the plain at a rapid pace, and, passing Seriaqous and El Merg, advanced to El Kangah. We arrived there at night. The enemy, finding himself closely pressed, again fled in disorder, leaving to our army the provisions and baggage, of which we stood in great need.

Thus, in that plain of Heliopolis, 10,000 soldiers, by superiority in discipline and quiet courage, dispersed 70,000 or 80,000 foes. But, to obtain a more beneficial result than that of a few thousand killed, wounded, and stretched in the dust, it would be necessary to pursue the Turks, to drive them into the desert, and to cause them to perish there by hunger, thirst, and the sword of the Arabs. The French army was exhausted with fatigue. Kléber allowed it a little rest, and gave orders for the pursuit on the following day.

We had scarcely 200 or 300 wounded or dead, for in this species of combat, troops in a square, which preserve themselves unbroken, sustain but little loss. Kléber, at this moment, hearing cannon towards Cairo, had no doubt that the corps which had turned his left had gone to second the revolt of that city. Nassif Pasha, the vizir's lieutenant, and Ibrahim Bey, one of the two Mameluke chiefs, had actually entered it with 2000 Mamelukes, 8000 or 10,000 Turkish horse, and some revolted villagers of the environs, in all about 20,000 men. Kléber had left scarcely 2000 in that great capital, distributed in the citadel and the forts. He ordered General Lagrange to set out in the

middle of that same night, with four battalions, and go to their relief. He enjoined all the commandants of troops left at Cairo to take strong positions, to keep in communication with one another, but not to attempt any decisive attack before his return. He was apprehensive of some false manœuvre on their part, which might uselessly endanger the lives of the soldiers, every day more and more precious, now that they were absolutely doomed to remain in Egypt.

During the whole time that the battle had lasted, the second Mameluke chief, Murad Bey, who had formerly shared with Ibrahim Bey the rule over Egypt, who was distinguished from his colleague by brilliant valour, chivalrous generosity, and great intelligence, had remained on the wings of the Turkish army, motionless, at the head of 600 superb horse. When the battle was over, he had plunged into the desert and disappeared. It was in consequence of a promise given to Kléber that he had thus acted. Murad Bey, who had recently arrived at the vizir's headquarters, had felt the old jealousy which so long divided the Turks and the Mamelukes spring up again within him. He was aware that the Turks were anxious to recover Egypt, not to restore it to the Mamelukes, but to possess it themselves. He, therefore, thought to conciliate the French, under the idea of allying himself with them, if they were victorious, or of succeeding them if they were vanquished. Acting, however, with circumspection, he refrained from the manifestation of his sentiments till hostilities were definitively resumed, and had promised Kléber to declare for him after the first battle. That battle was fought; it was glorious for the French; and his sympathy for them could not fail to be greatly augmented by it. There was reason to hope that, in a few days, we should have him for our professed ally.

In the middle of the very night which followed the battle, after allowing the troops a few hours' rest, Kléber ordered the drums to beat to arms, and marched for Belbeis, determined not to give any respite to the Turks. He arrived there very early in the day. This was the 21st of March (30th Ventôse). The vizir, in his rapid flight, was already beyond Belbeis. He had left in the fort and town a corps of infantry, and in the plain a thousand horse. On the approach of our troops these horse fled. The Turks were driven out of the town; they were shut up in the fort, where, after exchanging a few cannon-shot, want of water and fear induced them to surrender. So great was the fanaticism of these Turkish troops, that some men chose rather to be slaughtered than to give up their arms. Meanwhile, the cavalry of General Leclerc, scouring the plain, seized a long caravan of camels proceeding towards Cairo, and laden with the baggage of Nassif Pasha and Ibrahim Bey. This

capture revealed more completely to Kléber the real design of the Turks, which consisted in exciting not only the capital but all the large towns in Egypt to rise against the French. Apprised of this design, and finding that the Turkish army made no stand anywhere, he detached General Friant with five battalions for Cairo, to support the four battalions sent in the night from El Kangah, under the orders of General Lagrange.

Next day, March 22nd (1st Germinal), he set out for Salahieh. General Reynier preceded him at the head of the left division: he himself followed with the guides and the 7th hussars. Lastly came General Belliard, with his brigade, the rest of Friant's division. During the march, a message was received from the grand-vizir, who desired to negotiate. The only answer returned was a refusal. Not far from Karaïm, half-way to Salahieh, a violent cannonade was heard; soon afterwards Reynier's division was seen formed in square and engaged with a multitude of horse. Kléber sent word to Belliard to hasten his march, and he himself, with the cavalry, proceeded with the utmost expedition towards Reynier's square. But at this sight the Turks, who were attacking Reynier's division, liking better to have to do with the French cavalry than with the infantry, fell upon the guides and the 7th hussars, whom Kléber was bringing with him. Their charge was so sudden that the light artillery had not time to place itself in battery. The drivers were slaughtered on their guns. Kléber, with the guides and the hussars, was for a moment in the greatest danger, especially as the inhabitants of Karaïm, thinking that it was all over with such a handful of French, had hastened to the spot with pitchforks and scythes to finish them. But Reynier immediately sent the 14th dragoons, which extricated Kléber in time. Belliard, who had pushed on at a great rate, came up soon afterwards with his infantry, and cut in pieces some hundred men.

Kléber, anxious to reach Salahieh, hastened his march, deferring till his return the punishment of Karaïm. The heat of the day was oppressive; the wind blew from the desert, and along with a scorching air was inhaled a fine, penetrating dust. Men and horses were exhausted with fatigue. At length, about nightfall, they arrived at Salahieh. They were now on the very frontier of Egypt, at the entrance of the desert of Syria, and Kléber expected to have on the morrow a final engagement with the grand-vizir. But, on the morning of the next day, March 23rd (2nd Germinal), the inhabitants of Salahieh came to meet him, and informed him that the vizir was continuing his flight in the greatest disorder. Kléber hastened forward, and with his own eyes beheld this sight,



which proved how much he had exaggerated to himself the danger of Turkish armies.

The grand-vizir, taking with him 500 of his best horse, had penetrated with some baggage into the desert. The rest of his army was fleeing in all directions; one part was running towards the Delta; a second begged upon its knees for quarter; a third, seeking an asylum in the desert, was slaughtered by the Arabs. These last, after convoying the Turkish army, had remained on the frontier, knowing that one party or the other must be vanquished, and that, of course, there would be booty to pick up. Their conclusion was correct; for, finding the Turkish army completely demoralised and incapable of defending itself even against them, they murdered the fugitives for the purpose of plundering them. Just at the moment when Kléber arrived, they had borne down to the deserted camp of the vizir, and pounced upon it like a flock of birds of prey. At the sight of our army, they flew away on their swift horses, leaving abundant spoils to our soldiers. Here, in the entrenched space of a square league, they found an infinite multitude of tents, horses, cannon, and a great quantity of saddles and harness of all sorts, 40,000 horse-shoes, a profusion of provisions and of rich apparel, boxes already broken open by the Arabs, but still full of perfumes of aloes, silk stuffs, in short, of all those articles that compose the dazzling and barbarous luxury of Oriental armies. Along with twelve litters of wood, carved and gilt, there was a carriage hung on springs after the European fashion, of English manufacture; and pieces of cannon were found with the motto *Honi soit qui mal y pense*; a certain evidence of the very active intervention of the English in this war.

Our soldiers, who had brought nothing with them, found, in the Turkish camp, provisions, ammunition, a rich booty, and objects the singularity of which made them laugh, as they were always disposed to do after a brief moment of dejection. Strange power of the mind over man! Now, victorious, they had no wish to leave Egypt, and no longer considered themselves doomed to perish in distant exile!

When Kléber had ascertained with his own eyes that the Turkish army had disappeared, he resolved to return and reduce the towns of Lower Egypt, and Cairo in particular, to their duty. He made the following dispositions:—Generals Rampon and Lanusse were ordered to scour the Delta; Rampon was to march to the important town of Damietta, which was in the hands of the Turks, and to retake it. Lanusse was to keep in communication with Rampon, to sweep the Delta from Damietta to Alexandria, and to reduce successively the revolted villages. Belliard had the general commission to support these different operations, and the special commission to second

Rampon in his attack on Damietta, and to retake himself the fort of Lesbeh, which commands one of the mouths of the Nile. Kléber, moreover, left Reynier at Salahieh, to prevent the remnants of the Turkish army, which had fled into the desert of Syria, from coming back. The latter was to remain in observation on the frontier, till the Arabs had completed the dispersion of the Turks, and then return to Cairo. Lastly, Kléber himself set out on the next day, March 24th (3rd Germinal), with the 88th demi-brigade, two companies of grenadiers, the 7th hussars, and the 3rd and 14th dragoons.

He arrived at Cairo on the 27th of March. Important events had occurred there since his departure. The population of that great city, which numbered nearly 300,000 inhabitants, fickle, inflammable, inclined to change, like all multitudes, had followed the suggestions of Turkish emissaries, and fallen upon the French the moment they heard the cannon at Heliopolis. Pouring forth outside the walls during the battle; and seeing Nassif-Pasha and Ibrahim Bey, with some thousand horse and Janissaries, they supposed them to be conquerors. Taking good care not to undeceive the inhabitants, the Turks affirmed, on the contrary, that the grand-vizir had gained a complete victory, and that the French were exterminated. At these tidings, 50,000 men had risen in Cairo, at Boulaq, and at Gyzeh. Armed with swords, pikes, and old muskets, they purposed to slaughter the French left among them. But 2000 men, entrenched in the citadel and in the forts which commanded the city, supplied with provisions and ammunition, opposed a resistance difficult to overcome. Having almost all of them fallen back in time, they had managed to shut themselves up in the fortified places. Some, however, had been in great danger; it was those who, to the number of 200 only, mounted guard at the headquarters. This noble edifice, formerly occupied by General Bonaparte, and since by Kléber and the principal administrations, stood at one of the extremities of the city, overlooking on one side the square of Ezbekyeh, the finest in Cairo; on the other, gardens stretching to the Nile. The Turks and the insurgent populace intended to storm this house, and to slaughter the 200 French by whom it was occupied. This would have been the more easy for them, since General Verdier, who guarded the citadel, placed at the other extremity of Cairo, could not come to their assistance. But the brave soldiers who were in the headquarters managed, sometimes by a well-supported fire, sometimes by daring sorties, to keep the ferocious multitude at bay, and to give General Lagrange time to arrive. He had been detached, as we have seen, the very night after the battle, with four battalions. He arrived at noon the next day,

entered by the gardens, and rendered the headquarters thenceforth impregnable.

The Turks, seeing no means of overcoming the resistance of the French, reeked their revenge on such unfortunate Christians as were in their power. They began by slaughtering part of the inhabitants of the European quarter; they killed several merchants, plundered their houses, and carried off their wives and daughters. They then went in search of those Arabs who were accused of living on good terms with the French, and of drinking wine with them. They put them to death; and murder and plunder went hand in hand, as usual. They impaled an Arab, who had been chief of the Janissaries under the French, and who was charged with the police of Cairo; and they treated in the same manner one who had been secretary to the Divan instituted by General Bonaparte. Thence they proceeded to the quarter of the Copts. These, as every one knows, are descended from the ancient inhabitants of Egypt, and have adhered to Christianity, in spite of all the Mussulman dominations that have succeeded one another in their country. They possessed great wealth, arising from the collection of the taxes, which the Mamelukes had delegated to them. The intention was, to punish in them, friends of the French, and more especially to plunder their houses. Very fortunately for these Copts, their quarters formed the left side of Ezbekyeh square, contiguous to our headquarters. Their chief was, moreover, rich and brave; he defended himself well, and succeeded in saving them.

Amid these horrors, Nassif Pasha and Ibrahim Bey were ashamed of themselves for what they did, or suffered to be done. They saw that wealth wasted which would belong to them, if they remained in possession of Egypt. But they winked at all that was done by a populace of which they were no longer masters, and thought, besides, by these massacres, to keep up their animosity against the French.

During these transactions arrived General Friant, detached from Belbeis, and lastly, Kléber himself. Both entered through the gardens behind our headquarters. Though conqueror of the grand-vizir's army, Kléber had a serious difficulty to surmount, nothing less than to subdue an immense city, peopled by 300,000 inhabitants, partly in a state of revolt, occupied by 20,000 Turks, and built in the Oriental style, that is to say, having narrow streets, divided into piles of masonry, which were real fortresses. These edifices receiving light from within, and exhibiting without nothing but lofty walls, had terraces instead of roofs, from which the insurgents poured a downward and destructive fire. Add to this, that the Turks were masters of the whole city, excepting the citadel and the square of

Ezbekyeh. As for the latter, they had blockaded it in a manner by closing the streets that ran into it with embattled walls.

The French had but two modes of attack; either to keep up a destructive fire of bombs and howitzers from the citadel, till the city was reduced, or to debouch by the square of Ezbekyeh, overthrowing all the barriers erected at the head of the streets, and taking all the quarters by assault, one by one. The first method was liable to cause the destruction of a great city, the capital of the country, which the French needed for the supply of necessaries; the second exposed them to the risk of losing ten times as many men as ten battles like that of Heliopolis would have cost them.

In this case, Kléber showed as much prudence as he had just shown energy in the field. He resolved to gain time, and to let the insurrection wear itself out. He had sent almost the whole of his *matériel* to Lower Egypt, under the idea that he should very soon embark. He enjoined Reynier, as soon as the army of the vizir had entirely crossed the desert, and as soon as Damietta and Lesbeh were retaken, to ascend the Nile with his whole division and the stores necessary for Cairo. Meanwhile, he caused all the outlets, by which the city could communicate with the surrounding country, to be blockaded. Though the insurgents had procured provisions by plundering the houses of the Egyptians, in general amply supplied with them, though they had cast balls, and even founded cannon, they could not possibly help suffering very soon from dearth. Nor could they fail at length to be undeceived respecting the general state of things in Egypt, and to learn that the French were everywhere victorious, and the vizir's army dispersed; moreover, they were likely to fall out ere long, for their interests were totally opposite. Nassif Pasha's Turks, Ibrahim Bey's Mamelukes, and the Arab population of Cairo could not agree together long. For all these reasons, Kléber thought it advisable to temporise and to negotiate.

While he was gaining time, he completed his treaty of alliance with Murad Bey, through the agency of the wife of that Mameluke prince, a person universally respected, endowed with beauty, and even with a superior understanding. He granted to him the province of Saïd, under the supremacy of France, on condition of paying a tribute equivalent to a considerable part of the imposts of that province. Murad Bey engaged, moreover, to fight for the French; and the French engaged, if they should ever quit the country, to facilitate for him the occupation of Egypt. Murad Bey, as we shall see by-and-by, faithfully adhered to the treaty which he had just signed, and began by driving from Upper Egypt a Turkish corps which had occupied it.

By means of Murad Bey and the sheiks who were secret friends of France, Kléber then opened negotiations with the Turks who had entered Cairo. Nassif Pasha and Ibrahim Bey began, in fact, to be afraid of being shut up in the city by the French, and treated after the Turkish fashion. They knew, besides, that the grand-vizir's army was completely dispersed. In consequence, they cheerfully assented to conferences, and agreed to a capitulation, by the terms of which they were to be allowed to retire safe and sound. But, at the moment when this capitulation was about to be concluded, the insurgents of Cairo, finding themselves abandoned to the vengeance of the French, were seized with consternation and rage, caused the conferences to be broken off, threatened to despatch all those who showed any determination to desert them, and even gave money to the Turks to induce them to fight. An attack by main force was, therefore, indispensable for completing the reduction of the city.

Lower Egypt having returned to its duty, Reynier had ascended with his corps and a convoy of military stores. He assisted in investing that part of the outworks of Cairo which stretch from north to east, that is to say, from Fort Camin to the citadel; General Friant encamped towards the west, in the gardens behind our headquarters, between the city and the Nile; Leclerc's cavalry was posted between Reynier's and Friant's divisions, scouring the country; General Verdier occupied the south.

On the 3rd and 4th of April (13th and 14th Germinal) a detachment of General Friant's commenced the first attack. Its chief object was to clear Ezbekyeh square, which was our principal *nébouché*. A beginning was made with the Copt quarter, which formed the left of it. The troops penetrated with the greatest intrepidity into the streets which crossed this quarter in all directions; while several detachments blew up the houses all round Ezbekyeh square, for the purpose of opening avenues to the interior of the city. Meanwhile, the citadel threw a few bombs to intimidate the population. These attacks were successful, and made us masters of the heads of the streets terminating in Ezbekyeh square. In the following days, an eminence situated near Fort Sulkouskoi, which the Turks had entrenched, and which commanded the Copt quarter, was taken. Every preparation was thus made for a general and simultaneous attack. Before he made this attack, Kléber summoned the insurgents for the last time: they refused to listen to the summons. Still making a particular point of sparing the city, which, it is true, was not implicated in the horrors committed by a few fanatics, he resolved to speak to the eye by means of a terrible example. He gave orders for

attacking Boulaq, a detached suburb of Cairo, on the banks of the Nile.

On the 15th of April (25th Germinal) Friant's division surrounded Boulaq, and poured upon that devoted suburb a shower of bombs and howitzers. Favoured by this fire, the soldiers rushed to the assault, but met with an obstinate resistance from the inhabitants and the Turks. Every street, every house, became the theatre of a desperate conflict. Kléber ordered this horrible carnage to be suspended for a moment, to offer pardon to the revolvers: that pardon was rejected. The attack was then resumed: the fire spread from house to house, and Boulaq, in flames, experienced the twofold horror of a conflagration and an assault. Meanwhile, the chiefs of the population having thrown themselves at the feet of the conqueror, Kléber put a stop to the effusion of blood, and saved the remnant of the hapless suburb. It was the quarter which contained the warehouses of the merchants; in these were found an immense quantity of goods, which were preserved from the flames for the use of the army.

This horrible sight was witnessed by the whole population of Cairo. Taking advantage of the effect which it was likely to produce, Kléber ordered the capital itself to be attacked. A house adjoining to the headquarters had been undermined; fire was applied to the mine, and Turks and insurgents were blown up together. This was the signal for the attack. Friant's and Belliard's troops debouched by all the outlets from Ezbekyeh square, while General Reynier entered at the north and east gates, while Verdier, from the elevated citadel, showered bombs upon the city. The fight was obstinate. Reynier's troops penetrated through the Bab-el-Charyeh gate, situated at the extremity of the great canal, and, driving before them Ibrahim Bey and Nassif Pasha, who defended it, at length cooped up both of them between the 9th demi-brigade, which, having entered at the opposite point, had driven back all they encountered in their victorious course. The two French corps joined, after making a frightful carnage. Night separated the combatants. Several thousand Turks, Mamelukes, and insurgents had fallen; four hundred houses were in flames.

This was the last effort at resistance. The inhabitants, who had long detained the Turks, now began to conjure them most earnestly to quit Cairo, and thus leave them at liberty to negotiate with the French. Kléber, who was averse to these sanguinary scenes, and who was anxious to spare his soldiers, wished for nothing better than to treat. The envoys of Murad Bey served him for agents. The treaty was soon concluded. Nassif Pasha and Ibrahim Bey were to retire to Syria, escorted by a detachment of the French army. The only terms granted them were,

that their lives should be spared. They set out from Cairo on the 25th of April (5th Floréal), leaving to the mercy of the French the wretches whom they had urged into revolt.

Thus terminated that sanguinary struggle, which had commenced with the battle of Heliopolis on the 20th of March, and which ended on the 25th of April with the departure of the last lieutenants of the vizir, after thirty-five days' fighting, between 20,000 French, on one side, and, on the other, the whole force of the Ottoman Empire, seconded by the revolt of the Egyptian towns. Great faults had occasioned this insurrection, and provoked this horrible effusion of blood. If, in fact, the French had not made preparations for departing, the Egyptians would never have dared to rise. The contest would have been limited to a brilliant but by no means dangerous battle between our squares of infantry and the Turkish cavalry. But a commencement of evacuation having produced a popular explosion in several towns, it was necessary to retake them by assault, which was more destructive than a battle. Let us forget Kléber's faults in admiration of his glorious and energetic conduct! He had imagined that he could not defend Egypt, when subjugated and peaceful, against the Turks; and he had now conquered it in thirty-five days, in spite of Turks and of the insurgent Egyptians, with equal energy, prudence, and humanity.

In the Delta, all the towns had returned to a state of complete submission. Murad Bey had driven from Upper Egypt the Turkish detachment of Dervish Pasha. The vanquished everywhere trembled before the conqueror, and expected a terrible chastisement. The inhabitants of Cairo in particular, who had committed revolting cruelties upon the Arabs attached to the French, and upon the Christians of all nations, were filled with consternation. Kléber, who was humane and wise, took good care not to repay cruelties with cruelties. He knew that conquest, odious to all nations, never becomes tolerable in the estimation of those on whom it falls, but at the price of a good government, and cannot render itself legitimate in the eyes of enlightened nations unless by the accomplishment of great designs. He hastened, therefore, to use his victory with moderation. The Egyptians were persuaded that they should be treated harshly: they conceived that the loss of life and property would atone for the crime of those who had risen in revolt. Kléber called them together, assumed at first a stern look, but afterwards pardoned them, merely imposing a contribution on the insurgent villages.

Cairo paid 10,000,000 *l.*, a burden far from onerous for so large a city. The inhabitants considered themselves as most lucky to get off so easily. Eight millions more were imposed upon the rebel towns of Lower Egypt.

This sum sufficed for the immediate discharge of the arrears of pay, and furnished funds for procuring the provisions needed by the army, for supplying all the wants of the wounded, and for completing the fortifications that were begun. It was a precious resource, till the system of the impositions should be improved and carried into execution. Another resource, equally unexpected, presented itself at this moment. Seventy Turkish vessels had just entered the Egyptian ports, to carry away the French army. The late hostilities justified our detaining them. They were laden with goods, which were sold for the benefit of the chest of the army. Owing to these various resources, an abundant provision was made for all the services, without any requisition in kind. The army found itself in plenty, and the Egyptians, who had not hoped to be let off so easily, submitted with perfect resignation. The army, proud of its victories, confident in its strength, knowing that General Bonaparte was at the head of the government, ceased to doubt that it would soon receive reinforcements. Kléber had in the plain of Heliopolis made the noblest amends for his momentary faults.

He assembled the administrators of the army, the persons best acquainted with the country, and turned his attention to the organisation of the finances of the colony. He restored the collection of the direct contributions to the Copts, to whom it had formerly been entrusted; he imposed some new customs' duties and taxes on articles of consumption. The total of the revenues was to amount to 25,000,000 f., and this was sufficient for all the wants of the army, which did not exceed eighteen or twenty millions. He admitted into the ranks of our demi-brigades, Copts, Syrians, and even Blacks, bought in Darfur, and whom some of the subalterns, beginning to speak the language of the country, undertook to drill. These new soldiers placed in the regiments, fought there as stoutly as the French with whom they had the honour to serve. Kléber gave orders for the completion of the forts constructing around Cairo, and set men to work at those of Lesbeh, Damietta, Burlos, and Rosetta, situated on the sea-coast. He pressed forward the works of Alexandria, and imparted fresh activity to the scientific researches of the Institute of Egypt. From the cataracts to the mouths of the Nile, everything assumed the aspect of a solid and durable establishment. Two months afterwards, the caravans of Syria, Arabia, and Darfur began to appear again at Cairo. The hospitable welcome which they received ensured their return.

If Kléber had lived, Egypt would have remained in our possession, at least till the time of our great disasters. But a deplorable event snatched away that general, in the midst of his exploits and of his judicious government.

It is always more or less dangerous to give a deep shock to



the ruling principles of human nature. All Islamism had been moved by the presence of the French in Egypt. The children of Mahomet had felt somewhat of that enthusiasm which of old inflamed them against the Crusaders. Cries of a holy war were raised, as in the twelfth century; and there were fanatic Mussulmans who vowed to achieve the *sacred fight*, which consists in slaying an Infidel. In Egypt, where people saw the French closely, where they appreciated their humanity, where they could compare them with the soldiers of the Porte, especially with the Mamelukes—in Egypt, where they witnessed their respect for the Prophet (a respect enjoined by General Bonaparte), less aversion for them was entertained; and, when they afterwards left the country, the fanaticism had considerably abated. Indeed, during the late insurrection, there had even been perceived, in some places, real signs of attachment to our soldiers, to such a degree, that the English agents were surprised at it. But, throughout the rest of the East, the attention of all was engrossed by one subject, and that was the invasion by Infidels of an extensive Mussulman country.

A young man, a native of Aleppo, named Suleiman, who was a prey to extravagant fanaticism, who had performed the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, who had studied at the mosque El Azhar, the most celebrated and the wealthiest in Cairo, that where the Koran and the Turkish law are taught, who, finally, purposed to obtain admission into the body of the doctors of the faith, chanced to be wandering in Palestine, when the wrecks of the vizir's army passed through the country. He witnessed the sufferings, the despair, of his co-religionists, which violently affected his morbid imagination. The aga of the Janissaries, who had chanced to see him, inflamed his fanaticism still more by his own suggestions. This young man offered to assassinate "the Sultan of the French," General Kléber. Furnished with a dromedary and a sum of money, he repaired to Gaza, crossed the desert, proceeded to Cairo, and shut himself up for several weeks in the great mosque, into which students and poor travellers were admitted, at the cost of that pious foundation. The rich mosques are in the East what convents formerly were in Europe; there are found prayer, religious instruction, and hospitality. The young fanatic intimated his design to the four principal sheiks of the mosque, who were at the head of the department of instruction. They were alarmed at his resolution, and at the consequences to which it was likely to lead; they told him that it would not succeed, and that it would bring great disasters upon Egypt; but still they refrained from apprising the French authorities.

When this wretched man was sufficiently confirmed in his resolution, he armed himself with a dagger, followed Kléber for

several days, but, finding no opportunity to approach him, he resolved to penetrate into the garden of the headquarters, and to hide himself there in an abandoned cistern. On the 14th of June he appeared before Kléber, who was walking with Protain, the architect of the army, and showing him what repairs would require to be done in the house, to obliterate the traces of the bombs and balls. Suleiman approached him, as if to beg alms, and, while Kléber was preparing to listen to him, he rushed upon him, and plunged his dagger several times into his breast. Kléber fell, under the violence of this attack. Protain, having a stick in his hand, fell upon the assassin, struck him violently on the head, but was thrown down in his turn by a stab with the dagger. At the cries of the two victims, the soldiers ran to the spot, raised their expiring general, sought and seized the murderer, whom they found skulking behind a heap of rubbish.

A few minutes after this tragic scene Kléber expired. The army shed bitter tears over him. The Arabs themselves, who had admired his clemency after their revolt, united their regrets to those of our soldiers. A military commission assembled immediately to try the assassin, who confessed everything. He was condemned, according to the laws of the country, and impaled. The four sheiks to whom he had communicated his intention were beheaded. These bloody sacrifices were deemed necessary for the safety of the chiefs of the army. Vain precaution! With Kléber, the army had lost a general, and the colony a founder, for whom none of the officers left in Egypt was qualified to make amends. With Kléber Egypt was lost for France. Menou, who succeeded him by right of seniority, was a warm partisan of the expedition; but, notwithstanding his zeal, he was very far beneath such a task. One man alone could have equalled Kléber, nay, surpassed him, in the government of Egypt; this was he, who, three months before, embarked in the harbour of Alexandria for Italy, and who fell at Marengo, on the same day, nearly at the same moment that Kléber was murdered at Cairo; this was Desaix. Both died on the 14th of June 1800, for the accomplishment of the vast designs of General Bonaparte. How singular the destiny of these two men, constantly placed side by side during life, undivided in death, yet withal so different in every quality whether of mind or body!

Kléber was the handsomest man in the army. His lofty stature, his noble countenance, expressing all the pride of his soul, his valour at once intrepid and cool, his quick and solid intelligence, rendered him a most formidable commander on the field of battle. His mind was brilliant, original, but uncultivated. He read incessantly and exclusively Plutarch and Quintus Curtius; there he sought the food of great souls, the history of the heroes of antiquity. He was capricious, indocile,





and a grumbler. It was said of him, that he liked not either to command or to obey; and this was true. He obeyed under General Bonaparte, but not without murmuring; he sometimes commanded, but in the name of another, under General Jourdan, for example, assuming the command by a sort of inspiration amidst the battle, exercising it like a superior captain, and, after the victory, resuming his character of lieutenant, which he preferred to any other. Kléber was licentious in his manners and language, but upright, disinterested, as men were in those days, for the conquest of the world had not yet corrupted their dispositions.

Desaix was the reverse in almost every respect. Simple, bashful, nay, somewhat awkward, his face hid by a profusion of hair, he had not the look of a soldier. But, heroic in action, kind to the soldiers, modest with his comrades, generous to the vanquished, he was adored by the army and by the people conquered by our arms. His solid and eminently cultivated mind, his intelligence in war, his application to his duties, and his disinterestedness, made him an accomplished model of all the military virtues; and while Kléber, indocile, refractory, could not endure any superior authority, Desaix was obedient, as though he had not known how to command. Under a rough exterior, he concealed a soul ardent and susceptible of enthusiasm. Though trained in the severe school of the army of the Rhine, he was a warm admirer of the campaigns in Italy, and was desirous of inspecting with his own eyes the fields of battle of Castiglione, Arcole, and Rivoli. While visiting those places, the theatres of immortal glory, he accidentally fell in with the commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, who conceived a strong attachment for him. What an honourable homage was the friendship of such a man! General Bonaparte was deeply touched by it. He esteemed Kléber for his high military qualities, but considered none as equal to Desaix either in talents or character. Besides, he had an affection for him; surrounded by companions in arms, who had not yet forgiven his elevation, though feigning an obsequious submission to him, he appreciated the more Desaix's pure disinterested devotedness, founded on deep admiration. At the same time, keeping to himself the secret of his preferences, affecting ignorance of Kléber's faults, he treated him and Desaix both alike, and was desirous, as we shall see, to unite in the same honours two men whom Fortune had united in one and the same fate.

For the rest, all continued quiet in Egypt after Kléber's death. General Menou, on assuming the command, lost no time in despatching the ship *Océis* from Alexandria, to carry to France tidings of the then flourishing state of the colony, and of the deplorable end of its second founder.

## BOOK VI.

### ARMISTICE.

WHILE the *Osiris* was conveying to Europe the tidings of what had happened on the banks of the Nile, orders totally contrary to those before given were despatched from the ports of England. The observations of Sir Sidney Smith had been well received in London. The government had been fearful of disavowing an English officer, who had come forward as invested with its powers; it had above all discovered the falsehood of the intercepted despatches, and formed a more correct estimate of the difficulty of wresting Egypt from the French army. It had, therefore, ratified the convention of El Arisch, and instructed Lord Keith to cause it to be executed. But it was too late, as we have seen: the convention was at that moment torn, sword in hand; and the French, having recovered possession of Egypt, were no longer disposed to abandon the country. The English ministers were destined to experience bitter regret for the levity of their conduct and violent attacks in parliament.

The First Consul, on his part, was rejoiced by the intelligence of the consolidation of his conquest. Unfortunately, the news of Kléber's death reached him almost at the same moment as the news of his exploits. His grief was intense and sincere. He rarely dissembled, and only when obliged to do so by a duty or by an important interest, but always with effort, because the vivacity of his temper rendered dissimulation difficult. But in the narrow circle of his family and his counsellors, he used no disguise; he manifested his affections, his antipathies, with extreme vehemence. It was among these intimates that he betrayed the profound sorrow which he felt for the death of Kléber. In him, he regretted not a friend, as in Desaix; he regretted a great general, an able chief, more capable than any other to ensure the establishment of the French in Egypt—an establishment which he regarded as his most glorious work, but which definitive success alone could convert from a brilliant attempt into a great and solid enterprise.

Time, that like a river sweeps along with it all that falls into its rapid current, Time has engulfed the odious falsehoods then

invented by the hatred of parties. There is one of them, however, which it may be instructive to mention here, though long since consigned to profound oblivion. The royalist agents reported, and English newspapers repeated, that Desaix and Kléber, having given umbrage to the First Consul, were assassinated by his orders, the one at Marengo, the other at Cairo. There were miserable and silly fools enough to believe it, and now people are almost ashamed to recollect such imputations. Those who fabricate these infamous calumnies ought sometimes to place themselves in presence of posterity. They would blush at the refutation which time has in store for them.

The First Consul had already given pressing orders to the fleets at Brest and Rochefort to prepare to set sail for the Mediterranean. Though our finances were in a much better state, still, being obliged to make great efforts on land, the First Consul could not accomplish all that our navy required. He neglected nothing, however, to put the great Brest fleet in a condition to put to sea. He solicited the court of Spain to send the necessary orders to Admirals Gravina and Mazzaredo, commanding the Spanish division, to concur in the movements of the French division. The squadrons of the two nations, blocked up in Brest for a year past, when united, would form a force of forty ships of the line. The First Consul proposed that, taking advantage of the sailing of this immense naval force, the French ships disposable at L'Orient, Rochefort, and Toulon, and the Spanish ships disposable at Ferrol, Cadiz, and Carthagena, should join the combined fleet, to increase its strength. These different movements were to be directed in such a manner as to deceive the English, to throw them into great perplexity, and meanwhile, Admiral Ganteaume, taking with him the quickest sailers, was to slip away and to carry to Egypt 6000 picked troops, numerous workmen, and an immense *matériel*.

Spain willingly assented to this combination, which would at least have the advantage of bringing back into the Mediterranean, and consequently into her ports, the squadron of Admiral Gravina, uselessly shut up in the harbour of Brest. She saw no other objection to this plan but the bad condition of her fleets and their wretched equipment. The First Consul did his best to remove this objection, and the ships of the two nations were soon provided with the more necessary stores. In the meantime, he was anxious that the army in Egypt should receive intelligence from him every five or six days. He gave orders that, from all the ports of the Mediterranean, Spain and Italy included, there should sail brigs, avisoes, mere merchantmen, carrying balls, bombs, lead, powder, muskets, swords, wood for cartwrights' work, medicines, Jesuits' bark, corn, wine, in short, all that the army in Egypt was likely to need. He ordered

moreover, that each of these small vessels should take out a number of workmen, masons or smiths, some gunners, and some picked cavalry soldiers. He directed them to charter vessels at Carthage, Barcelona, Port Vendre, Marseilles, Toulon, Antibes, Savona, Genoa, Bastia, St. Florent, &c. He even bargained with merchants of Algiers to send to Egypt cargoes of wine, of which the army was destitute. By his command a company of actors was formed, the requisites for a theatre were provided, and the whole was to be sent to Alexandria. The best Paris newspapers were subscribed for, in order to be forwarded to the principal officers of the army, that they might be made acquainted with what was passing in Europe. In short, nothing was neglected that could serve to keep up the courage of the exiled soldiers, and to place them in constant communication with the mother-country.\*

Of course several of these vessels were liable to be taken, but the greater number had a chance of arriving, and did actually arrive, for the extensive coast of the Delta could not be strictly guarded. The same success did not attend the attempts made to revictual Malta, which the English kept closely blockaded. They made an especial point of reducing this second Gibraltar; they knew that the blockade must in the long run produce here a certain effect; for Malta is a rock, which cannot be supplied but by sea, whereas Egypt is a vast kingdom, which feeds both itself and its neighbours. They steadfastly persevered, therefore, in investing the place and in inflicting upon it the horrors of famine. The brave General Vaubois, having at his disposal a garrison of 4000 men, was not afraid of their attacks; but he saw the provisions destined for the subsistence of his soldiers hourly diminishing, and unfortunately did not receive from the ports of Corsica sufficient resources to supply the place of those that were every day consumed.

The First Consul also turned his earnest attention to the selection of a chief capable of commanding the army in Egypt. The loss of Kléber was distressing, especially in consideration of those who might be called to succeed him. Had Desaix remained in Egypt, the misfortune would have been easily repaired. But Desaix had returned; Desaix was dead. Those who were left were not competent for such a command. Reynier was a good officer, brought up in the school of the army of the Rhine, skilful, experienced, but cold, irresolute, without ascendancy over the troops. Menou was well informed, personally brave, an enthusiast in favour of the expedition, but incapable of directing an army, and covered with ridicule because he had married a Turkish woman and turned Mahometan

\* All these particulars are extracted from the voluminous correspondence of the First Consul with the department of war and of the marine.



himself. He took the name of Abdallah Menou, which was a subject of mirth for the soldiers, and greatly abated the respect with which a commander-in-chief needs to be surrounded. General Lanusse, brave, intelligent, full of an ardour which he understood the art of communicating to others, appeared to the First Consul to deserve the preference, though he was deficient in prudence. But General Menou had assumed the command by right of seniority. It was difficult to ensure the arrival of an order in Egypt; the English might intercept that order; and, without communicating it literally, they might excite a suspicion of its purport, in such a manner as to render the command uncertain, to produce dissension among the generals, and to distract the colony. He therefore left things in the same state, and confirmed Menou in the charge, not conceiving him to be so utterly incapable as he really was.

We must now return to Europe, to see what was passing on this theatre of the great events of the world. The letter addressed from Marengo itself to the Emperor of Germany reached him along with the news of the lost battle. The court of Vienna was then aware of the faults which it had committed, in rejecting the offers of the First Consul at the beginning of winter, in persisting to consider France as exhausted and incapable of continuing the war, in refusing to believe the existence of the army of reserve, and in blindly pushing M. de Melas into the gorges of the Apennines. The credit of M. de Thugut was considerably diminished, for to him alone were imputed all the errors of want of conduct and foresight. However, to these faults, already so serious, was added another not less important, that of forming a closer alliance than ever with the English, under the impression of the disaster of Marengo. Till now, the cabinet of Vienna had declined their subsidies, but it thought it right to procure immediately the means of repairing the losses of this campaign, either to place itself in a condition to treat more advantageously with France, or to be able to engage in a fresh struggle with her, if her pretensions were too exorbitant. It accepted, therefore, two millions and a half sterling (62,000,000 francs). In return for this subsidy, it engaged not to make peace with France before the month of February following, unless the peace were common to England and Austria. This treaty was signed on the 20th of June, the very day on which the news of the events in Italy reached Vienna. Austria, therefore, bound herself to the fortunes of England for seven months longer; but she hoped to pass the summer in negotiations, and to get on till winter before hostilities could be recommenced. For the rest, the imperial cabinet had made up its mind to peace; it merely wished to negotiate jointly with England, and especially not to make too great

sacrifices in Italy. On this condition, it desired nothing better than to conclude peace.

The emperor sent as bearer of his answer to the letter of the First Consul, the same officer who had brought that letter, namely, M. de St. Julien, in whom he reposed great confidence. The answer on this occasion was direct and personally addressed to General Bonaparte. It contained the ratification of the double armistice, signed in Germany and in Italy, and an invitation to explain himself confidentially and with perfect frankness respecting the bases of the future negotiation. M. de St. Julien was specially charged to sound the First Consul on the conditions of peace, and on his part to say sufficient concerning the intentions of the emperor to induce the French cabinet to disclose its own. The letter of which M. de St. Julien was the bearer, full of flattering and pacific protestations, contained a passage in which the object of his mission was clearly specified. "I am writing to my generals," said his imperial majesty, "to confirm the two armistices, and to settle the details of them. I have, moreover, sent to you the Count de St. Julien, major-general in my army: he is charged with my instructions, and to point out to you how essential it is not to enter into public negotiations, likely to excite prematurely in so many nations hopes perhaps illusory, till it is ascertained, at least in a general manner, if the bases that you mean to propose for peace are such as to afford a prospect of obtaining that desirable end.

*"Vienna, July 5, 1800."*

The emperor hinted, towards the conclusion of this letter, at the engagements which bound him to England, and which made him desirous of a peace common to all the belligerent powers.

M. de St. Julien arrived in Paris on the 21st of July (2nd Thermidor, year VIII.), and was cordially received. He was the first envoy from the emperor who had been seen for a long time in France. He was welcomed as the representative of a great sovereign and a messenger of peace. We have already shown how earnestly the First Consul desired to put an end to the war. Nobody contested with him the glory of battles; he now aspired to one of a different kind, less brilliant, but more novel, and at this time more profitable to his authority, that of giving peace to France and Europe. In his ardent soul desires were passions. He then sought peace as we have since seen him seek war. M. de Talleyrand desired it as much; for he was already fond of assuming the part of moderator about the First Consul. It was an excellent part to play, especially at a later period; but to urge the First Consul to peace at this time was adding one impatience to another, and endangering the result by too great precipitation.

On the very day after his arrival, the 22nd of July (3rd Thermidor), M. de St. Julien was invited to a conference with the minister for foreign affairs. They conversed on the subject of their reciprocal desire to terminate the war, and the best way of accomplishing it. M. de St. Julien listened to all that was said to him concerning the conditions on which peace might be concluded, and hinted on his part at all that the emperor wished. M. de Talleyrand concluded too hastily that M. de St. Julien had secret and sufficient instructions for treating, and proposed that they should not confine themselves to a mere conversation, but draw up jointly preliminary articles of peace. M. de St. Julien, who was not authorised to take such an important step, for the engagements of Austria towards England were in absolute opposition to it, M. de St. Julien objected that he had no power to conclude a treaty. M. de Talleyrand replied, that the emperor's letter completely authorised him, and that, if he would agree to some preliminary articles and sign them, with the proviso of their ulterior ratification, the French cabinet, on the mere letter of the emperor, would consider him as sufficiently accredited. M. de St. Julien, a soldier by profession, and devoid of experience in diplomatic usages, had the simplicity to avow to M. de Talleyrand his embarrassment and his ignorance of forms, and to ask him what he would do in his place. "I would sign," answered M. de Talleyrand. "Well then, be it so," rejoined M. de St. Julien, "I will sign the preliminary articles, which shall not be held valid till they have received the ratification of my sovereign." "Most assuredly," replied M. de Talleyrand, "no engagements between nations are valid but such as have been ratified."

This singular manner of communicating their powers to each other is specified at length in the minutes still existing of that negotiation. They are dated the 23rd, 24th, 27th, and 28th of July (4th, 5th, 8th, and 9th Thermidor, year VIII.). All the important points to be arranged between the two nations were discussed. The treaty of Campo Formio was adopted as the basis, with the exception of some modifications. Thus the emperor abandoned to the Republic the boundary of the Rhine, from the point where that river leaves the Swiss territory to that where it enters the Batavian territory. In regard to that article M. de St. Julien demanded and obtained a change in the wording. He wished the expression, "The emperor assents to the line of the Rhine," to be altered as follows: "The emperor does not oppose the retaining of the boundary of the Rhine by the French Republic." This mode of expression was adopted in answer to the reproaches of the Germanic body, which had accused the emperor of giving up to France the territory of the confederation. It was agreed that France should not retain any

of the fortified positions which operated upon the right bank (Kehl, Cassel, Ehrenbreitstein), that their works should be razed, but that, in return, Germany should not throw up any entrenchment, either of earth or masonry, within three leagues of the river.

So much for the boundary between France and Germany. The limits between Austria and Italy yet remained to be settled. The fifth secret article of Campo Formio had stipulated that Austria should receive in Germany an indemnity for certain lordships which she had given up on the left bank of the Rhine, independently of the Netherlands, which she had long before sacrificed to France. The bishopric of Salzburg was to compose that indemnity. The emperor would have liked better to be indemnified in Italy, for the acquisitions which he made in Germany, especially in the ecclesiastical principalities, were scarcely new acquisitions, the court of Vienna already possessing in those principalities an influence and privileges nearly equivalent to a direct sovereignty. On the contrary, the acquisitions which he obtained in Italy had the advantage of giving him territory, which he did not yet possess in any degree, and especially of extending his frontier and his influence in a country which had been the constant object of the ambition of his family. From these same motives it was natural that France should be better pleased to see Austria aggrandise herself in Germany than in Italy. This latter point, however, was conceded. The treaty of Campo Formio threw Austria back upon the Adige, and attributed to the Cisalpine Republic the Mincio and the celebrated fortress of Mantua. The ambition of Austria this time was to obtain the Mincio, Mantua, and the Legations into the bargain, which was exorbitant. The First Consul went so far as to grant her the Mincio and Mantua, but he would not cede the Legations at any rate. The utmost he would consent to was to give them to the Grand Duke of Tuscany, on condition that, in return, Tuscany should be transferred to the Grand Duke of Parma, and the Duchy of Parma to the Cisalpine. The Grand Duke of Parma would have gained considerably by this exchange, which was a satisfaction granted to Spain, with what views we shall show by-and-by.

M. de St. Julien replied that, on this latter point, his sovereign was not prepared to adopt a definitive resolution; that these removals of sovereign houses from one country to another were by no means conformable with his policy; that of course this was a point which must be afterwards adjusted. To evade the difficulty, the negotiators merely said, in the preliminary articles, that Austria should receive in Italy the territorial indemnities previously granted to her in Germany.

The Austrian officer, thus metamorphosed into plenipotentiary,

expressed in the name of his sovereign a warm interest for the independence of Switzerland, but scarcely any for that of Piedmont, and appeared to insinuate that France might pay herself in Piedmont for what she ceded to the house of Austria in Lombardy.

The parties, therefore, stopped short at very general conditions; the boundary of the Rhine for France, with the demolition of Kehl, Cassel, and Ehrenbreitstein; particular indemnities for Austria, taken from Italy instead of Germany; which signified that Austria would not be confined within the limit of the Adige. But, it must be confessed, not only was it vain to treat with a plenipotentiary without powers, but something still more vain was it to consider as articles of peace articles, the only contestable point in which, the only one for which the emperor went to war, the boundary of Austria and Italy, was not even resolved in a general manner: for, as to the boundary of the Rhine, no one had seriously thought of disputing that with us for a long time past.

To the preceding articles were added some accessory arrangements: it was agreed, for example, that a congress should be held immediately; that, during this congress, hostilities should be suspended, the levies *en masse* making in Tuscany disbanded, and the English landings, with which Italy was threatened, deferred.

M. de St. Julien, urged beyond all reasonable bounds by the desire to play an important part, had from time to time scruples respecting the strange and bold step which he had ventured to take. To make him easy upon the matter, M. de Talleyrand promised, on his word of honour, that these preliminary articles should remain secret, and that they should not be considered as having any value whatever till after their ratification by the emperor. On the 28th of July 1800 (9th Thermidor, year VIII.), these famous preliminaries were signed at the hôtel of foreign affairs, to the great joy of M. de Talleyrand, who, finding M. de St. Julien so prepared upon every question, seriously believed that he had secret instructions to treat. This, however, was not the case, and, if M. de St. Julien was so well informed, it was only because they wished at Vienna to enable him to provoke and to receive the confidential communications of the First Consul relative to the conditions of the future peace. The French minister had not been able to penetrate that circumstance: and, from the desire to sign an act resembling a treaty, he had committed a serious error.

The First Consul, paying no attention to the forms observed by the two negotiators, and trusting on that point entirely to M. de Talleyrand, thought for his part of nothing but making Austria explain her views, in order to ascertain whether she

wished for peace, and to force it from her by a new campaign, if she appeared not to desire it. But, for this purpose, it would have been better to have summoned her to explain herself within a given time than to enter into an illusory and puerile negotiation, in consequence of which the dignity of the two nations was likely to be compromised, and their reconciliation to be rendered more difficult.

M. de St. Julien thought it best not to wait in Paris for the emperor's answer, as he was solicited to do; he wished himself to carry the preliminaries to Vienna, no doubt with a view to explain to his master the motives of his extraordinary conduct. He left Paris on the 30th of July (11th Thermidor), accompanied by Duroc, whom the First Consul sent to Austria, as he had previously sent him to Prussia, to observe the court there closely, and to give it an advantageous opinion of the moderation and policy of the new government. Duroc, as we have elsewhere remarked, was well suited for missions of this kind from his sound sense and elegant manners. The First Consul had, moreover, given him written instructions, in which he had provided with minute attention for every contingency. In the first place, when any circumstance led to a presumption of the intentions of Austria in regard to the preliminaries, Duroc was instantly to send off a courier to Paris. It was recommended to him until the ratification to keep an absolute silence, and to appear totally ignorant of the intentions of the First Consul. If the ratification was granted, he was authorised to declare, in a positive manner, that peace might be signed in twenty-four hours, if there was a sincere desire for it. He was to let it be understood, in one way or another, that, provided Austria would be content with the Mincio, the Fossa Maestra, and the Po, which was the line marked out by the convention of Alexandria; and provided, moreover, that she agreed to the removal of the Duke of Parma to Tuscany, and of the Duke of Tuscany to the Legations, there was no obstacle to an immediate conclusion. These instructions even contained rules respecting the language to be held on all the subjects that might arise in conversation. Duroc was forbidden to join in any sneers against Russia and Prussia, which were then disliked at Vienna, because they had withdrawn from the coalition. He was enjoined to maintain a great reserve respecting the Emperor Paul, whose character was a theme for raillery in every court: he was to speak highly of the King of Prussia, to visit the Grand Duke of Tuscany, to show none of those passions which the Revolution had excited, either in one way or in another. Royalists and Jacobins were all to be spoken of as though they were not less ancient in France than the Guelfs and the Ghibellines in Italy. He was particularly enjoined not to manifest any antipathy towards

emigrants, excepting those, indeed, who had borne arms against the Republic. He was ordered to assert on all occasions that, of all the countries of Europe, France was most attached to its government, because of all countries it was that which had afforded the government occasion to do the most good. Lastly, he was to represent the First Consul as having no prejudices, neither those of other times nor those of the present day, and as being indifferent to the attacks of the English press, for he did not understand English.

Duroc set out with M. de St. Julien, and though the secret of the preliminaries was kept, still the numerous conferences of the emperor's envoy with M. de Talleyrand had been remarked by everybody, and people said aloud that he was the bearer of conditions of peace.

Our prodigious successes in Italy and Germany had naturally exercised a considerable influence, not upon Austria alone, but upon all the courts of Europe, whether friendly or hostile.

On the news of the battle of Marengo, Prussia, still neutral upon system, but kindly disposed towards us according to events, Prussia had expressed warm admiration to the First Consul, and from that moment had not said a single word which could give rise to a doubt respecting the attribution to France of the entire line of the Rhine. The only point now to be studied, according to her, was to be just in the partition of the indemnities due to all those who lost territories on the left bank of the Rhine, and discreet in settling the general limits of the great States. She even added that it was right to be firm towards Austria, and to curb her insatiable ambition. Such was the language which she held every day to our ambassador in Berlin.

M. d'Haugwitz, and King Frederick William in particular, whose kindness was sincere, informed General Beurnonville from day to day of the rapid progress which the First Consul was making in the esteem of Paul I. As we have already seen, that fickle and enthusiastic prince had for some months been passing from a chivalrous animosity against the French Revolution to an unbounded admiration of the man who was now the representative of that Revolution. He had conceived an absolute hatred for Austria and England. Though from this change a first result of great importance had been obtained, namely, the motionless attitude of the Russians on the Vistula, still the First Consul aspired to something more. He wished to enter into direct communication with the Emperor Paul, and suspected Prussia of prolonging that equivocal state, that she might be the sole agent in our relations with the most powerful of the courts of the North.

He devised a method, which was crowned with complete

success. There were still in France six or seven thousand Russians taken last year; and who could not be exchanged, because Russia had no prisoners to release in return. The First Consul had proposed to England and to Austria, which held in their hands a certain number of our soldiers and seamen, to exchange these Russians for a like number of French. Both of them assuredly owed Russia such a courtesy, for these Russians had incurred captivity solely by serving the purposes of English and Austrian policy. The proposal was nevertheless rejected. The First Consul immediately conceived the happy idea of restoring unconditionally to Paul I. the prisoners in our hands. This was an act of dexterous generosity, and not very burdensome to France, which could do nothing with these prisoners, since they could not procure her Frenchmen in exchange. The First Consul accompanied this act with the attentions most likely to touch the susceptible heart of the Emperor Paul. He caused these Russians to be armed and clothed in the uniform of their sovereign: he even gave up their officers, their colours, and their arms. He then wrote a letter to Count de Panin, minister of foreign affairs at St. Petersburg, informing him that, Austria and England having refused to procure their liberty for the soldiers of the Czar, who had become prisoners while serving the cause of those powers, the First Consul would not detain those brave men indefinitely, and that he sent them back to the emperor unconditionally; that this was on his part a testimony of consideration for the Russian army, an army which the French had learned to know and to esteem on fields of battle.

This letter was sent by way of Hamburg. It was transmitted by M. de Bourgoing, our minister in Denmark, to M. de Muraview, minister of Russia at Hamburg. But such was the fear excited by Paul I. in his agents, that M. de Muraview refused to receive this letter, not daring to disobey the anterior orders of his cabinet, which forbade him all communication with the representatives of France. M. de Muraview merely reported to his court what had passed, and made it acquainted with the existence and contents of the letter, of which he had refused to take charge. Upon this, the First Consul made another, and still more efficacious advance towards the Russian monarch. Seeing that Malta could not hold out long, and that this island, strictly blockaded, would be obliged, by want of provisions, to surrender to the English, he conceived the idea of giving it to Paul. It is well known that this prince, an enthusiast on the subject of the ancient orders of chivalry, and that of Malta in particular, had caused himself to be elected grand-master of St. John of Jerusalem, that he was resolved to re-establish that religious and chivalric institution, and that he



frequently held at St. Petersburg chapters of the Order, for the purpose of conferring its decoration on the princes and great personages of Europe. It was impossible to take a more direct course to his heart than by offering him the island that was the seat of the Order, of which he had made himself the head. The thing was ably conceived in all its bearings. Either the English, who were on the point of taking it, would consent to restore it, and then it would be out of their hands; or they would refuse, and Paul I. was capable enough to declare war against them on that account. This time, M. de Sergijeff, a Russian officer, and one of the prisoners detained in France, was directed to proceed to Petersburg, as the bearer of the two letters relative to the prisoners and the island of Malta.

When these different communications reached St. Petersburg, they produced their inevitable effect. Paul was deeply touched, and thenceforth indulged, without reserve, in the highest admiration of the First Consul. He immediately selected an old Finland officer, M. de Sprengporten, formerly a Swedish subject, a most respectable man, very well disposed towards France, and in high favour at the court of Russia. He appointed him governor of the island of Malta, ordered him to put himself at the head of the 6000 Russian prisoners in France, and to go with this force perfectly organised, and to take possession of the island of Malta, which would be delivered up to him by the French. He ordered him to proceed to Paris, and to thank the First Consul publicly. To this demonstration Paul added a much more effective step; he enjoined M. de Krudener, his minister in Berlin, who had been charged, some months before, to renew the connection between Russia and Prussia, to enter into direct communication with General Beurnonville, our ambassador, and furnished him with the necessary powers for negotiating a treaty of peace with France.

M. d'Haugwitz, who thought, perhaps, that the reconciliation was proceeding too rapidly, for Prussia would lose her character of mediating agent the moment the cabinets of Paris and St. Petersburg were in direct communication—M. d'Haugwitz contrived to be the ostensible agent of this reconciliation. Hitherto M. de Krudener and M. de Beurnonville had met in Berlin, in the houses of the ministers of the different courts, without speaking. One day, M. d'Haugwitz invited them both to dinner; after dinner, he brought them face to face, then left them *tête-à-tête* in his own garden, to give them opportunity for complete explanation. M. de Krudener expressed his regret to M. de Beurnonville that it had not been in his power before to seek the society of the French legation; he excused the refusal given at Hamburg to receive the First Consul's letter by the existence of anterior orders; and, lastly, he entered into

a very long explanation respecting the new dispositions of his sovereign. He informed him of the mission of M. de Sprengporten to Paris, and avowed the especial satisfaction which Paul I. had felt at the restitution of the prisoners, and the offer to restore Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. At length, from all these subjects he passed to the most serious, namely, the conditions of peace. Russia and France had nothing to quarrel about. They had not gone to war for any interest of territory or commerce, but for a dissimilarity in the form of their government. As far as concerned themselves directly, they had, therefore, but to write one article, to the effect that peace was re-established between the two powers. This circumstance alone showed how unreasonable the war had been. But the war had brought with it alliances, and Paul, who prided himself on strict fidelity to his engagements, desired only one thing, that his allies should be treated indulgently. They were four in number:—Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Piedmont, and Naples. He demanded, on behalf of the four, the integrity of their dominions. Nothing could be more easy, if an explanatory clause were merely introduced to the effect, that this condition should be considered as fulfilled, if those princes obtained an indemnity for the provinces which the French Republic should take from them. The point was thus understood and admitted by M. de Krudener. In fact, the secularisation of the ecclesiastical States of Germany, and their proportionate partition among the lay princes who had lost the whole or part of their dominions, in consequence of the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France, was a thing long agreed upon by everybody. It had even been admitted at the congress of Rastadt, under the Directory. An arrangement was equally easy for the Italian princes, allies of Paul I. Piedmont was to lose Nice and Savoy; it might be indemnified in Italy, if Austrian ambition were curbed in that country, and not suffered to extend itself too far there. On this point, Paul I., greatly irritated against the cabinet of Vienna, said, like Prussia, that Austria must be kept down, and nothing granted her but what could not be refused. As for the kingdom of Naples, France had nothing to take from it, but she had odious proceedings to punish, outrages to avenge. Still the First Consul was willing to pardon, on one condition, of a nature to be particularly pleasing to Paul I., who was not less hostile to the English than to the Austrians, namely, that the cabinet of Naples should atone for its faults by a formal rupture with Great Britain. On all these points the parties were nearly agreed. They could not fail to become still more so every day, from the natural course of events, and from the impetuous character of Paul I., who from a state of dissatisfaction with

his former allies, was about to pass, without transition, to a state of open war.

The reconciliation of France with Russia was, therefore, nearly accomplished, and even public; for the departure of M. de Sprengporten for Paris had just been officially announced. Paul I., the furious enemy of France, thus became her friend, her ally, against all the powers of the old coalition. The glory and the profound address of the First Consul had wrought this extraordinary change. A fortuitous and important circumstance was about to render it still more complete; this was the quarrel of the neutral powers, exasperated by the violences of England upon the seas. It seems as if everything concurred to favour the designs of the First Consul, and one is tempted to admire, at this moment, his good fortune as much as his genius.

On viewing the course of events in this lower world, one would almost say, that Fortune loves to smile on youth, for she seconds, in a wonderful manner, the early years of great men. Let us not, however, like the ancient poets, make her blind and capricious; if she so often favours the youth of great men, as she did that of Hannibal, of Cæsar, of Napoleon, it is because they have not yet abused her favours. General Bonaparte was fortunate, then, because he had deserved to be so; because he was in the right against all the world; at home, against party strife; abroad, against the powers of Europe. At home, he aimed only at order and justice; abroad, at peace, but an advantageous and glorious peace, such as he has a right to desire who has not been the aggressor, but who has been victorious through his superior ability. Thus Europe sought anxiously to be reconciled to France, represented by a great man, so just and so powerful. And if this great man had met with auspicious circumstances, there was not one which he had not brought about himself, or by which he had not skilfully profited. It was but yesterday that one of his lieutenants, anticipating his orders, had hastened, at the report of the cannon, to gain for him the victory of Marengo: but what had he not done to pave the way to that victory? Now, a prince, struck with insanity, on one of the first thrones in the world, afforded an easy prey to his diplomatic ability: but with what masterly condescension had he not contrived to flatter that monarch! England, by her conduct on the seas, was soon going to reconcile all the maritime powers with France: but we shall see what art he had employed to soothe them, and to leave to England the part of violence. Fortune, that capricious mistress of great men, is not, then, so capricious as people are pleased to represent her. All is not caprice when she smiles upon them, caprice when she abandons them, and, in her alleged infidelities, the fault is, in general, not on her side. But let us speak a language more true, more worthy of so grave a subject: Fortune, that pagan

name given to the power which governs all things here below, is Providence, befriending genius when walking in the path of rectitude, that is, in the ways marked out by infinite wisdom.

The fortunate circumstance which was destined definitively to rally the powers of the North around the politics of the First Consul, and to procure for him auxiliaries upon the element on which he had most need of them, that is, on the seas, was this:—The English had just committed new violences against neutrals. They could not suffer the Russians, the Danes, the Swedes, the Americans, to frequent quietly all the ports of the world, and to lend their flags to the commerce of France and Spain. They had already violated the independence of the neutral flag, especially in regard to America, and it was because the Americans had not sufficiently defended it that the Directory showed its anger, by subjecting them to treatment almost as rigorous as that which they experienced from the English. General Bonaparte had repaired this fault by annulling the harshest of the regulations enforced by the Directory; by instituting the tribunal of prizes, charged to administer better justice to captured vessels; by paying homage, in the person of Washington, to all America; lastly, by inviting negotiators to Paris, for the purpose of renewing relations of amity and commerce with her. It was precisely at this moment that England, as if irritated by the ill success of her policy, seemed to become more oppressive towards neutrals. Odious acts had already been committed by her upon the seas; but the last exceeded all the bounds, not only of justice, but of the most ordinary prudence.

This is not the place for entering into all the details of that important dispute; suffice it to specify its principal points. The neutrals alleged that the war, which certain great nations thought fit to wage with one another, ought not, in any way, to cramp their own trade, nay, that they had a right to pick up that commerce of which the belligerent powers voluntarily deprived themselves. In consequence, they claimed the right of frequenting freely all the ports of the world, of navigating even between the ports of the belligerent nations; of going, for instance, from France and Spain to England, from England to Spain and France, and, what was more disputable, of going from the colonies to the mother-countries, of going from Mexico to Spain, for the purpose of carrying thither the precious metals, which, but for their intervention, could never have reached Europe. They maintained that “the flag covers the merchandise,” which means, that the flag of a power, not implicated in the war, covered from every kind of search the merchandise transported in their vessels; that, on board them, French merchandise could not be seized by the English, nor English merchandise by the French; as a Frenchman, for instance,

would have been inviolable on the quays of Copenhagen and St. Petersburg for the British power; in short, that the vessel of a neutral nation was as sacred as the very quays of its capital.

The neutrals consented to only one exception. They admitted that they ought not to carry goods specially used in war, for it was contrary to the very idea of neutrality that they should supply one of the belligerent nations with arms against the other. But they sought to limit this interdiction solely to articles fabricated for war, such as muskets, cannon, powder, projectiles, materials for accoutrements of every kind, &c.; and as for provisions, they would not consider any provisions interdicted but such as were prepared for the use of armies, such as biscuit, for example.

If they admitted one exception as to the nature of transportable merchandise, they admitted another as to the places to be entered, but on condition that it should be accurately defined. This second exception was relative to the ports *bonâ fide* blockaded, and guarded by a naval force capable of laying siege to them, or of reducing them by famine, by means of blockade. In such a case they admitted that to run into a blockaded port was thwarting one of the two nations in the use of its right, by preventing it from taking the places of its enemy by attack or by famine; that it was consequently affording succour to one of the two against the other. But they insisted that the blockade should be preceded by formal declarations, that the blockade should be *bonâ fide*, executed by such a force that there would be imminent danger in violating it; and they did not admit that, by a mere declaration of blockade, either party could interdict at pleasure, by means of a pure fiction, the entry into such or such a port, nay, frequently the entire extent of certain coasts.

Lastly, as it was necessary to ascertain whether a vessel really belonged to the nation whose flag she hoisted, whether or not she carried merchandise called contraband of war, the neutrals consented to be searched, but required that this search should be made with certain courtesies to be agreed upon and punctually observed. Above all, they considered it as an essential rule that search should not take place if merchant vessels were convoyed by a ship of war. The military or royal flag, according to them, ought to enjoy the privilege of being believed on its word, when it affirmed, upon the honour of its nation, that the vessels under convoy were, in the first place, of its nation, and, in the next, that they had on board no interdicted articles. If it were otherwise, said they, a mere brig, when cruising, might stop a convoy, and with that convoy a fleet of war, perhaps an admiral. Who knows even? a privateer might stop either M. de Suffren or Lord Nelson.

Thus the doctrines maintained by the neutrals may be reduced to four principal points.

The flag covers the merchandise, that is to say, no search shall be made after an enemy's goods on board a neutral vessel, foreign to the belligerent nations.

No merchandise is interdicted but contraband of war. This contraband is confined solely to articles made for the use of the armies. Corn, for instance, and naval stores, are not included.

Access cannot be interdicted to any port, unless it is *bonâ fide* blockaded.

Lastly, no vessel under convoy can be searched.

Such were the principles maintained by France, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden, Russia, and America, that is to say, by an immense majority of nations: principles, founded on respect for the rights of others, but pertinaciously contested by England.

She insisted, in fact, that, on these conditions, the commerce of her enemies would be carried on without obstacle by means of the neutrals (which, be it observed by the way, was not correct, for that commerce could not be continued by means of neutrals, without relinquishing to them the greater part of the profits, and causing the nation obliged to have recourse to them to sustain an enormous loss); she insisted then on seizing French and Spanish merchandise on board whatever vessel it might be. She maintained that certain commodities, without being fabricated, such as corn and naval stores, were real succours carried to a nation in time of war. She alleged that a declaration of blockade was sufficient, without the presence of a naval force, to interdict the entry of certain ports or coasts; and lastly, that neutrals, upon pretext of being under convoy, could not escape the search of the belligerent powers.

If the reader wishes to know what was at the bottom of the important interest concealed under these sophistries of the public writers of England, here it is. England was bent on preventing the precious metals of Mexico, the principal source of the opulence of Spain, from being brought to the Spaniards; to the French sugar and coffee, which they cannot dispense with; to both the timber, hemp, and iron of the North, necessary for their navy. She would fain have it in her power to starve them, in case of a deficient harvest, as she had done in 1793, for instance; she sought a pretext for closing the ports of entire countries, without having recourse to a *bonâ fide* blockade; lastly, she purposed, by dint of searches, annoyances, and obstacles of every kind, to ruin the commerce of all nations, so that war, which, for commercial nations is a state of distress, should become for her merchants, what it actually was, a time of monopoly and of extraordinary prosperity. With regard to the Americans, she had an intention still more unjust,

namely, to rob them of their seamen upon pretext that they were English, a confusion easy to make, owing to the similarity of the languages.

In 1780, during the American war, Catherine the Great had formed the league of the neutrals to resist these pretensions. The First Consul, taking advantage of the nascent friendship of Paul, of the increasing irritation of the neutrals, and of the unparalleled violences of the English, made the utmost efforts to form a similar one in 1800.

At this moment, the dispute presented itself under one form only, that of the right of search. The Danes and the Swedes, to escape the vexations of the English cruisers, had devised the expedient of sailing in numerous convoys, escorted by frigates bearing the royal flag. It must be added that they never tarnished the honour of their flag, and took good care not to escort false Danes or false Swedes, or to cover contraband of war, as it was called. They studied only how to escape vexations which had become intolerable. But the English, viewing this as a mere subterfuge to elude a difficulty and continue the commerce of neutrals, persisted in exercising the right of search, even in regard to vessels under convoy.

In the preceding year, two Swedish frigates, the *Troya* and the *Halla Fersen*, escorting Swedish merchantmen, had been stopped by the English squadrons and obliged to submit to the search of the convoy under their care. The King of Sweden had sent the captains of the two frigates before a court-martial for not defending them. This example had for a moment checked the English, who were apprehensive lest they should provoke a rupture with the northern powers. They had in consequence shown a little more lenience to Swedish vessels. But two recent instances had revived the difficulty, and driven Sweden and Denmark to the last degree of exasperation.

In the winter of 1799-1800, the Danish frigate the *Hauversen*, Captain Vandockum, who was convoying a fleet of merchantmen in the Mediterranean, was stopped by the squadron of Admiral Keith; she attempted to resist, was fired upon, and carried into Gibraltar. A most violent dispute ensued on this subject between the English cabinet and the Danish cabinet, and it was still going on, when, in the month of July, the Danish frigate, the *Freyja*, escorting a convoy of her nation, was met in the Channel by an English squadron. The latter insisted on exercising the right of search; Captain Krabe, commander of the *Freyja*, nobly resisted the summons of the English admiral, and refused to suffer the convoy to be searched. Force was employed with uncalled-for violence; Captain Krabe defended himself; his ship was riddled, and he was obliged to surrender to the superior force of the enemy, for he had but a single

frigate to oppose to six men-of-war. The *Freyja* was carried into the Downs.

This occurrence was soon followed by another, of a different nature, but more odious and more serious. Two Spanish frigates were lying at anchor at the entrance of the road of Barcelona. The English formed a plan for taking them. Here was no question about the right of neutrals, but the perpetration of a piece of downright knavery, for the purpose of entering an enemy's port with impunity, without being recognised. They perceived in these roads a Swedish galliot, the *Hoffnung*, and resolved to make use of her for accomplishing the piratical act which they meditated. They manned their boats, boarded the galliot, clapped a pistol to the breast of the Swedish captain, and obliged him to sail quietly towards the Spanish frigates, which, having no mistrust of the Swedish flag, since it was neutral, suffered her to come alongside. The English immediately rushed on board, surprised the two frigates, which had few hands on board, took possession of them, and left the harbour of Barcelona with their unworthily acquired prey.

This event produced an extraordinary sensation in Europe, and incensed all the maritime nations, whose rights the English were no longer satisfied with violating, but whose flag they outraged, by making it, unknown to itself, subservient to acts of the most infamous piracy. Spain was already at war with Great Britain; she could do nothing more; but she had recourse to Sweden, whose flag had been usurped, to denounce this odious fact, more offensive to Sweden than even to Spain. Nothing more was requisite to embitter the quarrel between England and the neutrals. At this moment especially, the moderation which the First Consul had manifested towards them was of such a nature as to render British violence more glaring. Sweden demanded reparations: Denmark had already demanded them. Behind these two courts was Russia, which, ever since the league of 1780, regarded herself as a copartner with the powers of the Baltic in all questions that interested their maritime rights.

On the part of Denmark, M. de Bernstorff kept up a brisk controversy with the cabinet of London, by means of notes which France published, and which do equal honour to the minister who wrote them, and to the nation which gave them its signature, and which had soon to support them with its arms. "A mere gunboat," said the English, "carrying the flag of a neutral, is to have a right then to convoy the trade of the world, and to withdraw from our vigilance the commerce of our enemies, which may be carried on as easily in time of war as in time of peace!" "A whole squadron," replied M. de Bernstorff, "would be obliged then to obey the summons of



the most paltry cruiser, to stop at her requisition, to suffer the convoy which it is escorting to be examined before its face! The word of an admiral, making a declaration upon the honour of his nation, is not to weigh against the doubt of the captain of a privateer, who is to have a right to verify the declaration by a search! One of these hypotheses is more inadmissible than the other."

To support its doctrines by means of terror, the English cabinet, which had just sent Lord Whitworth to Copenhagen, despatched after him a squadron of sixteen sail, which was cruising at this moment at the entrance of the Sound. The presence of this squadron produced a strong sensation among all the powers of the Baltic: it alarmed not only Denmark, against which it was directed, but also Sweden, Russia, and Prussia herself, whose commerce was likewise interested in the free navigation of the seas. The four powers which signed the old armed neutrality of 1780 commenced a negotiation, with the avowed purpose of forming a new league against the maritime tyranny of the English. The cabinet of London, which was, nevertheless, afraid of such an event, insisted warmly at Copenhagen on settling the dispute; but, so far from offering indemnities, it had the singular presumption to demand them. It purposed, by frightening Denmark, to withdraw her from the league before it was formed. Unfortunately, Denmark had been taken by surprise; the Sound was not in a state of defence; Copenhagen was not secured from a bombardment. In this state of things, she was obliged to give way for the moment, with a view to gain the winter season, during which ice would defend the Baltic, and give all the neutrals time to make their preparations for resistance. On the 29th of August (11th Fructidor, year VIII.) Denmark was obliged to sign a convention, in which the question of the law of nations was adjourned, and the last misunderstanding only, which had arisen on the subject of the *Freyja*, was adjusted. The *Freyja* was to be repaired in the English dockyards and restored; but, for the moment at least, the Danish government ceased to furnish convoys for merchantmen.

This convention had settled nothing. The storm, so far from being dispersed, soon gathered again, for the four northern courts were extremely incensed. The King of Sweden, whose honour was not yet satisfied, prepared for a journey to St. Petersburg, to renew the ancient league of neutrality; and Paul I., who was not fond of middle terms, took at the outset a most energetic step. Being informed of the dispute with Denmark, and of the presence of a British fleet at the entrance of the Sound, he sequestered all property belonging to the English, as a security for the injury that might be done to

Russian commerce. This measure was to be continued till the intentions of the British government were completely elucidated.

In the northern courts, therefore, everything tended to favour the designs of the First Consul. Events served him according to his wish. Things went on equally well in the south of Europe, that is, in Spain. Here one of the first monarchies of the globe was seen sinking into dissolution, to the great detriment of the balance of Europe, and to the great grief of a generous nation, indignant at the part which it was made to act in the world. The First Consul, whose indefatigable mind embraced all objects at once, had already directed the efforts of his policy towards Spain, and sought to derive as much advantage for the common cause as he could from that degenerate court.

We should not draw the melancholy picture that follows, if it were not true, in the first place, and if it were not necessary, in the next, for understanding the great events of the period.

The King, the Queen of Spain, and the Prince of Peace had engaged for many years the attention of Europe, and exhibited a spectacle extremely dangerous for royalty, at that time already so much lowered in the estimation of nations. One would have said that the illustrious house of Bourbon was destined at the close of this century to lose their crowns in France, in Naples, and in Spain: for, in these three kingdoms, three sovereigns of imbecile weakness exposed their sceptres to the derision and the contempt of the world, by leaving them in the hands of three queens, either giddy, violent, or dissolute.

The Bourbons of France, whether by their own fault, whether through misfortune, were swallowed up by the French Revolution; by dint of foolishly provoking it, those of Naples had been driven a first time from their capital; those of Spain, before they let their sceptre drop into the hands of the crowned soldier whom that Revolution had produced, deemed it expedient to pay their court to him. They had already allied themselves with France in the time of the Convention; they could not but connect themselves with her much more cheerfully now that the Revolution, instead of a sanguinary anarchy, exhibited to them a great man, disposed to protect them if they followed his advice. Happy had it been for these princes, if they had followed the advice, at that time excellent, of this great man! Happy for himself had he done no more than give it them!

The King of Spain was an honest man, not harsh and blunt like Louis XVI., more agreeable in person, but less informed, and surpassing him in weakness. He rose very early, not to attend to his royal duties, but to hear Masses, and then go down to his workshops, where, surrounded by turners, smiths, and armourers, and stripped of his clothes like them, he wrought in their company at all sorts of work. Though very fond of the

chase, he liked still better to manufacture arms. From his shops he went to his stables, to assist in dressing his horses, and indulged in the most incredible familiarities with his grooms. After spending the first half of the day in this manner, he took a solitary repast, to which neither the queen nor even his children were admitted, and devoted the rest of the day to the chase. Several hundred horses and servants were set in motion for this daily pleasure, which was his predominant passion. After riding like a young man, he would return to his palace, give a quarter of an hour to his children, half an hour to the signature of the papers submitted to him by the queen and his ministers, sit down to play with some of the nobles of his court, sometimes take a nap with them, till the hour for his last meal, which was followed immediately by his retirement to bed, always at one and the same fixed time. Such was his life, without a single variation throughout the year, unless during Passion Week, which was devoted entirely to religious exercises. In other respects, an honest man, faithful to his word, mild, humane, religious, of exemplary chastity though not cohabiting with his wife, ever since his physicians had, by her direction, ordered him to abstain from it; he had no other share in the scandals of his court, in the faults of his government, than in suffering them to be committed, without perceiving them, without believing them, during the course of a long reign.

By his side, the queen, sister of the Duke of Parma, a pupil of Condillac's, who wrote for her and her brother some excellent works of instruction, led a totally different life, and would do very little honour to the celebrated philosophic tutor of her youth, if philosophers could in general answer for their disciples. She was nearly fifty years old, and had still certain vestiges of beauty, which she strove to perpetuate with infinite pains. Going to Mass every day, like the king, she employed in corresponding with a great number of persons, and particularly with the Prince of Peace, those hours which Charles IV. spent in his workshops and his stables. In this correspondence she communicated to the Prince of Peace the affairs of court and State, and received from him a report of all the puerilities and scandal of Madrid. She finished her morning by giving one hour to her children, and one to the duties of government. Not a paper, not an appointment, not a pardon, went for the royal signature, before it was submitted to her. The minister who should have ventured upon such an infraction of the conditions of her favour would have been instantly dismissed. She dined alone, like the king, in the middle of the day; the rest of the afternoon was devoted to receptions, in which she acquitted herself very gracefully, and to the Prince of Peace, on whom she bestowed several hours of her time every day.

The reader is aware that the Prince of Peace was no longer minister, at the period of which we are treating. M. d'Urquijo, whom we shall presently introduce, had succeeded him; but that prince was nevertheless the first authority in the kingdom. This singular personage, ignorant, fickle, of no capacity, but of handsome exterior, as it is necessary to be in order to succeed in a corrupt court, the arrogant ruler of Queen Louisa, had reigned for twenty years over her vacant and frivolous soul. Weary of his high favour, he shared it cheerfully with obscure favourites, indulged in a thousand debaucheries, which he recounted to his crowned slave, whom he delighted to mortify by his stories, nay, even maltreated her, it is said, in the grossest manner; and yet he retained an absolute empire over that princess, who was incapable of resisting him, who could not be happy unless she saw him every day. After she had long committed the government to him, with the official title of first minister, she gave it up as much to him still, though he no longer had that title; for nothing was done in Spain but according to his pleasure. He disposed of all the resources of the State; and he had at home enormous sums in cash, while the treasury, reduced to the greatest straits, made shift with a discredited paper-money, depressed to half its nominal value. The nation was almost habituated to this spectacle; it manifested indignation only when some new and extraordinary scandal made the blood mount into the faces of the brave Spaniards, whose heroic resistance soon afterwards proved that they were worthy of a different government. At the moment when Europe rang with the great events occurring on the Po and the Danube, the court of Spain was the theatre of an unheard-of scandal, which had well-nigh exhausted the patience of the nation. The Prince of Peace, proceeding from one excess to another, had finished by marrying a relation of the royal family. A child was born from this union. The king and queen, resolving themselves to stand sponsors for the new-born infant, had the ceremony performed with all the etiquette customary at the baptism of Infants of Spain. The highest nobles of the court were obliged to perform the same duty that would have been required of them if the child had been the offspring of royalty. On this infant in long-clothes had been conferred the great orders of the crown and magnificent presents. The grand-inquisitor had officiated at the religious ceremony. This time, it is true, indignation had risen to the highest pitch, and every Spaniard had considered himself as personally insulted by this odious proceeding. Things had come to such a pass that the Spanish ministers opened their minds upon the subject to the foreign ambassadors, and particularly to the ambassador of France, to whom they usually

had recourse in most of their embarrassments, and who received from their own lips the shocking particulars which we are here relating.

Amidst these scandalous proceedings, the king alone, kept under continual espionage by his wife, neither knew nor suspected what was passing. Neither the outcry of his subjects, nor the occasional revolt of some of the *grandees* of Spain, indignant at the degradation that was required of them, nor the inexplicable assiduities of the Prince of Peace, could open his eyes. This poor good-natured king even used sometimes to make this singular remark, which embarrassed all present who were doomed to hear it: "My brother of Naples is a blockhead, who suffers himself to be ruled by his wife." It should be added that the Prince of the Asturias, since Ferdinand VII., brought up at a distance from the court and with incredible harshness, detested the favourite, whose criminal influence he was aware of, and that his just hatred for the favourite was at last converted in his mind into an involuntary hatred for his father and mother.

What a spectacle, at the conclusion of the eighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the throne of France had recently sunk with a crash, and when a young warrior, simple, austere, indefatigable, full of genius, had just raised himself upon its ruins! How long could the Spanish monarchy withstand the dangerous effect of this contrast!

Amidst these disorders, the house of Spain was at times overtaken by confused presentiments, and began to feel some apprehensions of a Revolution. The ancient attachment of the Spaniards to royalty and to religion served, it is true, to cheer it; but it was afraid that Revolution would come by the way of the Pyrenees, and therefore sought to dispel the danger by implicit deference towards the French Republic. The incredible violence of the English cabinet, the passionate outbursts of Paul I. against that house, on the formation of the second coalition, had thrown it completely into our arms. It regarded this as advantageous, nay, honourable, since General Bonaparte had ennobled, by his presence in the seat of power, all the relations of the cabinets with the government of the Republic.

The good king Charles IV. had conceived, though at a distance, a sort of friendship for the First Consul. This feeling became stronger every day, and it is painful to think how this singular attachment was destined to terminate, without treachery on the part of France, but by an inconceivable concatenation of circumstances. "What a great man is General Bonaparte!" Charles IV. was incessantly saying. The queen said so too, but more coldly, because the Prince of Peace, disposed sometimes to censure what the court of Spain did since he was no

longer minister, seemed to blame the partiality that was shown to the government of France. Meanwhile the First Consul, informed by M. Alquier, our ambassador, a man of superior understanding and sagacity, that he must absolutely secure at Madrid the good-will of the Prince of Peace, the First Consul had sent to that favourite some magnificent arms, made at the manufactory of Versailles. This attention on the part of the greatest personage in Europe had touched the vanity of the Prince of Peace. Some attentions of our ambassador had completely won him, and thenceforward the whole court of Spain seemed to give itself up to us without reserve.

From d'Urquijo, the minister, alone was a slight resistance experienced. He was a man of eccentric character, naturally an enemy to the Prince of Peace, whom he had succeeded, and liking General Bonaparte not much better. M. d'Urquijo, of plebeian extraction, and endowed with some energy, having drawn upon himself the enmity of the clergy and of the court through some insignificant reforms which he had attempted, inclined, in an astonishing manner for a Spaniard of that time, towards revolutionary ideas. He was connected with many French demagogues, and participated to a certain point in their aversion for the First Consul. He had the merit of desiring to reform the most crying abuses, of striving, for instance, to diminish the revenues of the clergy and the jurisdiction of the agents of the court of Rome. To these measures he was striving to obtain his Holiness' assent; and in making this attempt he had exposed himself to serious dangers. Having, in fact, the Prince of Peace against him, he must be undone, if the Romish influence were to unite with the domestic influence in the palace to overthrow him. Touched with some attentions paid him by M. Alquier, witnessing, moreover, the partiality of the king and queen, M. d'Urquijo at length began, in his turn, to admire General Bonaparte, whom it was not only natural, but at that time quite the fashion, to admire.

The partiality of the king soon became unbounded. Having seen the arms sent to the Prince of Peace, he conceived and expressed a wish to have some of the same sort. Some magnificent specimens were manufactured forthwith, and he received them with real joy. The queen also wished for dresses, and Madame Bonaparte, who was celebrated for her taste, sent all the most exquisite and elegant productions of that kind in Paris. Charles IV., generous as a Castilian, unwilling to be behindhand, took care to make a right royal return. Knowing that horses would be acceptable to the First Consul, he stripped the studs of Aranjuez, Medina Cœli, and Altamira of their handsomest inmates, to find first six, then twelve, then sixteen horses, the finest in the Peninsula. One cannot tell where he

would have stopped, had he not been checked in his ardour. He took two months to select them himself, and nobody could have performed the task better, for he was a consummate judge. He appointed, moreover, a numerous train to accompany them to France, chose his best grooms for this mission, clothed them in magnificent liveries, and imposed but one condition on all this parade, namely, that, while travelling in France, his grooms should attend Mass every Sunday. A promise was given that his desire should be complied with, and his joy at making a handsome present to the First Consul was then unalloyed. Though fond of France, this excellent prince had a notion that it was impossible for a man to live in that country many days, without wholly forsaking the religion of his forefathers.

The *éclat* of these demonstrations suited well the views of the First Consul. It gratified him: he thought it useful to show to Europe, and even to France, the successors of Charles V., the descendants of Louis XIV., taking honour to themselves from their personal relations with him. But he sought more solid advantages in his diplomatic relations, and aimed at a more important object.

The King and Queen of Spain were passionately fond of one of their children, the Infanta Maria Louisa, wife of the Hereditary Prince of Parma. The queen, sister, as we have said, of the reigning Duke of Parma, had united her daughter to her nephew, and concentrated upon this couple her fondest affections; for she was most ardently attached to the house from which she sprang. She meditated an aggrandisement for that house in Italy, and, as Italy was at the disposal of the conqueror of Marengo, it was on him that she rested all her hopes of obtaining the accomplishment of her wishes. The First Consul, apprised of those wishes, took care not to neglect this way of arriving at his ends; and he despatched to Madrid his faithful Berthier, in order to profit by the circumstance that presented itself. This was the first subject of his attention on his return from Marengo. If he had sent one of his aides-de-camp to Berlin and to Vienna, he resolved to do more for the court of Spain; he resolved to send thither the man who had the largest share in his glory; for Berthier was then the Parmenio of the modern Alexander.

It was at the very moment when the First Consul was negotiating the preliminaries of peace with M. de St. Julien, when he was seducing the inflammable heart of Paul I., and fomenting in the North the quarrel of the neutral powers: it was at this moment that he despatched General Berthier in all haste to Madrid. He set out towards the end of August (beginning of Fructidor), without official title, but with the certainty of

producing a great effect by his mere presence, and with secret powers for treating on the most important subjects.

His journey embraced several objects; the first was, to visit the principal seaports of the Peninsula, to ascertain their state and their resources, and, money in hand, to urge expeditions for Malta and for Egypt. Berthier quickly performed this task, and then hastened to Madrid to fulfil the more important mission with which he was charged. The First Consul was quite willing to grant an increase of territory to the house of Parma; he was even disposed to add to this aggrandisement a new title, that of king, which would have crowned the wishes of the queen; but he required to be paid for these concessions in two ways: firstly, by the restitution of Louisiana to France; secondly, by a threatening injunction to the court of Portugal, for the purpose of deciding it to make peace with the Republic and to break with England.

The motives of the First Consul for requiring such conditions were these:—Since Kléber's death, he began to be uneasy about the preservation of Egypt, and he shared with all his contemporaries the ambition of distant possessions. The rivalry between France and England, which, for a century past, had fought solely for the East and West Indies, had inflamed to the highest degree the passion for possessing colonies. In case of Egypt being wrested from us, the First Consul wished to achieve something for the colonial greatness of France. He cast his eye over the map of the world, and beheld a magnificent province, situated between Mexico and the United States, formerly belonging to France, ceded, in a time of abasement, by Louis XV., to Charles III., seriously threatened by the English and the Americans, so long as it should be in the impotent hands of the Spaniards, of little value to the latter, who possessed half the American continent, but of great value to the French, who had no possession in that part of America, and capable of being made productive, when the activity of the latter should be specially concentrated on its territory: this province was Louisiana. If Egypt, lost to us, could no longer furnish us with a compensation for St. Domingo, the First Consul hoped to find it in Louisiana.

He demanded it formally, therefore, of Spain, as the price of an acquisition in Italy. He required, in addition, that part of the Spanish fleet blocked up in the roads of Brest should be given to him. As for Portugal, he wished to take advantage of the geographical position of Spain in regard to that country, and of the ties of consanguinity which united the two reigning houses of the Peninsula, to detach it from the alliance with England. The Prince of Brazil, Regent of Portugal, was, in fact, son-in-law of the King and Queen of Spain. The court of Madrid, therefore, possessed not only the power of neighbourhood, but also



family influence, and it was a fit occasion for employing this twofold medium for driving the English from this part of the Continent. The English, once excluded from Portugal, when the coasts of Prussia, Denmark, Russia, and Sweden were about to be closed against them, when Naples, doomed to submit to the will of France, was going to receive orders to forbid them her ports—the English would soon be excluded from the whole of the Continent.

Such were the proposals which Berthier was ordered to carry to Madrid. He was cordially received by the king, the queen, the Prince of Peace, and by all the grandees of Spain, curious to see the man, whose name always figured beside that of General Bonaparte in the military bulletins of these times. The conditions of France appeared hard, yet no serious resistance could be made to them. D'Urquijo, the minister, alone, fearing the effect which this cession might produce upon the Spaniards, showed rather more opposition than the court. Reasons incontestably good were adduced to make him easy. He was told that it would take a large extent of territory on the yet uninhabited banks of the Mississippi to form an equivalent for the smallest possessions in Italy; that the Spaniards needed, in the Gulf of Mexico, allies such as the French against the English and the Americans; that, if Louisiana was of great value to France, stripped of all her colonial possessions, it was of scarcely any to Spain, already so rich in the New World; that an increase of influence in Italy would be worth more to Spain than a distant territory, situated in a region where she had more land than she could work and defend; that it was an ancient French possession, wrung from the weakness of Louis XV., and which Charles III. himself, with that upright spirit which was known to all the world, had for a moment refused, so convinced was he that it was not his due. These reasons were excellent, and assuredly, under these circumstances, Spain was not asked to give more than she received. But what decided M. d'Urquijo more than all the best arguments, was the fear of offending France, and thwarting a combination to which his court was attached with a sort of passion.

An eventual treaty was agreed upon. By this treaty, the First Consul promised to obtain for the Duke of Parma an increase of dominions in Italy of about 1,200,000 souls; to ensure to him, moreover, the title of king, and the acknowledgment of this new rank by all the sovereigns of Europe, at the general peace. As soon as part of these conditions were fulfilled, Spain, in return, was to cede back to France Louisiana, with the same extent of territory which that province had when it was ceded by Louis XV. to Charles III., and to give, moreover, six ships of the line, rigged, armed, ready to receive their crews.

This treaty, signed by Berthier at Madrid, filled the queen with joy, and raised the infatuation of the court of Spain for the First Consul to the highest pitch.

The last condition, which had for its object to force Portugal to break with England, was easy, for it was as accordant with the interests of Spain as with those of France. Spain, in fact, was equally interested with France in weakening the power of England, and above all in excluding her from the Continent. In this the First Consul did no more than rouse her from her unpardonable apathy, and urge her to make use of an influence which she ought long since to have employed. He went still further in his plans relative to this point: he proposed to Charles IV., if the court of Lisbon should not comply immediately with the injunction given it, to pass the frontiers of Portugal with an army, to seize one or two provinces, and to keep them as pledges, for the purpose of afterwards obliging England to restore the Spanish colonies which she had taken, in order to save the dominions of her ally. For his part, if Charles IV. did not conceive himself strong enough to undertake this enterprise, he offered him the assistance of a French army. That kind-hearted king did not ask for so much. The Prince of Brazil was his son-in-law; he had no wish, therefore, to take provinces from him, even though they were only to serve as pledges for the restitution of Spanish provinces. But he addressed to him the most pressing exhortations, and even added threats of war, if his advice was not attended to. The court of Lisbon promised to send a negotiator immediately to Madrid, to confer with the ambassador of France.

Berthier returned to Paris loaded with the favours of the court of Spain, and could assure the First Consul that he had friends entirely devoted to him in Madrid. The magnificent horses sent by Charles IV. arrived nearly about the same time, and were presented to the First Consul in the Place du Carrousel, at one of those great reviews, in which he delighted to show to the Parisians and to foreigners the soldiers who had conquered Europe. An immense concourse of curious persons came to see those beautiful animals and those grooms in splendid liveries, which reminded the spectator of the pageantries of ancient monarchy, and bore evidence to the respect, the extraordinary attentions, of the oldest courts of Europe for the new head of the French Republic.

At this moment, three American negotiators, Messrs. Oliver Ellsworth, Richardson Davie, and Van Murray, sent to reconcile France and the United States, arrived in Paris. That Republic, swayed by interest much more than gratitude, above all, governed at that time by the policy of the Federalist party, had drawn closer to Great Britain during the late war, and had

been wanting not only to France but likewise to herself in deserting the principles of the maritime neutrality. Forgetful of the treaty of alliance of 1778, to which she owed her existence, a treaty which bound her not to grant to others commercial advantages which were not at the same time extended to the French, she had conceded extraordinary and exclusive advantages to Great Britain. Giving up the principle that "the flag covers the goods," she had admitted that an enemy's property may be searched for on board a neutral bottom, and seized if its origin were ascertained. This conduct was alike impolitic and dishonourable. The Directory, naturally much irritated, had had recourse to the system of reprisals, declaring that France would treat neutrals as they suffered England to treat them. Proceeding from one harsh step to another, it had come to a state of almost declared war with America, but without actual hostilities.

Such was the state of things which the First Consul had it much at heart to put an end to. We have seen what honours he paid to Washington, with the twofold intention of producing an effect both at home and abroad: he appointed three plenipotentiaries, his brother Joseph Bonaparte, and the two councillors of State Fleurieu and Rœderer, to arrange matters with the American plenipotentiaries, and earnestly pressed the conclusion of the negotiation, in order to give England very soon a new adversary, by placing another power on the list of those who would engage to cause the true principles of maritime neutrality to be observed. The first obstacle to a reconciliation was the article by which the United States promised to France a share in the commercial advantages granted by her to all nations. This obligation not to concede anything to others without conceding as much to us occasioned the Americans great embarrassment. Their negotiators manifested no disposition to yield on this point, but appeared ready to acknowledge and to defend the rights of neutrals, and to re-establish, in their stipulations with France, the principles which they had abandoned in treating with England. The First Consul, who was much more tenacious of the principles of the maritime neutrality than of the commercial advantages of the treaty of 1778, which had become illusory in practice, the First Consul directed his brother to waive the point, and to conclude an arrangement with the American envoys, provided there could be obtained from them a complete and formal recognition of the principles of the law of nations which it was important to enforce. This difficulty removed, the parties soon agreed about all the rest, and at this moment a treaty of reconciliation was preparing to be signed with the United States.

Another reconciliation, of much greater importance still, that of the Republic with the Holy See, began to produce its fruit.

The new Pope, elected in the vague hope of an accommodation with France, had beheld this hope, to which he owed his elevation, realised. General Bonaparte, as we have related, returning from Marengo, had transmitted some overtures to Pius VII. through Cardinal Martiniana, Bishop of Vercelli, assuring him that he had no intention to re-establish the Roman and Parthenopean Republics, instituted by the Directory. He had certainly enough to do in Italy, with the Cisalpine Republic to constitute, to direct, and to defend against the policy and the interests of all Europe. General Bonaparte required in return that the new pontiff should lend the aid of his spiritual authority in re-establishing peace and concord in France. The Pope joyfully received Count Alciati, nephew of Cardinal Martiniana, who was charged to carry the overtures of the First Consul; he sent him back immediately to Vercelli, to declare, in his name, that though disposed to co-operate with the First Consul, in effecting an object so important and so dear to the Church, still he wished first to be made acquainted in a somewhat more precise manner with the views of the French cabinet. The cardinal, in consequence, wrote from Vercelli to Paris, to communicate the dispositions and the wishes of the new Pope. The First Consul, in reply, asked for a negotiator, with whom he could enter into direct explanation, and the Pope immediately appointed Monsignor Spina, Bishop of Corinth, nuncio of the Holy See at Florence. This envoy, having first repaired to Vercelli, resolved to set out for France, at the urgent solicitation of the First Consul, who, by bringing this negotiation under his own eye, thought to make the more sure of its success. On the part of the First Consul, it was a ticklish step to bring to Paris a representative of the Holy See, especially in the state of the public mind, which was not yet prepared for a sight of this kind. It was agreed that Monsignor Spina should not have any official title, and that he should profess himself to be Bishop of Corinth, charged to treat with the French government on the affairs of the Roman government.

During these negotiations, so actively and so ably conducted with all the powers, M. de St. Julien, who had signed and was the bearer of the preliminaries of peace, had proceeded for Vienna, accompanied by Duroc. Aware of the imprudence of his conduct, he had not concealed from M. de Talleyrand that he was not sure he should be able to take Duroc on to Vienna. The illusion of the minister would not allow him to give heed to this difficulty; and it was agreed that M. de St. Julien and Duroc should take the headquarters of M. de Kray, established at Alt-*Ettingen*, near the Inn, in their way, to obtain from that general passports permitting Duroc to enter Austria.

They reached the headquarters on the 4th of August 1800 (16th Thermidor, year VIII.), but Duroc was detained, and not suffered to pass the limit fixed by the armistice. This was a first and by no means favourable sign of the reception which the preliminaries were likely to meet with. M. de St. Julien then set off alone for Vienna, telling Duroc that he would apply for passports for him and send them to the headquarters if he obtained them. M. de St. Julien then sought audience of the emperor, and delivered to him the articles which he had signed in Paris, on condition of ratification and secrecy. The emperor was greatly surprised and dissatisfied at the extraordinary latitude which M. de St. Julien had given to his instructions. It was not precisely the conditions contained in the preliminary articles which displeased him: it was the fear of being compromised with England, which had just assisted him with her money, and was extremely suspicious. He was prepared, it is true, to go so far as to communicate part of his intentions, for the purpose of discovering those of the First Consul; but he would not at any price have signed any document whatever, for that would infer a negotiation opened without the participation of the British cabinet. Therefore, in spite of the danger of provoking a storm on the part of France, the imperial cabinet resolved to disavow M. de St. Julien. That officer was publicly very ill-treated, and sent into a sort of exile in one of the remote provinces of the empire. The preliminaries were considered as null, having been signed, though provisionally, by an agent without character and without powers. Duroc received no passports, and, after waiting till the 13th of August (25th Thermidor), he was obliged to return to Paris.

All this, independently of the delay in the conclusion of peace which it created, was very disagreeable to say to the First Consul; and Austria had reason to fear the effect of such a communication on his irritable character. It was very possible that he might leave Paris immediately, put himself at the head of the armies of the Republic, and march upon Vienna. The court of Austria resolved, therefore, while disavowing the preliminaries, not to make a rupture of that disavowal, and to propose to the French government the immediate opening of a congress. Lord Minto, representative of the British cabinet at Vienna, consented to suffer Austria to negotiate, but on condition that England should be a party to the negotiation. It was agreed with him to propose diplomatic conferences in which England and Austria should alike take part. In consequence, M. de Thugut wrote to M. de Talleyrand, under date of the 11th of August (23rd Thermidor), that, though disavowing the imprudent conduct of M. de St. Julien, the emperor was

nevertheless earnestly desirous of peace; that he, therefore, proposed the immediate opening of a congress, in France itself, at Schelestadt, or Luneville, whichever the French government pleased; that Great Britain was ready to send a plenipotentiary; and that, if the First Consul assented to this, a general peace might soon be restored to the world. The whole was clothed in the language most likely to soothe the impetuous disposition of him who then governed France.

When the First Consul received these tidings, he was highly irritated. He was offended, in the first place, at the disavowal of the officer who had treated with him, and in the next, he saw with mortification that peace was deferred. He perceived, above all, in the presence of England at the negotiation, a cause of interminable delays; for there was much more difficulty in concluding a maritime than a continental peace. On the spur of the moment, and under the influence of a first impression, he was for raising an outcry, denouncing Austria as having violated her faith, and commencing hostilities forthwith. M. de Talleyrand, sensible that he had himself done wrong in treating with a plenipotentiary without powers, endeavoured to pacify the First Consul. The matter was submitted to the Council of State. This great body, which is now nothing more than an administrative tribunal, was then a real council of government. The minister laid before it a detailed report. "The First Consul," said he in his report, "has thought fit to convoke an extraordinary meeting of the Council of State, and, trusting to its discretion as well as to its wisdom, he has charged me to communicate to it the most minute details of the negotiation which has taken place with the court of Vienna." Having unfolded that negotiation, as one might have done before a council of ministers, M. de Talleyrand acknowledged that the Austrian plenipotentiary had no powers; that, in negotiating with him, the possibility of a disavowal ought to have been foreseen; that, in consequence, there was no establishing a *polemique d'apparat* on this subject; and that a violent outbreak ought to be avoided. But, referring to the example of the negotiations for the peace of Westphalia, which had long preceded the signature of the treaty of Munster, and during which the parties continued to negotiate and fight, he proposed that the opening of a congress should be agreed to, and at the same time that hostilities should be recommenced.

This was, in fact, the wisest course that could be pursued. It was expedient to treat, since the hostile powers had made France an offer to do so, but also to profit by the state of our armies, quite ready to take the field afresh, and that of the Austrian armies not yet recovered from their defeats, to force Austria to negotiate in earnest, and to separate herself from Great Britain.

There was, however, one thing which might be tried that had also its advantages; and the First Consul discovered it with his usual sagacity. England proposed a joint negotiation. In admitting her to a congress, there was a danger of introducing a contracting party in no hurry to conclude, and the danger, more especially, of clogging the continental peace with all the difficulties of the maritime peace: time would, therefore, elapse in negotiations either insincere or rendered more difficult; the season for fighting would be suffered to pass away, and thus the Austrian armies would gain a respite which they greatly needed. These were serious inconveniences. But a compensation might be found for them all; it was this: since England desired to be admitted to the negotiation, to admit her, but on one condition, that of concluding a naval armistice also. If England assented to this, the benefits of the naval armistice would far surpass the inconveniences of the continental armistice; for our fleets, navigating wherever they pleased, would be enabled to provision Malta and to carry soldiers and *matériel* to Egypt. For such an advantage, the First Consul would gladly have run the risk of an extra campaign on the Continent. A naval armistice was no doubt something quite new, quite unusual, in the law of nations; but it was fair that the Anglo-Austrian alliance should pay in some manner for the sacrifice which we made on our part in suspending the march of our legions for Vienna.

We had residing in London a discreet and skillful negotiator, M. Otto, who was there for the purpose of treating of matters relative to the prisoners of war. He had even been chosen by our cabinet, with a view to make use of him on the first occasion, either to make or to listen to overtures. He was instructed specially to address himself to the British cabinet, and plumply propose the question of a naval armistice. In this mode of proceeding the First Consul found the advantage of getting on faster, and of negotiating his business directly, which he always liked to do better than to employ agents. On the 24th of August (6th Fructidor, year VIII.), instructions conformable with this new plan of negotiation were sent to M. Otto. On the same day, the communications from Vienna were answered in a very harsh tone. In this answer, the refusal to admit the preliminaries was attributed to the subsidiary treaty signed on the 20th of June last: the French government disdainfully deplored the dependence in which the emperor was placed in regard to England; it assented to a congress at Luneville, but added, that they must nevertheless fight while negotiating, because, in proposing a joint negotiation, Austria had not taken the precaution to provide, as a natural condition, for a suspension of arms by land and sea. This was one way of inducing Austrian diplomacy itself to make an effort in London for obtaining a naval armistice.

Negotiations were opened in London between M. Otto and Captain George, the head of the Transport Office. They lasted during the whole month of September. M. Otto proposed, on the part of France, that hostilities should be suspended by land and sea; that all the vessels both of commerce and war of the belligerent nations should be allowed to sail freely; that the ports belonging to France, or occupied by her armies, such as Malta and Alexandria, should be assimilated to the fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt, in Germany, which, though blockaded by our armies, were nevertheless to receive provisions and supplies. M. Otto, treating frankly, admitted that France would derive great advantages from this arrangement; but he added, that she ought to have very great advantages, to compensate her for the concession which she made in suffering the summer to pass away without completing the destruction of the Austrian forces.

The sacrifice required of England in this demand was one which nothing was capable of wringing from her. It would, in fact, be permitting the revictualling of Malta and Egypt, and thus perhaps ensuring for ever those two possessions to France; it would also be permitting the grand combined French and Spanish fleet to leave Brest, to sail into the Mediterranean, and to take a position there, which would render it afresh master of that sea for a longer or a shorter time. England, therefore, could not assent to such a proposal. Still the danger of Austria touched her deeply; she had an important interest in not suffering her to be crushed; for, if Austria were crushed, General Bonaparte, having the full command of his means, would be able to attempt some formidable enterprise against the British Islands. In consequence she deemed it expedient to make sacrifices to an interest of this kind; and, while crying out against the strangeness of a naval armistice, she presented a counter-project, dated the 7th of September 1800 (20th Fructidor, year VIII.). To begin with, she assented to Luneville as the place of the congress, and appointed Mr. Thomas Grenville, brother of the minister for foreign affairs, to treat for the general peace. She next proposed the following system respecting the naval armistice. All hostilities were to be suspended by land and sea: the suspension of arms was to extend not only to the three belligerent parties, Austria, England, and France, but to their allies. This arrangement was designed to deliver Portugal from the threatening remonstrances of Spain. The maritime places which were blockaded, such as Malta and Alexandria, were to be assimilated to the places in Germany and to be provisioned every fortnight in proportion to the consumption which had taken place during the interval of time elapsed. The ships of the line lying at



Brest and other ports were not to be at liberty to change their station during the armistice.

This counter-project was, on the part of England, rather a testimony of good-will towards Austria than an actual concession on the important point of the negotiation. Malta might, no doubt, gain something by being provisioned for a few months; but Egypt needed no provisions. It was soldiers, muskets, cannon, that it wanted, and not corn, which it had to spare to all the world.

France, however, by yielding on some points, might still find in the naval armistice advantages sufficiently great to induce its acceptance, even with modifications.

On the 21st of September (the 4th complementary day of the year VIII.), the First Consul made a proposal, which was the last. He consented that ships of the line should not be allowed to change their station, which condemned the combined squadron of Spain and France to remain blocked up in Brest; he required that Malta should be revictualled every fifteen days, at the rate of 10,000 rations per day; he consented that Egypt should continue blockaded; but he required that six frigates should have liberty to leave Toulon, to sail to Alexandria, and to return without being searched by the British cruisers.

His intention here was clear enough, and he was right not to disguise an interest, which every one would have guessed at first sight. He meant to arm these six frigates *en flûte*, to load them with men and munitions of war, and to send them to Egypt. He hoped that they might be made to carry 4000 soldiers, a great quantity of muskets, swords, bombs, balls, &c. He had, therefore, sacrificed everything, to confine himself to his main object, the revictualling of Malta and the recruiting of the army in Egypt.

But the difficulty, what effort soever might be made on both sides to diminish it, remained at bottom the same. The object was to preserve Malta and Egypt for France, two points upon which England would not give way. Thus there were no means of coming to an understanding. The negotiation was relinquished, on the refusal in London to admit the last plan for a naval armistice.

Before these parleys were definitively broken off, the First Consul, by way of courtesy, made a final proposal to England. He offered to renounce all armistice, and, nevertheless, to treat with her, but in a separate negotiation from that which was about to commence with Austria.

It was now September 1800. Several months had been spent in sterile negotiations since the victories of Marengo and Hochstett, and the First Consul would not waste any more time without acting.

Austria, when threatened, had replied that she could not force England to sign a naval armistice ; that she offered, for her own part, to negotiate immediately ; that she had appointed M. de Lherbach to repair to Luneville ; that he was about to proceed thither forthwith ; that Mr. Thomas Grenville was waiting, on his part, for passports ; that they could, therefore, negotiate without delay ; but that it was not necessary to resume hostilities during the negotiations, and to spill more torrents of human blood. The First Consul, who perceived the secret intention of protracting till winter should arrive, determined, at length, on resuming hostilities, and had issued his orders accordingly. He had employed to good purpose the two months which had elapsed, and put a finishing hand to the organisation of the armies. His new arrangements in respect to them were as follows :—

Moreau, as we have said, had been obliged to send General St. Suzanne upon the Rhine with some detachments, for the purpose of uniting the garrisons of Mayence and Strasburg, and making head against the partisans raised by Baron d'Albini in the heart of Germany. The army of Moreau was in consequence weakened, and, at the same time, the force so collected was insufficient to cover his rear. The First Consul, to ward off all danger in that quarter, had hastened to complete the Batavian army, placed under the command of Augereau. He had formed it of 8000 Dutch and 12,000 French, drawn from the troops which guarded Holland and the departments of the North. These troops, the most worn down by the preceding campaigns, reinvigorated since by rest, reinforced by recruits, now constituted excellent corps. Augereau had marched to Frankfort, where he awed by his presence the Mayence levies of Baron d'Albini and the Austrian detachments left in the environs. This precaution taken, the corps of St. Suzanne reorganised, nearly 18,000 strong, had returned to the Danube, and again formed the left wing of Moreau. His return raised the active army of the Rhine to more than 100,000 men.

When the army of reserve had thrown itself into Italy, it had been obliged to leave behind part of the corps destined to compose it, and for the complete formation of which there had not been time to wait. Instead of an effective force of 60,000 men, as was intended, it had numbered only forty and some odd thousand. The First Consul had formed with these corps left behind a second army of reserve, 15,000 strong, given the command of it to Macdonald, and posted it in the Grisons, facing the Tyrol, which had permitted Moreau to draw him to his right wing, commanded, as the reader is aware, by Lecourbe, and to unite, in case of need, under his hand, the entire mass of his army, if he should have to force the barrier of the Inn.

The army of Italy, on its part, established on the banks of the Mincio by the convention of Alexandria, relieved also by the presence of Macdonald from all concern about Switzerland and the Tyrol, had been enabled to draw its wings closer to its main body, and to concentrate itself in such a manner that it could enter into action at any moment. Composed of the troops which had crossed the St. Bernard, of those which had been drawn from Germany by the St. Gothard, lastly, of the troops of Liguria, which had defended Genoa and the Var, rested and recruited, it presented a total mass of about 120,000 men, 80,000 of whom were assembled on the Mincio. Masséna had at first been appointed commander-in-chief, and he was, in fact, the only one capable of commanding it well. Unfortunately, mischievous dissensions had arisen between the commissariat of the army and the Italian governments. The army, though stationed amidst fertile Italy, and in possession of the rich magazines left by the Austrians, had nevertheless not enjoyed all the plenty to which it was entitled by its long privations. It was alleged that the commissariat officers had sold part of these magazines. The governments of Piedmont and the Cisalpine, moreover, complained that they were drained by war contributions, and refused to pay them. Amidst this confusion, heavy charges were preferred against the French administration; and in these complaints General Masséna himself was included. The clamour soon became so vehement, that the First Consul thought himself obliged to recall Masséna, and to appoint General Brune in his stead. Brune, with abundance of intelligence and courage, was but an indifferent general, and a still more indifferent politician. He was one of the most zealous leaders of the demagogue party, which, however, did not prevent him from being devotedly attached to the First Consul, who was thereby much gratified. Not having had it in his power to assign him an active command during the spring campaign, the First Consul determined to give him one during the autumn campaign. His victory in Holland caused him to rank high in public estimation; but the recall of Masséna was a misfortune for the army, and for the First Consul himself. Masséna, soured, was about to become, in spite of himself, a subject of hope for a multitude of intriguers, who at this moment were again stirring. The First Consul was aware of this, but he would not suffer irregularities anywhere, and one cannot blame him for it.

To these four armies the First Consul had added a fifth assemblage of troops around Amiens. He had detached from the demi-brigades left in the interior the skeletons of the companies of grenadiers, recruited them with fine men, and formed out of them a superb corps of 9000 or 10,000 picked soldiers, whom he intended to despatch in haste to the coast, if the

English should effect a landing on any part of it, or into Italy, to perform the duty which Augereau was performing in Germany, that of covering the wings and the rear of the principal army. Murat was appointed its commander-in-chief.

All this had been accomplished, as far as related to the recruiting, by means of the levy ordered by the Legislative Body, and, with reference to expense, by means of the financial resources recently created. These different corps were now in want of nothing; they were well fed, well armed; they had horses, and a complete *matériel*.

The First Consul was naturally impatient to avail himself of such means to wring peace from Austria before winter. He, therefore, ordered Moreau and Brune to repair to their headquarters, and to make preparations for recommencing hostilities. He directed Moreau to give the Austrian general the notice stipulated by the armistice, and not to allow any prolongation of the suspension of arms, unless on one condition, that the emperor should relinquish to the French the three fortresses actually blockaded, Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt. On this condition he consented to grant a further respite of five or six weeks. These fortresses, in fact, were worth the sacrifice. Once in possession of them, the French would obtain an excellent base of operation on the Danube; they would be reinforced by the corps which were blockading them; they would, moreover, have time left to push one wing of the army of Italy upon Tuscany and the kingdom of Naples, countries in which levies *en masse* were being raised at the instigation of Austria, and with the money of England. Such were the orders despatched to the headquarters of Moreau.

The Emperor of Germany, on his part, making good use of the time, had employed with the greatest activity the subsidies furnished by England. He hastened the new levies ordered in Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, Styria, and Carinthia. Wickham, the English minister, had established a sort of offices in several towns of Germany, for bribing soldiers to fight for the coalition. By means of a fresh subsidy, the Bavarian and Wurtemberg corps had been considerably augmented. Independently of the sums paid to Austria, English recruiting officers had taken into the direct pay of their government two regiments, composed of boatmen plying on the rivers of Germany, and destined to facilitate the passage of them. Ten thousand peasants, hired for the purpose, threw up, under the direction of Austrian engineers, formidable entrenchments along the whole line of the Inn, from the Tyrol to the junction of that river with the Danube. All was bustle from Vienna to Munich. The staff of the Austrian army had been totally changed. M. de Kray, notwithstanding his experience and his vigour on the field of battle, had shared

the disgrace of M. de Melas. The Archduke Ferdinand himself, who served under him, had been removed. The Archduke John, a young prince of highly cultivated mind and very brave, but without experience in war, his head full of theories, his imagination struck by the manœuvres of General Bonaparte, and anxious to imitate him at any rate, had been called to the supreme command of the imperial armies. This was one of those novelties, which people are fond of trying in desperate circumstances. The emperor had repaired in person to the army, to review it, and to excite the spirit of the soldiers by his presence.

He passed several days with the army, accompanied by M. de Lherbach, the negotiator appointed to proceed to Luneville, and by the young Archduke John. Having seen everything, examined everything, in company with his advisers, he ascertained that nothing was ready, that the army was not yet sufficiently recruited, either in point of *matériel* or courage, for the immediate recommencement of hostilities. M. de Lherbach was, therefore, commissioned to repair to Moreau's headquarters, to learn whether a prolongation of the armistice for a few days could not be obtained from the French government. M. de Lherbach was informed by Moreau of the conditions fixed by the First Consul for a new suspension of arms. He consented reluctantly to these conditions, and, on the 20th of September (the 3rd complementary day of the year VIII.), he concluded a new prolongation of the armistice with General Lahorie, in the village of Hohenlinden, which was destined so soon to become celebrated. The fortresses of Philippsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt were to be delivered up to the French army, to be disposed of as it should think fit. In return, the armistice was prolonged for forty-five days, reckoning from the 21st of September, including fifteen days' notice of the resumption of hostilities, if they were once more to recommence.

The emperor returned to Vienna, dissatisfied with the visit which he had been induced to pay to the army, for that visit had been productive of no other result than the surrender to the French of the three strongest fortresses in the empire. That prince was overwhelmed with chagrin. His subjects shared his sentiments, and accused M. de Thugut of being a complete tool of England. Queen Caroline of Naples had just arrived with Admiral Nelson and Lady Hamilton, to support the war party in Vienna; but the public clamour was vehement. M. Thugut was reproached for egregious faults, such as the refusal, at the commencement of winter, to listen to the pacific proposals of the First Consul, the vicious direction of the military operations, his obstinacy in not admitting the existence of the army of reserve, even when it was crossing the St. Bernard,

the concentration of the principal forces of the empire in Liguria, with a view to please the English, who flattered themselves that they should gain possession of Toulon; lastly, the engagement entered into with the British government not to treat without it; an engagement signed on the 20th of June, at a moment when he ought, on the contrary, to have preserved his freedom of action. These reproaches were, in great part, well founded; but, whether founded or not, they had the sanction of events; for nothing had succeeded with M. de Thugut, and nations judge only from results. M. de Thugut was, therefore, obliged to yield to circumstances, and retired, still retaining, however, considerable influence over the Austrian cabinet. M. de Lherbach was appointed to succeed him, and, as envoy to the congress of Luneville, instead of M. de Lherbach, was selected a well-known diplomatist, M. Louis Cobentzel, who was personally acceptable to General Bonaparte, and who had negotiated with him the treaty of Campo Formio. Hopes were entertained that M. de Cobentzel would prove a fitter person than any other for establishing amicable relations with the French government, and that, placed at Luneville, at some distance from Paris, he would occasionally visit that capital, to have direct communication with the First Consul.

The delivery to the French army of the three fortresses of Ulm, Ingolstadt, and Philipsburg took place most seasonably for the celebration of the fête of the 1st Vendémiaire. It could not fail to revive the hopes of peace, by furnishing evidence of the extremity to which Austria was reduced. This fête, one of the two which the Constitution had retained, was destined to celebrate the anniversary of the foundation of the Republic. The First Consul determined that it should not be less pompous than that of the 4th of July, so opportunely heightened by the presentation to the Invalides of the colours taken in the last campaign; he resolved that it should be distinguished by a character as patriotic, but more serious, from all those which had been given during the course of the Revolution, and, above all, that it should be exempt from the ridicule attached to the imitation of ancient customs in modern times.

Religion, it must be confessed, leaves a great void in the solemnities of nations, when it is excluded from them. Public games, theatrical representations, and fires, illumining the night with their brightness, may occupy, during several hours, the multitude assembled to rejoice at any joyful occurrence, but cannot fill up an entire day. In all ages, nations have been disposed to celebrate their victories at the foot of their altars, and they have converted their public ceremonies into an act of thanksgiving to the Deity. But altars France then had none. Those which had been erected to the goddess of Reason, during

the Reign of Terror, those which the Theophilanthropists innocently strewed with flowers, during the licentious system of the Directory, were covered with a ridicule never to be effaced; for, in regard to altars, none are respectable but those which are ancient. Now, the old Catholic altar of France had not yet been restored. Nothing, consequently, was left but ceremonies in some sort academic, beneath the dome of the Invalides; elegant discourses, such as M. de Fontanes could deliver; or patriotic airs, such as a Mehul or a Lesueur could compose. The First Consul, sensible of all this, sought, therefore, to supply the place of the religious feature by a profoundly moral feature.

The homage to Washington, the presentation of the colours taken at Marengo, had already supplied materials for the two fêtes celebrated during his consulship; he contrived to find, in a great reparative act, the subject-matter of the fête of the 1st of Vendémiaire, year IX. (23rd September 1800).

At the time of the violation of the tombs at St. Denis, the body of Turenne had been found in perfect preservation. Amidst the excesses of the populace, an involuntary feeling of respect had saved these remains from the general profanation. Deposited at first in the Jardin des Plantes, they had afterwards been consigned to the care of M. Alexandre Lenoir, a man whose pious zeal, worthy of being recorded in history, had preserved for us a multitude of ancient monuments, which he had collected in the museum of the Petits Augustins. There lay these remains of Turenne, exposed to the curiosity, rather than to the respect, of visitors. The First Consul conceived the idea of depositing the relics of this great man beneath the dome of the Invalides, and under the guard of our country's veterans. To glorify an illustrious general and a servant of the ancient monarchy was reconciling the glories of Louis XIV. with those of the Republic; it was re-establishing respect for the past, without offending the present; it was, in short, the whole policy of the First Consul, under the noblest and the most touching form. This removal was to take place on the last complementary day of the year VIII. (22nd of September), and, on the following day, the first stone of the monument to Kléber and Desaix was to be laid. Thus, at the moment when our earth, in obedience to the laws which govern its motions, was completing one great century, and giving birth to another (no less famous in its turn, if it prove one day worthy of its commencement), at this moment, the First Consul resolved to pay a joint homage to the heroes of past times and to the twin heroes of the present time. To render these two ceremonies the more striking, he imitated in some points what had been practised at the Federation of 1790, and desired all the departments to send to him representatives, who, by their presence,

should give to these fêtes not merely a Parisian, but a national character. The departments cordially responded to this appeal, and chose distinguished citizens, whom curiosity, a desire to see, with their own eyes, disorder succeeded by tranquillity, the miseries of anarchy by prosperity, and the desire especially to approach and to converse with a great man, drew in great numbers to Paris.

On the 5th complementary day, in the year VIII. (September 22nd), the public authorities repaired to the museum of the Petits Augustins, to fetch the car on which was laid the body of Turenne. On this car, drawn by four white horses, was placed the sword of the hero of the monarchy, preserved in the family of Bouillon, and lent to the government for that noble ceremony. Four old generals, mutilated in the service of the Republic, held the slips of the car; it was preceded by a piebald horse, like one which Turenne frequently rode, harnessed as horses were in his time, led by a black, and offering an accurate representation of some scenes from the age to which this homage was paid. Around the car marched the invalids, followed by some of those fine troops which had just returned from the banks of the Po and of the Danube. This extraordinary and noble procession passed through Paris, amidst an immense concourse, and proceeded to the Invalides, where the First Consul awaited it, surrounded by the envoys of the departments, both those of the old France of Louis XIV., and those of new France; these latter representing Belgium and Luxemburg, the Rhenish provinces, Savoy, and the county of Nice. The precious relic borne by this train was placed under the dome. Carnot, minister of war, delivered a simple and suitable address, and, while music of a solemn kind pealed through the vaulted edifice, the body of Turenne was deposited beneath the monument where it now reposes, and where it was soon to be re-joined by his companion in glory, the illustrious and virtuous Vauban; where he was destined to be joined one day by the author of the great things which we are here relating: where he will certainly remain, surrounded by this august company, throughout the ages which Heaven may reserve for France.

If, in times like ours, when faith is quenched, anything can supply its place, and equal, perhaps, the pomp of religion, it is such spectacles.

On the evening of that day, a gratuitous representation of the *Tartuffe* and the *Cid* was given to the people of the capital, with a view to afford them an amusement less coarse than usual. The First Consul attended the performance. His presence, his intention, instinctively guessed by that impressible and intelligent populace, all concurred to maintain, in that tumultuous assemblage, perfect decorum, a very unusual thing at



gratuitous representations. The silence was interrupted only by cries, a thousand times repeated, of *Vive la République! Vive le Général Bonaparte!*

On the following day, the First Consul, accompanied, as on the preceding, by the public authorities and the envoys of the departments, repaired to the Place des Victoires. There was to be raised a monument in the Egyptian style, destined to receive the mortal remains of Kléber and Desaix, who, according to the intention of the First Consul, were to rest side by side. He laid the first stone, and then proceeded on horseback to the Invalides. There the minister of the interior, who was his brother Lucien, delivered a speech on the state of the Republic, which made a strong impression. Certain passages were highly applauded, among others the following, relative to the present age and the age of Louis XIV.: "One might say, that at this moment those two great ages have met to express mutual admiration over that august tomb." The speaker, while pronouncing these words, pointed to the tomb of Turenne. He was answered by unanimous applause, proving that all hearts, without derogating from the present, were willing to take again from the past what deserved reviving. And, that the spectacle might be complete, that the ordinary illusions of human nature might have their share in these scenes, otherwise so noble, the orator further exclaimed: "Happy the generation which sees a revolution begun under monarchy terminate in a republic!"

During this ceremony, the First Consul had received a telegraphic despatch, announcing the armistice of Hohenlinden and the cession of the three fortresses of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt. He sent his brother Lucien a note, which was read to those present, and greeted with greater applause than the academic harangue of the minister of the interior. Notwithstanding the respect due to the place, shouts of *Vive Bonaparte! Vive la République!* shook the vaults of the noble edifice. An immediate publication of the news in Paris produced a more profound satisfaction than all the rejoicings destined for the amusement of the multitude. People were not afraid of war; they were full of confidence in the genius of the First Consul and in the courage of the French armies, if it must be continued; but, after so many battles, after so many troubles, they wished to enjoy in peace the glory acquired and the prosperity that was beginning to dawn.

That prosperity was, indeed, making rapid advances. If the mere presence of General Bonaparte had sufficed, on the 18th of Brumaire, to soothe, to cheer men's minds, to revive their hopes, the case must be very different now, when the successes of our armies, the eager advances made by Europe towards us, the prospect of a speedy and a glorious peace, and lastly, tranquillity

everywhere restored, had realised the hopes conceived in a first moment of confidence.

These hopes had, in fact, become realities, and it may be said that, in the ten months past, from November 1799 to September 1800, the face of France was changed. The public funds, the vulgar but true index to the state of public opinion, had risen from twelve francs (the real price at which five per cent. stock was sold the day before the 18th of Brumaire) to forty francs. They promised to reach fifty.

The stockholders had just received a half-year's dividend in cash, a thing which had not occurred since the commencement of our Revolution. This financial phenomenon had produced a great effect, and it appeared to be not one of the least of the victories of the First Consul. How had he been able to accomplish this prodigy? This was an enigma which the mass of the public explained by that extraordinary power, which he was already said to possess, of doing whatever he pleased.

But there is no miracle in this world: there is no other cause for real successes but sound sense seconded by a strong will. Such too was the sole cause of the happy results obtained by the administration of the First Consul. He had, in the first place, applied a remedy to the real evil, which consisted in the delays in the collection of the taxes: he had, with this view, instituted a special agency for the preparation of the assessments, formerly left too complaisantly to the communes. This special agency, stimulated by the prefects, another creation of the consular government, had made out the assessments in arrear of the year VII. and the year VIII. and finished those for the year IX., the year just entered upon (September 1800 to September 1801). Thus, for the first time since the Revolution, the assessments of the current year were about to be put into a train of collection, from the very first day of that year. The receivers-general, having the revenue paid to them punctually, were thus enabled to discharge punctually the monthly bills which they had accepted, and had, in fact, always paid them at the end of every month. We have already said that to guarantee the solidity of these bills, the treasury had required of the receivers a security in cash, which security, deposited in the Sinking Fund, was to serve to retire such bills as might be protested. Out of the 20,000,000 f. composing the total amount of the securities, not more than 1,000,000 f. had been required for the payment of dishonoured bills. Hence they had obtained immediately a character equal to that of the best commercial paper. At first, they could not be discounted below three-fourths per cent. per month, that is, nine per cent. per annum; now, persons were willing to discount them at eight, and even at seven. This was a very moderate rate, especially

in comparison with that which the government had hitherto been obliged to pay. Now, as the direct contributions in a total budget of 500,000,000 amounted to about 300,000,000 f., the treasury had, from the first day of that year's account, had in its hands the 300,000,000 f. in assets easy to be realised. Instead of receiving nothing, or nearly nothing, as formerly, and receiving but tardily the little that was paid in, it had, from the very 1st of Vendémiaire, the greater part of the public revenue at its disposal. Such had been the result of the preparation of the assessments in proper time, and of that system of bills of exchange drawn, by the name of obligations, on the chests of the receivers-general: by depriving the latter of the pretext of delay in their receipts, the government had been enabled to impose upon them the condition of paying on a fixed day.

The year VIII. which had just closed (September 1799 to September 1800), had not been so easily provided for as the year IX. promised to be. It had been necessary to withdraw all the papers previously issued, *bons d'arrérage*, *bons de réquisition*, *délégations*, &c. These papers had been withdrawn either by the discharge of anterior contributions, or by means of certain arrangements entered into with the holders. The revenue of the year VIII. had consequently been diminished by so much, and there had resulted a deficit on that year's account. But the victories of our armies having carried them into the enemy's country, the treasury was immediately relieved from the burden of their subsistence; and, with some national domains, which began to fetch advantageous prices, the deficit of that year might afterwards be covered. No more *bons d'arrérage* had been issued, for the stockholders were in future to be paid in cash; no more *bons de réquisition*, for the armies were supported either by the French treasury, or by some foreign treasury; lastly, no more *délégations*, for, as we have elsewhere related, the First Consul had adopted an invariable system in regard to persons having claims upon the State: he either gave them nothing or cash: and in cash he already gave them more than the preceding governments. Every week he held a council of finances; at this council he required a statement of the resources, and another of the wants, of each ministerial department, to be laid before him, selecting the most urgent of those wants, and dividing among them the resources which were sure to come in, but nothing more. With this regularity, this firmness of conduct, there was no further necessity for issuing paper; and, throwing no fictitious stock into circulation, the government had ceased to have any to redeem. The receipts of the treasury, during the year IX., were therefore sure to be in specie.

The public dividends had been paid by the Bank of France. This bank had existed for only six months, and it was already able to issue notes to a considerable amount, which were taken by the public as readily as cash. The wants of trade and the conduct of the government towards the new establishment had occasioned this rapid success. The way in which the thing was done was this. Out of the securities in cash, a million, at most, had been sufficient to support the credit of the obligations. The rest had been left unemployed; and, strong as was the temptation to employ the 18,000,000 or 19,000,000 f. remaining to satisfy wants, all of which were urgent, the government had not hesitated to impose upon itself the severest privations, in order to devote 5,000,000 f. to the purchase of bank shares, the amount of which it had paid immediately. It had not stopped there, but had deposited with it in account current the surplus of the disposable funds. An account current is composed of sums which are paid in on condition that they can be drawn out at pleasure, according to the wants of each day. Having all at once such resources at its disposal, the bank had lost no time in discounting, in issuing notes, which, always paid in money, if the holders so desired, had acquired in a few months the value of cash. All this may now appear ordinary enough; for we see this phenomenon in every small town operating in the easiest manner, and a great number of banks prospering from the very day of their foundation. But, at that time, after so many bankruptcies, after the aversion which the assignats had excited for paper, it was a sort of commercial prodigy, wrought by a government, which, of all sentiments, particularly inspired that of confidence.

The treasury then resolved to entrust the bank with various services advantageous for itself and for the State, especially that of paying the *rentes*. It did this by means of a perfectly simple process. The acceptances of the receivers-general were as good as bills of exchange. The treasury, therefore, offered the bank these bills to the amount of about 20,000,000 f. for discount; an operation highly advantageous to it, for discount was at six or seven per cent., and an operation perfectly safe, as these acceptances had acquired an unexceptionable character. The bank then undertook the payment of six months' dividend to the stockholders, who received from it either cash or notes, at their option.

Thus, in a few months, the government had, by submitting to privations, already raised itself a powerful instrument, which, for an aid of 10,000,000 or 12,000,000 f. that it had received for the moment, could now render it services to the amount of hundreds of millions.

Financial prosperity, therefore, revived on all sides. The

only sensible depression amidst the general well-being was the depression of landed property. In the height of our troubles, the proprietors of land or of houses had enjoyed the advantage of paying no taxes, owing to the delay in making out the assessments, or in paying next to nothing, thanks to the assignats. It was now otherwise. They were now obliged to pay, first the arrears, next the current assessments, and the whole in cash. For small proprietors, the burden was heavy. Allowance had at first been made for 5,000,000 f. of non-available assets in the budget, with the intention of exempting the taxpayers who were too hardly pressed; it was found necessary to devote to the same object a much larger sum. It was a kind of profit and loss account opened with the taxpayers, by the operation of which the past was forgiven them, in order that punctual payment of the present might be obtained. Landed property alone cannot support in a State all the public burdens. These must partly be met by excise, and other duties on articles of consumption. The Revolution, by abolishing the taxes on liquors, on salt, and on other articles, had closed one of the two necessary sources of the public wealth. Time had not yet opened it again. This was one of the glories destined at a later period for the restorer of order and of society in France. But he had first a great many prejudices to overcome. By establishing *octrois* at the gates of towns to provide for the wants of the hospitals, he had made a first useful experiment, and which accustomed people to the resumption of a measure, sooner or later indispensable.

Though landed property was for a moment heavily burdened, a general feeling of ease was, nevertheless, diffused among all classes. In all parts people felt themselves regenerated, and they found within them courage for speculation and exertion.

But there was much more to be done in that convulsed society, to restore everything, not to a perfect state, such as one might aspire to in time, but merely to a state that was enduring. We have just seen what required to be done for the finances: there was another service quite as important and quite as much disorganised as that of the finances, namely, that of the roads. They had become almost impassable. As everybody knows, not a few years' but a few months' neglect is sufficient to change into a quagmire the artificial strata which men make upon the earth, for the transport of heavy loads. Now, it was nearly ten years since the roads in France were left almost without repairs. Under the old government, their repair was provided for by *corvées*, and since the Revolution by means of a sum which figured in the general budget, but had not been paid more punctually than the sums destined for other services. The Directory, seeing how things stood, had been led to the idea of a special resource, which could not be misapplied, and which

could never run short; and, to attain this end, it had established a toll for keeping up the roads, and erected gates for collecting it. This toll had been farmed to the contractors for the roads themselves, who, negligently superintended, defrauded both in the collection of the toll and in the application of the produce of it. Besides, it was insufficient. It yielded at most 13,000,000 or 14,000,000 f. per annum, and 30,000,000 f. would have been required. In the three years VI., VII., and VIII. no more than 32,000,000 f. had been expended on the roads, and it would have required at least 100,000,000 f. to remedy the ravages which Time had made, and to provide for their annual repair.

The First Consul, adjourning the adoption of a complete system, had recourse to the simplest expedient, that of applying the general funds of the State to the succour of this important service. He continued the toll, the mode of levying it, and its application, confining himself to a stricter superintendence, and gave immediately 12,000,000 f. upon the year IX., a considerable sum for that time. This sum was to serve for the repair of the principal highroads running from the centre to the extremities of the Republic, from Paris to Lille, from Paris to Strasburg, from Paris to Marseilles, from Paris to Bordeaux, and from Paris to Brest. He proposed to lay out afterwards on other roads a similar amount to what he had thus devoted to them, to augment this grant in proportion to the improved circumstances of the treasury, at the same time continuing the toll till the roads of France were restored to the state in which those of every civilised country ought to be.

The canals of St. Quentin and the Ourcq, commenced towards the end of the old government, exhibited everywhere the appearance of ditches half filled up, of hills half cut through, of ruins, in short, rather than works of art. He immediately sent engineers to survey them, went thither himself, and ordered definitive plans, with the intention of signalling by works of great public utility the first moments of the speedily expected peace.

It was not merely the wretched state of the roads which rendered them unfit for travelling, but also the robbers by whom they were infested in a great number of provinces. The Chouans and the Vendéans, unemployed ever since the termination of the civil war, and having contracted habits of life incompatible with peace, pursued the trade of plunder on the highroads of Bretagne, Normandy, and the environs of Paris. Refractory persons running away from the conscription, and some soldiers of the army of Liguria, impelled by privations to desert, were committing the like depredations on the roads of the centre and of the south. Georges Cadoudal, who had returned from England with plenty of money, and was now concealed in the Morbihan, secretly directed this new *chouannerie*. Numerous

movable columns, accompanied by military commissions, were requisite to suppress this disorder. The First Consul had already formed some of these columns, but he had not sufficient troops. While the Directory had kept too many troops at home, he had kept too few. But he said to himself, most justly, that, when he had beaten the enemies abroad, he should soon put down those at home. "Have patience," he replied to those who spoke to him in alarm about this kind of disorder; "give me a month or two; by that time I shall have conquered peace, and then I will do speedy and complete justice upon those highwaymen." Thus, in every point of view, peace was then the indispensable condition of well-being. Meanwhile, however, he applied himself to remedy the most urgent disorders.

We have already related that he had consented to substitute for the oath formerly required of priests a mere promise of obedience to the laws, which could not offend their consciences in any way. They had immediately availed themselves of this in great numbers, and the clerical functions were at once disputed by the constitutional priests, who had taken the oath to the civil constitution of the clergy, the nonjuring priests, who had given only a promise of obedience to the laws, and, lastly, those who had neither taken the oath nor given the promise. The priests belonging to the first two classes were competitors with one another for obtaining the churches, which were granted to them with more or less facility, according to the extremely variable humour of the local authorities. Those who had refused any sort of declaration performed the ceremonies of religion clandestinely in private houses, and were held by many staunch Catholics to be its only true ministers. Lastly, to add to the confusion, there were the Theophilanthropists, who also made use of the Catholic churches, and on certain days deposited flowers on those altars at which the priests had been saying Mass. These ridiculous sectaries held festivals in honour of all the virtues, of courage, temperance, charity, &c. On All Saints' Day, for example, they celebrated a festival in honour of ancestors. In the eye of strict Catholics this was a profanation of the religious edifices; and sound sense and the respect due to the dominant creeds commanded that it should be done away with.

For putting an end to this chaos, an agreement with the Holy See was requisite; an agreement by means of which those who had taken the oath, those who had given the promise, and those who had refused both, might be reconciled together. But Monsignor Spina, envoy of the Holy See, had but just arrived at Paris, and, surprised to find himself there, kept out of everybody's sight. The subject to be discussed was as delicate for him as for the government. The First Consul, discerning with extraordinary tact the characters of men and the employment

for which they were fitted, had opposed to this wily Italian the person most capable of coping with him, namely, the Abbé Bernier, who, after having long directed La Vendée, had at length reconciled it with the government. He had brought him to Paris, attached him to himself by the most honourable of all ties, the desire to contribute to the public welfare, and to share the honour of doing so. To the Abbé Bernier to re-establish a good understanding between France and the Romish Church was like continuing and completing the pacification of La Vendée. The interviews with Monsignor Spina had but just begun, and the government could not promise itself an immediate result.

It was of importance to come to as speedy an arrangement of religious affairs as possible; for peace with the Holy See was not less desirable for the quiet of people's minds than peace with the great powers of Europe. But, meanwhile, there was a multitude of irregularities, either mischievous or singular, against which the First Consul strove to provide in the best possible manner by consular ordinances. He had already, by his ordinance of the 7th Nivôse, year VIII. (28th of December 1799), forbidden the local authorities, frequently favourable to the priests, to thwart them in the exercise of their religion. Having charge of the religious edifices, as we have elsewhere observed, they would frequently not allow the priests the use of them on Sundays, but only on decadis, alleging that the decadi was the only holiday recognised by the laws of the Republic. The ordinance referred to above had provided for this difficulty, by enjoining the local authorities to give up the edifices for public worship to the priests on the days indicated by each persuasion. But this ordinance had not smoothed all the difficulties relative to Sundays and decadis. On this point the laws and manners were at variance, a variance which it is necessary to explain, in order to convey an idea of the state of French society at that period.

The Revolution, in its passionate fondness for uniformity and symmetry, had not confined itself to the introduction of uniformity into all measures of length, superficies, and weight, and to the reduction of them to natural and immutable unities, such as a fraction of the meridian, or the specific gravity of distilled water; it had aimed at introducing the same regularity into the measure of time. It had therefore divided the year into twelve equal months, of thirty days each, completing it by the ingenious invention of five complementary days. It had divided the months into three decades, or weeks of ten days each, reduced in this manner the days of rest to three per month, and substituted for the four Sundays of the Gregorian calendar the three decadis of the Republican calendar. Most assuredly, in all mathematical points of view, this latter



calendar was far better than the old one ; but it offended religious ideas ; it was not that of the generality of mankind, that of history ; it could not overcome inveterate habits. The metrical system, after forty years' efforts and legislative restrictions, and notwithstanding its incontestable commercial advantages, has scarcely yet been definitively adopted : how then could there be any hope of supporting the Republican calendar against a custom of twenty centuries, against universal usage, against the power of religion ? When we reform, we must be content to reform for the purpose of applying a remedy to real sufferings, of re-establishing justice where it is wanting ; but to reform for the pleasure of the eye or of the mind, for the purpose of putting a straight line where there is none, is requiring too much of human nature. You may form at pleasure the habits of a child ; you cannot remould those of a grown man. It is the same with nations : you cannot alter the habits of a people after an existence of fifteen centuries.

Accordingly, Sunday was again observed in all quarters. In certain towns, the shops were closed on Sundays, in others on decadis ; frequently in the same town, in the same street, the contrast existed, and exhibited the spectacle of a mischievous conflict of ideas and manners. For the rest, Sunday would have prevailed everywhere, but for the intervention of certain authorities. The First Consul, by a new ordinance of the 7th Thermidor, year VIII. (July 26, 1800), decided that every one should be at liberty to keep holiday when he pleased, to adopt for a day of rest the day most conformable with his tastes or his religious opinions ; and that the public officers, bound to adhere to the legal calendar, should alone be obliged to choose the decadi for the suspension of their labours. This was ensuring the triumph of Sunday.

The First Consul acted judiciously in encouraging the return to an ancient and general habit, most judiciously, if he designed re-establishing the Catholic religion, as he really did design, and with good reason, to do.

The emigrants again engaged his attention. We have already adverted to their eagerness to return ever since the very first days of the Consulate ; this eagerness had kept increasing, on observing what repose France enjoyed, in what security all the inhabitants of its territory lived. But, desirous as the government was to put an end to the proscription launched against them, it was yet necessary, while putting down one disorder, and proscription is one, to avoid falling into another, for a precipitate reaction is a disorder too, and of the most serious nature. These returned emigrants found on their estates either old denouncers, who had contributed to persecute them, or purchasers who had obtained possession of their property

with paper: to both these classes they were disquieting enemies, or at least troublesome neighbours; and they were not discreet enough not to abuse the clemency shown to them by the government.

They availed themselves with alacrity of the law passed a few months before, which declared that the list of the emigrants was closed. Those who had been omitted in this list lost no time in profiting by the clause respecting them. As they could no longer be inscribed but by the authority of the ordinary tribunals, which constituted but an inconsiderable danger for them, they lived in quiet, and had almost all returned. Those who had been entered in the list, and whom the law referred to the administrative authorities to claim their erasure, took advantage of the spirit of the times to get their names erased. They applied, in the first instance, for surveillances, that is, as we have already explained, the faculty of returning for a time under the superintendence of the political police; they then obtained from friends, or from complaisant persons, false certificates, attesting that they had not quitted France during the Reign of Terror; that they had only kept concealed to save themselves from the scaffold; and in this manner they obtained their erasure with incredible facility. The list drawn up formerly by the local authorities, with the recklessness of persecution, comprehended 145,000 persons, and formed nine volumes. Now, names were erased with as much recklessness as they had before been inscribed, and the emigrants were reinstated by thousands in all their rights. Some, whose properties had not yet been sold, applied to the members of the government to get the sequestration taken off; they solicited, according to custom, the men whom they abused the day before, whom they would again abuse on the morrow, and frequently Madame Bonaparte herself, who had formerly been connected with the French noblesse, in consequence of the rank which she held in society. If the emigrants, whose estates were not sold, recovered them at the price of abject solicitations followed by ingratitude, there was no great mischief in that; but those whose property had been alienated went into the provinces, addressed themselves to the new proprietors, and often, by dint of threats, importunities, or religious suggestions at the pillow of the dying, recovered their family possessions at a low price, by means not much more creditable than those by which they had been despoiled of them.

The tumult was at this moment so general as to attract the attention of the First Consul. He wished to redress the wrongs done by the Revolution, but above all he wished to avoid alarming any of the interests which it had created, and which had become legitimate with time. In consequence, he thought

it right to adopt a measure, which was only part of what he did at a later period, but which introduced some order into that chaos of claims, of precipitate returns, and of dangerous attempts. After mature deliberation in the Council of State, the following ordinance was issued on the 20th of October 1800 (28th Vendémiaire, year IX.).

In the first place, all those previously erased, no matter by what authority, or with what negligence the proceedings in regard to them had been conducted, were validly withdrawn from the list of emigrants. Certain collective inscriptions, under the designation of children or heirs of emigrants, were considered as not having taken place. Women, under the authority of husbands when they quitted France, minors under the age of sixteen years, priests who left the country in obedience to the laws of banishment, persons comprehended under the head of day-labourers, workmen, artisans, or domestic servants; the absent, whose absence was anterior to the Revolution, the Knights of Malta, residing in Malta during our troubles, were all definitively erased. The names of the victims who had perished on the scaffold were also withdrawn from the list: this was a reparation due to their families and to humanity. These modifications made, those were kept upon the list without exception who had borne arms against France, those who held offices in the civil or military household of the exiled princes, those who had received rank or title from foreign governments, without the authorisation of the French government. The minister of justice was to appoint nine commissioners, the minister of police a like number; to these eighteen commissioners the First Consul was to add nine councillors of State; these twenty-seven persons collectively were charged to make out the new list of emigrants upon the bases indicated. The emigrants definitively erased were obliged to make a promise of fidelity to the Constitution, if they wished to remain in the country, or to obtain the removal of the sequestration from their unsold property. They were condemned to remain under the surveillance of the political police till a year after the conclusion of a general peace. This precaution was designed for the protection of the purchasers of national domains. As for the emigrants definitively kept upon the list, nothing could for the present be enacted relative to them: what concerned them was deferred to a later period.

Under existing circumstances, this ordinance comprehended all that could most reasonably be done; it retrenched from the proscription list the great mass of the inscribed: it reduced that list to a small number of the declared enemies of the Revolution, and postponed the decision of the fate of all such to a future period. Thus, when the Republic should be definitively

victorious over Europe, universally recognised, solidly established, when the firm determination of the First Consul to protect the purchasers of national domains should have sufficiently dispelled their alarms, the government would probably be able to complete that act of clemency, and at length recall all the proscribed, even those who had been traitors to France. For the moment it went no further than to cut several embarrassing questions and to put an end to many intrigues.

We see what difficulties of all kinds that government had to surmount, to restore order in a subverted society, to be clement and just towards the one, without alarming or being unjust towards others. But toilsome as were its labours, they found their reward in the plaudits, it may be said, of the entire country. In the first days which succeeded the 18th Brumaire, people had thrown themselves into the arms of General Bonaparte, because they sought force, whatever it might be; and because, from the acts of the young general in Italy, they hoped that this force would be enlisted into the service of sound sense and justice. A single doubt was then felt, and somewhat diminished the eagerness to give themselves up to him. Will he keep his place longer than the governments which preceded him? Will he understand how to govern so well as he did how to fight? Will he put an end to the troubles, the persecutions? Will he be of such or such a party? The eleven or twelve past months had effectually dispelled these doubts. His power was gaining strength from hour to hour; since Marengo, especially, France and Europe bowed under his ascendancy. As for his political talents, there was but one voice on that subject among those who approached him; he was, at least, as great a statesman as he was a commander. As for the tendency of his government, that was as evident as his genius. He was of that moderate party which deprecated persecution of every kind, which, disposed to annul some of the things which the Revolution had done, was not for annulling all, but, on the contrary, was determined to uphold its principal results. These doubts removed, people rallied around him with the eagerness of joy and gratitude.

In all parties there are two sets of persons; the one numerous, and honest, whom a man may bring over to himself by realising the wishes of the country; the other, small in number, stubborn and factious, which, far from contenting, you deeply mortify by realising those wishes, because you deprive it of its grievances. With the exception of this latter class, all the parties were satisfied, and lent freely their support to the First Consul, or resigned themselves, at least, to his government, if their cause was irreconcilable with his, as the royalists, for example. The patriots of '89, and ten years before these comprised nearly all France, the patriots of '89, at first hurried on by enthusiasm

towards the Revolution, soon borne back at the sight of the bloody scaffold, now disposed to think that they had been mistaken on almost everything, conceived that they had at length found, under the consular government, all that was possible to be realised in their wishes. The abolition of the feudal system, civil equality, a certain intervention of the country in its affairs, no great deal of liberty, but much order, the triumphant position of France in Europe—all this, very different, it is true, from what they had at first wished for, but now sufficient in their estimation, all this seemed ensured to them. M. de la Fayette, who, in many respects, resembled those men, excepting that he was less convinced—M. de la Fayette, released from the dungeons of Olmütz, through an act of the First Consul's, proved, by his perfectly disinterested assiduities towards him, the esteem which he felt for his government and the adhesion of those who entertained sentiments like his own. As for the more ardent revolutionists, who, without being attached to the Revolution from participation in its condemnable excesses, adhered to it from conviction and from sentiment—these were pleased with the First Consul for being the reverse of the Bourbons and ensuring their definitive exclusion. The purchasers of national domains, though looking black at times, on account of his indulgence towards the emigrants, had no doubt of his resolution to uphold the inviolability of the new properties, and clung to him as to an invincible sword, that secured them from the only real danger with which they were threatened, the triumph of the Bourbons and the emigrants by means of the arms of Europe.

As for that timid and well-disposed portion of the royalist party, which sought, above all, to be relieved from all further dread of the scaffold, exile, or confiscation, which, for the first time for ten years past, began not to have them before its eyes, it was almost happy, for, with it, to have nothing to fear was almost happiness. All that the First Consul did not yet grant, it finally anticipated from him, if I may so express myself. To see the people in their workshops, the tradesmen at their counters, the nobility in the government, the priests at the altar, the Bourbons in the Tuileries, and General Bonaparte at their side, in the highest station imaginable for a subject, would have been to these royalists perfection. Of these things there were three or four, which already they clearly discerned in the acts and plans of the First Consul. As for the last, that of seeing the Bourbons again in the Tuileries, they were disposed, in their good-natured credulity, to expect it of him, as one of the miracles of his astounding genius; and, if the difficulty of believing that a man would thus give up to others a crown which he held in his hand staggered those possessed of some

perspicacity, their resolution was soon taken. "Let him make himself king," said they, "but let him save us, for monarchy alone can save us!" A great man, in default of a legitimate prince, seemed acceptable to them; but a king they must have at any rate.

Thus, by ensuring to the patriots of '89 civil equality; to the purchasers of the national domains, to the staunchest patriots, the exclusion of the Bourbons; to the moderate royalists personal safety, the re-establishment of religion; to all, order, justice, national greatness, he had won the honest and disinterested mass of all the parties.

There was still, what there always is, the implacable portion of these parties, that which Time never changes but by consigning it to the grave. Those who compose it are, in general, the most conscientious, or the most guilty of men, and these are always last upon the breach.

The men who, in the course of the Revolution, had imbrued their hands in blood, or signalised themselves by excesses which it was impossible to forget; others who, though they had nothing wherewith to reproach themselves, had been hurried into demagogue turbulence by the violence of their character or the turn of their mind; the furious Mountaineers, the few survivors of the famous Commune, the old Jacobins and Cordeliers, were irritated in proportion to the success of the new government. They called the First Consul a tyrant, who meant to effect a complete counter-revolution in France, to abolish liberty, to bring back the emigrants, the priests, and even the Bourbons, to make himself their base servant. Others, less blinded by anger, said that he designed to make himself tyrant for his own aggrandisement, to stifle liberty for his own advantage. He was a Cæsar who ought to fall under the dagger of a Brutus. They talked of daggers, but did nothing but talk of them; for the energy of these men, greatly exhausted by ten years' excesses, began to turn into violence of language. We shall soon see, in fact, that it was not in their ranks that resolute assassins were likely to be found. The police was incessantly at their heels, penetrating into their clandestine meetings, watching them with incessant attention. There were some who wanted nothing but bread; the First Consul, by the advice of Fouché, the minister, cheerfully supplied them with it, or, if they were fit for anything, he did better, he gave them employment. They then became, according to the account of the others, nothing but wretches sold to the tyrant. If even there were any, who, from sheer fatigue, became a little more calm, as was at this time the case with some notorious personages, such as Santerre, and several others, they were immediately branded with the appellation of hirelings. According to

the custom of parties, these incorrigible demagogues sought, among the real or supposed discontented men of the day, the imaginary hero who was to realise their dreams. It is not known from what indications Moreau had appeared to them to be jealous of the First Consul; it was, probably, because he had acquired sufficient glory to be the second personage in the State. They had instantly extolled him to the skies. But Moreau had just arrived in Paris; the First Consul had given him a most flattering reception, made him a present of a pair of pistols, enriched with precious stones, and inscribed with the names of his victories; he was now nothing but a lackey. Brune, the demagogue, at first dear to their hearts, had, by his intelligence, attracted the attention of the First Consul, obtained his confidence, and been appointed to the command of the army of Italy; he, too, was a lackey. Masséna, on the contrary, deprived rather abruptly of the command of that army, was dissatisfied, and could scarcely contain himself; he was immediately declared the future saviour of the Republic, and ought to put himself at the head of the real patriots. Such was the case with Carnot, whom they called a royalist of the 18th of Fructidor, whose proscription they then demanded and obtained, and who, being now deprived of the portfolio of war, again became, in their estimation, a great citizen; such was the case with Lannes, who, it is true, was attached to the First Consul, but was a decided republican, and at times used extremely violent language relative to the return of the priests and of the emigrants; such was the case with M. Sieyès himself—with M. Sieyès, odious at first to the republicans for having been the principal accomplice of the 18th of Brumaire, then the butt of their raillery, on account of the disappointment with which the First Consul had repaid his services, and by this time almost a favourite with them, because, dissatisfied with being a cipher, he showed what he had shown to all the governments—a cold and disapproving mien. Carnot, Lannes, Sieyès, were to join Masséna to set up the Republic again on the first occasion. Lastly, what will strikingly illustrate the silly credulity of the expiring parties, the minister Fouché, one of the two principal advisers of the First Consul, and who had no object to gain—the minister Fouché, because he was well acquainted with these patriots, not afraid of them, and occasionally afforded them relief, knowing that it was rather tongues which needed silencing than hands disarming—the minister Fouché was to join Masséna, Carnot, Lannes, and Sieyès, to overthrow the tyrant, and save the liberties which were menaced.

The royalist faction had, like the revolutionary faction, its implacable sectaries, equally credulous reasoners, but more formidable conspirators. These were the great nobles of Versailles,

who had returned, or were about to return, intriguers charged with the sorry affairs of the Bourbons, going to and fro between France and foreign countries, to frame childish plots, or to earn a little money; lastly, desperadoes, devoted soldiers of Georges, ready for any crimes.

The first, great nobles, accustomed to talk much, attacked by words only the First Consul, his family, and his government. They lived in Paris nearly like foreigners to the country, scarcely deigning to notice what was passing there, sometimes soliciting their erasure from the list of emigrants, or the removal of the sequestration from their unsold property. For this purpose they frequented Madame Bonaparte's, at least such of them as had been acquainted with her when she was the wife of M. de Beauharnais. They went in the morning, never in the evening, were received in the entresol of the Tuileries, which she had fitted up for her private apartments, warm solicitors while there, excusing themselves as soon as they had left for having gone thither, and attributing that step to a strong desire to oblige unfortunate friends. Madame Bonaparte foolishly found pleasure in the society of these equivocal visitors; and her husband, though frequently annoyed by them, nevertheless endured them out of complaisance to his wife, perhaps, too, from a desire to know everything, and to have communications with all parties. There were few of these solicitors who were not under obligations to the government, either on their own account, or on account of relations; but the freedom of their language was not for this reason at all diminished. All that was done for them was, in their estimation, no more than their due: they had been robbed of their possessions, and, if they were restored to them, this was but a duty, an act of repentance, for which they owed no gratitude to any one. They jeered at everything and at everybody, even at the embarrassment of Madame Bonaparte, who, if she was proud to be the wife of the first man of the age, seemed almost ashamed of being the wife of the chief of the government, and who was at once too kind and too weak to crush them with the legitimate pride which she ought to have felt. They jeered, we said, at everybody, excepting, however, the First Consul, whom they thought a great general, but a middling politician, without consistency in his ideas, favouring the Jacobins one day, the royalists the next, having no will but in war, because war was his profession, and there too, inferior to Moreau, in more than one respect. It is true, he had obtained splendid successes; that those gentlemen admitted; thus far everything had prospered with him, but how long would that last? Europe, indeed, was now incapable of resisting him; but, though conqueror abroad, would he overcome all the difficulties with which he was surrounded at home? The finances seemed



to improve, but paper, which had been the ephemeral expedient of all the revolutionary governments, was also the expedient of his. Nothing was to be seen but bills of the receivers-general, notes of the Bank of France, &c. Would not this new paper end as paper had always ended? The government at this time did make some sort of shift, because the armies were maintained by the conquered countries; but at the peace, when they should return to their own territory, how were they to be provided for? Landed property was grievously burdened, and before long those subject to the taxes neither could nor would pay them. People talked, it was true, of the satisfaction of certain classes, of priests and emigrants, who were well treated by the present government; but that government recalled the emigrants without restoring their property to them. They were enemies whom it brought from abroad into the country, and who were in consequence the more dangerous. It recalled the priests, but without giving them back their altars. To concede everything by halves in this way, was to confer an obligation one day on people who would not thank you for it the next. Bonaparte, as these royalists called him, for they never deigned to give him his proper title, Bonaparte knew not how to do anything but in an incomplete manner. He had permitted Sunday to be kept, but he had not dared to abolish the decadi, and France, left to herself, had returned universally to Sunday. This was not the only ancient custom to which she would return, as soon as an example was set or liberty given. Bonaparte, by re-establishing, now this, then that, was himself commencing a counter-revolution, which would soon hurry him further than he meant to go. Since he was about reviving so much of the past, would he go the length of restoring the monarchy, and even of restoring it for himself, by making himself king or emperor?—if so, he would only render the counter-revolution more certain, by undertaking to effect it with his own hands. On this restored throne there would very soon be wanted those princes who alone were worthy to fill it; and, in re-establishing the institution, he would have re-established it for the Bourbons.\*

It frequently happens that hatred guesses right, because it takes delight in imputing faults, than which nothing is more predicable of human conduct. Only, in its restless impatience, it outstrips Time. These shallow tattlers knew not how near they came to the truth; neither did they know that, before

\* This picture of the emigrants of those days is not drawn from imagination. The language which I attribute to them is literally extracted from the voluminous correspondence addressed to Louis XVIII., and brought by that prince to France. Left, during the Hundred Days, at the Tuileries, and subsequently deposited in the archives of the Foreign Office, it furnishes singular evidence of the illusions and of the passions of that time. Some of these letters are very witty, and all very curious.

their predictions were accomplished, it was decreed that the world should be convulsed for fifteen years, it was decreed that the man of whom they thus spoke should have achieved sublime things, committed prodigious faults, and that, ere the catastrophe arrived, they should have time to belie themselves, to abjure their cause, to forsake the only legitimate princes in their estimation, to serve this ephemeral master, to serve and to adore him; they knew not that, if France should one day return to the feet of the Bourbons, she would approach them as if thrown by the tempest to the foot of a time-honoured tree, but thrown thither only for a moment.

In a lower sphere conspired otherwise than by words the intriguers in the service of the Bourbons, and lower still, but more dangerously, the agents of Georges, with their hands full of money supplied by England. Georges, ever since his return from London, was in the Morbihan, concealing himself from observation, acting the part of a man who retires in resignation to some rural retreat, but implacable in reality, having sworn in his heart, having sworn to the Bourbons, to perish or to destroy the First Consul. To attack in open fight the grenadiers of the consular guard would be hopeless; still there were among the Chouans arms quite ready to have recourse to the last expedient of vanquished parties, that is, to assassination. Among them might be found a band ready for anything, for the blackest crimes as well as the rashest attempts. Georges, still undecided as to the moment and the place which ought to be chosen, kept them to their purpose, communicating with them through trusty persons, giving up to them the highroads for their subsistence, or part of the money received in profusion from the British cabinet.

The First Consul, satisfied with the homage of France, with the unanimous adhesion of the sincere and disinterested men of every party, gave himself little concern about the language of the one class, or the plots of the other. Wholly engrossed by business, he thought little of the empty talk of the idle, though he was far from being insensible to it; but, for the time being, he was too much absorbed by his task to pay much attention to such language. He thought very little more of the plots directed against his person; he considered them as one of those dangers which he braved every day on the field of battle with the indifference of fatalism. For the rest, he deceived himself respecting the nature of his danger. Having, on the 18th of Brumaire, wrested the supreme power from the revolutionary party, and having it at the moment for his principal enemy, he threw the blame of all that happened on this party, and seemed to be irritated against it alone. The royalists, at least at that time, were in his eyes but a persecuted party, which it was

right to screen from oppression. He was well aware that there were villains among them; but he had contracted the habit, from living with moderate men, of anticipating violence from the revolutionists alone. One of his advisers, however, strove to correct this error of his judgment: it was M. Fouché, the minister of the police.

In this government, conducted almost by one man, all the ministers had been cast into the shade, with the exception of two, Messrs. Fouché and de Talleyrand. They alone were, at times, faintly discernible through the halo of glory which encircled General Bonaparte, and the dazzling effulgence of which threw all around him into comparative obscurity. General Berthier had just succeeded Carnot in the department of war, because he was more supple, more resigned to the modest part of comprehending and rendering the ideas of his chief, which he did with a clearness and a precision truly admirable. It was no slight merit to be the worthy chief of the staff to the greatest captain of the age, and perhaps of all ages. But Berthier, beside the First Consul, could not have any importance as director of the military operations. The navy, at the moment, attracted very little attention. The finances required only the firm and persevering, but unobtrusive application of certain principles of order, laid down once for all. The police, on the contrary, was of great importance, on account of the vast authority with which the government was armed; and, as well as the police, the foreign affairs, on account of the relations to be re-established with the whole world. As for the police, the First Consul needed a man who was acquainted with the parties and with the individuals of whom the parties were composed: this was the cause of the influence acquired by Fouché, the minister. In regard to the foreign affairs, though no person better qualified than the First Consul could be presented to Europe, there needed every moment an agent more mild, more patient than he; and this was the cause of the influence acquired by M. de Talleyrand. Messrs. Fouché and de Talleyrand shared, therefore, the only portion of political credit which the ministers then enjoyed.

The police was not at that period what fortunately it has since become, a mere surveillance, without power, charged solely with warning and giving information to justice. It was an immense arbitrary authority deposited in the hands of a single man. The minister of the police could exile these as revolutionists, could recall those as emigrants, fix for all the place of their residence, continue or remove the sequestration from the property of returned emigrants, restore or take away his church from a priest, suppress or reprimand a journal which had displeased him; lastly, point out any person to the mistrust or the favour of a government, which then had an extraordinary

number of places to give away, and which soon had the wealth of Europe to distribute among its creatures. The minister of the police, on whom the institutions of the time conferred such attributions, though placed under the supreme and vigilant authority of the First Consul, yet possessed a formidable power over the whole nation.

M. Fouché, charged to exercise this power, formerly an Oratorian and a Conventionalist, was an intelligent and a crafty personage, neither good nor wicked, well acquainted with men, especially the bad, and despising them; employing the funds of the police in supporting the agents of troubles as much as in watching them; always ready to procure bread or a place for every person weary of political agitations; thus making friends for the government, and more especially for himself; creating for himself obliged dependents, far superior to credulous and deceitful spies, who never failed to inform him of everything that it was his interest to know; having persons under obligations to him in all the parties, even among the royalists, whom he knew how to manage, and to repress at the right time; always forewarned, never overrating danger, nor exaggerating it to his master; clearly distinguishing an imprudent man from one really to be feared, knowing when to caution the one, to proceed against the other; in short, managing the police better than it ever was managed, for it consists in disarming animosities as much as in repressing them; a superior minister, if he had had elevated intentions, if his indulgence had sprung from any other principle than an indifference to good and evil, if his activity had proceeded from any other motive than a passion for interfering in everything, which rendered him irksome and suspicious to the First Consul, and frequently gave him the appearance of a vulgar intriguer. For the rest, his intelligent but ignoble countenance was a faithful mirror of the qualities and vices of his soul.

The First Consul, chary of his confidence, never granted it freely, especially to men for whom he had no esteem. He made use of M. Fouché, and at the same time distrusted him. Hence he sometimes sought to dispense with or to control him, by giving money to de Bourrienne, his secretary, to Murat, the commandant of Paris, but especially to Savary, his aide-de-camp, in order to compose in this way several contradictory polices. But M. Fouché always contrived to convict these bastard polices of awkwardness and puerility, proved himself alone to be well informed, and, while frequently crossing the First Consul, nevertheless made his peace with him by that manner of treating men in which was mingled neither love nor hate, but an incessant application to wean them, one by one, from an agitated and factious existence.

M. Fouché, half faithful to the revolutionary party, took pleasure in showing indulgence to his old friends, and dared, in reference to them, to contradict the First Consul. Well knowing their moral situation, appreciating, more especially, the villains of royalism, he was incessantly repeating that the danger, if there were any, was from the royalists much more than from the revolutionists, and that they should soon have occasion to perceive this. He had even the merit, but not for a long time, of insisting that it would be well not to forsake the Revolution and its ideas quite so much. Hearing already the flatterers of the day assert, that it was necessary to proceed more rapidly in reaction, to disregard the prejudices of the Revolution, and to return to something that should resemble monarchy, minus the Bourbons, he dared to censure, if not the aim, at least the imprudence with which certain persons pursued that track. While admitting the justice of his opinions, given with good sense, but without frankness and without dignity, the First Consul was struck, but not pleased, with them. He acknowledged the services of this personage, but had no esteem for him.

M. de Talleyrand performed a totally contrary part; he had neither affection for M. Fouché nor resemblance to him. They had both been formerly priests, the one having belonged to the superior, the other to the inferior clergy, and yet they had nothing in common, but their having both taken advantage of the Revolution to cast aside, the former the prelate's robes, the latter the humble gown of the Oratorian professor. How strange, it must be confessed, and how characteristic of that deeply convulsed society, was the spectacle presented by this government, composed of a soldier and two priests, who had abjured their profession, and, though thus composed, having none the less splendour, grandeur, and influence in the world.

M. de Talleyrand, descended from a family of the noblest lineage, destined by his birth for the army, doomed to the priesthood by an accident, which deprived him of the use of one foot, having no liking for this imposed profession, successively bishop, courtier, revolutionist, and emigrant, then afterwards minister for foreign affairs under the Directory, M. de Talleyrand had retained something of all these different states; there was to be found in him a touch of the bishop, of the man of quality, and of the revolutionist. Having no firmly fixed opinion, but only a natural moderation, which was opposed to every species of exaggeration; capable of entering at once into the feelings of those whom he wished to please, either from liking or from interest: speaking a unique language peculiar to that society which had Voltaire for instructor; full of smart, poignant repartees, which rendered him as formidable as he was attractive; by turns caressing or disdainful, demonstrative

or impenetrable; careless, dignified, lame without loss of gracefulness, in short, one of the most extraordinary personages, and such a one as a revolution alone can produce, he was the most seducing of negotiators, but at the same time incapable of directing, as head, the affairs of a great State; for every leader should possess a resolute will, settled views, and application, and he had none of these. His will was confined to pleasing, his views consisted in the opinions of the moment, his application was next to nothing. In a word, he was an accomplished ambassador, but not a directing minister: be it understood, however, that this expression is to be taken in its most elevated acceptation. For the rest, he held no other post under the consular government. The First Consul, who allowed no person the right to give an opinion on the affairs of war and of diplomacy, merely employed him to negotiate with the foreign ministers, on bases previously prescribed, and this M. de Talleyrand did with an art that will never be surpassed. He possessed, however, a moral merit, that of being fond of peace under a master who was fond of war, and of showing that he was so. Endowed with exquisite taste, uniting with it unerring tact, and even a useful indolence, he was able to render real services, by simply opposing to the First Consul's exuberance of language, pen, and action, his sobriety, his perfect moderation, and his very propensity to do nothing. But he made little impression on that imperious master, from whom he extorted no respect either by genius or by conviction. Thus he had no more empire than M. Fouché, nay, even less, though quite as much employed, and more agreeable.

Then again, M. de Talleyrand said just the contrary to what M. Fouché said. Attached to the ancient *régime*, minus the persons and the ridiculous prejudices of other times, he recommended the re-establishment of the monarchy as soon as possible, or an equivalent for it, by availing of the glory of the First Consul in lieu of blood-royal, adding that, if we wished to have a speedy and a durable peace with Europe, we ought to make haste to resemble other States. And while his colleague, Fouché, in the name of the Revolution, advised that we should not go too fast, M. de Talleyrand, in the name of Europe, advised that we should not go so low.

The First Consul prized the plain good sense of M. Fouché, relished the graces of M. de Talleyrand, but absolutely believed neither the one nor the other on any subject, and, as for his confidence, had given that, given it wholly and entirely, but not to either of those two men—to his colleague Cambacérès. The latter, with an understanding far from brilliant, had extraordinary good sense, and an unbounded attachment to the First Consul. Having trembled for ten years of his life under

proscribers of all sorts, he loved, with a kind of affection, the powerful master, who at length procured him the faculty of breathing at his ease. He loved his power, his genius, his person, from which he had not received, and hoped never to receive, anything but favours. Acquainted with the weaknesses of men, even of the greatest, he counselled the First Consul, as one ought to counsel when one wishes to be attended to, with perfect sincerity, with extreme discretion, never for the purpose of showing off his own wisdom, but always to be serviceable to a government which he loved as dearly as himself, always approving of all its acts in public, whatever they might be, and never disapproving of them but in private, in an absolute *tête-à-tête* with the First Consul; keeping silence when there was no good to be done, and when censure could be but a vain pleasure of finding fault; sure to speak his mind, and with a courage highly meritorious in a man so extremely timid, when he was in time to prevent a blunder, or influence the general conduct of affairs. And, as if a character which is incessantly under self-restraint must needs be betrayed into some weakness, the Consul Cambacérès exhibited a puerile vanity with his inferiors, lived with some subaltern courtiers, who paid him fulsome homage, walked every day in the Palais Royal, in a ridiculously magnificent dress, and sought, in the gratification of a *gourmandise* that has become proverbial, pleasures which were suited to his vulgar but prudent soul. Of what consequence, however, are a few foibles, redeemed by superior reason!

The First Consul cheerfully forgave these foibles in his colleague, and made much of him. He appreciated that superior good sense, which never wished to shine but to be useful, and which threw a tempered and true light upon everything. He appreciated, above all, the sincerity of his attachment, laughed at his weaknesses, but always with delicacy, and paid him the very high compliment of confiding everything to him alone, of never being concerned but about his judgment. Hence, he was susceptible of no influence but his—an influence scarcely suspected, and on that account very great.

The Consul Cambacérès was qualified more especially to temper his vehemence in regard to persons, and his precipitation in regard to things. Amidst this conflict of two opposite tendencies, one urging to a precipitate reaction, the other, on the contrary, combating that reaction, M. Cambacérès, inflexible when the maintenance of order was in question, was, in everything else, always a decided advocate for not going too fast. He did not oppose the end to which things were visibly tending, for he kept incessantly repeating, "Let them in due time decree as much power as they please to the First Consul, well and

good, but not too soon." He wished especially that reality should always be preferred to appearance, real power to that which was but ostentation. A First Consul, possessing the power to do all that he pleased for the welfare of the State, seemed to him far superior to a crowned prince, cramped in his action. To act, and to keep out of sight, above all, never to act too quickly, constituted the whole of his wisdom. This most certainly is not genius, but it is prudence; and, for founding a great State, both are requisite.

M. Cambacérés was useful to the First Consul in another way, besides advising him with superior judgment—that of governing the Senate. That body, as we have said, was of immense importance, owing to the patronage vested in it. In the first moments, it had been relinquished, in some measure, to M. Sieyès as a compensation for the executive power, vested wholly in General Bonaparte. M. Sieyès was at first content to abdicate, but, living on his estate of Crosne, began to feel somewhat vexed at his nullity; for there never was abdication without regret. Had he possessed firmness and consistency, he might have wrested the Senate from the First Consul, who would then have had no resource left but a *coup d'état*. But M. Cambacérés, without noise, without ostentation, insinuating himself by degrees with that body, occupied the ground, which the peevish negligence of M. Sieyès abandoned to him. People knew that it was through him they could come at the First Consul, the source of all favour, and to him they accordingly addressed themselves. Of this he availed himself with infinite and always concealed art, to repress or to regain opponents. But this was done with such discretion, that nobody thought to complain of it. At a time when repose had become true wisdom, when repose was even necessary for reviving one day a taste for liberty, we dare not censure, we dare not give the name of corrupter to the man who, on the one hand, tempered the master imposed by events, and, on the other, checked the imprudences of an opposition without aim, unseasonable, and politically unwise.

As for the Consul Lebrun, General Bonaparte treated him with respect, even with affection, but as a person meddling but little with public affairs, the administration excepted. To him he consigned the superintendence over the details of the finances, and charged him to keep him acquainted with the proceedings and the sentiments of the royalists, by whom this third consul was frequently surrounded. He had thus an ear and an eye among them, but only from the mere interest of curiosity as to what might be hatching in that quarter.

To convey an accurate idea of the circle surrounding the First Consul, we must say a word concerning his family. He



had four brothers, Joseph, Lucien, Louis, and Jérôme. The two latter we shall notice in due time. Joseph and Lucien only were then of any importance. Joseph, the eldest of all, had married the daughter of a wealthy and respectable merchant of Marseilles. He was mild, tolerably acute, agreeable in person, and caused his brother less vexation than any of the others. It was for him that the First Consul reserved the honour of negotiating the peace of the Republic with the States of the Old and the New World. He had charged him to conclude the treaty which had been signed with America, and had just appointed him plenipotentiary to Luneville, thus seeking to assign to him a part which should be popular in France. Lucien, at present minister of the interior, was a clever man, but of an unequal mind, restless, ungovernable, and, though possessing talent, not having sufficient to make amends for what he wanted in point of good sense. Both flattered the propensity of the First Consul to raise himself to the supreme power; and this was but natural. The genius of the First Consul, like his glory, were things personal to himself; one quality only could be transmissible to his family, that was the princely quality, if he should one day assume it, in preference to that of first magistrate of the Republic. His brothers were among those who asserted, with least reserve, that the present form of government was but one of transition, devised to lull revolutionary prejudices; but that he ought to make up his mind, and that, if he wished to found something truly stable, it was indispensably necessary to introduce greater concentration, unity, and durability. The drift of all this was very evident. The First Consul, as every one knows, had no children, which greatly embarrassed those who already dreamt of the transformation of the Republic into a monarchy. It was, in fact, an inconsistency to pretend to be desirous of ensuring the regular and natural transmission of the supreme power in the family of a man who had no heirs. Thus though, hereafter, this default of heirs might be a personal advantage for the brothers of the First Consul, it was now an argument against their projects, and they frequently reproached Madame Bonaparte for a misfortune, of which, they said, she was the cause. Having quarrelled with her, from sheer jealousy of her influence, they had not spared her in conversation with her husband, and persecuted her with their remarks, incessantly and loudly repeating that it was absolutely necessary for the First Consul to have a wife who should bring him children, that this was not a private but a public consideration, and that a resolution on this point was indispensable, in order to ensure the future welfare of France. They caused these cruel sentiments, pregnant with the most sinister consequences for her, to be repeated by all lips. The

wife of the First Consul, apparently so fortunate, was, therefore, at this moment very far from happy.

Joséphine Bonaparte, who had been married first to the Count de Beauharnais, then to the young general who had saved the Convention on the 13th Vendémiaire, and now shared with him a place which began to resemble a throne, was a Creole by birth, and had all the graces, all the defects, usual in women who are so born. Kind-hearted, profuse, and frivolous, not a beauty, but perfectly elegant, and endowed with infinite fascination, she could please much more than women who were superior to her in understanding and personal charms. The levity of her conduct, depicted to her husband in the most unfavourable colours when he returned from Egypt, filled him with anger. He had thoughts of separating himself from a wife whom, right or wrong, he believed to be culpable. She wept a long time at his feet; her two children, Hortense and Eugène Beauharnais, both very dear to General Bonaparte, wept too; he was overcome, and yielded to a conjugal tenderness, which, for many years, was with him paramount to policy. He forgot the real or alleged faults of Joséphine; he loved her still, but not as in the early period of their union. The unbounded extravagance, the vexatious imprudences, in which she daily indulged, frequently excited in her husband gusts of impatience which he could not repress; but he forgave her with the kindness which prosperity inspires, and could not long be angry with a woman, who had shared the first moments of his nascent greatness, and who, from the day of their union, seemed to have brought fortune along with her.

Madame Bonaparte was altogether a woman of the *ancien régime*, devout, superstitious, nay, a royalist, detesting what she called the Jacobins, who hated her in return; seeking only the society of the ancient nobility, who, returning in throngs, as we have said, used to visit her in the morning. They had known her the wife of an honourable man, pretty high in rank and in military standing, the unfortunate Beauharnais, who died on the revolutionary scaffold; they found her the wife of a *parvenu*, but of a *parvenu* more powerful than any prince in Europe; they did not hesitate to go and solicit favours, while affecting to look down upon her. She was eager to make them partakers of her power, and to render them services. She even took pains to excite in them a sort of illusion which they were fond of indulging, that, in reality, General Bonaparte was only waiting for a favourable occasion to recall the Bourbons, and to restore the inheritance which belonged to them. And, singularly enough, this illusion which she delighted to instil into them, she would almost fain have shared herself; for she would rather have seen her husband a subject of the Bourbons, but a subject the

protector of his kings, surrounded by the homage of the ancient French aristocracy, than crowned monarch by the hand of the nation. She was a very faint-hearted woman. Though giddy, she loved that man who covered her with glory, and loved him the more since she was less beloved by him. Not conceiving it possible that he could set his daring foot on the steps of the throne, without falling immediately beneath the dagger of republicans or royalists, she foresaw her children, her husband, and herself overwhelmed in one general ruin. But, supposing that he ascended safe and sound to that usurped throne, another fear harrowed her heart—it would not be her lot to share his elevation. If General Bonaparte should some day be made king or emperor, it would evidently be under the pretext of giving a stable government to France, by rendering it hereditary; and unfortunately her physicians left her no hope of ever having more children. She recollected on this subject the extraordinary prediction of a woman, a sort of Pythoness then in vogue,\* who had told her: “You will occupy the first place in the world, but only for a short time.” She had already heard the brothers of the First Consul pronounce the fatal word, divorce. The victim of grandeur, whom, to judge of her lot from the external splendour by which she was surrounded, the queens of Europe might have envied, was a prey to corroding care. Each advance of fortune added apparently to her happiness, but really augmented her distress; and if she did escape from her keen anxieties, it was by a levity of character which saved her long and intense thought. The attachment of General Bonaparte for her, his gusts of passion, when he gave way to them, repaired the next moment by demonstrations of the greatest kindness, served also to cheer her. Hurried away, moreover, like all the people of that time, by a stupefying whirlwind, she reckoned upon the god of revolutions, upon chance; and, after painful agitations, she returned to the enjoyment of her fortune. She strove, meanwhile, to divert her husband from his ideas of an exaggerated greatness, ventured even to talk to him of the Bourbons, at the risk of raising storms; and, in spite of her partialities, which ought to have led her to prefer M. de Talleyrand to M. Fouché, she had taken a liking to the latter, because, thorough Jacobin as he was, she said, he dared tell the truth to the First Consul: and to tell the truth to the First Consul was, in her estimation, to advise him to uphold the Republic, but to increase at the same time his consular power. Messrs. de Talleyrand and Fouché, thinking

\* Mademoiselle Le Normand, the celebrated fortune-teller, whom some readers may have visited at her residence, No. 5 Rue de Tournon, Paris. She published, in 1820, *Mémoires Historiques et Secrets de l'Impératrice Joséphine*, in two volumes, containing very interesting particulars of her distinguished patroness, and died in 1844.—*Translator.*

to strengthen themselves by penetrating into the family of the First Consul, introduced themselves into it by flattering each as each liked to be flattered. M. de Talleyrand strove to please the brothers, by saying that it was necessary to devise for the First Consul a different position from that which the Constitution conferred on him. M. Fouché endeavoured to please Madame Bonaparte by saying, that to hurry things would be the height of imprudence, and endanger the loss of all. This method of insinuating themselves into his family, and exciting disharmony by their interference, was excessively displeasing to the First Consul. This feeling he often manifested; and when he had any communication to make to his relations, he employed his colleague Cambacérés, who, with his accustomed prudence, listened to everything, but said no more than he was directed to say, and acquitted himself of this kind of commission with equal delicacy and precision.

A very strange circumstance occurred to impart a present and positive feature to all these internal agitations. The prince, who was afterwards Louis XVIII., then an exile, ventured upon a singular and indiscreet step. Many royalists, to account for and excuse their return towards the new government, affected to believe, or really did believe, that General Bonaparte meant to recall the Bourbons. These men, who had not read, or knew not how to read, the history of the English Revolution, and to appreciate the terrible lessons with which it abounds, all at once discovered in it an analogy which flattered their hopes; it was the recall of the Stuarts by General Monck. They said nothing about Cromwell, who, however, acted a part great enough not to be forgotten. The unfounded rumour had at length gained currency, and reached Louis XVIII. This prince, endowed with tact and a good understanding, had committed the blunder of writing to General Bonaparte himself, and had transmitted to him several letters which he thought seasonable, but which were not, and which proved only one thing—the ordinary illusions of the emigrants. The first of the letters was as follows:—

*“February 20, 1800.*

“Men such as you, sir, whatever their apparent conduct may be, never excite uneasiness. You have accepted an eminent post, and I am glad you have done so. You know better than any one else how much strength and power are required to secure the happiness of a great nation. Save France from its own frenzy, and you will have fulfilled the first wish of my heart; restore her king to her, and future generations will bless your memory. Your services will always be found too valuable to the State to admit of my discharging in full, and as I could wish, the debt of my ancestors and my own, by the bestowal of important posts.

LOUIS.”

The First Consul was extremely surprised on receiving this letter, and was for some time undecided whether he ought to reply. It had been transmitted to him by the Consul Lebrun, who had received it himself from the Abbé Montesquiou. The First Consul, engrossed by a multiplicity of business, on entering upon the government, had suffered some time to elapse without answering it. The prince, impatient as an emigrant, wrote a second letter, stamped still more with the credulity of his party, still more derogatory to his dignity. It was in these terms :—

“You must long have been aware, general, of the esteem in which I hold you. If you doubt whether I am susceptible of gratitude, mark your own place; fix that of your friends. As for my principles, they are those of the French character. I am clement by disposition. I shall be so from reason also.

“No, the victor of Lodi, of Castiglione, and of Arcola, the conqueror of Italy and of Egypt, can never prefer a vain celebrity to true glory. You are, nevertheless, losing valuable time: we can ensure the repose of France; I say *we*, because I need Bonaparte for this purpose, and he could not accomplish it without me.

“General, Europe observes you, glory awaits you, and I am impatient to restore peace to my people. Louis.”

This time the First Consul thought that he could not help answering. At bottom he had never had any doubt as to the course which he ought to pursue towards the deposed princes. Ambition apart, he considered the recall of the Bourbons as impracticable and fatal. It was from conviction that he repelled them, earnestly as he might otherwise desire to be master of France. His wife had been made acquainted with the incident, so had his secretary; and, though he did them not the honour to admit them to such deliberations, he gave them his motives. His wife had thrown herself at his feet to implore him to leave at least some hope for the Bourbons; he repulsed her angrily, and addressing his secretary, “You do not know those people,” said he; “if I were to give them back their throne, they would fancy that they had recovered it by the grace of God. They would soon be surrounded and hurried away by the emigrants; they would overturn, in pretending to remodel, everything, even what cannot be remodelled. What would become of the numerous interests created since '89? What would become of the purchasers of national domains and of the leaders of the army, and of all those who have embarked their lives and fortunes in the Revolution? After men, what would become of things? What would become of the principles for which we have fought so hard? All this would perish, but not perish without a struggle; the conflict would be tremendous: thousands of men would perish. No,

never will I take so fatal a resolution." He was right. Setting aside all personal interest, he acted judiciously. His dictatorship, which retarded the establishment of public liberty in France, a liberty, however, extremely difficult to establish at that time, his dictatorship completed the triumph of the French Revolution, which Waterloo itself, after a lapse of fifteen years, could no longer destroy.

As might be expected, his answer was in unison with his sentiments, and did not hold out more hopes than he meant to give. It is only from the very words of the letter that one can judge of the grandeur of expression with which he replied to the imprudent overture of the exiled prince:—

“PARIS, *the 20th Fructidor, year VIII. (Sept. 7, 1800).*

“I have received your letter, sir, and thank you for the obliging expressions which it contains regarding myself.

“You should renounce all hope of returning to France, you could not do so but over the corpses of half a million Frenchmen.

“Sacrifice your individual interest to the repose and happiness of France; history will give you credit for it.

“I am not insensible to the misfortunes of your family; I will contribute with pleasure to the ease and the tranquillity of your retirement.  
BONAPARTE.”

Some portion of this got abroad, and the personal designs of the First Consul became, in consequence, the more evident.

It is full often the attempts of parties to stifle an infant power that accelerate its growth, and encourage it to dare all that it meditates. An attempt more ridiculous than criminal of the republicans against the First Consul hastened a demonstration quite as ridiculous on the part of the men who purposed to hurry forward his elevation: both came to nothing.

The patriot declaimers, more noisy and far less formidable than the agents of the Bourbons, met frequently at the house of a man formerly employed by the Committee of Public Welfare, now out of office. His name was Demerville; he talked a great deal, hawked about the pamphlets against the government, and was scarcely capable of doing more. His house was the resort of Aróna, the Corsican, one of the members of the Five Hundred, who had escaped by a window on the 18th Brumaire; of Topino Lebrun, a painter of some talent, pupil of David, participating in the revolutionary extravagance of the artists of that time; and of many Italian refugees, who were exasperated against General Bonaparte, because he protected the Pope and did not re-establish the Roman Republic. The principal and the most violent of these latter was a sculptor named Ceracchi. These hot-brained men used to meet at Demerville's, and made use of language the most absurd. It was

requisite, they said, to put a finishing hand to the business; they had plenty of people on their side; Masséna, Carnot, Lannes, Sieyès, nay, Fouché himself. There was nothing to do but to strike the tyrant, and all the genuine republicans would speak out; all would unite to raise up the expiring Republic again. But it was necessary to find a Brutus to strike the new Cæsar. Nobody came forward. A soldier out of employ, named Harrel, leading a life of idleness and penury with these declaimers, indigent and discontented like them, appeared to them the man of action whom they needed. They made proposals to him which alarmed him exceedingly. In his agitation, he communicated the matter to a commissary of war, with whom he was somewhat intimate, and who advised him to report all he knew to the government. This Harrel went to M. de Bourrienne, secretary to the First Consul, and General Lannes, commandant of the consular guard. The First Consul, apprised by them, directed the police to give Harrel money and orders to consent to all that his accomplices should propose to him. These miserable conspirators conceived that they had found in him the very man for executing their purpose; but they thought that one was not sufficient. Harrel offered to bring some others. They agreed to it, and Harrel brought to them some spies of M. Fouché's. After they had fallen into this snare, they thought of procuring daggers to arm Harrel and his companions. This task they took upon themselves, and brought daggers purchased by Topino Lebrun. At length, they chose the place for despatching the First Consul, and this was the Opera, then called the Theatre of the Arts. They fixed the moment, and that was the 10th of October (18th Vendémiaire, year IX.), on which day the First Consul was to attend the first representation of a new opera. The police, being forewarned, had taken its precautions. The First Consul went to the Opera House followed by Lannes, who, watching over him with the most anxious attention, had doubled the guard, and placed the bravest of his grenadiers around his box. The would-be assassins actually came at the time agreed upon, but not all, and not armed. Topino Lebrun was not there, neither was Demerville: Aréna and Ceracchi alone appeared. Ceracchi approached nearer to the First Consul's box than the others, but he had no dagger. The only bold fellows on the spot, and armed, were the conspirators sent by the police to the theatre of crime. Ceracchi and Aréna were apprehended, as were successively all the others, but most of them either at home or in the houses where they had sought refuge.

This affair produced a great sensation; it was not deserving of it. Assuredly the police, which ignorant men, not conversant with such matters, in general charge with fabricating itself

such plots as it discovers, the police had not invented this, but it must be admitted, that it had taken too great a part in it. The conspirators wished, without the least doubt, the death of the First Consul, but they were incapable of striking him with their own hands; and, by furnishing them with what was most difficult to be found, pretended perpetrators, they had been led further into the crime than they would have ventured had they been left to themselves. If all this were to have terminated in a severe but only temporary punishment, such as ought to be inflicted on madmen, well and good! but to put them to death on such grounds is more than it is right to do, even when the object is to protect a precious life. But at that time of day people were not so nice; proceedings were immediately instituted, and these were destined to lead the unhappy wretches to the scaffold.

This attempt excited a general alarm. Hitherto there had been seen during the Revolution only what were then called *journées*, or attacks by armed bands; but people now felt secured from such assaults by the military power of the government. They had not yet thought of assassination, or of the possibility of the First Consul being struck unawares, in spite of the guard of grenadiers which surrounded him. The attempt of Ceracchi, the ridiculous part of which was not known, was a kind of forewarning which terrified all classes. A dread of finding themselves plunged back into chaos seized everybody, and generated a sort of enthusiasm in favour of the First Consul. The populace crowded round the Tuileries. The Tribunate, the only one of the assemblies of the State assembled at that moment, since it met every fortnight in the interval between the sessions, repaired thither in a body. All the public authorities followed this example. Great numbers of addresses were sent to the First Consul. They may all be summed up in these words of the municipal body of Paris:—

“General,” it said, “we beg in the name of our fellow-citizens to express the deep indignation which they have felt at the news of the attempt meditated against your person. So many interests are involved with your existence, that the plots which have threatened it must necessarily be a subject of public grief, as the vigilance which has preserved it will be a subject of national gratitude and joy.

“That Providence, which in the year VIII. brought you back from Egypt, which at Marengo seemed to protect you from all dangers, which, lastly, on the 18th Vendémiaire, year IX., has just saved you from the fury of assassins, is, permit us to say so, the Providence of France much more than yours. It has not willed that a year so brilliant, so full of glorious events, destined to occupy so large a space in the recollection of men,



should terminate all at once in a detestable crime. May the enemies of France cease to seek your destruction and ours! May they submit to that destiny, which, more mighty than all plots, will ensure your preservation and that of the Republic! . . . We say nothing to you about the guilty; justice lays claim to them."

These addresses, all cast in the same mould, repeated to the First Consul that he had no right to exercise clemency, that his life belonged to the Republic, and ought to be defended like the public welfare, of which it was the pledge. It must be added that these manifestations were sincere. Every one thought himself in danger along with the First Consul. Every one but the factious wished for his preservation. The royalists believed that, if he were to die, they should be sent back to the scaffold or into exile; the revolutionists imagined that they beheld counter-revolution triumphant through the arms of foreigners.

The First Consul took particular and remarkable pains to diminish the estimate that was formed of the danger to which he had been exposed. He would not have it believed that his life depended on the first comer; and he conceived this to be equally necessary for his safety and for his dignity. In conversing with the authorities deputed to congratulate him, he told them all that the danger, about which they were so much alarmed, had not been serious: he explained to them how, surrounded by the officers of the consular guard and a picket of his grenadiers, he was completely secure against the seven or eight wretches who purposed to attack him. He was convinced much more than his words could lead people to suppose of the danger with which his life was threatened; but he thought it useful to exhibit himself to all imaginations surrounded by the grenadiers of Marengo, and inaccessible amidst them to the weapons of assassins.

More serious plots than this, about which so much fuss was made, and framed by other hands, were preparing in the dark. Under the influence of a vague presentiment, people said to one another that these attempts would be repeated. Hence the partisans of the First Consul took occasion to insist that something more stable was requisite than an ephemeral power resting on the head of a single man, to which the stab of an assassin's dagger might at any time put an end. The brothers of the First Consul, Messrs. Roderer, Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely, de Talleyrand, de Fontanes, and many others, held these ideas, some from conviction, others to please the master, all, as it is usually the case, from a mixture of sincere and interested motives. This led to the appearance of a very singular, and very remarkable, anonymous pamphlet, said to have been written by Lucien Bonaparte, but which, from the extraordinary ele-

gance of the language, from the classic knowledge of history, ought to have been attributed to its real author, who was M. de Fontanes. This pamphlet excited so strong a sensation as to deserve mention here. It marks one of the steps taken by General Bonaparte in the career of supreme power. Its title was, "*Parallèle entre César, Cromwell, Monck et Bonaparte.*" The author first compared General Bonaparte with Cromwell, and found in him no resemblance to that leading personage of the English Revolution. Cromwell, as he said, was a fanatic, a sanguinary leader of a faction, the murderer of his king, victor only in the Civil War, conqueror of a few cities or counties of England, in short, a barbarian who had ravaged the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, a clever villain, but no hero. The counterpart to Cromwell in the French Revolution would be Robespierre, if Robespierre had possessed courage, and if France, having nothing to subdue but La Vendée, he had been the conqueror of it. General Bonaparte, on the contrary, having no hand in the evils of the Revolution, had compensated by immense glory for crimes which were not his. He had abolished the barbarous festival instituted in honour of regicide; he was putting an end to the horrors of the revolutionary fanaticism; he honoured the arts and sciences, established schools, opened the temple of the arts. He had not carried on civil war: he had conquered not cities, but kingdoms. As for Monck, what had that unsteady mind, that deserter from all parties, who did not know whither he was steering, who wrecked the vessel of the Revolution upon monarchy, as he might have wrecked it on the Republic, what had this sorry personage in common with General Bonaparte, who possessed a mind so firm, and knew so clearly what he purposed! The title of Duke of Albemarle might be enough to satisfy the vulgar vanity of General Monck, "but is it to be supposed that the truncheon of marshal or the sword of constable would suffice for the man *before whom the universe stands aghast?* . . . Does not every one know that there are certain destinies which call to the loftiest station? . . . And besides, were Bonaparte ever to imitate Monck, is it not evident that France would be again plunged into the horrors of a new revolution? The tempests, instead of being allayed, would spring up again on all sides."

After rejecting these comparisons, the author found in the whole range of history no counterpart to General Bonaparte but Cæsar. He discovers in him the same military greatness, the same political greatness, but he discovers also one point of dissimilarity. Cæsar, at the head of the Roman demagogues, had oppressed the party of the honest citizens and destroyed the Republic; General Bonaparte, on the contrary, had raised in

France the party of the honest citizens and put down that of the wicked.

All this was true; the task undertaken thus far by General Bonaparte was much more moral than that of Cæsar.

After all these comparisons, it was necessary to draw a conclusion. Happy the Republic, exclaimed the author, if *Bonaparte were immortal!* "But where," he added, "where are his heirs? where are the institutions capable of upholding his benefits and perpetuating his genius? The destiny of 30,000,000 of human beings hangs on the life of a single man! Fellow-countrymen, what would become of you, if at this moment a funeral wail were to announce that this man had ceased to live?"

The author next examined the different chances that might turn up at the death of General Bonaparte. Would the nation return under the yoke of an assembly? but the remembrance of the Convention was there to exclude such a supposition from every mind. Would it throw itself into the arms of a military government? but where was the equal of General Bonaparte? The Republic, no doubt, possessed great generals, but which of them so far eclipsed all the rest as to extinguish all rivalry, and to prevent the armies from slaughtering one another, in behalf of their particular chief? . . . In default of the government of assemblies, in default of the government of Prætorians, would the country have recourse to the *legitimate* dynasty, which was on the frontiers, stretching out its arms to France? . . . But this would be counter-revolution; and the return of Charles II. and James II. to England, and the blood which flowed at their appearance, were examples sufficient to enlighten nations; and, were more recent examples needed, the late return of the Queen of Naples and her imbecile husband to their unfortunate kingdom was a lesson written in characters of blood. *Frenchmen, you are sleeping on the brink of an abyss!* Such were the concluding words of this singular composition.

All that it contained, excepting the flatteries of language, was true; but those truths were very premature, to judge from the impression which they produced. Lucien, minister of the interior, employed the means at his disposal for circulating this pamphlet over all France. He filled Paris and the provinces with it, taking care to conceal its origin. The publication produced a great effect. In reality it said only what everybody thought, but it required of France an avowal which a very legitimate pride did not yet permit her to make. Eight years before, the French had abolished a royalty of fourteen centuries, and were they to come so soon and confess, at the feet of a general of thirty, that they were wrong, and beseech him to revive that royalty in his person? They were willing enough to invest him with a power equal to that of kings, but it was necessary at least to save

appearances, were it merely for the sake of the national dignity. True, this young warrior had already gained admirable victories, and already restored, to some extent, security throughout the country, but he had scarcely commenced the reconciliation of parties, the reorganisation of France, the compilation of its laws, and above all he had not yet given peace to the world. There were then many titles yet left for him to acquire, but which he was sure of soon concentrating on his glorious head.

The impression was general and painful. The prefects reported from all quarters that the pamphlet produced a mischievous effect; that it supplied the demagogue faction with some justification; that Cæsars called forth Brutuses; that the publication was imprudent and to be regretted. In Paris the impression was the same. In the Council of State the disapprobation was not concealed. The First Consul, whether he had been concerned in the pamphlet, or whether he had been compromised without his knowledge by impatient and unskilful friends, deemed it incumbent on him to disavow it, especially in the eyes of the revolutionary party. He sent for M. Fouché, and asked him publicly how he could suffer such publications to be circulated. "I know the author," replied the minister. "If you know him, you ought to have sent him to Vincennes." "I could not send him to Vincennes," rejoined M. Fouché, "for it is your own brother." At these words General Bonaparte complained bitterly of that brother, who had already compromised him oftener than once. A feeling of displeasure with Lucien Bonaparte was the consequence. One day, the latter not being punctual at the council of the ministers, which was frequently the case, and many complaints being preferred against his administration, the First Consul expressed strong dissatisfaction, and seemed disposed to dismiss him immediately. But Cambacérès advised him not to proceed so harshly, and not to take the portfolio of the interior from Lucien, without giving him a suitable compensation. The First Consul complied. M. Cambacérès contrived the embassy to Spain, and was directed to offer it to Lucien. He had no difficulty in persuading him to accept it. Lucien set off, and before long the imprudent pamphlet ceased to be thought of.

Thus a first attempt at assassination against the First Consul had provoked in his favour a first attempt at elevation; but the one was as mad as the other was awkward. It was requisite that General Bonaparte should purchase by fresh services an augmentation of authority, which nobody yet defined with precision, but which all foresaw confusedly in the future, and to which he or his friends already aspired in an open manner. At all events his fortune was soon to furnish him, in services rendered, in dangers encountered, with immense claims, which France would no longer resist.

## BOOK VII.

### HOHENLINDEN.

JOSEPH BONAPARTE had just signed at Morfontaine, with Messrs. Ellsworth, Davie, and Van-Murray, the treaty which re-established peace between France and the United States. It was the first treaty concluded by the consular government. It was natural that the reconciliation of France with the different powers of the globe should begin with that Republic, to which she had, in a measure, given birth. The First Consul had allowed the difficulties relative to the treaty of alliance of the 6th of February 1778 to be adjourned; but, on the other hand, he had required the adjournment of the claims of the Americans relative to captured vessels. He judged, and very justly, that, at the moment, he ought to be satisfied with the acknowledgment of the rights of neutrals. This was giving to France one ally more, and to England one enemy more upon the seas; it was a new leaven added to the maritime quarrel, which was arising in the North, and which became from day to day more serious. In consequence, the principal articles of the law of neutrals, such, at least, as they are laid down by France and all the maritime states, were inserted integrally in the new treaty.

These articles were the same to which we have already adverted.

1. *The flag covers the merchandise*—consequently, the neutral can carry the goods of any enemy without being searched.

2. There is no exception from this rule, unless for contraband of war, and that contraband does not extend to alimentary substances, or to naval stores, timber, pitch, hemp, but solely to manufactured arms and munitions of war, such as “powder, saltpetre, petards, matches, balls, bullets, bombs, grenades, carcasses, pikes, halberts, swords, sword-belts, or accoutrements, pistols, scabbards, cavalry-saddles, harness, cannon, mortars with their carriages, and generally all arms, munitions of war, and implements for the use of troops.”

3. Neutral bottoms can sail from any port to any port: there is no exception to their freedom of navigating, unless in regard to ports *bonâ fide* blockaded; and only those ports are *bonâ fide*

blockaded which are guarded by such a force that there is serious danger in attempting to break the blockade.

4. The neutral is bound to submit to search, for the purpose of ascertaining her real character; but the visiting vessel must keep at the distance of cannon-shot, and send only a boat and three men to board her; and, if the neutral is convoyed by a vessel of war, no search can take place, the presence of the admiralty flag being a sufficient guarantee against every species of fraud.

The treaty contained other stipulations of detail, but these four principal clauses, which truly constitute the law of neutrals, were an important victory; for the Americans, in adopting them, were obliged to insist on the application of them to their vessels on the part of the English, or forced to go to war with them.

The signature of this treaty was celebrated with *éclat* at Morfontaine, a beautiful seat, which Joseph, who was richer than his brothers, in consequence of his marriage, had some time before purchased. The First Consul went thither, accompanied by a numerous and brilliant party. Elegant decorations, set up in the mansion and the gardens, everywhere exhibited France and America united. Toasts suited to the occasion were drunk. The First Consul proposed the following: "To the manes of the French and the Americans who died on the field of battle for the independence of the New World." Lebrun proposed, "The union of America with the Northern powers, to enforce respect for the liberty of the seas." Cambacérès gave for the third, "The successor of Washington."

The French government waited with impatience for the arrival of M. de Cobentzel at Luneville, to learn whether his court was disposed to conclude peace. The First Consul, if he was not satisfied with the progress of the negotiations, was determined to renew hostilities, let the season be ever so far advanced. Since he had crossed the St. Bernard, he reckoned obstacles as nothing, and thought that men could fight just as well in snow or on ice, as on ground covered with verdure or with crops. Austria, on the contrary, wished to gain time, because she was pledged to England not to make any separate peace before the month of February ensuing, that is, February 1801 (Pluviôse, year IX.). Extremely apprehensive of the renewal of hostilities, she had just applied for a third prolongation of the armistice. The First Consul had peremptorily refused it, on the ground that M. de Cobentzel had not yet arrived at Luneville. He was resolved not to concede this point till the Austrian plenipotentiary should be on the very spot fixed for the negotiation. At length, on the 24th of October 1800, M. de Cobentzel arrived at Luneville. He was received on the frontiers and along the whole route with salutes of cannon, and with

extraordinary demonstrations of respect. General Clarke had been appointed governor of Luneville, to do the honours of the place to the members of the Congress; and, that he might be able to discharge that duty in a suitable manner, a sum of money and some crack regiments had been placed at his disposal. Joseph, on his part, had repaired thither, accompanied by M. de Laforêt, for secretary. No sooner had M. de Cobenzel arrived, than the First Consul, anxious to learn himself the dispositions of the Austrian negotiator, sent him an invitation to come and pass a few days in Paris.\* M. de Cobenzel durst not refuse, and proceeded to Paris with great deference. He reached it on the 29th of October. A new prolongation of the armistice for twenty days was at once granted him. The First Consul then conversed with him on the peace, and the conditions upon which it might be concluded. M. de Cobenzel's replies were not very satisfactory on the question of a separate negotiation, and as to the conditions, he put forward pretensions that were totally out of place. Austria had views in regard to Italy which it was impossible to satisfy, and she expected, if the indemnities promised in Italy by the treaty of Campo Formio were granted to her in Germany only, she expected that exorbitant concessions of territory should be made to her either in Bavaria, or in the Palatinate, or in Swabia. The First Consul gave way to some sallies of passion. This he had done before in the negotiations of Campo Formio with this same M. de Cobenzel: but, with increasing age and power, he controlled himself even less than he had formerly done. M. de Cobenzel complained bitterly, saying that he had never been treated in that manner, either by Catherine, or by Frederick, or by the Emperor Paul himself. In consequence, he desired to return to Luneville, and the First Consul suffered him to depart, imagining that it would be better to negotiate foot by foot with him, through the medium of Joseph. The latter, mild, calm, and tolerably intelligent, was fitter than his brother for this operation of patience.

M. de Cobenzel and Joseph Bonaparte having met at Luneville, exchanged their full powers on the 9th of November (18th Brumaire). Joseph had orders to put to him the three following questions:—1. Had he authority to treat? 2. Was he authorised to treat separately from England? 3. Was he to treat for the Emperor, in the name of the house of Austria alone, or in the name of the whole Germanic Empire?

The powers being exchanged, and found to be valid, for which purpose they were most minutely scrutinised, on account of the misadventure of M. de St. Julien, they entered into explanations

\* Napoleon said at St. Helena that M. de Cobenzel was desirous to come to Paris in order to gain time. His memory deceived him. The diplomatic correspondence proves what I advance.

concerning the extent of those powers. M. de Cobentzel declared, without hesitation, that he could not treat without the presence of an English plenipotentiary at the congress. As to the question whether he was to treat for the house of Austria alone or for the whole empire, he said that he must refer to Vienna for fresh instructions.

These answers were transmitted to Paris. The First Consul immediately directed M. de Cobentzel to be informed that hostilities should be renewed at the expiration of the armistice, that is to say, in the last days of November; that, nevertheless, the congress need not break up; that while the hostilities continued they might negotiate; but that the French armies would not stop in their march till the Austrian plenipotentiary had consented to treat without England.

During these transactions the First Consul had taken a precaution, which had become indispensable, in regard to Tuscany. The Austrian general, Sommariva, had remained there with a few hundred men, agreeably to the convention of Alexandria, but he continued to raise levies *en masse* with English money. At the same moment intelligence was received of a landing at Leghorn of those same English troops which had so long been on their way from Mahon to Ferrol, from Ferrol to Cadiz. The Neapolitans, on their part, were advancing towards Rome, and the Austrians, spreading themselves in the Legations beyond the limits marked out by the armistice, were thus endeavouring to extend a hand to the Tuscan insurrection. The First Consul, seeing that, while the Austrians were seeking to gain time, they were preparing to place the French army between two fires, directed General Dupont to march upon Tuscany, and Murat, commanding the camp at Amiens, to proceed immediately to Italy. He had several times warned the Austrians what he meant to do, unless they suspended the movements of troops begun in Tuscany; and perceiving that they paid no attention to these intimations, he had actually given orders accordingly. General Dupont, with Pino's, Malher's, and Carra St. Cyr's brigades, rapidly crossed the Apennines, and occupied Florence; while General Clement marched from Lucca to Leghorn. No resistance was anywhere experienced. Meanwhile, the insurgents assembled in the town of Arezzo, which had already distinguished itself against the French at the time of Macdonald's retreat in 1799. They were obliged to take it by assault and to punish it. This was done less severely, perhaps, than it had deserved for its conduct towards our soldiers. All Tuscany was thenceforward submissive. The Neapolitans were stopped in their march, and the English driven from the soil of Italy at the very moment when they were about to enter Leghorn. Two days afterwards they landed 12,000 men.



The armies were in motion on all sides, from the banks of the Mayn to the coast of the Adriatic, from Frankfort to Bologna. Notice of hostilities had, moreover, been given. Austria, in alarm, made a last attempt, through the medium of M. de Cobentzel—an attempt which proved her desire to bring matters to a conclusion, but also the embarrassment resulting from her unfortunate engagements with England. M. de Cobentzel, therefore, addressed himself to Joseph Bonaparte, and assuming a tone of confidence, asked him several times if the discretion of the French government might be depended upon. Made easy on this point by Joseph, he showed him a letter, in which the Emperor, expressing the same fears that he himself had just expressed relative to the danger of an indiscretion, but relying upon his knowledge of men and things, authorised him to make the following overture. Austria consented, at length, to detach herself from England, and to treat separately, on two conditions, on which she must insist in the most absolute manner: firstly, inviolable secrecy till the 1st of February 1801, the period at which her engagements with England terminated, with a formal promise, if the negotiation should miscarry, to give up all the papers written on both sides; secondly, the admission of an English plenipotentiary to Luneville, to mask the real negotiation by his presence. On these two conditions, Austria consented to treat immediately, and desired a fresh prolongation of the armistice.

The proximity of Paris admitted of an immediate answer. The First Consul would not, at any rate, admit an English negotiator to Luneville. He consented, however, to suspend hostilities again, on condition of a peace signed secretly, if that suited Austria, but signed within forty-eight hours. The conditions of this peace were already settled, in a great measure, by the discussion on the preliminaries. They were the following:—The Rhine as boundary of the French Republic in Germany; the Mincio for the boundary of Austria in Italy, instead of the Adige, which she had in 1797, but with the cession of Mantua to the Cisalpine; the Milanese, the Valteline, Parma, and Modena to the Cisalpine; Tuscany to the Duke of Parma; the Legations to the Duke of Tuscany; lastly, as general conditions, the independence of Piedmont, Switzerland, and Genoa. These were the groundwork of the St. Julien preliminaries, with a single difference, the relinquishment of Mantua to the Cisalpine, to punish Austria for the refusal of her ratification. But the First Consul required that the treaty should be signed in forty-eight hours, otherwise he threatened immediate war, and with redoubled vigour. In case of acceptance, he bound himself to absolute secrecy till the 1st of February, and to a new suspension of hostilities.

Austria was not disposed either to proceed so expeditiously or to assent to such sacrifices in Italy. Deceiving herself respecting the conditions which she was able to obtain, she rejected the French proposal. Hostilities were, therefore, renewed immediately. M. de Cobentzel and Joseph remained at Luneville, waiting, before they made new communications to one another, for the events that were about to take place at once on the Danube, on the Inn, on the High Alps, and on the Adige.

The renewal of hostilities had been announced for the 28th of November (7th Frimaire, year IX.). Everything was ready for this winter campaign, one of the most celebrated, and one of the most decisive in our annals.

The First Consul had disposed five armies on the vast theatre of this war. His intention was to direct them from Paris, without putting himself personally at their head. Still he had not renounced the idea of going to Germany or Italy, and assuming the direct command of one of them, if an unforeseen reverse, or any other cause, should render his presence necessary. His equipages were at Dijon, quite ready to start for the point to which he might be obliged to repair.

These five armies were those of Augereau on the Mayn, of Moreau on the Inn, of Macdonald in the Grisons, of Brune on the Mincio, and of Murat on march for Italy, with the grenadiers of Amiens. Augereau had under his command 8000 Dutch, 12,000 French, in all 20,000 men; Moreau 130,000, of whom 110,000 belonged to the active army. The army of this latter had been raised to this considerable force by recruiting, by the return of sick and wounded, and by the junction of St. Suzanne's corps. The delivery of Philipsburg, Ulm, and Ingolstadt had, moreover, permitted Moreau to concentrate all his troops between the Isar and the Inn. Macdonald had at his disposal 15,000 men in the Grisons. Brune in Italy was at the head of 125,000 soldiers, 80,000 of whom were on the Mincio, 12,000 in Lombardy, Piedmont, and Liguria; 8000 in Tuscany; and 25,000 in the hospitals. Murat's corps formed a force of 10,000 grenadiers. This constituted a total of 300,000 combatants. If we add to this number 40,000 men in Egypt and in the colonies, 60,000 in the interior and on the coasts, we shall find that, since the administration of the First Consul, the Republic numbered nearly 400,000 soldiers under arms. The 300,000 posted on the theatre of war, 250,000 of whom were effective, and capable of acting immediately, were provided with everything, thanks to the united resources of the Treasury and the contributions levied in the countries occupied. The cavalry was well mounted, especially that in Germany. The parks of artillery were large and in admirable condition. Moreau

possessed 200 pieces of cannon, Brune 180. We were, therefore, much better prepared than in spring, and our armies had unbounded confidence in themselves.

Enlightened but rigid judges have asked why the First Consul, instead of dividing the whole of his active forces into five corps, had not, according to his own principle, formed two great masses, one of 170,000 men under Moreau, marching for Vienna through Bavaria; the other of 130,000 under Brune, crossing the Mincio, the Adige, and the Alps, and threatening Vienna by the Friule? This was, indeed, the plan which he adopted in 1805, but the exposition of facts will enable the reader to comprehend his motives, and prove with what a profound knowledge of men and things he understood how to vary the application of the great principles of war according to circumstances.

Our two principal armies, that of Moreau and that of Brune, were posted on the two sides of the Alps, nearly on the same meridian, the first along the Inn, the second along the Mincio. Moreau was to force the line of the Inn, Brune that of the Mincio. These two armies were at least equal in numerical force, immensely superior in moral force, to those which were opposed to them. Between the two lay the chain of the Alps, forming in this part what is called the Tyrol. The Austrians had the corps of General Iller in German Tyrol, and that of General Davidovich in Italian Tyrol. General Macdonald, with the 15,000 men placed under his command, and designated the second army of reserve, was to occupy those two corps, and to attract all their attention, by leaving them uncertain respecting the point of attack which he should choose; for, placed in the Grisons, he had the option of throwing himself directly into German Tyrol, or by the Splügen into Italian Tyrol. The title borne by his army, and the doubts circulated respecting its force, could not but excite apprehensions of some other extraordinary stroke, and it was there to profit by the dread which the passage of the St. Bernard had produced. People had not given sufficient credit to the first army of reserve; they were ready to give too much to the second. Moreau and Brune, thenceforth relieved from all uneasiness about the side next to the Alps, could, without being alarmed for their flanks, push forward with the whole of their forces.

Augereau's little army was destined to watch the levies *en masse* of Franconia and Swabia, supported by the Austrian corps of Simbschen. It covered, therefore, the left and the rear of Moreau. Lastly, Murat, with 10,000 grenadiers and a powerful artillery, was to perform precisely the same part in regard to Brune as Augereau was about to perform in regard to Moreau. He was to cover the right and the rear of Brune

against the insurgents of Central Italy, the Neapolitans, and the English, &c.

These prudential precautions are such as it is right to take when you are confined within the conditions of ordinary warfare. Now, the First Consul was necessarily confined within them when he had for executors of his plans two such generals as Brune and Moreau. Moreau, the best of the two, and one of the best in Europe, was, nevertheless, not the man to do what the First Consul, after he became emperor, himself did in 1805, when, collecting a considerable force on the Danube, and leaving a smaller force in Italy, he swept onwards like a torrent upon Vienna, regardless either about his flanks or his rear, and placing his safety in the overwhelming vigour of the strokes which he dealt to the principal enemy. But Moreau, but Brune, were not men to act thus. It was therefore necessary that, in directing them, he should keep within the conditions of methodical warfare; it was necessary to guard their flanks and their rear, to secure them against whatever might happen around them; for neither was capable of controlling accidents by the grandeur and vigour of his resolutions. For this reason it was that Macdonald was placed in the Tyrol, Augereau in Franconia, Murat in Central Italy.

These dispositions did not admit of improvement, unless the state of affairs at home had allowed the First Consul to assume in person the command of one of the armies; but everybody agreed that at this moment he ought not to leave the centre of the government. His absence during the short campaign of Marengo had been attended with inconveniences serious enough to prevent him from incurring them again without absolute necessity.

The dispositions of the Austrians were, in all respects, inferior to ours. Their armies, nearly equal in number to the French forces, were not a match for them in any other respect. They had not yet recovered from their recent defeats. The Archduke John commanded in Germany, Marshal Bellegarde in Italy. Simbschen's corps, destined to form the nucleus of the levies in Swabia and Franconia, appuyed itself on General Klenau. The latter commanded an intermediate corps, placed *à cheval* on the Danube, connecting itself, on the right, with Simbschen's corps, on the left with the principal army of the Archduke. Generals Simbschen and Klenau had, between them, 24,000 men, exclusively of the partisan troops raised in Germany. General Klenau was destined to follow the movements of General St. Suzanne, to approach the Archduke if St. Suzanne approached Moreau, to join Simbschen's corps if St. Suzanne should join the little army of Augereau.

The Archduke John had with him 80,000 men, of whom

60,000 were Austrians, in advance of the Inn, and 20,000 Wurtembergers or Bavarians behind the entrenchments of that river. General Iller commanded 20,000 men in the Tyrol, besides 10,000 Tyrolese. Marshal Bellegarde, in Italy, was at the head of 80,000 soldiers, well established behind the Mincio. Lastly, 10,000 Austrians, detached towards Ancona and La Romagna, were to second the Neapolitans and the English in case these latter should make an attempt upon Central or Southern Italy. They formed, therefore, a principal force of 224,000 men, which, with the Mayencers, the Tyrolese, the Neapolitans, the Tuscans, and the English, might amount to about 300,000. The First Consul, in causing the Tuscans to be disarmed, in closing Leghorn against the English, in repressing the Neapolitans, had taken very useful and proper precautions for preventing the augmentation of the hostile forces.

By a sort of mutual resolution, both the belligerent parties prepared to settle the quarrel in Germany between the Isar and the Inn. The operations commenced on the 28th of November (7th Frimaire), in severe weather, produced by a very cold rain in Swabia, and intense frost in the Alps. While Augereau, advancing by Frankfort, Aschaffenburg, Wurtzburg, and Nuremberg, fought a brilliant action at Burg-Eberach, separated the Mayence levies from Simbschen's corps, and crippled the latter for the rest of the campaign; while Macdonald, after occupying the Austrians for a considerable time towards the sources of the Inn, was preparing, in spite of the season, to cross the great chain of the Alps, with the intention of boldly throwing himself into Italian Tyrol, and facilitating for Brune the attack of the line of the Mincio; Moreau, with the principal mass of his forces, advanced between the Isar and the Inn to a field of battle which he had long studied, seeking a decisive engagement with the great Austrian army.

It is necessary to give an accurate idea of the ground on which the French and the Austrians were about to meet upon one of the most important occasions of our long wars. We have elsewhere described the basin of the Danube, watered by that great river and a series of tributaries, which, descending rapidly from the Alps, come in succession to swell the mass of its waters. These tributaries, we observed, are lines which an Austrian army, intending to cover Vienna, ought to defend, and which a French army, purposing to march on that capital, must force. In the summer campaign, Moreau, as it will be recollected, after penetrating from the valley of the Rhine into that of the Danube, and crossing the Iller, the Lech, the Isar, had halted between the Isar and the Inn. He was master of the course of the Isar, all the principal points of which he occupied: first Munich, then Freising, Moosburg, Landshut, &c.

He had advanced beyond that river, and was facing the Inn, occupied in force by the Austrians.

The Isar and the Inn, both issuing from the Alps, run together towards the Danube, separated by an almost invariable distance of between ten and twelve leagues. Proceeding at first in a northward direction, the Isar to Munich, the Inn to Wasserburg, they both turn off towards the east, till they fall into the Danube; the Isar at Deggendorf, the Inn at Passau. We were masters of the Isar, and it was requisite that we should force the Inn; but the Inn, broad, deep, defended at its outlet from the mountains by the fort of Kufstein, and in the lower part of its course by the fortress of Braunau, covered between these two points by a vast number of intrenchments, the Inn was a difficult barrier to pass. If Moreau attempted to force it in the upper part of its course, between Kufstein, Rosenheim, and Wasserburg, he would meet with almost insurmountable local difficulties; he would, moreover, have the army of Tyrol on his right flank. If he determined on forcing it in the lower part of its course, between Braunau and Passau, near the point where it falls into the Danube, he would have to run the risk of a lengthened march upon the left, through a difficult, wooded, marshy country, exposing his flank to the Austrian army, which, advancing by Mühldorf and Braunau, might throw itself upon the right wing of the French army. These two inconveniences were judged extremely serious. If the Austrians, taking care to guard themselves properly, and to observe with vigilance all the passes of the Inn, confined themselves to the defensive, Moreau might encounter almost invincible obstacles. But such was not their design. The offensive was resolved upon in the Austrian staff. The young Archduke John, with his head full of new theories invented by the Germans, and emulous also to imitate something of the great movements of General Bonaparte, devised a very extensive plan, which was not badly conceived either, in the opinion of competent judges. Unluckily this plan was inapplicable, because it was not based on the accurate appreciation of present circumstances. As far as it has come to our knowledge, it was as follows:—

Moreau was established on the ground which separates the Isar from the Inn. Between Munich and Wasserburg this ground forms an elevated plain, covered with a thick forest, subsides as it approaches the Danube, and, as it sinks, is rent into numerous ravines, continues wooded in some parts, becomes swampy in others, and, in short, is very difficult of access on every side. Moreau was in possession of this plateau, of the forest which covers it, and of the roads that intersect it. From Munich, where he had his headquarters, two roads lead to the

Inn; the one running direct through Ebersburg to Wasserburg, the other in an oblique direction to the left, and passing through Hohenlinden, Haag, Ampfing, and Mühldorf. Both crossed the gloomy forest of pines which covers that elevated tract. It was in this formidable retreat, formed by a hilly and wooded country, approachable by two roads, both of which were held by Moreau, that an assailing force must needs encounter him. The other roads consisted of only very narrow paths, destined solely for the conveyance of timber, and impassable for the heavy waggon-train of an army.

The young Archduke projected a great manœuvre. He purposed not to attack Moreau's position in front, but to turn it, in debouching by the bridges of Mühldorf, Neu-Oetting, and Braunau. Leaving about 20,000 men, Bavarians, Wurtembergers, and Condé's emigrants, to dispute the Inn, he intended to assume the offensive with 60,000 Austrians, and to march on the left of Moreau, through that half woody, half swampy country, which extends between the Inn and the Isar, near the points where they fall into the Danube. If the young Archduke proceeded rapidly through the difficult country by Eggenfelden, Neumarkt, and Wilsburg, and arrived in time at Landshut on the Isar, he would be able to ascend the Isar on our rear to Freising, cross it at that place, and thence continue his march upon a chain of heights which begins at Dachau, and commands the plain of Munich. Occupying this point, he would dangerously threaten Moreau's line of retreat, and oblige him to evacuate the country between the Inn and the Isar, and to pass through Munich with the utmost haste, in order to take a retrograde position on the Lech. But, to ensure the success of such a manœuvre, one must have correctly calculated all the means of execution, and, after engaging in it, great firmness was requisite for encountering its perilous chances: for there was an almost impassable country to traverse, in horrible weather, and at the same time incessantly skirting an enemy, who was not prompt and daring, it is true, but intelligent, firm, and not easily disconcerted.

The troops of both nations were in motion on the 26th and 27th of November (5th and 6th Frimaire), to commence hostilities on the 28th (7th Frimaire). The Austrian General Klenau, stationed on the Danube to support Simbschen against the little army of Augereau, had attracted the attention of General St. Suzanne, commanding Moreau's fourth corps. Being thus both of them removed to a considerable distance from the principal theatre of events, they were on the Danube; General St. Suzanne towards Ingolstadt, General Klenau towards Ratisbon.

Moreau had moved his left wing, 26,000 strong, and under

the command of General Grenier, along the highroad from Munich to Mühldorf, by Hohenlinden, Haag, and Ampfing, thus making it occupy the slopes of that species of plateau which extends between the two rivers. His centre, which he commanded in person, and which amounted to about 34,000 men,\* occupied the direct road from Munich to Wasserburg by Ebersberg. The right wing under Lecourbe, of about 26,000 men, was posted along the Upper Inn, in the environs of Rosenheim: a division of it observed the Tyrol. Moreau had consequently at hand only his left and his centre, nearly 60,000 men. He had set his army in motion to make a strong reconnoissance from Rosenheim to Mühldorf, and to force the enemy to disclose his intentions. Moreau, unable to anticipate, like General Bonaparte, the designs of his adversary, still less to dictate them, as the latter did, by taking the initiative with a high hand—Moreau was obliged to grope about to discover what he could neither divine nor preinduce. But he advanced prudently, and if he was surprised, he repaired expeditiously and with great calmness the mischief of the surprise.

The 29th and 30th of November (8th and 9th Frimaire) were spent by the French army in reconnoitring the line of the Inn; by the Austrian army, in crossing that line and traversing the low tract between the Inn, the Danube, and the Isar. Moreau forced the Austrian advanced posts to fall back, moved his right under Lecourbe to Rosenheim, his centre, under his own immediate command, to Wasserburg, his left, under Grenier, to the heights of Ampfing. These heights command, but at a great distance, the banks of the Inn. The left of the French army was in some danger; for, following the course of the Inn to Mühldorf, it was fifteen leagues from Munich, while the rest of the army was only ten. Moreau had, in consequence, taken care that it should be supported by a division of the centre, that which General Grandjean commanded. But it was a fault to advance in this manner in three corps, so far separated from one another, in place of marching on the Inn *en masse*, and presenting himself before a single *débouché*, while he made false demonstrations at several points. This fault had well-nigh been productive of serious consequences.

The Austrian army had passed at Braunau, Neu-Oetting, Mühldorf, and crossed the low tract which has been already mentioned. Part of the Archduke's troops, recently arrived, had scarcely had time to rest themselves. They were marching laboriously in that region, sometimes wooded, sometimes intersected by small rivers, the Wils, the Rott, the Isen, which

\* The centre consisted of 30,000 men; but the Polish division of Kniazewitz, which had rejoined General Decaen, and the artillery reserve, must have augmented it to about 34,000 or 35,000 men.



descend from the plateau occupied by the French army. The narrow paths, which it was necessary to follow, were broken up; and it was with the utmost difficulty that the heavy park of waggons could move along them. The young Archduke and his advisers, who had not foreseen any of these circumstances, were alarmed at the undertaking, now that it was begun. Our left wing, advanced nearly to Ampting and Mühldorf, gave them uneasiness, and made them apprehensive lest they should be cut off from the Inn. They designed to turn Moreau, and now they were fearful that they should themselves be turned instead. This danger should have been foreseen, and a new base of operations prepared on the Danube, between Ratisbon and Passau, in case they should be separated from the Inn. But nothing of this kind was done. In every bold operation it is necessary to provide, in the first place, for difficulties of execution, and, in the next, after commencing the execution, to persevere with firmness in what one has planned, for it is very rarely the case that we do not incur ourselves the dangers in which we would involve our adversary. The Austrian staff, from the very outset, was astonished, terrified, at what it had projected, and suddenly changed its plan. Instead of persisting in gaining the Isar, for the purpose of ascending on our rear, it stopped short, and resolved to turn down upon our left, and to give battle immediately. This was meeting the difficulty in front and undiminished; for it became necessary, in ascending the bed of the rivers, to climb the elevated ground which we occupied, and then penetrate into the forest, in which we had been for a long time established. The enemy might at first have an advantage over our left wing, which was somewhat endangered, but this success obtained, he would find our army concentrated in an absolute labyrinth, all the outlets of which it knew and occupied.

Accordingly, on the 1st of December (10th Frimaire, year IX.), the Archduke John moved the greater part of his army upon our left by three roads at once; the valley of the Isen, the highroad from Mühldorf to Ampting, lastly, the bridge of Kraiburg on the Inn. The valley of the Isen, commencing on the flanks of the woody plateau already described, permitted the greatly lengthened position of our left to be turned. A corps of 15,000 men ascended it. Another corps marched direct for the highroad from Mühldorf, which, after ascending the heights of Ampting, leads through the forest to Hohenlinden and Munich. Lastly, a detachment, crossing the Inn at Kraiburg, and passing through Asebau, took in flank our left wing, which had unluckily ventured as far as Ampting. Forty thousand men were going in a moment to fall upon 26,000.

These 26,000 men, commanded by General Grenier, had to

sustain a severe and unequal contest. Ney, who defended the heights of Ampfing, displayed that incomparable energy which distinguished him in war. He performed prodigies of valour, and contrived to retire without serious loss. Threatened by the corps which had passed the Inn at Kraiburg and penetrated into the defile of Aschau, he was fortunately extricated by Grandjean's division, which Moreau, as we have said, had detached from his centre to support his left. Legrand's division, which was in the valley of the Isen, ascended that valley in retrograding upon Dorfen. Moreau, seeing the superiority of the Austrians, had the good sense not to persist, and effected his retreat in the best order.

It is obvious from these first movements that Moreau had not been able to penetrate the designs of the enemy, and that, in advancing upon all the *débouchés* of the Inn at once, instead of making an attack upon a single point, he had compromised his left. The extraordinary valour of his troops and the vigour of his lieutenants, who in execution were accomplished generals, had made amends for all.

But this was only an insignificant beginning. Moreau had abandoned the outskirts of his position, and retired to the centre of the extensive forest of Hohenlinden. It would be requisite to force him in this formidable retreat. His coolness and vigour were here about to be pitted against the inexperience of the Archduke, flushed by a first success.

We have already said that two roads ran through the forest: one on the right, descending directly to the Inn, by Ebersberg and Wasserburg; the other, on the left, which passes through Hohenlinden, Mattenboett, Haag, Ampfing, and joins the Inn at Mühldorf, is rather longer. It was along this latter road that the Austrians were proceeding *en masse*, some following the defile which it forms through the forest, others laboriously ascending the beds of the small rivers which gave access to the flank of our position. Moreau immediately formed a judgment, and a sound one, of this situation, and conceived an idea from which he derived great results: it was to allow the Austrians, already engaged with his left, to penetrate into the forest, and then, when they should be pretty far advanced in it, to transfer his centre from the Ebersberg road to the Hohenlinden road, to surprise them in that dangerous place, and to destroy them there. He made his dispositions accordingly.

The road on the left, or the Hohenlinden road, adopted by the Austrians, after leaving the banks of the Inn and ascending the heights of Ampfing, passed over hills, alternately wooded and naked, as far as Mattenboett, then through a thick wood from Mattenboett to Hohenlinden, forming there a long defile bordered by lofty pine-trees. At Hohenlinden itself

the forest suddenly ceased. A small plain, free from wood, studded with several hamlets, extended to the right and left of the road; in the middle were the village of Hohenlinden and the post-house. Not only the principal column of the Austrian army, marching in the defile of the forest, but also the detachments ascending the river Isen, for the purpose of debouching by different outlets on the left of our position, would necessarily have to pass this spot.

In this little plain of Hohenlinden, Moreau deployed his left wing under Grenier, Grandjean's division having been previously detached from the centre, with all the reserves of artillery and cavalry.

On the right of the road and village of Hohenlinden he posted Grandjean's division, commanded on this day by General Grouchy; on the left, Ney's division; still farther to the left, on the skirt of the wood, and at the head of the roads by which the Austrian columns ascending the valley of the Isen would arrive, Legrand's and Bastoul's divisions, both drawn up in advance of the villages of Preisendorf and Harthofen. The reserves of cavalry and artillery were in rear of these four divisions of infantry, deployed in the middle of the plain. The centre, reduced to Richepanse's and Decaen's two divisions, was at some leagues' distance, on the right-hand road, in the environs of Ebersberg. Moreau sent to those two divisions an order, somewhat vaguely expressed, but positive, to throw themselves from the right-hand into the left-hand road, to get into the latter in the environs of Mattenboett, and there surprise the Austrian army entangled in the forest. This order was neither precise, nor clear, nor circumstantial, as well conceived and well expressed orders ought to be, and those of General Bonaparte, for instance, invariably were. He neither indicated the route to be pursued, nor provided against any accidents which might occur: he left everything that was to be done to the intelligence of Generals Decaen and Richepanse. They, however, might well be trusted to make up for all that the commander-in-chief omitted to say. Moreau, moreover, directed Lecourbe, who formed his right towards the Tyrol, and General St. Suzanne, who formed his left towards the Danube, to draw near in haste to the spot on which the decisive event of the campaign was about to take place. But one was fifteen leagues off, at least, the other twenty-five, and they were consequently out of reach. It was not thus that General Bonaparte acted on the eve of great battles: on these occasions he did not leave half his forces at such distances. But to bring up all the parts of which a numerous army is composed in time to the point where the fortunes of war are decided, there is required a superior foresight, which the greatest men

alone possess, and without which it is still possible to be an excellent general. Moreau was about to fight nearly 70,000 Austrians with fewer than 60,000 French; this number was more than sufficient, with the soldiers of whom our legions were then composed.

The Archduke John, ignorant of all this, was intoxicated with his success on the 1st of December (10th Frimaire). He was young, and he had seen that formidable army of the Rhine, which for many years the Austrian generals had not possessed the skill to stop, falling back before him. He rested on the 2nd of December, which gave Moreau time to make the dispositions which we have just detailed; and he prepared everything for passing through the extensive forest of Hohenlinden on the 3rd of December (12th Frimaire). This general, rather raw in his profession, imagined that the French army could not make the least resistance to him in the route which he was about to pursue. He conceived at most that he should fall in with it in advance of Munich.

He divided his army into four corps. The principal, that of the centre, composed of the reserve, the Hungarian grenadiers, Bavarians, the greater part of the cavalry, the baggage, and a hundred pieces of cannon, was to follow the highroad from Mühldorf to Hohenlinden, to traverse the defile which it forms through the forest, and then debouch on the little plain of Hohenlinden. General Riesch, who had crossed the Inn at Kraiburg on the 1st of December with about twelve thousand men, was to flank the centre, and to debouch in the open ground at Hohenlinden, on the left of the Austrians, on the right of the French. At the other extremity of this field of battle, the corps of Baillet-Latour and Kienmayer, which had entered the valley of the Isen, were to continue to ascend it, and to debouch at some distance from one another, the first by Isen upon Kronacker and Preisendorf, the second by Lendorf upon Harthofen, both in the unwooded plain of Hohenlinden. They had orders not to lose time, to leave even their artillery behind, the corps of the centre taking a great quantity along with it by the principal road, and to carry with them no more baggage than was necessary for making soup for the soldiers.

Thus these four corps of the Austrian army, marching at a considerable distance from each other in that thick forest, one only, that of the centre, on a highroad, with causeway, the three others by paths exclusively destined for the carriage of timber, were to meet in the open space extending between Hohenlinden and Harthofen, exposed to the risk of not arriving together, and of encountering by the way many unforeseen adventures. The Bavarians having rejoined the Austrians, the Archduke's army amounted at this moment to 70,000 men.

On the morning of the 3rd of December, the French were deployed between Hohenlinden and Harthofen. Moreau, on horseback before daybreak, was at the head of his staff, and, a little farther off, Richepanse and Decaen were executing the movement which they were directed to make from the Ebersberg road to that of Hohenlinden.

The four Austrian corps, on their part, advanced simultaneously, each as fast as it could, sensible of the value of time in a season when there is so little daylight either for marching or for fighting. A thick fall of snow darkened the air, and rendered the nearest objects indistinguishable. The Archduke John, at the head of the centre, had penetrated into the defile of the forest from Mattenboett to Hohenlinden, and had almost cleared it long before General Riesch on his left, and Generals Baillet-Latour and Kienmayer on his right, could reach the field of battle, embarrassed as they were in those horrible roads. The young prince at length appeared on the margin of the wood facing Grandjean's and Ney's divisions, both drawn up in order of battle, in advance of the village of Hohenlinden. The 108th demi-brigade of Grandjean's division was deployed, having on its wings the 46th and the 57th, formed in close column. The 4th hussars and the 6th of the line supported it in the rear. A very brisk cannonade was opened on both sides. The Austrians attacked the 108th, which made a firm resistance. Eight battalions of Hungarian grenadiers were ordered to file through the wood, in order to turn it on its right. On seeing this, Generals Grandjean and Grouchy hastened with the 46th to the assistance of the 108th, which was shaken, and began to lose ground. They penetrated into the wood, and commenced among the pine-trees a desperate struggle, almost man to man, with the Hungarian grenadiers. A battalion of the 57th, pushing still deeper into it, turned the Hungarians, and obliged them to seek refuge in the recesses of the forest. Thus Grandjean's division remained victorious, and prevented the Austrian column from deploying in the plain of Hohenlinden.

After a few moments' rest, the Archduke John made a new attack on Hohenlinden and on Grandjean's division. This second attack was repulsed like the first. At this moment, the Austrian troops of Baillet-Latour began to be perceived towards Kronacker, making their appearance on our left, at the margin of the wood, ready to debouch into the plain of Hohenlinden. The snow having ceased falling for a few minutes, allowed them to be easily discerned. But they were not yet in a state to act, and besides, Bastoul's and Legrand's divisions were preparing to receive them. All at once, a kind of agitation, a wavering, was perceptible in the Austrian troops of the centre, which had not yet been able to get out of the defile of the forest.

Something extraordinary seemed to be taking place in their rear. Moreau, with a sagacity which does honour to his military intuition, remarked this circumstance, and said to Ney, "Now is the moment to charge; Richepanse and Decaen must be upon the rear of the Austrians." He immediately ordered Ney's and Grandjean's divisions, which were on the right and left of Hohenlinden, to form into columns of attack, to charge the Austrians drawn up on the margin of the forest, and to drive them back into that long defile in which they had till then been shut up. Ney charged them in front; Grouchy, with Grandjean's division, took them in flank, and both drove them impetuously into that gorge, where they were crowded together pell-mell, along with their artillery and cavalry.

At this very instant, the events which Moreau had foreseen and prepared were taking place at the other extremity of the defile, at *Mattenboett*. Richepanse and Decaen, in obedience to the orders which they had received from him, had struck off from the *Ebersberg* road into that of *Hohenlinden*. Richepanse, who was the nearest to *Mattenboett*, had started without waiting for Decaen, and daringly penetrated into that tract of thickets and ravines which separates the two roads, marching while the fight was going on at *Hohenlinden*, and making incredible efforts to drag with him, over that inundated ground, six pieces of small calibre. He had already passed, without accident, the village of *St. Christoph*, when the corps of General *Riesch*, destined to flank the centre of the Austrians, arrived there; but he had proceeded onward from *St. Christoph* with a single brigade, leaving the second, *Drouet's*, engaged with the enemy. Richepanse, reckoning upon Decaen to extricate *Drouet's* brigade, had marched, without losing a moment, for *Mattenboett*; for his military instinct told him that there was the decisive point. Though he had left but two demi-brigades of infantry, the 8th and the 48th, a single regiment of cavalry, the 1st chasseurs, and six pieces of cannon, with about 6000 men, he had continued his march, dragging his artillery by hand, almost always through the quagmire. On reaching *Mattenboett*, at the other extremity of the defile of the forest, the head of which we have just said that Ney was attacking, he fell in with a body of Austrian cuirassiers, dismounted, with their horses' bridles over their arms; he fell upon them, and made them prisoners. Then deploying on the small open spot which surrounds *Mattenboett*, he placed the 8th on the right, the 48th on the left, and pushed the 1st chasseurs on eight squadrons of cavalry, which, on seeing him, had formed to charge him. The 1st chasseurs, after a vigorous charge, was repulsed, and fell back behind the 8th demi-brigade. The latter, crossing

bayonets, stopped the career of the Austrian cavalry. At this moment, Richepanse's position became critical. Having left behind his second brigade to make head against Riesch's corps, surrounded himself on all sides, he thought that he ought not to give the Austrians time to perceive his weakness. Committing to General Walther, with the 8th demi-brigade and the 1st chasseurs, the duty of keeping in check the enemy's rear-guard, which was preparing to fight, he himself, with the 48th alone, fell to the left, and took the bold resolution to fall upon the Austrian rear in the defile of the forest. Hazardous as was this resolution, it was not less sensible than vigorous; for the Archduke's column, entangled in this defile, must have before it the main body of the French army, and, by dashing furiously upon its rear, it was probable that he should produce great disorder in it, and obtain important results. Richepanse immediately formed the 48th into columns, and marching sword in hand amidst his grenadiers, penetrated into the forest, sustained without flinching a violent discharge of grape-shot, then fell in with two Hungarian battalions, which hastened up to bar his passage. Richepanse would have inspirited his brave soldiers with words and gestures, but they had no need of them. "Those fellows are our prisoners," cried they, "let us charge!" They charged accordingly, and completely routed the Hungarian battalions. Presently, they came to masses of baggage, artillery, infantry, accumulated pell-mell at this spot. Richepanse struck inexpressible terror into this multitude, and threw it into frightful disorder. At the same moment, he heard confused shouts at the other extremity of this defile. On advancing, these shouts, becoming more distinct, revealed the presence of our troops. It was Ney, who, marching from Hohenlinden, had penetrated by the head of the defile, and pushed before him the Austrian column, which Richepanse was driving the other way, by attacking it in rear.

Ney and Richepanse met, recognised one another, and embraced, intoxicated with joy on seeing so glorious a result. Their troops rushed, on all sides, upon the Austrians, who sought shelter by flight in the woods, or begged quarter of the conqueror. They took thousands of prisoners, the whole of the artillery, and the baggage. Richepanse, leaving Ney to secure these trophies, returned to Mattenboett, where General Walther had remained with a demi-brigade and a single regiment of cavalry. He found this brave general, struck by a ball, borne away in the arms of his soldiers, but his countenance beaming with joy, and compensated for his sufferings by the satisfaction of having contributed to a decisive manœuvre. Richepanse extricated his troops, and returned to St. Christoph, where he had left Drouet's brigade alone engaged with Riesch's

corps. But all his anticipations were verified on that auspicious day. General Decaen had arrived in time, extricated Drouet's brigade, and repulsed Riesch's corps, after taking from it a great number of prisoners.

It was by this time mid-day. The centre of the Austrian army had been enveloped and entirely routed. The left, under General Riesch, arriving too late to stop Richepanse, attacked and driven towards the Inn by Decaen, was in full retreat, after sustaining considerable losses. With such results at the centre and on the left of the Austrians, the issue of the battle could no longer be doubtful.

During these events, Bastoul's and Legrand's divisions, posted on the left of the clear ground about Hohenlinden, had had upon their hands the infantry of Generals Baillet-Latour and Kienmayer. These divisions had been hard pressed, for they were inferior by one-half to the enemy; they had, moreover, the disadvantage of ground; for the head of the wooded ravines, by which the Austrians debouched into the little plain of Hohenlinden, being rather higher than that open plain, enabled them to pour a downward fire upon it. But Generals Bastoul and Legrand, under the command of General Grenier, seconded by the courage of their brave soldiers, made a vigorous stand. Luckily, too, d'Hautpoul's cavalry was there to support them, as well as Ney's second brigade, the latter general having entered the defile with one only.

The two French divisions, at first overwhelmed by numbers, had lost a little ground. Quitting the margin of the wood, they had fallen back into the plain, but with extraordinary steadiness and displaying to the enemy an heroic firmness. Two demi-brigades of Legrand's division, the 51st and the 42nd, thrown back towards Harthofen, had to oppose Kienmayer's infantry, besides a division of cavalry attached to that corps. Sometimes keeping up a well-sustained fire upon the infantry, at others crossing bayonets against the cavalry, they opposed an invincible resistance to all attacks. But at this moment, Grenier, being apprised of the success obtained at the centre, formed Legrand's division into columns, caused it to be supported by charges of d'Hautpoul's cavalry, and drove back Kienmayer's corps to the skirt of the wood. General Bonnet, on his side, with a brigade of Bastoul's division, charged the Austrians, and overthrew them in the valley from which they had endeavoured to issue. Meanwhile, the grenadiers of Iola's brigade, Ney's second, rushed upon Baillet-Latour and repulsed him. The impulsion of victory communicated to these brave troops, redoubled their ardour and their strength. They finally drove back the two corps of Baillet-Latour and Kienmayer, the one towards the Isen, the other towards Lendorf, in that low and difficult tract



from which they had in vain attempted to debouch, in order to gain possession of the plateau of Hohenlinden.

Moreau returned at this moment from the heart of the forest with a detachment of Grandjean's division, to bring relief to his left, which was so briskly attacked. But there, as at all the other points, he found his soldiers victorious, transported with joy, congratulating their general on such a glorious triumph. That triumph was indeed glorious. The Austrian army had greater difficulty to get out of those thickets than it had to penetrate into them. There were seen everywhere straggling corps, which, not knowing whither to flee, fell into the hands of our victorious troops and laid down their arms. It was five o'clock, and darkness shrouded the field of battle. The French had killed or wounded 7000 or 8000 of the enemy, made 12,000 prisoners, taken 300 waggons, and eighty-seven pieces of cannon, results very uncommon in war. Thus in one day the Austrian army had lost nearly 20,000 soldiers, almost all its artillery, its baggage, and, what was of still greater importance, its whole moral courage.

This battle is the most brilliant of all that Moreau ever fought, and certainly one of the greatest in the present century, which has beheld such extraordinary conflicts. It has been wrongfully asserted that there was another conqueror of Marengo than General Bonaparte, and that this was General Kellermann. With much greater reason it might be alleged that there was another conqueror of Hohenlinden than General Moreau, namely, General Richepanse, for he executed, upon a rather vague order, a most brilliant manoeuvre. But though less unjust, this assertion would still be unjust. Let us leave to every man the merit of his deeds, and not imitate those paltry efforts of envy, which is on all occasions bent on discovering a different conqueror from the real one.

Moreau, in advancing along the Inn from Kufstein to Muhlendorf, without having chosen a precise point of attack, without having concentrated all his forces upon that point, to make nothing but mere demonstrations—Moreau had in this manner exposed his left in the battle of the 1st of December. Still this could prove but a momentary advantage to the enemy; and in retiring into the recesses of the labyrinth of Hohenlinden, in drawing the Austrians thither, in bringing down opportunely his centre upon his left, from Ebersberg to Mattenboett, he had executed one of the most successful manoeuvres known in the history of modern warfare. It has been alleged that Richepanse marched without orders: \* that is incorrect: an order was given to him, as we have related, but it was too general, not

\* So Napoleon erroneously asserted at St. Helena. The written orders exist, and have been printed in the Memorial of the war.

sufficiently detailed. None of the circumstances that might have happened had been provided against. Moreau had merely directed Richepanse and Decaen to strike off from Ebersberg for St. Christoph, without specifying the route, without providing against either the presence of Riesch's corps, or any of the possible and even probable accidents, amidst that forest full of enemies; and, with an officer less vigorous than Richepanse, he might have reaped a disaster instead of a triumph. But fortune always has some share in military successes. All that can be said is, that in this case it was very great, nay, greater than usual.

Moreau has been censured because, while fighting with six divisions out of twelve, he left three under General St. Suzanne on the Danube, three under General Lecourbe on the Upper Inn, and thus exposed his left, under General Grenier, to the hazard of fighting in the proportion of one against two. This reproach is certainly more weighty and more deserved; but let us not tarnish so glorious a triumph, and let us add, in order to be just, that there are flaws in the finest works of men, that in the most splendid victories there are faults—faults which fortune repairs, and which must be admitted as an ordinary accompaniment of great military exploits.

After this important victory, the conqueror would have done well to pursue the Austrian army briskly, to march for Vienna, to demolish, by pushing forward, the defences of the Tyrol, to necessitate in this manner a retrograde movement in the whole line of the Austrians from Bavaria to Italy; for the retreat of the troops from the Inn would occasion that of the troops from the Tyrol, and the retreat of these latter would render the abandonment of the Mincio inevitable. But to obtain all these results it would have been necessary to have forced the Inn, then the Salza, which falls into the Inn, and forms a second line to cross after the first. At the moment, all this might have been accomplished from the impulsion given to our army by the victory of Hohenlinden.

Moreau, as soon as he had allowed some rest to his troops, moved his left and part of his centre into the Mühldorf road, threatening at once the bridges of Kraiburg, Mühldorf, and Braunau, to persuade the enemy that he intended to cross the Inn in its lower course. But meanwhile, Lecourbe, who a few months before had so gloriously passed the Danube at the battle of Hochstett, was directed to cross the Inn, with the right, near Rosenheim. This general had discovered a spot called Neubeurn, where the right bank, which we occupied, commanded the left bank, occupied by the enemy, and where the artillery might be advantageously employed to protect the passage. This point was therefore chosen. Several days were

unfortunately lost in collecting the necessary *matériel*, and it was not till the morning of the 9th of December, six days after the great battle of Hohenlinden, that Lecourbe was enabled to act.

Moreau had suddenly resumed his position on the Upper Inn. The three divisions of the centre had been despatched from Wasserburg to Aibling, at a little distance from Rosenheim, ready to assist Lecourbe. The left had succeeded them in their positions, and General Collaud, with two divisions of St. Suzanne's corps, had been pushed forward from the Isar to Erding.

On the morning of the 9th of December (18th Frimaire) Lecourbe commenced the operations for the passage before Neubeurn. Montrichard's division was to cross the Inn first. General Lemaire placed on the heights of the right bank a battery of twenty-eight pieces of cannon, and swept off every thing that appeared on the left bank. On this part of the Inn there was nothing but Condé's corps, and this was too weak to oppose any serious resistance. While all the enemy's detachments were kept at a respectable distance by a continued fire of artillery, the pontonniers threw themselves into boats, accompanied by some battalions of *élite*, destined to protect their operations. In two hours and a half a bridge was completed, and Montrichard's division could begin to debouch. It advanced upon the Austrians, who retreated, and descended the right bank of the Inn till they were opposite to Rosenheim. They took a strong position at Stephans Kirchen. During this movement the divisions of the centre, stationed before Rosenheim itself, exerted themselves to prevent the Austrians from destroying completely the bridge of that town. Having been unsuccessful, they ascended the Inn and crossed at Neubeurn, for the purpose of seconding Lecourbe. Condé's corps, reinforced by some succours, appuyed itself, on the one hand, upon the destroyed bridge of Rosenheim, on the other upon the small lake of Chiemsee. Lecourbe sent a detachment to turn this lake, which obliged the enemy to retire, after a resistance that was not very bloody. The Inn was thus crossed, and that formidable obstacle, which it was alleged could not fail to stop the French army, was surmounted. Thus Lecourbe had gathered a fresh laurel in the winter campaign. The march was not slackened. Next day, a bridge was thrown before Rosenheim for the passage of the rest of the centre. Grenier, with the left, crossed the Inn over the bridges of Wasserburg and Muhlendorf, which the enemy had abandoned without destroying them.

It was expedient to lose no time in driving the Austrians to the banks of the Salza, which runs behind the Inn and falls into that river, a little above Braunau. The Salza is like a

second arm of the Inn itself. If you would cross the Inn near the mountains, you are obliged to cross it twice, as it were; whereas, in passing it in the environs of Braunau, after its junction with the Salza, there is but one passage to perform. But then the volume of its waters is doubled, and the difficulty of crossing by main force is proportionably increased. This reason, and a desire to surprise the enemy, who did not expect to see the French attempt the passage above Rosenheim, had decided the choice of Moreau.

Lecourbe, supported by the divisions of the centre, advanced rapidly, in spite of all the difficulties presented by that hilly country, interspersed with woods, rivers, and lakes,—a country difficult in any season, but still more so in the middle of December. The Austrian army, though shaken by so many reverses, still kept the field. The sentiment of honour, awakened by the danger of the capital, caused it still to make noble efforts to stop us. The Austrian cavalry covered the retreat, and vigorously charged the French corps, which advanced too rashly. The enemy crossed the Alz, which conveys the water of the Chiemsee to the Inn; they passed Fraunstein, and at length arrived near the Salza, not far from Salzburg.

There, before Salzburg itself, was still left a strong position to occupy. The Archduke John thought that he might there concentrate his troops, hoping to procure for them some success which would raise their courage and somewhat slacken the daring pursuit of the French. Accordingly, he did concentrate them there on the 13th of December (22nd Frimaire).

The town of Salzburg is seated on the Salza. In advance of that river runs another small stream, the Saal, which descends from the neighbouring mountains, and falls into the Salza below Salzburg. The ground between the two is level, marshy, covered with clumps of trees, everywhere difficult of access. Here the Archduke John took a position, with his right to the Salza, his left to the mountains, his front covered by the Saal. His artillery swept this level tract. His cavalry, drawn up on the naked and solid parts of the ground, was ready to charge the French corps which should dare to take the offensive. His infantry was solidly appuyed upon the town of Salzburg.

On the morning of the 14th, Lecourbe, impelled by his ardour, forded the Saal, sustained several charges of cavalry on the strand bordering the river, and bore them bravely: but presently, the thick fog which covered the plain clearing off, he perceived, in advance of Salzburg, a formidable line of cavalry, artillery, and infantry. It was the whole Austrian army. In presence of this danger he behaved with great steadiness, but suffered some loss.

Fortunately Decaen's division at this moment crossed the

Salza towards Laufen, in an almost miraculous manner. On the preceding day, the advanced guard of this division, finding the bridge of Laufen destroyed, had explored the banks of the Salza, everywhere covered by the enemy's tirailleurs, in search of a passage. It had perceived a boat lying on the opposite shore. At this sight, three chasseurs of the 14th swam across to the other side, in spite of the most intense cold, and a current still more rapid than that of the Inn. After fighting hand to hand with several Austrian tirailleurs, they had taken and brought across the boat. Some hundred French availed themselves of it for crossing successively to the opposite bank, occupied a village quite close to the destroyed bridge of Laufen, and barricaded themselves there in such a manner that a small number of them sufficed to defend it. The others had rushed upon the Austrian artillery, taken it, seized all the craft on the right bank of the Salza, and thus furnished the division remaining on the left bank with the means of crossing. On the morning of the following day, the 14th, Decaen's whole division having crossed, and ascending to Salzburg, came up at the very moment when Lecourbe was engaged single-handed with the whole Austrian army. It could not have arrived more opportunely. The Archduke, apprised of the passage of the French and of their march upon Salzburg, hastily decamped, and thus Lecourbe was extricated from the serious danger to which chance and his ardour had exposed him.

All the defences of the Inn and the Salza were thus overcome. From that moment there was no obstacle to cover the Austrian army, or to give it courage to resist the French army. In Tyrol, it is true, there were left 25,000 men, who might have annoyed our rear, but it is not when you are victorious, and demoralisation has seized your enemy, that you need fear bold attempts. Moreau, having left St. Suzanne's corps behind, to invest Braunau, and to occupy the tract of country between the Inn, and the Isar.—Moreau, emboldened by the success attending every step he took, marched towards the Traun and the Ens, which were now incapable of stopping him. Richepanse formed the advanced guard, supported by Grouchy and Decaen. The retreat of the Austrians was effected in disorder. The French picked up every moment men, carriages, or cannon. Richepanse fought brilliant actions at Frankenmarkt, at Voklabrück, and at Schwanstadt. Incessantly engaged with the Austrian cavalry, he took so many as 1200 horse at a time. On the 20th of December (29th Frimaire) the French had crossed the Traun, and were marching for Steyer, with the intention of crossing the Ens at that place.

The young Archduke John, whom such a series of disasters had completely disheartened, had just been superseded by the

Archduke Charles, who was at length recalled from disgrace, to have a task assigned to him, now impossible to be performed—that of saving the Austrian army. He beheld with grief on his arrival the spectacle exhibited by those soldiers of the empire, who, after they had nobly resisted the French, desired that they might no longer be sacrificed to a fatal and universally reprobated policy. He sent M. de Meerfeld to Moreau, to propose an armistice. Moreau agreed to grant forty-eight hours, on condition that within this time he would return from Vienna furnished with the Emperor's powers; but he stipulated, at the same time, that the French army should meanwhile have the faculty of advancing to the Ens.

On the 21st, he crossed the Ens at Steyer. His advanced posts appeared on the Ips and the Erlaf. He was at the gates of Vienna; he might feel tempted to enter it, and to appropriate to himself the glory which no French general had yet had, of penetrating into the capital of the empire. But the moderate spirit of Moreau was not fond of pushing fortune to extremities. The Archduke Charles gave him his word that if hostilities were suspended, Austria would treat immediately for peace, on the conditions which France had always insisted upon, especially that of a separate negotiation. Moreau, full of a just esteem for that prince, showed a disposition to believe him.

Several of his lieutenants urged him to march to Vienna. "It will be better," he replied, "to secure peace. . . . I hear nothing of Macdonald and Brune; I know not whether the one has succeeded in penetrating into the Tyrol, whether the other has been able to cross the Mincio. Augereau is at a great distance from me, in a critical situation. I might perhaps drive the Austrians to despair, were I to persist in humbling them. We had better halt and be content with peace, for it is for that alone that we are fighting."

These were wise and praiseworthy sentiments. On the 25th of December (4th Nivôse, year IX.), he consented, therefore, to sign, at Steyer, a new suspension of arms, the conditions of which were the following:—There was to be a cessation of hostilities in Germany between the Austrian armies and the French armies commanded by Moreau and Augereau. Generals Brune and Macdonald were to be invited to sign a similar armistice for the armies of the Grisons and of Italy. The whole valley of the Danube, including the Tyrol, was given up to the French, besides the fortresses of Braunau and Wurtzburg, the forts of Scharnitz, Kufstein, &c. The Austrian magazines were placed at our disposal. No detachment of troops could be sent to Italy, in case a suspension of arms should not be agreed to by the generals commanding in that country. This stipulation was obligatory on both armies.

Moreau was satisfied with these conditions, calculating, with reason, upon peace, and preferring it to more signal, but more hazardous triumphs. A brilliant glory surrounded his name, for his winter campaign surpassed that of the spring. After crossing the Rhine in that first spring campaign, and driving the Austrians to the Danube, while the First Consul was crossing the Alps; after having then dislodged them from their camp at Ulm by the battle of Hochstett, and pushed them back to the Inn, he had taken breath during the summer, and, resuming his march in winter, during the most intense cold, he had overwhelmed them at Hohenlinden, driven them from the Inn to the Salza, from the Salza to the Traun and the Ens, pushing them, in disorder, to the very gates of Vienna. At last, halting a few leagues from the capital, he granted them time for signing peace. In his conduct there had been irresolution, dilatoriness, in short, faults which severe judges have since keenly censured, as if to revenge, on the memory of Moreau, the injustices committed upon the memory of Napoleon; but there was an unbroken series of successes, obtained by prudence and firmness. We ought to respect all glories, and not destroy one to avenge another. Moreau had proved himself capable of commanding 100,000 men with prudence and vigour; no man, excepting Napoleon, has manœuvred such a force so well, in the present century; and, although the place of the conqueror of Hohenlinden be at an immense distance from that of the conqueror of Rivoli, of Marengo, and of Austerlitz, that place is, nevertheless, glorious, and would have remained glorious, if criminal misconduct, the fatal effects of jealousy, had not subsequently sullied a life till then noble and pure.

The armistice in Germany happened seasonably for extricating the Gallo-Batavian army, commanded by Augereau, from its hazardous position. The Austrian general, Klenau, who had always remained at a great distance from the Archduke John, had suddenly formed a junction with Simbschen, and, by this union of forces, had brought Augereau into danger. But the latter had bravely defended the Rednitz, and maintained his ground till the conclusion of hostilities. The retreat of the Austrians into Bohemia relieved him from embarrassment, and the armistice covered him from the dangers of a position too destitute of support, since Moreau was at the gates of Vienna.

During these events in Germany, hostilities continued in the Alps and in Italy. The First Consul, seeing, from the commencement of the campaign, that Moreau could dispense with the assistance of the army in the Grisons, had ordered Macdonald to cross the Splügen, to throw himself from the great chain of the Alps into the Valteline, and from the Valteline into Italian Tyrol, then to proceed to Trent, and thus turn the

line of the Mincio, and, by this manœuvre, put an end to the resistance of the Austrians in the plains of Italy. No objection, founded on the height of the Splügen or the inclemency of the season, could shake the First Consul. He had invariably replied that, wherever two men could set their feet, an army had the means of passing, and that the Alps were easier to cross in frost than when the snow was melting, the season in which he had himself crossed the St. Bernard. This was the argument of an absolute spirit, which is determined to attain its end at any rate whatever. The event proved that, in the mountains, winter is attended with dangers at least equal to those of spring, and that, moreover, it dooms men to the most frightful hardships.

General Macdonald prepared to obey, and he did it with all the energy of his character. After leaving Morlot's division in the Grisons, to guard the *débouchés* which communicate between the Grisons and the Engadine (the upper valley of the Inn), he approached the Splügen. For some time past, the division of Baraguay d'Hilliers was in the Upper Valteline, threatening the Engadine from the Italian side; while Morlot threatened it from the side next to the Grisons. With the bulk of his army, about 12,000 men, Macdonald commenced his movement, and climbed the first acclivities of the Splügen. The passage of that lofty mountain, narrow and winding during an ascent of several leagues, was attended with the greatest dangers, especially at that season, when frequent tempests covered the roads with enormous drifts of snow and ice. The artillery and ammunition had been placed on sledges, and the soldiers were laden with biscuit and cartridges. The first column, composed of cavalry and artillery, began the passage in fine weather, but it was all at once assailed by a tremendous tempest. An avalanche precipitated one-half of a squadron of dragoons into the abyss, and struck terror into the soldiers. They, nevertheless, kept up their courage. In three days, the storm having ceased, a fresh attempt was made to cross this formidable mountain. It was encumbered with snow. Oxen were driven before the troops, to trample the snow, into which they sank up to the belly; then labourers beat it down hard; the infantry, in passing, rendered it quite solid; lastly, sappers widened the passes, when too narrow, by cutting the ice with hatchets. These exertions were requisite to render the road passable for cavalry and artillery. The first days of December were thus spent in effecting the passage of the first three columns. The soldiers endured these horrible sufferings with admirable fortitude, living upon biscuit and a small quantity of brandy. The fourth and last column had at last nearly reached the summit of the mountain, when a fresh



storm once more closed the passage, entirely dispersed the 104th demi-brigade, and buried about 100 men. General Macdonald was there. He rallied his soldiers, cheered them under dangers and hardships, caused the road, barred by blocks of frozen snow, to be again opened, and at length debouched with all the rest of his corps into the Valteline.

This truly extraordinary enterprise had carried the greater part of the army of the Grisons across the great chain, and to the very threshold of the Italian Tyrol. General Macdonald, as he had been ordered, sought, as soon as he had passed the Splugen, to concert with Brune before proceeding to the sources of the Mincio and the Adige, and thus demolishing the whole defensive line of the Austrians, which extended from the Alps to the Adriatic.

Brune would not deprive himself of a whole division to assist Macdonald, but he consented to detach Lecchi's Italian division, which was to ascend from the valley of the Chiesa to the Rocca d'Anfo. Macdonald, therefore, resolved to ascend the Valteline, and to attack Mont Tonal, which commands the pass into the Tyrol and the valley of the Adige. But here, though the height was inferior to that of the Splugen, the ice was as deeply drifted; and besides, General Wukassowich had covered the principal approaches to Mont Tonal with entrenchments. On the 22nd and 23rd of December, General Vandamme made an attack at the head of a corps of grenadiers, and renewed it several times with heroic courage. Those brave fellows made incredible but useless efforts. Several times, marching upon the ice, and exposed to a most destructive fire, they advanced to the very palisades of the entrenchment, and endeavoured to pull them up, but, the ground being frozen, they were foiled in the attempt. It was useless to persist further; it was, therefore, resolved to pass into the valley of the Oglio, to descend it to Pisogno, and then proceed into the valley of the Chiesa. The intention in this was to cross the mountains in a less elevated region, and by passes not so well defended. Macdonald, having descended to Pisogno, crossed the cols which separated him from the valley of the Chiesa, formed his junction with Lecchi's brigade towards the Rocca d'Anfo, and found himself beyond the obstacles which parted him from the Italian Tyrol and the Adige. He was enabled to reach Trent before General Wukassowich had effected his retreat from the heights of Mont Tonal, and to take a position between the Austrians who defended the sources of the rivers amidst the Alps and the Austrians who defended the lower part of their courses in the plains of Italy.

Brune, before he attempted to force the Mincio, had waited till Macdonald had made sufficient progress for the attacks to

be nearly simultaneous in the mountains and in the plain. Out of 125,000 spread over Italy, he had, as we have observed, 100,000 effective men, tried soldiers, and recruited after their privations, an artillery admirably organised by General Mar-mont, and an excellent cavalry. Nearly 20,000 men guarded Lombardy, Piedmont, Liguria, and Tuscany. A weak brigade, commanded by General Petitot, observed the Austrian troops, which, setting out from Ferrara, threatened Bologna. The national guard of the latter city was ready, besides, to defend itself against the Austrians. The Neapolitans were again passing through the Roman States on their march to Tuscany; but Murat, with the 10,000 men from the camp of Amiens, was gone to meet them. Brune, after providing for the guard of the different parts of Italy, had about 70,000 men to direct upon the Mincio. General Bonaparte, who was perfectly acquainted with this theatre of operations, had recommended to him carefully to concentrate his troops as much as possible in Upper Italy; to take no heed what the Austrians might attempt towards the banks of the Po, in the Legations, or even in Tuscany; to remain steadily, as he had himself formerly done, at the *débouchés* of the Alps; and he was incessantly repeating that, when the Austrians should be beaten between the Mincio and the Adige, that is to say, on the line by which they enter Italy, all those who had passed the Po and penetrated into Central Italy would be in so much the greater danger.

The Austrians did actually seem disposed to come out of Ferrara and to threaten Bologna; but General Petitot found means to repress them, and the national guard of Bologna displayed on its part the firmest attitude.

Brune, straightways conforming to the instructions which he had received, advanced to the Mincio, between the 20th and 24th of December (29th Frimaire to 3rd Nivôse), took the positions which the Austrians had occupied in advance of that river, and made his dispositions for passing it on the morning of the 25th. General Delmas commanded his advanced guard, General Moncey his left, General Dupont his right, and General Michaud his reserve. Besides the cavalry and artillery distributed in the divisions, he had a considerable reserve of both.

In recording the first campaigns of General Bonaparte,\* we have already described this theatre as the scene of so many memorable events; we must, nevertheless, portray in a few words the configuration of the country. The mass of the waters of the Tyrol is discharged by the Adige into the Adriatic; hence the Adige forms a line of great strength. But, before you reach the line of the Adige, you come to one of minor importance, namely, that of the Mincio. The waters of several

\* In the *History of the French Revolution*.

valleys lateral to that of the Tyrol, at first accumulated in the Lake of Garda, afterwards pour themselves into the Mincio, tarry some time at Mantua, around which they form an inundation, and at last fall into the Po. There was, consequently, a double line to cross, first that of the Mincio, then that of the Adige, the latter being far the more considerable and the stronger of the two. It was requisite to cross both, and if this were done promptly enough to give a hand to Macdonald, who was marching by the Rocca d'Anfo and Trent to the Upper Adige, it would be possible to separate the Austrian army defending the Tyrol from the Austrian army defending the Mincio, and to take the former.

The line of the Mincio, seven or eight leagues long at most, appuying on the Lake of Garda on the one hand and Mantua on the other, bristling with artillery, and defended by 70,000 Austrians, under the command of the Count de Bellegarde, was not easy to force. The enemy had at Borghetto and Vallegio a well entrenched bridge, which enabled him to act on both banks. The river was not fordable at this season; and the mass of its waters had been further increased by closing all the canals which are supplied by it.

Brune, after collecting his columns, conceived the singular idea of crossing the Mincio at two points at once, at Pozzolo and at Mozzembano. Between these two points the river formed a bend, the convexity of which was turned towards our troops; moreover, the right bank, which we occupied, commanded the left bank occupied by the Austrians, so that at Mozzembano, as well as at Pozzolo, we could open a converging fire from higher batteries upon the enemy's bank, and thus cover the operation of a passage. But at both points the Austrians were found firmly seated behind the Mincio, covered with solid entrenchments, appuyed either on Mantua or on Peschiera. The advantages and the inconveniences of the passage were therefore nearly alike at Pozzolo and at Mozzembano. But what ought to have decided Brune to prefer one of the two points, no matter which, while he might have made a false demonstration on the other, was that between these two points there was a *tête de pont*, then occupied by the enemy. The Austrians, therefore, could debouch by this *tête de pont*, and throw themselves on one of the two operations with a view to interrupt it. It follows that only one should have been attempted, and that with the whole of the forces.

Brune, nevertheless, persisted in his double plan, apparently to divide the enemy's attention, and on the 25th of December made all necessary dispositions for a double passage. But difficulties which supervened in regard to carriage, difficulties extremely great at this season, prevented everything from

being ready at Mozzembano, the point at which Brune himself was with the greater part of his troops, and the operation was deferred till the next day. It would seem that, in this case, the second passage ought to have been countermanded; but Brune, having always considered the attempt near Pozzolo as a mere diversion, thought that the diversion would produce its effect with the greater certainty, if it preceded the principal operation by twenty-four hours.

Dupont, who commanded at Pozzolo, was an officer full of ardour: he advanced, on the morning of the 25th, to the bank of the Mincio, crowned with artillery the heights of Molino della Volta, which commanded the opposite bank, threw a bridge in a very short time, and, favoured by a thick fog, succeeded in passing Wattrin's division to the right bank. Meanwhile, Brune continued motionless with the left and the reserves at Mozzembano. General Suchet, placed between the two with the centre, masked the Austrian bridge of Borghetto. General Dupont, then, was on the left bank with a single corps, in presence of the whole Austrian army. It was easy to foresee the result. The Count de Bellegarde, without loss of time, directed the mass of his forces upon Pozzolo. General Dupont sent to apprise his neighbour, Suchet, and the commander-in-chief, of the success of the passage, and of the danger to which that success exposed him. General Suchet, like a brave and faithful comrade, hastened to the assistance of Dupont's division; but, on quitting Borghetto, he sent to beg Brune to provide for the guard of that *débouché*, which he left uncovered by his movement towards Pozzolo. Brune, instead of hurrying with all his forces to the point where a lucky accident had opened the passage of the Mincio to his army, Brune, still engrossed by his operation of the following day upon Mozzembano, never quitted his position. He approved the movement of General Suchet, at the same time recommending to him not to compromise himself on the other side of the river, and merely sent Boudet's division to mask the bridge of Borghetto.

But General Dupont, eager to follow up his success, was absolutely engaged. He had crossed the Mincio, taken Pozzolo, which is situated on the left bank, and carried successively Wattrin's and Monnier's divisions across the river. One of his wings was appuyed on Pozzolo, the other on the Mincio, under the protection of the elevated batteries of the right bank.

The Austrians marched with all their reinforcements upon that position. They were preceded by a great number of pieces of cannon. Fortunately, our artillery, placed at Molino della Volta, and firing from one bank to the other, protected our soldiers by the superiority of its fire. The Austrians fell furiously

upon Wattrin's and Monnier's divisions. The 6th light, the 28th, and the 40th of the line were well-nigh overwhelmed, but they resisted, with admirable intrepidity, all the joint assaults of the Austrian infantry and cavalry. Monnier's division, however, surprised in Pozzolo by a column of grenadiers, was dislodged. At this moment, Dupont's corps, separated from its principal *pont d'appui*, was on the point of being thrown into the Mincio. But General Suchet, arriving on the other bank with Gazan's division, and perceiving from the heights of Molino della Volta the serious danger of his brother commander, engaged with 10,000 men against 30,000, hastened to send him reinforcements. Restrained, at the same time, by the orders of Brune, he durst not send him the whole of Gazan's division, and threw Clauzel's brigade only to the other side of the river. This brigade was insufficient; and Dupont must have succumbed notwithstanding these succours, when the rest of Gazan's division, crowning the opposite bank, from which the Austrians could be reached with grape-shot and even by musketry, poured on them a murderous fire, and thus stopped them short. Dupont's troops, being supported, resumed the offensive, and made the Austrians fall back. General Suchet, seeing that the danger increased every moment, resolved to send Gazan's whole division to the other bank. The important point of Pozzolo was thenceforward most fiercely disputed. That village was six times taken and retaken. At nine o'clock at night, the combatants were still fighting by moonlight and in a severe frost. The French finally remained masters of the left bank, but they had lost the *élite* of four divisions. The Austrians had left 6000 dead or wounded on the field of battle, the French nearly as many. But for the arrival of General Suchet, our left wing would have been destroyed; and, as it was, he durst not engage completely, his hands being tied by the orders of the commander-in-chief. If M. de Bellegarde had directed his whole forces upon that point, or if he had debouched from the bridge of Borghetto, while Brune was immovable at Mozzembano, he might have inflicted a disaster on the centre and on the right of the French army.

Fortunately, he did nothing of the kind. The Mincio was thus crossed at one point. Brune persisted in his plan of passing the next day, the 26th of December, towards Mozzembano, thus exposing himself anew to the risks of an operation by main force. He covered the heights of Mozzembano with forty pieces of cannon, and, favoured by the fogs of the season, succeeded in throwing a bridge. The Austrians, fatigued with the preceding day, doubting the intention of a second passage, made less resistance than the day before, and suffered the neighbouring positions of Sallionzo and Vallegio to be taken from them.

The whole army debouched in this manner beyond the Mincio, and was enabled to march, with all its divisions united, for the second line, that of the Adige. The *tête de pont* of Borghetto must have fallen, as a matter of course, from the offensive movement of our columns. A fresh blunder was committed in sacrificing several hundred of our brave soldiers for the conquest of a point which was not tenable. Twelve hundred Austrians were made prisoners there.

The French were victorious, but at the cost of valuable blood, which Generals Bonaparte and Moreau would not have failed to spare the army. Lecourbe passed the rivers of Germany in a different manner. Brune, having forced the Mincio, advanced towards the Adige, which he ought to have crossed immediately. He was not ready to effect the passage till the 31st of December (10th Nivôse). On the 1st of January, General Delmas, with the advanced guard, crossed the river without accident at Bussolengo, above Verona. General Moncey, with the left, was to ascend to Trent, while the rest of the army descended again to envelop Verona.

Count de Bellegarde was at this moment in imminent danger. Part of the troops of the Tyrol, under General Laudon, had retired before Macdonald, and fallen back upon Trent. General Moncey, with his corps, was marching thither also, in reascending the Adige. General Laudon, hemmed in between Macdonald's corps and Moncey's, must succumb, unless he had time to escape into the valley of the Brenta, which, running beyond the Adige, terminates, after numerous windings, at Bassano. Brune, if he suddenly crossed the Adige, and vigorously pushed Count de Bellegarde beyond Verona, to Bassano itself, might anticipate at this latter point the corps of the Tyrol, and take it entire by closing the *débouché* of the Brenta.

An act not the most honourable of General Laudon's, and the tardiness of General Brune, extenuated, it is true, by the season, extricated the Tyrol corps from all these perils.

Macdonald had actually reached Trent, while Moncey's corps was proceeding thither, on its side. General Laudon, hemmed in between these two corps, had recourse to a falsehood. He assured General Moncey that an armistice had just been signed in Germany, and that this armistice extended to both armies, which was false; for the convention signed at Steyer by Moreau applied only to the armies operating upon the Danube. General Moncey, from a nice sense of honour, credited the statement of General Laudon, and opened to him the passes leading to the Brenta; so that he was enabled to rejoin the Count de Bellegarde in the environs of Bassano.

But the disasters in Germany were known. The Austrian army, beaten in Italy, pressed by an army of 90,000 men, since

the junction of Macdonald's and Brune's troops, could hold out no longer. An armistice was proposed to Brune, who hastened to accept it, and signed it on the 16th of January at Treviso. Brune, impatient to settle matters, demanded no more than the line of the Adige, with the fortresses of Ferrara, Peschiera, and Portolegnago. He never thought of requiring the cession of Mantua. Yet he had received specific orders not to halt till he had entered Isonzo, and made himself master of Mantua. That place was the only one which was worth the trouble; for all the others must have fallen as a matter of course. It was of especial importance to occupy it, that there might be a ground for demanding, at the congress of Luneville, its cession to the Cisalpine Republic.

While these events were occurring in Upper Italy, the Neapolitans penetrated into Tuscany. The Count de Damas, who commanded a corps of 16,000 men, 8000 of whom were Neapolitans, had advanced to Sienna. General Miollis, obliged to guard all the posts of Tuscany, had not more than 3500 disposable men, mostly Italians. He marched, nevertheless, to meet the Neapolitans. The brave soldiers of Pino's division rushed upon the advanced guard of the Count de Damas, overthrew it, forced an entrance into Sienna, and put to the sword a considerable number of the insurgents. The Count de Damas was obliged to fall back. Besides, Murat was advancing with his grenadiers, to wring from him the signature of a third armistice.

Thus the campaign was finished everywhere, and peace ensured. In every quarter our operations had been successful. Moreau's army, flanked by that of Augereau, had penetrated to the very gates of Vienna; Brune's, seconded by that of Macdonald, had passed the Mincio and the Adige, and advanced to Treviso. Though it had not entirely thrown the Austrians to the other side of the Alps, it had dispossessed them of sufficient territory to furnish the French negotiator at Luneville with powerful arguments against the pretensions of Austria in Italy. Murat was about to complete the submission of the court of Naples.

On receiving intelligence of the battle of Hohenlinden, the First Consul, who was said to be jealous of Moreau, was filled with sincere joy.\* This victory lost none of its value in his estimation because it was achieved by a rival. He deemed himself so superior to all his companions in arms in military glory and in political influence, that he felt no jealousy of any of them. Wholly devoted to the task of pacifying and

\* M. de Bourrienne says that "he leaped for joy;" and this paragraph is not to be suspected, for, though he owed everything to Napoleon, he seems not to have recollected this in his Memoirs.

reorganising France, he derived warm satisfaction from every event which contributed to facilitate his task, even when such events added to the fame of those men, who were destined afterwards to be set up for rivals to him.

What displeased him in this campaign was the useless effusion of French blood at Pozzolo, and especially the grievous fault of not demanding Mantua. He refused to ratify the convention of Treviso, and declared that he would give orders for the renewal of hostilities, if the fortress of Mantua were not immediately delivered to the French army.

All the while, Joseph Bonaparte and M. de Cobentzel were at Luneville, awaiting the events occurring on the Danube and the Adige. It is a singular situation, that of two negotiators, treating while hostilities are going on, witnesses, as it were, of the duel between two great nations, expecting every instant the news not of the death, but of the exhaustion of the one or the other. On this occasion, M. de Cobentzel displayed an energy of character, which may be held up as an example to men who are called to save their country in disastrous circumstances. He did not suffer himself to be disconcerted by the defeat of the Austrians at Hohenlinden, or by the passage of the Inn, the Salza, the Traun, &c. To all these events he replied, with imperturbable composure, that all this was certainly unfortunate, but that the Archduke Charles had recovered from his mortifications; that he had arrived at the head of the extraordinary levies of Bohemia and Hungary; that he had brought to the assistance of the capital 25,000 Bohemians and 75,000 Hungarians; that, in advancing farther, the French would meet with a resistance which they did not expect. At the same time, he persisted in all the pretensions of Austria, particularly in that of not treating without an English plenipotentiary, who would at least mask by his presence the real negotiations which might take place between the two legations. Sometimes he went so far as to say, that he would retire to Frankfort, and thus put an end to the hopes of peace, which the First Consul needed for lulling people's minds. At this threat, the First Consul, who never shuffled when any one tried to intimidate him, sent word to M. de Cobentzel, that if he left Luneville, all chance of an accommodation would be totally lost, and that the war should be pushed to the utmost extremity, even to the entire destruction of the Austrian monarchy.

Amidst this diplomatic struggle, M. de Cobentzel received intelligence of the armistice of Steyer, the emperor's order to treat on any terms, and, in particular, urgent injunctions to obtain an extension to Italy of the armistice already agreed on for Germany; for there would be nothing gained, if, after stopping one of the two French armies which were marching



for Vienna, the other should be suffered to reach that capital by the Friule and Carinthia. In consequence, M. de Cobentzel declared, on the 31st of December, that he was ready to treat without the concurrence of England, that he consented to sign preliminaries of peace, or a definitive treaty, whichever the French government pleased; but that, before he definitively committed himself by separating from England, he desired that an armistice common to Italy and Germany should be signed, and that some explanation respecting the conditions of peace should be entered into, at least in a general manner. For his part, he proposed these conditions: the Oglio, for the boundary of Austria in Italy, together with the Legations; and at the same time, the reinstatement of the Dukes of Modena and Tuscany in their former dominions.

These conditions were unreasonable. The First Consul would not have admitted them even before the successes of the winter campaign, and still less after them.

The reader has not forgotten the preliminaries signed by the Count de St. Julien. The treaty of Campo Formio was there adopted for basis, with this difference, that certain indemnities promised to Austria for various petty territories should be granted in Italy, instead of Germany. We have already mentioned the drift of this alteration; the treaty of Campo Formio assigned the Adige for the boundary between the Cisalpine Republic and Austria; by promising Austria indemnities in Italy, she was led to hope for the Mincio, for example, instead of the Adige, as a boundary, but the Mincio at most, and never the territory of the Legations, which the First Consul intended to dispose of otherwise.

The ideas of the First Consul were thenceforth fixed. He determined that Austria should pay the expenses of the winter campaign; he determined that she should have the Adige, and nothing more, and that she should receive no indemnity, either in Germany or Italy, for the small territories ceded on the left bank of the Rhine. As for the Legations, he meant to reserve them, and to make them subservient to various combinations. Hitherto they had belonged to the Cisalpine Republic. His design was either to leave them to it, or to devote them to the aggrandisement of the house of Parma, promised, by treaty, to the court of Spain. In this latter case, he should give Parma to the Cisalpine, Tuscany to the house of Parma, which would be a considerable aggrandisement, and the Legations to the Grand Duke of Tuscany. As for the Duke of Modena, Austria had promised, by the treaty of Campo Formio, to indemnify him for the loss of his duchy by means of the Brisgau. It was, therefore, for her to fulfil her engagements towards that prince.

The First Consul wished for something else, that was

thoroughly understood but very difficult to make Austria agree to. He wished not to be obliged, as after the peace of Campo Formio, to hold a congress with the princes of the empire, to obtain from each individually the formal cession of the right bank of the Rhine to France. He recollected the congress of Rastadt, which terminated in the murder of our plenipotentiaries; he recollected the trouble it had been to treat with each prince separately, and to agree with all those who had lost territories upon a system of indemnities that would satisfy them. In consequence, he required that the emperor should sign, as head of the house of Austria, for what related to his house, and, as emperor, for what related to the empire. In short, he wanted to have, in a single stroke, an acknowledgment of our conquests, both on the part of Austria and on the part of the Germanic confederation.

He, therefore, ordered his brother Joseph to notify to M. de Cobentzel the following conditions, as definitively fixed:—The left bank of the Rhine to France; the boundary of the Adige for Austria and the Cisalpine, without relinquishing the Legations; the Legations to the Duke of Tuscany; Tuscany to the Duke of Parma; Parma to the Cisalpine; the Brisgau to the Duke of Modena; lastly, peace to be signed by the emperor, both for himself and for the empire. As for the armistice in Italy, he was willing to grant it, on condition of the immediate delivery of the fortress of Mantua to the French army.

As the First Consul was acquainted with the Austrian manner of negotiating, and particularly that of M. de Cobentzel, he wished to cut short a great many difficulties, a great many oppositions, a great many threats of a feigned desperation; and he devised a new way of signifying his ultimatum. The Legislative Body had just assembled; it was proposed to it on the 2nd of January (12th Nivôse), to declare that the four armies commanded by Generals Moreau, Brune, Macdonald, and Augereau, were entitled to their country's thanks. A message, added to this proposal, announced that M. de Cobentzel had at length engaged to treat without the concurrence of England, and that the definitive condition of peace was the Rhine for France, and the Adige for the Cisalpine Republic. The message added that, in case these conditions were not accepted, the French would march on Prague, on Vienna, and on Venice, and there enforce them.

This communication was hailed with transport in Paris, but excited a strong emotion at Luneville. M. de Cobentzel raised great outcries against the hardness of these conditions, and particularly against their form. He complained bitterly that France seemed to be making the treaty by herself, without having to negotiate with anybody. He, nevertheless, continued

firm, and declared that Austria could not give way on all the points, that she would rather fall with arms in her hand than accede to such conditions. M. de Cobentzel consented, however, to fall back from the Oglio to the Chiesa, which runs between the Oglio and the Mincio, on condition of having Peschiera, Mantua, and Ferrara, without obligation to demolish those fortresses. He consented to indemnify the Duke of Modena with the Brisgau; but he insisted on the restitution of the dominions of the Duke of Tuscany. He spoke of formal guarantees to be given for the independence of Piedmont, Switzerland, the Holy See, Naples, &c. As for peace with the empire, he declared that the emperor was about to demand powers of the Germanic Diet, but that this sovereign would never take it upon him to treat for it without being authorised. He insisted further on the signature of an armistice in Italy, declaring that, as for Mantua, if Austria were to deliver that fortress to the French army, she would put all Italy at once into the hands of the French, and deprive herself of all means of resistance, if hostilities should be renewed. Adding caresses to firmness, M. de Cobentzel endeavoured to touch Joseph, by talking to him of the favourable dispositions of the emperor towards France, and particularly towards the First Consul, insinuating even that Austria might probably ally herself with the French Republic, and that such an alliance would be very serviceable against the secret but real ill-will of the northern courts.

Joseph, who was extremely mild, could not help being affected, to a certain degree, by the complaints, the threats, and the caresses of M. de Cobentzel. The First Consul roused his energy by numerous despatches. "You are forbidden," he wrote to him, "to admit of any discussion on the principle laid down in the ultimatum: *the Rhine and the Adige*. Stick to those two conditions as irrevocable. Hostilities shall not cease in Italy till Mantua is given up. If they begin again, the *thalweg* of the Adige shall be carried back to the Julian Alps, and Austria shall be excluded from Italy. If Austria," added the First Consul, "should talk of her friendship and her alliance, reply that those who have just shown themselves so attached to the English alliance cannot care about ours. Assume, in negotiating, the attitude of General Moreau, and force M. de Cobentzel to play the part of the Archduke John."

At length, after a further resistance of several days, intelligence more and more alarming every moment arriving from the banks of the Mincio—it must not be forgotten that hostilities continued in Lombardy longer than in Germany—M. de Cobentzel consented, on the 15th of January 1801 (25th Nivôse), that the Adige should be adopted for the boundary of the possessions of Austria in Italy. He ceased to mention

the Duke of Modena, but renewed the formal demand of the reinstatement of the Duke of Tuscany in his dominions. He consented further to declare that the peace of the empire should be signed at Luneville, but after the emperor should have obtained powers from the Germanic Diet. In the same protocol, this plenipotentiary again claimed an armistice for Italy, but without assenting to the condition which France attached to it—the immediate delivery of Mantua to our troops. His fear was, that after giving up this *point d'appui*, France would impose harder conditions; and, alarming as the resumption of hostilities appeared to him, he would not yet part with this pledge.

This persevering firmness in defending his country in so difficult a situation was natural and honourable, but at last it became imprudent, and led to consequences which M. de Cobenzel had not foreseen.

The occurrences in the North contributed as much as the victories of our armies to augment the pretensions of the First Consul. He had hitherto sought anxiously for peace with Austria, in the first place, to have peace, and, in the next, to secure himself against one of those changes of humour so frequent in the Emperor Paul. For some months past, it is true, that prince had shown a keen resentment against Austria and England; but a manœuvre of the Austrian or English cabinet might bring back the Czar to the coalition, and then France would again have all Europe upon her hands. It was this apprehension which had induced the First Consul to brave the inconveniences of a winter campaign, in order to crush Austria while she was deprived of the support of the forces of the Continent. The turn which events had recently taken in the North having relieved him from all fear on this head, he had become at once more patient and more exacting. Paul, in fact, had formally broken with his late allies, and thrown himself completely into the arms of France, with that warmth which he showed in all his actions. Strongly disposed to this line of conduct by the effect produced upon his mind by the victory of Marengo, by the restitution of the Russian prisoners, by the offer of the island of Malta, lastly, by the adroit and delicate flatteries of the First Consul, he had been definitively decided by a recent event. It will be recollected that the First Consul, despairing of saving Malta, strictly blockaded by the English, had conceived the happy idea of offering that island to Paul I.; that this prince had received that offer with transport; that he had commissioned M. de Sprengporten to go to Paris, to thank the head of the French government, to receive the Russian prisoners, and to conduct them to Malta, to form its garrison. But, in the meantime, General Vaubois, reduced to the last extremity, had been compelled to surrender the island to the

English. This event, which, under any other circumstances, must have mortified the First Consul, grieved him but little. "I have lost Malta," said he, "but I have put an apple of discord into the hands of my enemies." Paul hastened to claim from England the seat of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem; but the British cabinet, instead of giving it up, replied by a flat refusal. Paul was enraged beyond measure. He laid an embargo on the English shipping, caused so many as three hundred of their vessels at once to be seized in the ports of Russia, and even ordered such as endeavoured to escape to be sunk. This circumstance, added to the quarrel of the neutrals noticed above, could not fail to produce a war. The Czar put himself at the head of this quarrel, calling to his aid Sweden, Denmark, and even Prussia, and proposing to them to renew the league of maritime neutrality of 1780. He invited the King of Sweden to repair to St. Petersburg, to confer with him on this important subject. Gustavus went thither, and was magnificently entertained. Paul, full of the mania with which he was possessed, held at St. Petersburg a grand chapter of Malta, admitted as knights the King of Sweden and all the personages who accompanied him, and conferred most lavishly the honours of the Order. But he did something more serious—he immediately renewed the league of 1780. On the 26th of December, a declaration was signed by the ministers of Russia, Sweden, and Denmark, by which those three maritime powers engaged to maintain, even by arms, the principles of the law of neutrals. They specified all these principles in their declaration, without omitting one of those which we have mentioned, and which France had just induced America to recognise. They bound themselves, moreover, to unite their forces, and to direct them in common against any power whatever that should violate the rights which they alleged to belong to them. Denmark, though extremely zealous for the interests of the neutrals, would have been glad not to proceed so fast; but the ice defended her for three months, and she hoped that, before her waters were navigable, England would have given way, or at least that the preparations of the neutrals of the Baltic would be sufficient to prevent the British fleet from appearing before the Sound, as it had done in the month of August last. Prussia too, which would rather have negotiated than proceeded with such promptness, was hurried along like Sweden and Denmark, and gave her adhesion two days afterwards to the declaration of St. Petersburg.

These were important events, and ensured to France the alliance of the whole North of Europe against England; but these were not all the diplomatic successes of the First Consul. The Emperor Paul had proposed to Prussia to concur with

France in what was passing at Luneville, and to agree to three of the bases of the general peace. Now, the tenor of the communications \* of these two powers to our government entirely coincided with those principles on which France had most insisted at Luneville.

Prussia and Russia conceded the left bank of the Rhine, without dispute, to the French Republic; but they demanded an indemnity for the princes who lost portions of territory, but solely for the hereditary princes, and by means of the secularisation of the Ecclesiastical States. This was precisely the principle which Austria repudiated, and which France proposed. Russia and Prussia demanded the independence of Holland, of Switzerland, of Piedmont, and of Naples, which, at the moment, was in no way contrary to the designs of the First Consul. The Emperor Paul interfered in behalf of Naples and Piedmont, solely on account of the treaty of alliance concluded with those States in 1798, when it had been necessary to involve them in the second coalition war; but he meant to protect Naples only on condition that this court should break with England. As for Piedmont, he claimed but a slight indemnity for the cession of Savoy to France. He thought it right, and Prussia with him, that France should curb the ambition of Austria in Italy, and confine her within the boundary of the Adige. Paul became at last so ardent, that he proposed to the First Consul to form a close alliance with him against England, and to engage not to make peace with her until the restitution of Malta to the Order of St. John of Jerusalem. This was more than was desired by the First Consul, who was shy of such absolute engagements. Paul, wishing appearances to correspond with the real state of things, opened, instead of the clandestine communications between M. de Krudener and General Beurnonville in Berlin, a public negotiation in Paris itself. He accordingly appointed M. de Kalitscheff as plenipotentiary to treat ostensibly with the French cabinet. M. de Kalitscheff received orders to repair immediately to France. This negotiator was the bearer of a letter addressed to the First Consul, and, moreover, written by the Emperor Paul with his own hand. We already had M. de Sprengporten in Paris; we were now about to have M. de Kalitscheff: it was not possible to desire a more signal reconciliation of Russia with France.

Thus the face of things was changed in Europe, in the North as well as in the South. In the North, the maritime powers, at open war with England, sought to join with us against her, by absolute engagements. In the South, Spain was bound to us by the closest ties: she threatened Portugal, to compel her to

\* Letter of the King of Prussia of the 14th of January, communicated by M. de Luchesini.

break with Great Britain. Lastly, Austria, worsted in Germany and Italy, left by all the powers at our mercy, had nothing but the daring obstinacy of her negotiator at Luneville to defend her.

These events, the fruits of the ability of the First Consul, followed each other in rapid succession in the first days of January. Prussia and Russia, in fact, manifested their desire for the peace of the Continent; and Paul, with his own hand, apprised the First Consul of the mission of M. de Kalitscheff, at the very moment when M. de Cobentzel, giving way as to the boundary of the Adige, but obstinately standing out in regard to all the rest, refused the delivery of Mantua, as the price of an armistice in Italy.

The First Consul immediately wished to retard the progress of the negotiation at Luneville. He directed instructions to be given to Joseph, and wrote to him,\* prescribing a new line of conduct to our legation. In a state of crisis, such as Europe was in at that time, he thought it inexpedient to be in a hurry. It was possible, in fact, that too much might have been ceded, or something stipulated, which might have run counter to the views of the northern courts. Anticipating besides, that M. de Kalitscheff would arrive in a few days, he wished to see him, before he concluded definitively. Instructions were therefore transmitted to Joseph, to temporise for at least ten days before he signed, and to require conditions still more stringent than the preceding.

Austria had consented to confine herself within the Adige. The construction which the First Consul now sought to put upon this was, that the Duke of Tuscany was not to remain in Italy, but should receive, like the Duke of Modena, an indemnity in Germany. His ultimate object was not to leave a single Austrian prince in Italy. To leave the Duke of Tuscany in Tuscany, was, in his views, equivalent to giving Leghorn to the English; to remove him to the Legations, was granting Austria a footing beyond the Po. In consequence, he adopted the idea of transferring Tuscany to the house of Parma, as he had stipulated at Madrid, thereby converting Leghorn into a Spanish arsenal, and of thenceforth including the whole valley of the Po in the Cisalpine Republic: for, according to this plan, it would comprehend the Milanese, the Mantuan, Plaisance, Parma, Modena, and the Legations. Piedmont, at the entrance of that valley, would in future be but a vassal of France. Austria, limited by the Adige, would be thrown to one extremity of Italy; Rome and Naples confined to the other extremity; France, with Tuscany and the Cisalpine for her advanced posts, would control and sway that superb country. Joseph Bonaparte was

\* Letter dated 1st Pluviose—21st January. *State Papers of the*

therefore directed by his new instructions to require that the Duke of Tuscany should, like the Duke of Modena, be removed into Germany; that the scheme for the secularisation of the ecclesiastical States should be realised to indemnify the hereditary German princes, as well as the Italian princes, dispossessed by France; that the peace with the empire should be signed at the same time as the peace with Austria, without even waiting for the sanction of the Diet; that nothing should be stipulated respecting Naples, Rome, and Piedmont, because France, though willing to preserve those States, desired first to arrange with them the conditions of their preservation; lastly, that Mantua should be delivered up to the French army, under threat of immediate renewal of hostilities.

Nothing is more usual, when a negotiation is still pending, when a treaty is not signed, nothing is more common than to modify the proposed conditions. The French cabinet, therefore, was quite justified in departing from its first conditions; but it must be confessed that, in this case, the alterations were abrupt and extensive.

M. de Cobenzel, by waiting too long, by demanding too much, by being wilfully blind to his real position, had lost the favourable moment. According to his custom, he complained bitterly, and threatened France with the desperation of Austria. He was, nevertheless, pressed to obtain the armistice for Italy, and made up his mind to concede Mantua; but he feared lest, after he had given up this bulwark, he should be at the mercy of France, and that fresh demands should be brought forward. In this frame of mind, he showed himself mistrustful and captious, and would not relinquish Mantua till at the last extremity. At length, on the 26th of January (6th Pluviôse), he signed the surrender of that fortress to the French army, to obtain an armistice in Italy and a prolongation of the armistice in Germany. The negotiators immediately despatched couriers from Luneville to the Adige, to prevent an effusion of blood, which was imminent.

Warm discussions ensued at the conferences, which were held at Luneville, on the following days. M. de Cobenzel said that he had been promised the re-establishment of the grand duke on the very day that he had consented to the boundary of the Adige. Joseph replied, that this was true, but that the re-establishment of this prince was to be granted in Germany; that every State availed itself of its present situation to treat more advantageously; that France, in acting thus, adopted the very principles expressed by M. de Thugut in his letters of the preceding winter; that, moreover, the grand duke, whose case was under discussion, would be in Tuscany, cut off from Austria and unsupported: that, in the Legations, on the contrary, he would



be too well placed, as he would serve for a link between Austria, Rome, and Naples, that is to say, between the enemies of France, an arrangement to which France would never consent. The idea of placing him either in Tuscany or in the Legations should, therefore, be relinquished.

After vehement controversies, M. de Cobentzel seemed at last to consent that the indemnities for the grand duke should be taken in Germany; but he would not admit the absolute principle of the secularisation of the ecclesiastical States. The ecclesiastical States were devoted to Austria, especially the three archbishop-electors of Treves, Cologne, and Mayence, whereas the hereditary princes, on the contrary, were often opposed to her interest in the Germanic Diet. Austria assented to the secularisations, understood in this way, that the small ecclesiastical States should serve to indemnify not only the hereditary princes of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, and Orange, but the great ecclesiastical princes, such as the archbishops of Treves, Cologne, and Mayence; for then her influence in Germany would have been in part maintained. Joseph Bonaparte had orders to make an obstinate opposition to this proposal. He was to admit the principle of secularisations solely for the benefit of the hereditary princes. Lastly, M. de Cobentzel would not sign the peace for the empire without powers from the Diet. This refusal proceeded, according to him, from a reluctance to violate forms; but in reality from an unwillingness to render too evident the part usually played by Austria in regard to the members of the Germanic body, a part which consisted in compromising them with France, whenever it was to the interest of Austria to do so, and afterwards deserting them, when the war had been disastrous. In 1797, she had delivered Mayence to the French, a proceeding most severely censured by all Germany; and now to sign for the empire, without powers from the Diet, seemed to M. de Cobentzel a new and very grievous act, to add to all the anterior acts with which the German princes reproached their sovereign. To these reasons Joseph Bonaparte replied, that it was easy to perceive the real motive of Austria; that she was afraid of committing herself with the Germanic body, but that it was not for France to heed such considerations; that, as to form, there was a precedent in the peace of Baden, signed by the emperor in 1714, without powers from the Diet; that, besides, the emperor was now only asked to sanction what the representatives of the empire had already assented to at Rastadt, that is to say, the cession of the left bank of the Rhine to France; and that his refusal would be a sorry service rendered to Germany, for the French armies would continue in the territories occupied by them till peace was concluded with the empire; whereas, if the peace were common to all

the German princes, the evacuation would immediately follow the ratifications.

These discussions lasted several days. M. de Cobentzel was, nevertheless, anxious to conclude. The French negotiator, on his side, though at first desirous to defer the signature of the treaty for a few days, being now apprised that M. de Kalitscheff would not arrive in Paris so soon as he was at first expected, saw no further advantage in temporising: he too was desirous to bring matters to a close. Orders had, in fact, been given to the two plenipotentiaries to come to an agreement; and, to decide M. de Cobentzel, Joseph Bonaparte had been authorised to make one of those concessions, which, at the last moment, serve for a pretext to an exhausted negotiator for yielding with honour. The *thalweg*\* of the Rhine was the limit assigned to France and Germany; consequently Düsseldorf, Ehrenbreitstein, Philipsburg, Kehl, Old Breisach, situated on the right bank, though attached to the left bank by many ties, were to be left to the Germanic Confederation. But Cassel, a suburb of Mayence, on the right bank, was a subject of dispute, for that suburb could scarcely be separated from the city itself. Joseph was authorised to cede Cassel, but on condition that it should be dismantled. Mayence would thus cease to be longer a fortified *tête de pont*, affording a passage at all times to the right bank of the Rhine.

The last conference was held on the 9th of February 1801 (20th Pluviôse, year IX.). As it usually happens, the negotiators were never nearer to a rupture than when they were on the point of agreeing definitively. M. de Cobentzel warmly insisted on the maintenance of the Grand Duke of Tuscany in Italy; on the indemnity destined for the German princes, an indemnity which he wished to extend to the ecclesiastical princes of the first order; lastly, on the inconvenience of signing for the Germanic body, without having powers from the Diet. An article relative to the debts of Belgium also gave rise to great difficulties. On all these accounts he at last declared that he durst not conclude without referring to Vienna. Joseph thereupon replied that his government enjoined him to declare the negotiations at an end, unless they brought them to a termination before they broke up; he added that in the event of another campaign Austria would be thrown back beyond the Julian Alps. At length he ceded Cassel, besides all the fortified positions on the right bank, but on condition that France should demolish before she evacuated them, and that they should never be reconstructed.

Upon this concession M. de Cobentzel yielded, and the treaty was signed on the 9th of February 1801, at half-past five in

\* The middle of the stream.—*Translator.*

the evening, to the great joy of Joseph, to the great grief of M. de Cobentzel, who, however, had nothing to reproach himself with; for, if he had endangered the interests of his court, it was because he had persisted in defending them too warmly.

Such was the celebrated treaty of Luneville, which terminated the war of the second coalition, and for the second time conceded to France the left bank of the Rhine, with a commanding situation in Italy. The principal clauses were as follows:—

The *tialweg* of the Rhine, from its exit out of the Helvetic territory to its entry into the Batavian territory, formed the boundary of France and Germany. Düsseldorf, Ehrenbreitstein, Cassel, Kehl, Philipsburg, Old Breisach, situated on the right bank, were left to Germany, but were first to be dismantled. The hereditary princes who suffered losses on the left bank were to be indemnified. No mention was made of the ecclesiastical princes or of the mode of fixing the indemnities; but it was perfectly understood that the whole or part of the ecclesiastical territories were to serve for the indemnities.

The emperor, at Luneville as at Campo Formio, ceded the Belgic provinces to France, as well as the small territories which he possessed on the left bank, such as the county of Falkenstein, and the Frickthal, which lay wedged in between Zurzach and Basle. He gave up, moreover, the Milanese to the Cisalpine. For these he obtained no other indemnity than the Venetian States as far as the Adige, which had been previously ensured to him by the treaty of Campo Formio. He lost the archbishopric of Salzburg, which had been promised him by a secret article of the same treaty. His house was, besides, deprived of Tuscany, which was ceded to the house of Parma. An indemnity in Germany was promised to the Duke of Tuscany. The promise of the Breisgau was still held out to the Duke of Modena.

The territorial distribution of Italy was thus settled on a much more advantageous basis for France than at the time of the treaty of Campo Formio. Austria continued to have the Adige for her boundary; but Tuscany was taken from her house and given to a house dependent on France; the English were excluded from Leghorn; the whole valley of the Po, from the Sesia and the Tamaro to the Adriatic, belonged to the Cisalpine Republic, a dependent daughter of the French Republic; lastly, Piedmont, confined to the sources of the Po, was dependent on us. Thus, masters of Tuscany and the Cisalpine, we occupied all Central Italy, and prevented Austria from giving a hand to Piedmont, the Holy See, and Naples.

By the first coalition, Austria had lost Belgium and Lombardy, besides Modena, for her family. By the second, she

lost the bishopric of Salzburg for herself, and Tuscany for her house, which placed her in a position somewhat inferior in Germany, but very inferior in Italy. This was certainly not too much for all the bloodshed, for all the efforts imposed upon France.

The principle of the secularisations was not explicitly but implicitly laid down, since it was promised to indemnify the hereditary princes without alluding to the ecclesiastical princes. Evidently the indemnity could not be demanded of any but the ecclesiastical princes themselves.

The peace was declared common to the Batavian, Helvetic, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republics. Their independence was guaranteed: nothing was said concerning Naples, Piedmont, or the Holy See. These States were dependent on the pleasure of France, which, for the rest, was tied in regard to Piedmont and Naples, by the interest which the Emperor Paul took in behalf of those two courts, and in regard to the Holy See, by the religious plans of the First Consul.

The First Consul, however, as we have seen, had not thought fit to explain himself to any one relative to Piedmont. Displeased with the King of Sardinia, who gave up his ports to the English, he was desirous of keeping himself at liberty in regard to a territory situated so near to France and of such high importance to her.

The emperor signed the peace for himself as sovereign of the Austrian States, and for the whole Germanic body as Emperor of Germany. France promised secretly to use her influence with Prussia to dispose her to approve this mode of proceeding of the emperor's. The ratifications were to be exchanged in thirty days by Austria and by France. The French armies were not to evacuate Germany till the ratifications had been exchanged at Luneville, but were to have evacuated it entirely a month after that exchange.

Here, as at Campo Formio, the liberation of all persons confined for political offences was stipulated. It was agreed that the Italians, shut up in the prisons of Austria, particularly Moscati and Caprara, should be released. The First Consul had not ceased to insist on this act of humanity ever since the opening of the congress.

General Bonaparte had attained the supreme power on the 9th of November 1799 (18th Brumaire, year VIII.); it was now the 9th of February 1801 (20th Pluviôse, year IX.); consequently just fifteen months had elapsed, and France, partly reorganised at home, completely victorious abroad, was already at peace with the Continent, and in alliance with the North and the South of Europe against England. Spain was preparing to march against Portugal; the Queen of Naples had thrown

herself at our feet; the court of Rome was negotiating in Paris the arrangement of religious affairs.

General Bellavène, appointed to carry the treaty, left Lunéville in the evening of the 9th of February, and arrived as an extraordinary courier in Paris. The treaty which he brought was immediately inserted entire in the *Moniteur*. Paris was suddenly illuminated; vehement and general joy burst forth on all sides; and thanks without number were given to the First Consul for this happy result of his victories and his policy.

## BOOK VIII.

### INFERNAL MACHINE.

WHILE the external position of France was daily becoming more brilliant, while Germany and Austria were treating for peace, while the northern powers were leaguings with us to resist the maritime pretensions of England, while Portugal and Naples were closing their ports against her, and while, in short, everything was succeeding to the wish of a victorious and moderate government, her internal situation exhibited a spectacle, at times frightful, of the last convulsions of expiring parties. We have already seen, in spite of the prompt reorganisation of the government, robbery infesting the highroads, and factions, in despair, attempting the assassination of the First Consul. These were the inevitable consequences of our past disunion. The men whom civil war had trained to crime, and who could no longer resign themselves to a peaceable and honest life, sought employment on the highways. The broken-down factions, despairing of overpowering the consular guard, attempted to destroy, by atrocious means, the invincible author of their defeat.

Robbery had increased on the approach of winter. It was impossible to travel the roads without running the risk of being plundered or murdered. The departments of Normandy, Anjou, Maine, Bretagne, and Poitou, were, as formerly, the theatres of these depredations. But the evil had spread. Several departments of the Centre and the South, as those of the Tarn, La Lozère, the Aveyron, the Upper Garonne, l'Herault, the Gard, the Ardèche, the Drôme, Vaucluse, the Bouches du Rhone, the Upper and Lower Alps, the Var, had been infested in their turn. In these departments the bands of robbers had been recruited by the assassins of the South, who, upon pretext of chastising Jacobins, murdered, for the purpose of robbing, the purchasers of national domains; by young men who would not submit to the conscription; and by some soldiers whom want had driven from the army of Liguria, during the cruel winter of 1799 and 1800. These wretched men, having once entered upon this criminal life, had taken a liking to it; and nothing but the force of arms and the severity of the laws could now

divert them from those courses. They stopped the public conveyances; they kidnapped from their homes the purchasers of national domains, and frequently opulent landed proprietors also, carried them into the woods, as they did the senator Clement de Ris, for example, whom they detained for twenty days, inflicted horrible tortures on their victims, sometimes burning their feet, till they had paid considerable sums for their ransom. They plundered more especially the public chests, and even seized the funds of the State at the houses of the collectors, upon pretext of making war upon the government. Vagabonds, who, in these times of trouble, had left their homes to follow a wandering life, served them for scouts, by assuming the character of beggars in the towns. These wretches, picking up all sorts of information while engaged in begging, intimated to the robbers, their accomplices, what carriages to stop and what houses to plunder.

Small bodies of troops had been required to repress these bands. When any of them were taken, justice could not take its course, for the witnesses durst not give evidence, and the juries were afraid to convict. Extraordinary measures are always to be regretted, not so much on account of the severities attendant on them, as the shock which they give to the constitution of a country, especially when that constitution is new. But, in this case, measures of that kind were indispensable; for ordinary justice, after it had been tried, was found to be powerless. A bill (*projet de loi*) had been prepared for instituting special tribunals for the suppression of highway robbery. This bill, presented to the Legislative Body, which was then sitting, was violently attacked by the opposition. The First Consul, exempt from those scruples of legality which are felt only in times of quiet, and which, even when they happen to be petty or narrow, are at least a happy sign of respect for the authority of the law, the First Consul had not hesitated to have recourse to martial law till the plan under discussion should be adopted. As it was necessary to employ bodies of troops to suppress these bands of robbers, the gendarmerie not being strong enough to cope with them, he thought that this situation might be assimilated to a state of real war, which authorised the application of the laws peculiar to the state of war. He formed several small corps, which scoured the infested departments, and were accompanied by military commissions. All the robbers taken in arms were tried within forty-eight hours and shot.

The horror excited by these villains was so great and so general, that nobody durst raise a doubt as to the regularity or the justice of these executions. Meanwhile, villains of another stamp were meditating the destruction of the consular government by different and still more atrocious means. While

Demerville, Ceracchi, and Aréna were undergoing judicial examination, their adherents of the revolutionary party continued to form a thousand schemes, the one more insane than the other. They had planned the assassination of the First Consul in his box at the Opera, and had scarcely dared, as we have seen, to grasp their daggers. Now, they were dreaming of something else. One day they proposed to excite a disturbance at the breaking up of one of the theatres, and to despatch the First Consul amidst the tumult; on another, to seize him on his way to Malmaison, and to murder him after they had carried him off. Like genuine declaimers at clubs, they talked of these schemes everywhere and aloud, so that the police was informed from hour to hour of each of their plans. But, while they talked incessantly, not one of them was bold enough to act. M. Fouché feared them but little, and yet watched them with continual attention. However, among their numerous devices, there was one more formidable than the rest, and which had roused the particular vigilance of the police. One Chevalier, a workman employed in the manufactories of arms established in Paris under the Convention, had been found at work upon a frightful machine. It was a barrel filled with powder and langrage to which was adjusted a musket-barrel with a trigger. This machine was evidently destined to blow up the First Consul. The inventor was apprehended and thrown into prison. This new contrivance made some noise, and contributed greatly to keep all eyes fixed on those who were called Jacobins and Terrorists. Their reputation of '93 caused them to be more feared than they deserved to be. The First Consul, as we have already said, participated in the error of the public respecting them; and, having continually to do with the revolutionary party, sometimes with honest men of that party dissatisfied with too rapid a reaction, sometimes with villains planning crimes which they no longer had the energy to commit, he laid the blame of everything upon the revolutionists, was angry with none but them, talked of punishing them alone. M. Fouché persisted, but to no purpose, in directing his attention to the royalists. It would have required strong facts to change the opinion of the First Consul and that of the public on this subject. Unfortunately, atrocious facts were in course of preparation.

Georges, having returned from London to the Morbihan, was full of money, thanks to the English, and secretly directed the plunderers of the diligences. He had sent some of his cut-throats to Paris, for the purpose of murdering the First Consul. Among them were two men, named Limoëlan and St. Réjant, both practised in the horrors of the civil war, and the latter, formerly a naval officer, having some knowledge of gunnery.



To these two he added a third, called Carbon, a subordinate person, the worthy tool of those great criminals. Arriving in Paris one after another, towards the end of November (first days of Frimaire), they sought the surest means of killing the First Consul, and made more than one trial with air-guns in the neighbourhood of Paris. Fouché, the minister, apprised of their presence and of their errand, had them closely watched. But, owing to the inefficiency of two agents employed to follow these men, he had lost sight of them. While the police was making every exertion to discover traces of them, these villains had buried themselves in profound obscurity. Without declaiming, like the Jacobins, or communicating their secret to any one, they prepared for an atrocious deed, which has been equalled but once, and in our own times. Chevalier's machine had suggested to them the idea of destroying the First Consul by means of a barrel of powder charged with langrage. They resolved to put this barrel into a small cart, and to place it in one of the narrow streets which then led to the Carrousel, and through which the First Consul very frequently passed in his carriage. They bought a horse and a cart, and hired a cart-house, passing themselves off for foreign traders. St. Réjant, who, as we have just said, was a naval officer and artilleryist, made the necessary experiments, went several times to the Carrousel, to see the First Consul's carriage leave the Tuileries, to calculate how long it took to reach the neighbouring streets, and to arrange everything in such a manner that the barrel should explode at the right time. These three men chose, for the accomplishment of their plan, a day when the First Consul was to go to the Opera to hear Haydn's oratorio of "The Creation," which was to be performed for the first time. It was the 3rd Nivôse (December 24, 1800). They selected for the theatre of the crime the Rue St. Nicaise, which ran from the Carrousel to the Rue de Richelieu, and through which the First Consul was in the habit of passing very often. Several successive windings in this street must necessarily slacken the progress of the most expert driver. The day having arrived, Carbon, St. Réjant, and Linoëlan drove their cart to the Rue St. Nicaise, and then separated. While St. Réjant was to set fire to the barrel of powder, the two others were to place themselves within sight of the Tuileries, and to come and give him notice the moment they saw the First Consul's carriage make its appearance. St. Réjant had the barbarity to get a girl of fifteen to hold the horse harnessed to this horrible machine. For his part, he kept himself in readiness to set fire to it.

At this very moment, the First Consul, fatigued with business, was hesitating about going to the Opera, but he suffered himself to be persuaded by the earnest solicitations of those

about him, and set out from the Tuileries at a quarter past eight o'clock. He was accompanied by Generals Lannes, Berthier, and Lauriston, and escorted by a detachment of mounted grenadiers. Most fortunately these grenadiers followed, instead of preceding, the carriage. It arrived in the narrow part of the Rue St. Nicaise, without having been announced either by the detachment or by the accomplices. The latter never came to apprise St. Réjant. Fear had prevented their doing so, or perhaps they had not recognised the First Consul's carriage. St. Réjant himself did not perceive it till it was a little past the machine. He was violently jostled by one of the horse-guards, but, not disconcerted, he set fire, and instantly took to flight. The First Consul's coachman, who was a capital whip, and usually drove his master with extreme rapidity, had had time to pass one of the turnings of the street, when the explosion was suddenly heard. The shock was tremendous; the carriage was nearly overturned; all the windows were broken, and the fronts of the neighbouring houses were shattered by the discharge. One of the horse-grenadiers was slightly wounded, and all the surrounding streets were instantly strewed with a great number of persons dead or dying. The First Consul and those who accompanied him, at first conceived that they had been fired at with grape; they stopped for a moment, soon learned the real state of the case, and pursued their way. The First Consul insisted on going to the Opera. He appeared calm, unmoved, amidst the extraordinary agitation that prevailed in all parts of the house. It was reported that, in order to despatch him, banditti had blown up a whole quarter of Paris.

He stayed but a few moments at the Opera, and returned immediately to the Tuileries, where, on the report of the attempt, an immense concourse had collected. His anger, which he had before repressed, then burst forth. "It is the Jacobins, the Terrorists," he exclaimed; "it is those wretches in permanent revolt, in *bataillon carré* against every government, it is the cut-throats of the 2nd and 3rd of September, the ringleaders of the 31st of May, the conspirators of Prairial; it is those villains, who, to assassinate me, have not scrupled to sacrifice thousands of lives. I will do signal justice upon them." There was no need for an impulsion from so high a quarter to inflame the public opinion against the revolutionists. Their exaggerated reputation, and their attempts for two or three months past, were such as to cause every possible crime to be attributed to them. In that saloon, thronged more especially by those who were anxious that their attachment should be remarked, there was soon but one cry against the Terrorists, as they were called. The numerous enemies of M. Fouché hastened to profit by the

occasion, and to launch forth into invectives against him. His police, said they, sees nothing, allows anything to be done; it shows a criminal indulgence towards the revolutionary party. This is owing to M. Fouché's fellow-feeling for his old accomplices. The life of the First Consul would no longer be safe in his hands. In a moment the animosity against that minister was at its height; that very evening it was asserted that he had been dismissed. As for M. Fouché, retiring into a corner of the saloon of the Tuileries, with a few persons who did not share the general excitement, he listened to the accusations preferred against him with the utmost composure. His air of incredulity inflamed still more the anger of his enemies. Still he would not disclose what he knew, for fear of marring the success of the researches that were on foot. But, recollecting the agents of Georges, dogged for some time by the police, and afterwards lost sight of, he did not hesitate in his own mind to impute the crime to them. Certain members of the Council of State would have addressed some observations to the First Consul, and expressed their doubts as to the real authors of the attempt in the Rue St. Nicaise: he flew into a violent passion. "I am not to be bamboozled," he exclaimed. "This is no attempt of Chouans or emigrants, or *ci-devant* nobles and priests. I know the authors; I shall be sure to get at them, and to inflict on them an exemplary punishment." While uttering these words, his speech was vehement, his gesture threatening. His flatterers applauded and excited that anger which should have been soothed, not inflamed, after the horrible events which had just agitated all around.

On the following day, the same scenes were repeated. According to a custom recently introduced, the Senate, the Legislative Body, the Tribunate, the Council of State, the judges, the administrative authorities, the staffs, waited upon the First Consul, to express their grief and indignation, sentiments sincerely and universally felt. Never, indeed, had such a thing been seen. The Revolution had familiarised men's minds with the cruelties of dominant factions, but not yet with the dark plots of vanquished parties. People were filled with surprise and dismay: they dreaded the repetition of these atrocious attempts, and asked each other in consternation what would become of France, if the man who alone curbed these wretches were to be cut off. All the bodies of the State, admitted into the Tuileries, expressed ardent attachment to the hero-pacificator, who had promised to restore, and who was actually restoring, peace to the world. The terms of these addresses were commonplace, but the sentiment which pervaded them all was not less genuine than profound. The First Consul replied to the Municipal Council: "I have been touched by the proofs of affection which the people of Paris have shown me on this occasion. I deserve them, because

the only aim of my thoughts, of my actions, is to augment the prosperity and the glory of France. While those banditti confined themselves to direct attacks upon me, I could leave to the laws the task of punishing them; but, since they have just endangered part of the population of the capital by a crime unexampled in history, the punishment shall be equally speedy and terrible. Assure the people of Paris, in my name, that that handful of villains, whose crimes have gone far to dishonour liberty, shall soon be deprived of the power to do mischief."

Every one applauded these words of vengeance, for there was not a person but, for his own part, made use of similar expressions. Men of reflection anticipated with pain that the enraged lion might, perhaps, overleap the barrier of the laws; but the multitude called for punishment. In Paris, the agitation was extreme. The royalists threw the guilt on the revolutionists, and the revolutionists on the royalists. Both were equally sincere, for the crime remained a profound secret to all but its authors. Every one descanted on the subject, and, according to his inclination to condemn one party rather than another, found reasons equally plausible for accusing the royalists or the revolutionists. The enemies of the Revolution, both old and new, said that the Terrorists alone could have devised so atrocious a scheme, and adduced as a conclusive proof of their opinion, the machine of Chevalier, the gunsmith, recently discovered. Sagacious persons, on the contrary, who had steadfastly clung to the Revolution, asked why those highway robbers, those *Chauffeurs*, who committed so many crimes, who daily displayed an unparalleled refinement in cruelty, and who, in particular, had just carried off the senator Clement de Ris, why these men might not be the authors of the horrible explosion in the Rue St. Nicaise as well as the so-called Terrorists. It should, moreover, be borne in mind that persons of sedate minds could scarcely obtain a hearing at that moment, so deeply was public opinion agitated, and so strong was the tendency to condemn the revolutionary party. But, will it be believed, amidst the conflict of diverse imputations, there were men of both parties inconsiderate or perverse enough to hold a totally different language. Certain factious royalists longed for the destruction of the First Consul at any rate, and adopting the general opinion which attributed the crime to the Terrorists, admired the atrocious energy, the profound secrecy, which had been required for the commission of such a deed. The revolutionists, on the contrary, seemed almost to claim the merit for their party; and there were among them braggarts of crime, who had the culpable folly of being almost proud of the execrable act that was imputed to them. It is only in times of civil war that we meet with such levity and such unprincipled language among

men who would themselves be incapable of perpetrating the deeds which they dare to approve.

We may further add, that all who talked of this event were totally wrong. The minister Fouché alone suspected who were the real culprits.

While he was engaged in searching after them, everybody was asking what was to be done to prevent future attempts of the same kind. People were, at that time, so accustomed to violent measures, that they thought it almost natural to seize the men known to have been formerly Terrorists, and to treat them as they had treated their victims in '93. The two sections of the Council of State, to whose province this subject more particularly belonged, the sections of legislation and of the interior, assembled two days after the event, on the 26th of December (5th Nivôse), to inquire which of the various plans proposed was most admissible. As the bill (*projet de loi*) to institute special tribunals was then under discussion, it was suggested that two clauses should be added to it. The first instituting a military commission for the trial of crimes committed against the members of the government; the second investing the First Consul with authority to remove from Paris men whose presence in the capital should be deemed dangerous, and to punish them with transportation, if they should attempt to disregard such first exile.

After the preliminary investigation of this subject in the two sections of legislation and of the interior, the whole Council of State met under the presidency of the First Consul. M. Portalis reported what had passed in the morning in the two sections, and submitted their propositions to the Council. The First Consul, out of temper, thought these propositions defective. A mere change of jurisdiction appeared to him totally inadequate to the circumstances. He was for apprehending the Jacobins *en masse*, shooting those who should be convicted of having had a hand in the crime, and transporting the others. But it was his wish to accomplish this by means of an extraordinary measure, in order to be more sure of the result. "The proceedings of a special tribunal," said he, "will be slow, and not reach the real criminals. Our business now is not to frame a system of judicial metaphysics. Metaphysical minds have ruined everything in France for the last ten years. We must judge of the situation like statesmen, and apply a remedy to it like resolute men. What is the evil that annoys us? There are in France 10,000 scoundrels, spread over the whole country, who have persecuted all the honest people, and who are steeped in blood. All are not guilty in the same degree, far from it. Many are still open to repentance, and are not incorrigible criminals: but, while they see the headquarters established in

Paris, and the chiefs concocting plots with impunity, they retain hope, and keep up their spirits. Strike the chiefs boldly, and the soldiers will disperse. They will return to those occupations from which they were driven by a violent revolution; they will forget that stormy passage in their lives, and again become peaceable citizens. Honest men, who are now in constant fear, will take courage, and attach themselves to a government which has known how to protect them. There is no middle course; either we must pardon all, like Augustus, or vengeance, prompt, terrible, and proportionate to the crime must overtake them. As many of the guilty must be sacrificed as there have been victims. Fifteen or twenty of these villains must be shot, and 200 of them transported. By these means we shall rid the Republic of agitators who convulse it; we shall clear it of such sanguinary scum." . . . At each successive sentence, the First Consul became more and more animated; and, nettled at the disapprobation even which he perceived in certain countenances, "I am," he exclaimed, "I am so convinced of the necessity and justice of a strong measure, to purify, and, at the same time, to quiet France, that I am ready to constitute myself sole judge, to have the culprits brought before me, to examine them, to try them, and to order sentence of condemnation to be executed. All France will applaud me, for it is not my own person that I here seek to avenge. My fortune, which has preserved me so often on the field of battle, will continue to preserve me. I think not of myself; I think of social order, which it is my mission to re-establish, and of the national honour, which it is my duty to purge from an abominable stain."

This scene petrified part of the Council of State with surprise and terror. Some members, sympathising with the sincere, but intemperate feelings of the First Consul, applauded his speech. A very decided majority discerned, with regret, in his words, the language which the revolutionists had themselves held, when they proscribed thousands of victims. They, too, had said that the aristocrats endangered the Republic, that it was necessary to get rid of them by the most speedy and by the surest means, and that the public safety was worth a few sacrifices. The difference, to be sure, was great; for, instead of a bloodthirsty rabble, who, in their blind fury, at length took each other for aristocrats, and slaughtered one another, here was a man of genius, proceeding, with consistency and vigour, towards a noble aim, that of setting convulsed society to rights. Unfortunately, he endeavoured to succeed, not by the slow observance of rules, but by prompt and extraordinary means, like those which had been employed to overturn it. His good sense, his generous heart, and the horror of shedding blood.

then prevalent, were guarantees against sanguinary executions; but, with the exception of actual bloodshed, he was disposed to resort to every severity towards those who were then denominated Jacobins and Terrorists.

Objections were raised in the Council of State, timidly, it is true, for the indignation universally excited by the crime of the Rue St. Nicaise checked the courage of those who would fain have made some resistance to arbitrary proceedings. However, one individual, who was not afraid to oppose the First Consul, and who did so bluntly, and in a straightforward way, Admiral Truguet, seeing that the intention was to strike the revolutionists *en masse*, raised doubts respecting the real authors of the crime. "Government," said he, "is desirous to get rid of the villains who disturb the Republic; well and good; but there are villains of more than one kind. The returned emigrants threaten the purchasers of the national domains; the Chouans infest the highroads; the reinstated priests inflame the passions of the people in the South; the public mind is poisoned by pamphlets." . . . This last expression of Admiral Truguet had reference to the famous pamphlet of M. de Fontanes, to which we have before adverted. At these words, the First Consul, stung to the quick, and, advancing directly to the speaker, asked, "What pamphlets do you allude to?" "Pamphlets that are publicly circulated," replied Admiral Truguet. "Specify them," rejoined the First Consul. "You know them as well as I do," retorted this courageous man, who thus dared defy such indignation.

A scene like this had never yet been witnessed within the walls of the Council of State. The circumstances produced an outburst of the impetuous temper of the man who then held in his hands the destinies of France. He thereupon gave vent to his passion, and displayed all the eloquence of wrath. "Do people take us for children?" he exclaimed. "Do they think to hurry us away with these declamations against the emigrants, the Chouans, the priests? Because there are still some partial attempts in La Vendée, are we to be required, as formerly, to declare the country in danger? . . . Has France ever been in a more brilliant situation, have the finances ever been in a better state, the armies more victorious, has general peace ever been nearer at hand? If the Chouans commit crimes, I will have them shot. But must I begin again by proscribing on account of the appellations of nobles, priests, or royalists? Must I send into exile ten thousand old men, who only desire to live peaceably, while paying respect to the established laws? Have you not seen poor ecclesiastics put to death in Bretagne, at the instigation of Georges himself, because he saw that they were gradually becoming reconciled to the government? Must

I again proscribe on account of rank or title? Must I strike some because they are priests, others because they were formerly nobles? Do you not know, gentlemen, members of the Council, that, with the exception of two or three, you are all reputed royalists? You, citizen Defermon, are you not taken for a partisan of the Bourbons? Must I send citizen Portalis to Sinnamary, citizen Devaisne to Madagascar, and then constitute myself a council *à la Babœuf*? No, citizen Truguet, I am not to be deceived: we have none who threaten our quiet but the Septembrisers. They would not spare even you; in vain you might tell them, that you had defended them to-day in the Council of State; they would sacrifice both you and me, as well as all your colleagues."

There was only one word to be said in reply to this vehement apostrophe, that it was not right to proscribe any person for a mere title, neither one party because they were styled royalists, nor another party because they were revolutionists. The First Consul had no sooner uttered his concluding words, than he rose abruptly, and put an end to the sitting.

Cambacérés, the consul, always calm, possessed infinite skill in obtaining by gentleness what his imperious colleague would fain extort by the sole power of his will. He assembled the two sections on the following day at his residence; he endeavoured, in a few words, to excuse the warmth of the First Consul, affirming, what was true, that he had no dislike to contradiction, when it was free from acrimony and personality; and he endeavoured to reconcile their minds to the idea of some extraordinary measure. This was not worthy of his accustomed moderation; but, though in the habit of giving prudent advice to the First Consul, he gave way when he saw that he was absolutely resolved, and especially when the point in discussion related to the curbing of the Terrorists. M. Portalis, who had the merit of being averse to proscribe any one, though he had been proscribed himself, adhered to the plan of the two sections, proposing to add two clauses to the law instituting the special tribunals. Cambacérés, however, insisted, and obtained a majority in favour of the adoption of an extraordinary measure, upon the understanding that it should be discussed afresh before the united sections. In this sort of meeting with closed doors words again ran very high. M. Rœderer inveighed vehemently against the Jacobins, imputed their crimes to the indulgence of M. Fouché, and went so far as to move that the Council of State should join in an address praying for the dismissal of that minister.

M. Cambacérés repressed all these ebullitions of zeal, and convoked the sections at the apartments of General Bonaparte, in whose presence was held a sort of privy council, composed



of the Consuls, the two sections of the interior and legislation, and the ministers of foreign affairs, of the interior, and of justice. So strong were the prejudices against M. Fouché, that he was not even summoned to these conferences.

The proposal of an extraordinary measure was again presented and discussed at great length. Several sittings of this same privy council were held before the members could agree. At length, it was resolved that a general measure should be adopted against those who were called the Terrorists. But a serious question yet remained to be settled; that was the form of that measure. The point to be decided was, whether that measure should be carried into execution by a spontaneous act of the government, or by means of a law. The First Consul, generally so bold, was in favour of a law. He was averse to compromise the great bodies of the State on this occasion, and this he declared openly. "The Consuls are irresponsible," said he, "but the ministers are not so, and any of them who sign such a resolution may some day be called to account. Not a single individual must be compromised: the Legislative Body must share in the responsibility of the proposed measure. The Consuls themselves," he added, "know not what may happen. As for myself, while I live, I am not afraid that any one will dare to call me to account for my actions. But I may be killed, and then I cannot answer for the safety of my two colleagues. It would be your turn to govern," said he, laughing, to the Second Consul, Cambacérès, "and *you are not very firm in the stirrups*. It will be better to have a law for the present, as well as for the future."

A singular scene was passing at this moment. They who were averse to the measure wished that it might be adopted, not by means of a law, but through a spontaneous resolution of the government. They were desirous to throw upon the government the entire responsibility, without perceiving that they were thus suffering it to acquire the mischievous habit of acting alone, and on its arbitrary authority. It was said, in support of this opinion, that the law would not pass, that opinions began to be divided respecting the real authors of the crime, that the Legislative Body would recoil from a proscription list, and that the government would run the risk of incurring a most signal defeat. Messrs. Roederer and Regnault de St. Jean d'Angely expressed themselves to this effect. To the latter the First Consul made this reply: "Since the Tribunate has rejected one or two laws, you are panic-struck. There are, it is true, some Jacobins in the Legislative Body, but not above ten or twelve at most. They frighten the others, who know that, but for me, but for the 18th of Brumaire, they would have been massacred. These latter will stand by me on this occasion: the law will pass."

The advocates of the other course persisted in their sentiments, and M. de Talleyrand, siding with those who were afraid of the bill being thrown out, suggested an argument most likely to make an impression on the First Consul, namely, that abroad the measure would have a more salutary effect. "Foreigners," he said, "would recognise in it the act of a government that dared, and was able to defend itself against the anarchists." The First Consul yielded to this argument, but he devised a middle course, which was adopted: this was, to refer it to the Senate, that this body might examine whether the act was, or was not, an infringement of the Constitution. The reader will, no doubt, recollect that, according to the Constitution of the year VIII., the Senate did not vote the laws, but was empowered to rescind them, if it deemed them contrary to the Constitution. It had not the same power with regard to the measures of the government. The suggestion of the First Consul was therefore approved, and M. Fouché was directed to make out a list of the principal Terrorists, with a view to their being transported to the deserts of the New World. The two sections of the Council of State were charged to draw up a declaration of the reasons for this act. The First Consul was to sign the decree, and the Senate to declare whether it was, or was not, contrary to the Constitution.

This measure against the Terrorists, illegal and arbitrary in itself, had not even the justice which an arbitrary act may sometimes carry with it, when it punishes those who are really guilty; for the Terrorists were not the authors of the crime. By this time, the truth began to be suspected. Fouché, the minister, and Dubois, prefect of police, had been incessantly engaged in the most active search, and this search had not been fruitless. The violence of the explosion had destroyed almost all the instruments of the crime. The girl whom St. Réjant had employed to hold the horse had been blown to pieces; nothing was left of the unfortunate creature but her legs and feet. The iron tires of the cart-wheels had been thrown to a great distance. Fragments of the articles employed in the commission of the crime, and which were likely to lead to the discovery of the authors, had been found, at a great distance apart, in every direction. There were also left some remains of the cart and the horse. These remains were collected, a description of them was drawn up, and made public through the newspapers, and all the horse-dealers in Paris were invited to inspect them. By a lucky chance, the original owner of the horse at once identified him, and gave the name of the seedsman to whom he had sold him. This seedsman, being summoned, declared with the utmost frankness all that he knew about the matter. He had sold the horse to two men, who represented themselves as foreign

traders. He had had two or three interviews with them, and described them very minutely. A man who kept carriages for hire, and who had let for a few days the cart-house in which the cart was deposited, made also a very circumstantial deposition. He described the same persons, and furnished particulars perfectly corresponding with those which had been received from the seedsman. The cooper who had sold the barrel, and who had put on the iron hoops, gave information agreeing entirely with the preceding accounts. All these depositions perfectly tallied as to the stature, features, dress, and appearance of the suspected individuals. When all these witnesses had been heard, recourse was had to a decisive proof. Upwards of two hundred revolutionists, apprehended on this occasion, were taken from prison and brought before them. These examinations lasted during the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th of January (11th, 12th, 13th, and 14th Nivôse), and led to the conviction that not one of the revolutionists was concerned in the crime, as not one was recognised. And no doubt could be entertained of the veracity of the witnesses who furnished these descriptions, for almost all of them had come forward spontaneously to give evidence, and manifested great zeal in seconding the efforts of the police. Thus it was proved almost to a certainty that the revolutionists were innocent. The fact, however, could not be perfectly established, unless by the discovery of the real authors. But an important circumstance pointed to the agents of Georges, who had been sent upwards of a month before to Paris, and who had always been considered by M. Fouché as really the guilty parties. Though all trace of them had been lost, yet down to the 3rd Nivôse they had been seen, sometimes in one place, sometimes in another, though the police had not been able to apprehend them. But, since the 3rd Nivôse, they had entirely disappeared, so that one would almost have thought that they had concealed themselves underground. This disappearance, so sudden and so complete, ever since the day of the crime, was a striking circumstance. Add to this, that one of the descriptions given by all the witnesses corresponded in every point to that of Carbon. M. Fouché, more convinced than ever by all these indications that the real authors were the Chouans, lost no time in despatching an emissary to watch Georges' motions, and to obtain information relative to Carbon, St. Réjant, and Limoelan. In the meantime he had collected sufficient evidence to shake the conviction of many, and even that of the First Consul, who, nevertheless, would not relinquish his first opinion but upon the production of actual proof.

Such was the state of the proceedings on the 4th of January (14th Nivôse), the day on which the act that condemned so

many men under the designation of Terrorists was definitively decreed.\*

The Council of State had successively come to an agreement upon all the points; it had never thought seriously of a tribunal which should try in a summary manner, and sentence the Terrorists to be shot; it had always stopped short at the idea of transporting a certain number of them; and, after many discussions, it was agreed that they should be transported by virtue of an act of the Consuls, submitted to the approbation of the Senate. The affair having been arranged with the principal members of the Council and the Senate, the rest could be nothing but an empty formality.

M. Fouché, who, without knowing the whole truth, was nevertheless acquainted with it in part, and buffeted on all sides, had the weakness to lend himself to a measure, directed, it is true, against men stained with blood, but not the authors of the crime, which it was intended to punish at the moment. Of all those who participated in this act of proscription, he was therefore the most inexcusable; but he was attacked in all quarters; he was accused of complaisance towards the revolutionists; and he had not the courage to resist. He himself drew up the report for the Council of State, on which the decree of the Consuls was founded.

In this report, presented to the Council of State on the 1st of January 1801 (11th Nivôse), a class of men was denounced, who for ten years had steeped themselves in crime of every kind; who had shed the blood of the prisoners in the Abbaye, invaded and outraged the Convention, threatened the Directory, and who now, driven to despair, had recourse to the dagger, to strike the Republic in the person of the First Consul. "All these men," it was said, "have not taken up the dagger, but all are universally known to be capable of pointing it, and of using it." It was added that the protective forms of justice were not made for them; it was therefore

\* I have compared the dates of all the documents in the case with the dates of the measures passed against the revolutionary party, and the result is, that between the 11th and the 14th Nivôse (the 1st and the 4th of January), only one thing was known, namely, that the personal examinations of the so-called Terrorists had not led to the identification of any one of them. Consequently, there were strong reasons for believing that the revolutionary party was not concerned in the crime of the Rue St. Nicaise; but this was not positively ascertained till much later, that is to say, till the 28th Nivôse (18th of January), the day of the apprehension and complete identification of Carbon by the sellers of the horse, cart, and barrel. The act against the revolutionists is dated the 14th Nivôse (4th of January): it is not true, therefore, as it has been sometimes asserted, that the proscription took place in spite of a perfect knowledge of the real authors of the crime, and that the government punished the revolutionists knowing them to be innocent. The procedure was at all events highly arbitrary; but it is our duty to state the facts as they occurred, without exaggeration or extenuation.

proposed to seize and to transport them from the territory of the Republic.

The examination of the report gave rise to the question, whether the Jacobins ought not to be denounced in it as the contrivers of the 3rd Nivôse. The First Consul took great pains to oppose this. "We believe so," said he, "but we do not know it;"—(he began, in fact, to be shaken in his conviction)—"they are transported for the deeds of the 2nd of September, of the 31st of May, of the days of Prairial, for Babœuf's conspiracy, for all that they have done, for all that they might yet do."

A list of 130 persons doomed to transportation was annexed to this report. The government did not confine itself to transporting them; but, what was perhaps more cruel, there was added to the names of several of them the appellation *Septembriser*, without any other ground for thus stigmatising them than public notoriety.

The Council of State manifested a visible repugnance on hearing these 130 names; for it might be said that it was called upon to draw up a proscription list. Thibaudeau, the councillor, said that such a list could not be prepared by the Council. "I am not so silly," replied the First Consul angrily, "as to make you pass sentence upon individuals; I merely submit to you the principle of the measure." The principle was approved, but not without some dissentient votes.

The question was then proposed, whether the measure should be an act of State police, on the part of the government, or a law passed in the accustomed forms. This point had been previously arranged: the resolutions already secretly adopted were confirmed, and it was decided that the measure should be a spontaneous act of the government, but referred to the Senate, which should pronounce upon the question of constitutionality.

On the 4th of January (14th Nivôse), the First Consul having had the definitive list prepared, drew up a decree, by which he banished from the territory of the Republic the persons included in that list, and without hesitation affixed his signature.

On the 5th of January (15th Nivôse), the assembled Senate, proceeding a step further than the decision of the Council of State, declared that the resolution of the First Consul was a measure essential to the preservation of the Constitution.

These unfortunate persons were collected on the following day, and despatched to Nantes to be shipped and transported to distant countries. There were among them some deputies of the Convention, several members of the old Commune, all that remained of the murderers of September, and the notorious Rossignol, who had been general of the revolutionary army. Assuredly these men, at least most of them, deserved no

sympathy; but all the forms of justice were violated in regard to them, and that which proves the danger of the violation of those sacred forms is, that many of the denunciations made by the police were disputed, and with a strong appearance of truth. It required some moral courage at the moment to intercede on behalf of these proscriptions; still there were some who, on the recommendation of bold men, were properly erased from the list of proscription, and spared at Nantes from the fatal embarkation. That an individual should be able to obtain, or fail in obtaining, the favour of a government, according as he can command, or is unable to command, an influential recommendation, is a point to which I shall not advert; but that his exclusion from a proscription list should depend upon the accidental circumstance, whether he can or cannot find a courageous influential friend to interfere on his behalf, must shock every feeling of justice, and prove that when forms are violated, society is exposed to all the horrors of arbitrary rule. And yet this period was resplendent with glory: it was distinguished by a love of order, by an antipathy to blood. But the nation was emerging from the revolutionary chaos; it had no respect for rules; it found them inconvenient and insupportable. If ever this arbitrary act were canvassed, a single word was sufficient to justify it. Those wretches, it was said, were steeped in blood, they would wallow in it again, if they were allowed free scope; they are treated much better than they had treated their victims. And, certainly, if this act had many previous precedents at anterior epochs, in regard to the violation of forms, it was marked by two peculiar distinct features from the past: punishment fell mostly upon villains, and their blood was not shed. A miserable excuse, we admit, but which we must nevertheless urge in extenuation, to show that the year 1800 had nothing in common with the year '93.

While these unfortunate persons were on the road to Nantes, it was with the greatest difficulty that they were saved from the fury of the populace in all the towns through which they passed, so strongly was public feeling expressed against them. Under the dominion of this feeling, something still more deplorable occurred; this was the condemnation of Ceracchi, Aréna, Demerville, and Topino Lebrun. It will be recollected that in the preceding October (*Vendémiaire*), these hot-headed men had entered into a plot for the assassination of the First Consul at the Opera. But none of them had had the courage, nor perhaps even any decided intention, to assist in the execution of the plot. The police agents, sent in as spies amongst them, and to whom they gave daggers, urged them on to a degree of guilt, which before, perhaps, they had not contemplated. But, at any rate, they did not make their appearance at the place fixed for the execution

of their plot; and Ceracchi, the only one apprehended in the Opera-house, was not even armed with one of the daggers which had been distributed amongst them. They were declaimers, who certainly wished for the destruction of the First Consul, but would never have dared to consummate it. They were tried on the 9th of January (19th Nivôse), at the very moment when the events just related were occurring. Their counsel, aware of the fatal influence exercised upon the minds of the jury by the catastrophe of the 3rd Nivôse, strove in vain to weaken it. That influence was irresistible upon the jury, which, of all tribunals, is that most swayed by public opinion, and which has the advantages and the inconveniences of that bias. Sentence of death was passed on four of these wretched men: these were Ceracchi, Aréna, Demerville, and Topino Lebrun. The latter deserved some sympathy, and became a striking example of the cruel mutability of fortune during revolutions. This young Topino Lebrun was a painter of some talent, and a pupil of David. Participating in the extravagant ideas of the artists of the time, he had been a jurymen at the revolutionary tribunal, but had there shown himself far more merciful than his colleagues. He brought forward the advocate Chaveau Lagarde, the respectable defender of the victims of that time, who in vain gave evidence in favour of his humanity. Extraordinary change of fortune! the former jurymen of the revolutionary tribunal, now accused in his turn, calls to his assistance the former defender of the victims of that sanguinary tribunal! But this assistance, generously afforded, could not save him. The whole four, condemned on the 9th of January (19th Nivôse), were, after an unavailing appeal to the Court of Cassation, executed on the 31st of the same month of January.

Meanwhile, the horrible mystery of the infernal machine was being gradually brought to light. M. Fouché had set agents to work about Georges, to make inquiries concerning Carbon, what had become of him, and where he lived. He had learned through this channel that Carbon had sisters residing in Paris, and he had also discovered their abode. The police searched it, and found a barrel of powder. They obtained, moreover, from Carbon's youngest sister, the address of the new lodging in which he had secreted himself. He was residing with very respectable persons, the demoiselles de Cicé, sisters of M. de Cicé, formerly archbishop of Bordeaux, and minister of justice. These ladies, taking him for a returned emigrant, whose passport was not in order, had procured him an asylum amongst a number of females, formerly nuns, who lived together in a remote quarter of Paris. These innocent women, who every day returned thanks to Heaven for the preservation of the First Consul, as they would have given themselves up for lost if he had fallen, had afforded a retreat.

unconsciously, to one of his assassins. The police repaired thither on the 18th of January (28th Nivôse), and apprehended Carbon, together with all the persons who had admitted him into the house. He was confronted the same day with the witnesses previously examined, and fully identified. At first, he denied everything, but at length confessed his participation in the crime, but an innocent participation, according to his account, for he asserted that he was not aware of the purpose for which the cart and the barrel were intended. He denounced Limoëlan and St. Réjant. Limoëlan had had time to make his escape to a foreign country, but St. Réjant, thrown down by the explosion, and half dead for some minutes, had only time and strength to change his lodging. An agent of Georges employed to attend on him, and who had been left at liberty, in hopes by tracking him to find St. Réjant, served to indicate his abode. On proceeding thither, the police found that he was still very ill from the effects of his wounds. He was soon confronted, identified, and convicted upon abundance of evidence, which left no room for doubt. Under his bed was found a letter to Georges, in which he related, with some ambiguity, the principal circumstances of the crime, and justified himself to his chief for his miscarriage. Carbon and St. Réjant were sent to the criminal tribunal, which soon sentenced these execrable assassins to the death they deserved.

When all these particulars were published, the obstinate accusers of the revolutionary party, and the complaisant defenders of the royalist party, were alike surprised and confounded. The enemies of M. Fouché also were disconcerted. The soundness of his judgment was acknowledged, and he was re-established in the favour of the First Consul. But he had furnished a weapon of which his enemies, with justice, took advantage. Since he was so sure of his point, said they, why did he suffer the revolutionists to be proscribed? He deserved, indeed, this keen reproach. The First Consul, who was unconcerned about violated forms, and cared for nothing but the results obtained, manifested no regret. He thought that what was done, was well done in every respect; that he was rid of what he called the "staff of the Jacobins," and that the 3rd Nivôse proved merely one thing—the necessity of watching the Royalists as well as the Terrorists. "Fouché's opinion," said he, "was, after all, the only correct one; he is right; we must keep an eye on the returned emigrants, the Chouans, and all the members of that party."

This event greatly diminished the sympathy which had been felt for the royalists, who had been complaisantly called the victims of terror; and likewise greatly diminished the animosity against the revolutionists. M. Fouché had gained in credit, but not in esteem.

The painful feelings created by the employment of the machine,



since named infernal, were soon dispelled by the joy produced by the peace of Luneville. All days are not auspicious, even under the most prosperous governments. That of the Consulate had the unexampled advantage, that, if sad impressions took possession of the public mind one moment, they were dissipated the next, by some grand, new, unforeseen result. Occasional brief but mournful scenes, in which the First Consul was conspicuous as the saviour of France, which each faction was striving to undo, and these scenes followed by victories, treaties, and acts of reparation, which healed deep wounds, or restored public prosperity—such was the spectacle which was then incessantly exhibited. General Bonaparte always emerged from them greater, dearer to France, more clearly destined for the supreme power.

The second session of the Legislative Body had commenced. It was engaged, at this moment, in the discussion and adoption of several laws, the principal of which—that of the special tribunals—was of no real importance, after what had just been done. But the opposition in the Tribunate opposed these laws against the government: this was sufficient to induce the latter to persevere in them. The first of them related to the archives of the Republic. It had become necessary, since the abolition of the ancient provinces had given up to neglect a great number of old title-deeds and documents, still either very useful or very curious, to decide in what place these and other ancient records, such as laws, treaties, &c., should be deposited. This was a measure of order, devoid of all political bearing. The Tribunate voted against the law, and having, as usual, sent its three orators to the Legislative Body, obtained its rejection by a great majority. The Legislative Body, although strongly attached to the government, was, like assemblies thus devoted, sometimes jealous of showing its independence in measures of detail; and it could certainly do this without danger, in the discussion of a law, the object of which was to determine in what place, or places, certain ancient records and papers should be deposited.

The two assemblies had under their consideration, at the moment, a law more important than the preceding, but equally foreign to politics. It related to justices of peace, whose number had been found too great. Six thousand having been appointed at the time of their first institution, they had not answered the purpose for which they were created. In many districts, men capable of duly performing such functions were not to be found. They had failed in another point. It had been resolved to assign to them the judicial police; they had performed this duty very indifferently, and besides, the paternal and benevolent character of their jurisdiction had been, in a certain degree, impaired by it.

The new plan of the government proposed two modifications relative to the justices of peace: in the first place, their reduction from 6000 to 2600; and, in the next, the transfer of the judicial police to other magistrates. The project was a reasonable one, and presented with excellent intentions; but it met with violent opposition in the Tribunalate. Several members spoke against it, especially M. Benjamin Constant. It was, nevertheless, carried in the Tribunalate by 59 votes against 32; and in the Legislative Body by 218 against 41.

Another law, more calculated to produce discussion, and of an entirely political nature, was presented at this period: this was the law which had for its object the institution of special tribunals. But this had lost its chief utility since the First Consul had appointed military commissions to accompany the movable columns employed in the suppression of robbery; and especially since he had not hesitated to proscribe arbitrarily such revolutionists as were deemed dangerous. These military commissions had already produced salutary effects. The judges in military uniform, who composed them, were not afraid of the accused: they encouraged the witnesses who were to give evidence, and frequently these witnesses were the very soldiers who had seized the banditti, and surprised them with arms in their hands. Prompt and vigorous justice, following the very active employment of force, had singularly contributed to re-establish safety on the roads. The deadly conflicts which had ensued with the escorts placed on the *impériales* of the diligences soon intimidated the robbers. Attacks became less frequent; and security began again to prevail, thanks to the vigour of the government and of the tribunal, thanks also to the conclusion of the winter. The proposed law, therefore, was introduced when the evil was already abated; but it was beneficial, inasmuch as it imparted regularity to the military tribunals established on the highroads, and applied to highway robbery a permanent and perfectly legal measure of punishment. The projected organisation was this:—

The special tribunals were to be composed of three ordinary judges, all of them members of the criminal tribunal, of three military officers, with two assessors, the latter chosen by the government, and duly qualified, by their standing at the bar, to act as judges. Thus the military members could not have a majority. The government was empowered to establish these tribunals in those departments where they might be thought useful. They were authorised to take cognisance of all crimes committed by armed bands on the highroads and in the country, of all outrages against the purchasers of national domains, and lastly, of murders attempted with premeditation against the heads of the government. This last clause comprehended such

crimes as the infernal machine, the plot of Ceracchi, Aréna, &c. The Court of Cassation was empowered to decide in every case of disputed jurisdiction, all other business before the court being suspended. This institution was to be abolished, as a matter of right, two years after the general peace.

These tribunals were obnoxious to every objection which can attach to exceptional justice. But there was this to be urged in their favour, that never had society, convulsed to the very centre, required more prompt and more extraordinary measures for tranquillising it. Under the pretext of an adherence to the Constitution, recourse was had to that article of it, which permitted the Legislative Body to suspend its provisions in the departments where that might be deemed necessary. The case of extraordinary jurisdictions was evidently comprehended in this clause; as the suspension of the Constitution necessarily led to the immediate establishment of martial law. Moreover, the discussion was altogether superfluous in a country, and at a time when 130 persons had just been proscribed without trial, and military commissions had been established in several departments, without eliciting the slightest murmur from public opinion. It must even be confessed that, as compared with these acts, the proposed law was a return to constitutional government. But it was vehemently, acrimoniously attacked by the usual opponents, Messrs. Daunou, Constant, Ginguéné, and others. In the Tribunate it passed by a majority of only 49 votes to 41. In the Legislative Body, the majority was much greater, for the bill obtained 192 votes against 88. But a minority of eighty-eight votes exceeded the usual strength of the minority in that assembly, wholly devoted to the government. This great number of dissentient votes was attributed to a speech of M. Français, of Nantes, who addressed language perhaps a little too intemperate to the Legislative Body. "M. Français, of Nantes, has done right," said the First Consul to his colleagues, Cambacérès and Lebrun, who seemed to disapprove that speech; "it is better to have fewer votes, and to show that we feel insults and are determined not to put up with them."

The First Consul made use of still stronger language to a deputation of the Senate, which presented to him a resolution of that body. He expressed himself in the boldest manner, and on several occasions he plainly declared, that, if he was too much annoyed, that if people would endeavour to prevent him from restoring peace and order to France, he would rely upon the opinion which the country had of him, and govern by consular ordinances. His ascendancy increased every moment with success, his boldness with his ascendancy, and he was no longer at the pains of dissembling the extent of his designs.

He met with still stronger opposition on the questions of finance, which were the last discussed during this session. This was, nevertheless, the most meritorious work of the government, and more particularly owing to the personal intervention of the First Consul.

We have several times explained the means employed to ensure the collection, and the regular payment into the treasury, of the revenues of the State. These means had been completely successful. In the year VIII. (1799-1800), there had been received 518,000,000,\* which equalled the amount of the taxes for a whole year; for, in the budget, the expenditure and the receipts did not at that period exceed 500,000,000. Of these 518,000,000, a sum of 172,000,000 belonged to years V., VI., and VII., and 346,000,000 to the year VIII. Some items were still owing for those four years; it was necessary that they should be completely liquidated, in order that the year IX. (1800-1801), which was the current year, might at length proceed with perfect regularity. The income of the year IX. was sure to be adequate to the expenses, as the taxes would produce from 500,000,000 to 520,000,000; and this was sufficient to cover the expenses of the peace establishment. A system of annual accounts, distinguishing the income and expenditure for each twelve months, had been introduced, and thenceforth the receipts of the year IX. were to be exclusively applied to the expenses of the year IX., and the receipts of the year X. to the expenses of the year X., and so on; provision was thus made for the future. But for the past, that is to say, for the years V., VI., VII., and VIII., there was a deficit to be made good. To this purpose, the daily receipts derived from the arrears of the contributions of those respective years were appropriated. But these arrears, which were chiefly owing by the landed proprietors, reduced them to a state of great depression. At the meeting of the councils-general of the departments, a meeting then held for the first time, eighty-seven councils-general out of 106 complained of the excessive burden of the direct contributions. Government, therefore, had no alternative, as we have before observed, but to remit a part of the outstanding arrears, if it persevered in requiring in future the punctual payment of the whole tax. A law was proposed to authorise the local administrations to relieve the taxpayers who were too heavily assessed. This bill passed without opposition. But this would occasion a considerable deficiency appertaining to the years V., VI., VII., and VIII. This deficiency was estimated for the three years V., VI., VII., at 90,000,000, and for the year VIII., separately, at 30,000,000. The year

\* These figures express francs, twenty-five of which are equivalent to £1 sterling.—*Translator.*

VIII. (1799–1800) was kept distinct from the years V., VI., and VII., because the year VIII. belonged to the Consulate.

It was necessary to decide how these deficits were to be met. There were national domains still undisposed of, to the extent of about 400,000,000; and it was here that the sound sense of the First Consul exercised the happiest influence on our financial system, and caused the best possible employment to be made of the public resources.

As the national domains were not always marketable, their value had repeatedly been received in anticipation, by means of a government paper, which had been issued under different denominations, and which was receivable in payment of these domains. Since the extinction of the assignats, this kind of paper was known by the name of *rescriptions*. In the course of the year VIII., some of these rescriptions had been negotiated at less ruinous rates than before, but still at too great a sacrifice to render it prudent to have recourse to them. These notes were negotiated at a loss from the very first day they were issued, soon fell into discredit, then passed into the hands of speculators, who, in this manner, purchased the national domains for next to nothing. In this way a valuable resource had been wasted, to the great detriment of the State, and to the great advantage of stockjobbers. The remaining 400,000,000, if they could be saved from the disorder, by which so many other millions had been swallowed up, to this day, would soon acquire, with time and peace, a three or fourfold value. The First Consul was resolved not to squander them in the same way that several thousand millions had already been thrown away.

Immediate funds were nevertheless required. The First Consul endeavoured to obtain them by the emission of *rentes*\* (stock), which, since his accession, had already advanced considerably in value. They had risen from the price of ten and twelve to that of twenty-five and thirty after Marengo, and above that of fifty since the peace of Luneville; it was asserted that they would rule as high as sixty at the general peace. At this rate, the government could begin to negotiate them, as there was less loss in selling *rentes* than national domains. The First Consul, unwilling to open a loan, proposed to pay with *rentes* certain creditors of the State, and to appropriate to the Sinking Fund an equivalent sum in landed property, which that Fund would sell by-and-by, slowly and at its full value, so as to compensate in this manner for the augmentation about to be made to the public debt. Such was the principle of the laws of finance proposed this year.

\* *Rente* signifies the annual dividend payable on stock, and 25 francs per cent. *rentes* perpetual annuity of 25 francs represents 5 francs capital stock. *Translator.*

The debts yet unpaid for the last three years of the Directory, V., VI., and VII., passed for bad debts. They were the remnant of the disgraceful contracts, to the amount of 600,000,000 f., made under the Directory. Upon commencing a new system, the government resolved to respect these debts, notwithstanding their origin and their nature. They amounted to a sum of about 90,000,000 f., but, almost the whole being in the hands of speculators, they were at a discount of seventy-five per cent. in the market. It was proposed to pay them off by means of a stock bearing interest at the rate of three per cent. The total of these debts amounting to 90,000,000 f., it would require, at three per cent., 2,700,000 f. to meet the dividends. This stock, at the current price of the public funds (say 30 to 33 $\frac{1}{2}$ ), represented a real value of 27,000,000 or 30,000,000 f., and could not fail to represent one of 40,000,000 f. at least, in the eight or ten months which must elapse before the operation was completed. The debts intended to be paid, being at a discount of seventy-five per cent., and the capital of 90,000,000 f., of which they were composed, being thus reduced in reality to 22,000,000 or 23,000,000 f., much more would be paid for them than they were worth, if government granted a *rente* of 2,700,000 f. for them, since that *rente*, sold immediately, would have produced 27,000,000 or 30,000,000 f., and soon was likely to produce 40,000,000 f.

The debts of the year VIII. to be still liquidated were of a totally different nature. They were contracted for services performed during the first year of the consular government, when order already prevailed in the administration. These services, rendered at a time when the distress was still great, had, it is true, been paid for at a very high rate; but it would have been derogatory to the honour of the consular government not to have faithfully kept these engagements, which were recently contracted, which had not been classed, like those of the Directory, among discredited paper, nor negotiated as such, and to have treated them in the same manner as those which belonged to the years V., VI., and VII. Government, therefore, did not hesitate to pay in full, and at its nominal value, the excess of the expenditure of the year VIII. It was now estimated at 60,000,000 f., but the receipt of arrears of the contributions of the year VIII. would reduce it to 30,000,000 f. It was resolved to pay a portion of it, 20,000,000 f., with a stock bearing interest at five per cent., which made 1,000,000 f. interest. We shall explain presently, in what way the balance of 10,000,000 f. was provided for.

The income of the year IX. (1800-1801) seemed likely to meet the expenses, on the nearly certain hypothesis of a speedy termination of the war; for the continental peace concluded

at Luneville must soon lead to a maritime peace. The budget was not at that time voted a year in advance; it was voted in the same year, while the expenses were being incurred. The budget of the year IX., for instance, was presented and discussed in Ventôse, year IX., that is to say, the budget of 1801 in March 1801. The expenditure and the receipts of this year were estimated at the moment at 415,000,000 f. (exclusively of the expenses of collection and various local services, which may be taken at 100,000,000 f. more, so that 415,000,000 f. must be taken at 515,000,000 f.). But the estimate of 415,000,000 f. for the expenditure and the receipts fell short of the truth, for then, as now, the real charges always exceeded the estimates. We shall even show, by-and-by, that the sum of 415,000,000 f. was increased to 500,000,000 f. Fortunately, the produce of the taxes exceeded the sum estimated, as well as the expenditure. This excess on both sides was certainly calculated upon; but fearing, erroneously by-the-by, that the surplus receipts would not cover the excess of the expenditure, government determined to secure a supplementary resource. Ten millions yet remained to be provided for, as we have just said, to complete the payments of the year VIII.; it was supposed that 20,000,000 f. would be required for the balance of the year IX.; thus 30,000,000 f. would have to be raised in two years. It was resolved to have recourse to a sale of national domains to that extent only. The sale of fifteen millions' worth of these domains might be effected with advantage and without confusion in the course of each year. By placing this business in the hands of the commissioners of the Sinking Fund, who had already performed this duty with great ability, the government was sure to dispose of this portion of the domains of the State on advantageous terms. In this manner the previous accounts would be liquidated, and the present balanced. There was but one more operation requisite to render the organisation of the finances of the State complete, and that was the definitive regulation of the public debt.

The moment was come, in fact, for fixing its amount, for adjusting the resources of the Sinking Fund to the amount of the entire capital of the debt, and for applying to this object the 400,000,000 f. of national domains, which were still at the disposal of the State.

The public debt was just as it had been left by the bankruptcy declared by the Directory, but attributable to the Convention and the Constituent Assembly. One-third of this debt had been placed upon the Great Book; it was this portion which was called, in the language of the time, *the Constituted Third*. Interest at five per cent. had been allowed on this third, saved from the bankruptcy. The amount of it inscribed

in the Great Book was 37,000,000 f. (interest and not capital). A very considerable sum had still to be inscribed. Two-thirds had been *mobilised*, another expression of the time, that is to say, struck out of the Great Book, and declared receivable in payment of the national domains, so that, in point of fact, they were clearly assignats. A subsequent law had completed their depreciation, by restricting them to a single purpose, that of being received in payment exclusively for the buildings, and not for the lands or the woods, constituting part of the national possessions.

It was necessary to put an end to this state of things, and for that purpose to carry to the Great Book the remainder of the *Consolidated Third*, which the preceding government had deferred inscribing, that it might be dispensed from paying interest upon it. Justice and regularity in the finances demanded that an end should be put to this state of things. It was proposed to enter in the Great Book *Consolidated Third* to the extent of 1,500,000 f., but to bear interest only from the commencement of the year XII. This part of the debt, though the enjoyment of the income from it was postponed for two years, yet acquired immediately, from the mere circumstance of the inscription, a value nearly equal to the portions already inscribed; and a very high value was moreover conferred on all that remained of the *Consolidated Third* by this earnest of punctuality. There was a considerable amount left uninscribed, either in *Consolidated Thirds*, properly so-called, or in debts of the emigrants, which the State had taken upon itself, in confiscating their property, or in debts of Belgium, which had been a condition of the conquest. Lastly, there were the *mobilised two-thirds*, now extremely depreciated, and which it was but just to afford the holders the means of realising. An offer was made to convert them into *Consolidated Thirds*, funded at the rate of five francs stock for one hundred francs nominal capital. It was probable that the holders would eagerly accept this offer. It was proposed to create for this purpose 1,000,000 f. of *rentes*, and if this first trial succeeded, it was anticipated that the entire value of the *mobilised two-thirds* would be soon absorbed. A fixed period was also appointed, after which the *two-third bonds* should no longer be receivable in payment of the national domains. At the expiration of this term, the domains purchased and not paid for were to revert unconditionally to the State.

It was calculated that the addition of the sum of 20,000,000 f. of *rentes* to the 37,000,000 f. of *Consolidated Third* already inscribed in the Great Book would suffice to meet the balance of *Consolidated Third* still uninscribed, the *mobilised two-thirds*, the conversion of which was contemplated, and lastly, the debts of the emigrants and of Belgium. The national debt would



accordingly comprise 57,000,000 f. perpetual *rentes*. In addition to that permanent charge there existed, however, 20,000,000 f. of life annuities, 19,000,000 f. of civil and religious pensions (the latter paid to the clergy who had been dispossessed of their property), and lastly, 30,000,000 f. of military pensions; thus, in all, 69,000,000 f. of terminable annuities, of which about 3,000,000 f. would annually fall in. There was reason, therefore, to hope, that in a few years, as the annuitants, pensioners, and others died off, the saving under the head of life annuities would compensate for the successive augmentations which the perpetual debt would receive in consequence of new inscriptions in the Great Book. Consequently, the entire annual charge for interest on both branches of the debt, supposing provision to be made for all old claims, could not possibly exceed the sum of 100,000,000 f., about one-half of which consisted of *perpetual rentes*, and the other of *terminable rentes*. Our financial position then was this: a debt bearing 100,000,000 f. annual interest, and a budget exhibiting a total expenditure (interest on the debt included) of 500,000,000 f., with a clear net revenue of a like amount, after deduction of 100,000,000 f. for the costs of collection. This position was certainly far superior to that of England, which had an annual debt of nearly 500,000,000 f., with a revenue of 1,000,000,000 or 1,100,000,000 f. Add to this that France still had left the resource of the indirect contributions, that is to say, taxes on liquors, tobacco, salt, &c., not yet re-established, and which were destined to furnish at a future period an immense revenue.

The First Consul was desirous of augmenting the resources of the Sinking Fund in proportion to the increase of the debt. He had decided upon the creation of *rentes* to the amount of 2,700,000 f. to wipe off the deficit of the years V., VI., and VII., of 1,000,000 f. for the deficit of the year VIII., and of several more millions for the inscription of the balance of the *Consolidated Third*, and for the conversion of the *mobilised two-thirds*, &c. He caused a capital of 90,000,000 f. in national domains, saleable at discretion, and applicable to the redemption of *rentes*, to be assigned to the Sinking Fund. At the suggestion of the First Consul, there was moreover transferred to the commissioners a *rente* of 5,400,000 f. belonging to the fund for public instruction: we shall presently see how this sum was made good.

By this arrangement, the national domains were preserved from being frittered away; for the commissioners of the Sinking Fund, disposing of them slowly, and at seasonable times, or keeping them, if it suited them, thus avoided the deplorable dilapidations which had formerly taken place. To secure the remainder with a greater degree of certainty, the First Consul

resolved to apply a considerable portion of them to various other branches of service, in which he took great interest, such as public instruction and the maintenance of the invalids. Public instruction appeared to him the most important service of the State, that, in particular, for which an enlightened government like his, having a new society to found, ought to lose no time in providing. As for the invalids, that is to say, wounded soldiers, they formed, as it were, his family; they were the props of his power, the instruments of his glory: all his attention was due to them; he owed them at least some instalment of the thousand millions formerly promised by the Republic to the defenders of the country.

The First Consul did not like to see these important services dependent on the budget, on its fluctuations and contingencies. In consequence, he caused 120,000,000 f. worth of national domains to be allotted to public instruction, and 40,000,000 f. to the support of the hospitals for the invalids. Here was sufficient amply to endow the noble institution which he intended one day to devote to the education of the French youth, and wherewithal to endow also several similar hospitals upon the same footing as that which owes its origin to Louis XIV. Whether these assignments were or were not afterwards respected, it was for the moment 160,000,000 f. rescued from the improvident sales of public lands, and an annual relief for the budget. Thus of the 400,000,000 f. worth of national domains left, 10,000,000 f. were granted towards the expenditure of the year VIII., 20,000,000 f. for that of the year IX., 90,000,000 f. to the Sinking Fund, 120,000,000 f. to public instruction, 40,000,000 f. to the invalids. These formed a total sum of 280,000,000 f. out of 400,000,000 f., for which a useful employment was immediately found, without having recourse to the system of public sales. Out of this sum of 280,000,000 f., 10,000,000 f. only for the year VIII., and 20,000,000 f. for the year IX., were to be disposed of in the course of two years, which would not be attended with any inconvenience; the 90,000,000 f. assigned to the Sinking Fund were to be sold, but very slowly, when the Fund should be in absolute want of money, perhaps not at all. The 120,000,000 f. for public instruction, the 40,000,000 f. for the invalids, were never to be offered for sale. Out of the total of 400,000,000 f., there would remain 120,000,000 f. disposable and unappropriated. In reality, only 30,000,000 f. out of the 400,000,000 f. were to be sold; the rest remained in trust for different branches of the services, or as a disposable reserve with a certainty of soon increasing at least double or treble in value for the advantage of the State.

To sum up: the government availed itself of the revival of

credit to substitute the expedient of the creation of *rentes* to that of the alienation of the national domains; it discharged by a very small portion of these domains, and by a creation of *rentes*, the deficiencies left unpaid in the years V., VI., VII., and VIII.; it completed the liquidation of the floating public debt, and ensured the payment of the interest in a certain and regular manner. After having thus regulated old accounts, saved the remnant of the domains of the State, and fixed the amount of the debt, there would be an annual interest of 100,000,000 f., an ample Sinking Fund; and finally, a budget, with an equal income and expenditure, of 500,000,000 f., exclusive of the costs of collection, or of 600,000,000 f. including those costs.

Such a distribution of the public property, conceived with not less equity than sound sense, ought to have met with general approbation. A violent opposition was nevertheless raised in the Tribunate. The 415,000,000 f. demanded for the current year, the year IX., were granted without difficulty; but the opposition complained that the budget was not voted a year in advance: an unfair reproach, for nothing was at that time arranged for such a mode of proceeding. It was not yet practised in England, and it was even a disputed point among financiers. The same opposition members complained of the regulation of the arrears being an act of bankruptcy towards the creditors of the years V., VI., and VII., whose debts were to be consolidated at three per cent. only, instead of five, as was the case with those of the year VIII. They found fault with the regulation of the debt for depriving the holders of the *Consolidated Third* of the interest of their stock for two years, since that interest was to commence only with the year XII. For these two complaints there was very little foundation: for, as we have seen, the creditors of the years V., VI., and VII., in obtaining a permanent *rente* of three per cent., received more than their debts were worth; and as for the portion of the *Consolidated Third*, the inscription of which was resolved upon, a great service was rendered to the holders by the mere circumstance of that inscription. If, in fact, that inscription had been deferred a year or two longer, as had been done by the preceding government, the holders would have been deprived, not only of the interest, but of the benefit of the definitive consolidation. To resume the process of that consolidation, so long deferred, was of itself to place them in a much better position.

The Tribunate grew warm upon these trivial objections: paid no regard to the answers that were addressed to it; and rejected the plan of finance by a majority of fifty-six votes to thirty, in the sitting of the 19th of March (28th Ventôse). Some cries of "*Vive la République!*" were even raised in the

tribunes, a circumstance which had not happened for a long time, and revived the remembrance of the tumultuous days of the Convention. On the motion of Messrs. Riouffe and Chauvelin, the president caused the tribunes to be cleared.

Two days later, on the 21st of March (30th Ventôse), the last day of the session of the year IX., the Legislative Body heard the discussion of the bill. Three tribunes were to attack, and three councillors of State to defend it. M. Benjamin Constant was one of the three tribunes. He urged in a brilliant manner the objections raised against the plan of the government. The Legislative Body, nevertheless, voted its adoption by a majority of 227 to 58. The First Consul ought to have been satisfied. But he knew not, neither did those about him know, that we ought to do good without being surprised, without being ruffled, by the injustice with which we are frequently repaid. And what man ever had so much glory as the First Consul to compensate him for these attacks, so frivolous, so indiscreet! Besides, notwithstanding these attacks, the arrangements were excellent on the part of the government. The majority in the Legislative Body was five-sixths at least; and in the Tribunate, the vote of which decided nothing, it was two-thirds. There was nothing to be astonished at, little to cause alarm in such inconsiderable minorities. But, although the object of universal admiration, the man who then governed France could not endure the petty censures passed upon his administration. The time for a real representative government had not yet arrived: the opposition had not its principles or its manners any more than the government itself. That which will completely portray the oppositionists of the Tribunate is, that the odious procedure against the revolutionists did not elicit from them a single observation. They took advantage of the circumstance, of the act not having been referred to the Legislature, to remain silent on the subject. They declaimed on things that were of little importance or unobjectionable, and winked at the unpardonable infringement of all the rules of justice. Such, in almost all times, is the conduct of men and of parties.

After all, the barren agitation of a few systematic oppositionists, mistaking the general movement of minds, and the exigencies of the time, produced little sensation. The public was wholly engrossed by the spectacle of the immense efforts which had achieved victory and a continental peace for France, and which were soon to procure for her a maritime peace also.

As we have observed several times, the First Consul, amidst his military and political occupations, never ceased to give his attention to roads, canals, bridges, to manufactures, and to commerce.

We have already described the wretched state of the roads, and the means employed by the First Consul to supply the insufficiency of the produce of the tolls. He had given orders for a thorough inquiry into this subject, but, as is mostly the case, the difficulty consisted much more in the want of money than in the choice of a good system. He proceeded direct to the point, and in the budget of the year IX. he appropriated fresh sums out of the general funds of the treasury for prosecuting the extraordinary repairs already begun. Canals were also the subject of conversation. Men's minds, disgusted with political agitations, gladly turned towards everything that concerned industry and commerce. The canal now known by the name of the canal of St. Quentin, connecting the navigation of the Seine and of the Oise with that of the Somme and the Scheld, that is to say, connecting Belgium with France, had been abandoned. It had been found impossible to agree upon the mode of executing the cutting, which was to afford a passage from the valley of the Oise into those of the Somme and the Scheld. The engineers were divided in opinion. The First Consul went thither himself, heard what each had to say, decided the question, and decided it well. The cutting was determined upon, and continued in the best direction, the identical one which has succeeded. The population of St. Quentin received him with transport, and no sooner had he returned to Paris, than the inhabitants of the Seine Inferieure sent a deputation, to solicit him to grant them in their turn forty-eight hours of his time. He promised a speedy visit to Normandy. At his instigation, the erection of three new bridges in Paris over the Seine was decided upon, and entrusted to companies; these were, that fronting the Jardin des Plantes, and called the bridge of Austerlitz; that which unites the isle of the City with the isle St. Louis; lastly, that which connects the Louvre with the palace of the Institute. He directed his attention at the same time to the road of the Simplon, the first project of his youth—a project ever dearest to his heart, most worthy to rank, in future, beside the exploits of Rivoli and Marengo. It will be recollected that the First Consul, as soon as he had founded the Cisalpine Republic, was desirous to connect it with France by a road, which, running from Lyons or Dijon, passing through Geneva, traversing the Valais, descending to the Lago Maggiore and Milan, should enable an army of 50,000 men with 100 pieces of cannon to debouch at any time in the heart of Upper Italy. For want of such a road, he had been obliged to cross the St. Bernard. Now that the Cisalpine Republic had been reconstituted at the congress of Luneville, it was more than ever expedient to form a great military communication between Lombardy and France. The

First Consul had immediately issued orders for the necessary works. General Thurreau, whom we have seen descending the Little St. Bernard with the legions of conscripts, while General Bonaparte was descending the Great St. Bernard with his seasoned troops, received orders to fix his headquarters at Domo d'Ossola, at the very foot of the Simplon. This general was to protect the workmen, and his soldiers were to assist in the completion of the undertaking.

To this magnificent work the First Consul resolved to add another, in commemoration of the passage of the Alps. The monks of the Great St. Bernard had rendered important services to the French army. Supplied with some money, they had, during ten days, supported the strength of our soldiers with food and wine. The First Consul retained a deeply grateful recollection of those services. He resolved upon the establishment of two similar hospices, one on Mount Cenis, the other on the Simplon, both auxiliary to the convent of the Great St. Bernard. They were each to contain fifteen monks, and to receive from the Cisalpine Republic a considerable endowment in lands. That Republic could refuse nothing to its founder. But as that founder liked prompt execution in all things, he had the works necessary for the first establishment performed at the expense of France, that these useful undertakings might experience no delay. Thus magnificent roads and institutions, founded with a beneficence truly noble, were to attest to future ages the passage of the Alps by the modern Hannibal.

Concurrently with these grand and beneficent views, a subject of another kind engaged his attention, which was no less useful to the nation; that is, the compilation of the Civil Code. The task of digesting this code the First Consul had confided to several eminent lawyers, Messrs. Portalis, Tronchet, and Bigot de Préameneu. Their labours were concluded, and the result had been communicated to the Court of Cassation, as well as to the twenty-nine tribunals of appeal, since called royal courts. The opinions of the whole of the magistracy were thus collected, and the work was now about to be submitted to the Council of State, and gravely discussed under the presidency of the First Consul. It was proposed, that it should then be presented to the Legislative Body in the course of the ensuing session, that of the year X.

Ever ready to undertake great works, and at the same time to reward their authors munificently, the First Consul had just used his influence to raise M. Tronchet to the Senate. By this means he conferred a distinction upon an eminent jurisconsult, one of the compilers of the Civil Code, and, what was not a matter of indifference to him in a political point of view, the courageous defender of Louis XVI.

All things, therefore, were being organised at the same time, with the harmony which a comprehensive mind is capable of introducing into its works, with the rapidity which a resolute energy, an authority already punctually obeyed, is capable of imparting to them. The genius which accomplished these things was without doubt extraordinary; but, it must be confessed, the situation was as extraordinary as the genius. General Bonaparte had France and Europe to move, and victory for a lever; he had to digest all the codes of the French nation, but then at the same time all ranks were disposed to submit to his laws with implicit obedience; he had roads, canals, bridges to construct, and the necessary resources for these objects, at his undisputed disposal; he had even nations ready to furnish him with their treasures, the Italians, for example, who cheerfully contributed to the expense of opening the Simplon, and to the endowment of the hospices raised on the summits of the Alps. Providence does nothing by halves. For every mighty task, she furnishes a great genius; and to every great genius, she assigns a mighty task.

## BOOK IX.

### NEUTRAL POWERS.

PEACE between the emperor and the empire having been concluded at Luneville in February 1801, the First Consul was impatient to secure the results of his policy. These were to conclude a peace with those continental States which had not yet been reconciled to the Republic, and to compel them to close their ports against England; to direct against the latter the combined strength of the neutral powers, and, in conjunction with them, to strike some decisive blow against the British trade and territory; and by this combination of means attain a maritime peace, without which the peace of the continent would be incomplete. Everything proclaimed that these happy results could not be long delayed.

The Germanic Diet had ratified the signature affixed by the emperor to the treaty of Luneville. There were no grounds for supposing that there would be any demur, as Austria possessed the power of influencing the ecclesiastical States, the only dissidents opposed to the treaty. With respect to the secular princes, as they were to be indemnified for their losses from the territories proposed to be secularised, they had a strong interest in accelerating the acceptance of the conditions stipulated between Austria and France. They were, moreover, under the influence of Prussia, which power France had induced to view favourably the proceedings at Luneville. Besides all this, every one was anxious for peace, and was ready to contribute to promote it, even by sacrifices. Prussia alone, in ratifying the signature of the emperor, which he had granted without the authority of the Diet, appeared desirous to qualify her consent in such a form as rather to assume the semblance of toleration than that of approbation, thereby reserving for the future the rights of the empire. But this proposition of Prussia, which at the same time that it ratified the treaty implied an indirect censure on the emperor, was not supported by the majority. The treaty was ratified unconditionally in its original form by a *conclusum* of the 9th of March 1801 (18th Ventôse, year IX.). The ratifications were exchanged at Paris on the 16th of March (25th Ventôse). There only remained to settle a plan



of indemnifications, which was to be the subject of ulterior negotiations.

Peace was thus concluded with the greater part of Europe. It was, indeed, not yet signed with Russia, but we were, as will soon appear, engaged with her, and with the northern courts, in one great maritime coalition. There were at the same moment two Russian ministers at Paris: M. de Sprengporten on the subject of the prisoners, M. de Kalitscheff for the adjustment of general affairs. The latter had just arrived in the early part of March (middle of Ventôse).

There still remained the courts of Naples and Portugal to coerce, in order to close the entire continent completely against England.

Murat was advancing towards Southern Italy with a chosen body of troops, which had been drawn from the camp at Amiens. Reinforced by several detachments supplied from the army of General Brune, he had proceeded as far as Foligno, with a view to compel the court of Naples to yield to the will of France. Had it not been for the interest evinced by the Emperor of Russia in favour of this court, the First Consul would probably at once have granted to the house of Parma the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, with the view of depriving a hostile family of this fine territory. But the disposition manifested by the Emperor Paul would not allow him to carry this idea into effect. He was desirous, moreover, to conciliate general opinion throughout Europe, and for this reason it was expedient to avoid, as much as possible, the overthrowing of the ancient kingdoms. He was then willing to grant peace to the court of Naples, on the condition that she should come to a rupture with England. But to influence her to take this step was in the highest degree difficult of accomplishment. Murat advanced to the frontiers of the kingdom, taking care to avoid Rome, and lavishing upon the Pope the greatest demonstration of respect. The court of Naples no longer resisted, but signed an armistice which contained a stipulation agreeable to the wishes of the First Consul, for the exclusion of the English from the ports of the Two Sicilies. Nevertheless, the armistice was only for the short term of thirty days; at the expiration of which, a definitive treaty of peace was to be signed.

The Marquis de Gallo, one of the negotiators at Campo Formio, who boasted of his intimacy with the First Consul, and of having as much influence over him as M. de Cobentzel, had repaired to Paris. Confiding on these personal recommendations, he flattered himself that, under the protection of the Russian embassy, and at the instances of Austria, he should obtain the conditions desired by the court of Naples, which were confined to a simple neutrality. These pretensions were

ridiculous, inasmuch as this court, which had given the signal for the second coalition, which had waged against us an obstinate war, which had, in short, treated the French with great indignity, could not expect, now that we held her at our discretion, to escape upon the condition of a plain and simple separation from England. The least we could do was to compel her, either willingly or by force, to act as hostilely against England as she had done against France.

M. de Gallo having betrayed considerable self-sufficiency at Paris, having even appeared to depend more than was becoming upon the Russian embassy, a prompt termination was put to his negotiation. M. de Talleyrand notified to him that a French plenipotentiary had set out for Florence, that the negotiation was consequently transferred to that city, and that, moreover, he could not treat with a negotiator who had not the power to consent to the sole condition deemed indispensable, namely, the expulsion of the English from the ports of the Two Sicilies—a condition which the Emperor Paul had as much at heart as the First Consul himself. Consequently, M. de Gallo found it necessary to quit Paris without delay. We had, in fact, just despatched to Florence M. Alquier, who had been recalled from Madrid at the period when Lucien Bonaparte was sent to Spain. M. Alquier was invested with full instructions and powers to negotiate.

This plenipotentiary repaired to Florence with the utmost haste, and found there Chevalier Micheroux, the same minister who signed the armistice with Murat, who had just received full powers from his court. The negotiations, transferred to that city, and carried on under the bayonets of the French army, no longer experienced the same difficulties as at Paris. A treaty of peace was signed on the 18th of March 1801 (27th Ventôse, year IX.). The conditions may be pronounced moderate, if the situation of the court of Naples be compared with that of the French Republic. We permitted that branch of the house of Bourbons to retain the whole of its dominions, which were preserved to them in their full integrity. We only exacted an insignificant portion of territory which it possessed in the island of Elba. This was Porto Longone, and the surrounding district. The island of Elba, at that time, belonged partly to Tuscany, and partly to the Two Sicilies. The intention of the French Consul was to annex it entirely to France. An historian of these treaties has loudly inveighed against this alleged act of spoliation, as if it were not plainly the natural right of the victor. With the exception of this insignificant sacrifice, the court of Naples lost nothing. She bound herself to close her ports against the English, and to furnish France with three frigates, to be delivered over, ready armed, at Ancona. The

First Consul destined these for Egypt; but the most important article of the treaty was secret. It stipulated that the Neapolitan government should receive a division of 12,000 to 15,000 French troops in the Gulf of Tarentum, and should victual them during the whole term of their occupying that station. The real intention of the French Consul, without any reservation, was to transport them to that spot, with a view to succour Egypt. At that station they would be half-way on the route to Alexandria. A last article required the restitution of all the objects of art which had been selected at Rome by the French, which were all packed up in cases when the Neapolitan army penetrated into the Papal States in 1799, and which the court of Naples had seized and appropriated to itself. An indemnity of 500,000 f. was granted to the French who had been pillaged or harassed by the marauding bands of Neapolitans.

Such were the terms of the treaty of Florence, which must be viewed as an act of clemency when the previous conduct of the court of Naples is taken into consideration; but which was perfectly in accordance with the intentions of the First Consul, who was aiming exclusively at procuring the ports of the continent to be closed against England, and at securing advantageous positions to enable him to keep up communications with Egypt.

Nothing was yet agreed upon with the Pope, whose plenipotentiary was still negotiating at Paris upon the most important of all, the religious question. He was dissatisfied with the King of Piedmont, who had yielded up Sardinia to the English, and also with the Piedmontese, who had manifested dispositions but little friendly towards our troops. He was desirous, therefore, of freeing himself from any engagement respecting that important part of Italy.

Let us now turn to Spain and Portugal. Everything proceeded favourably in that quarter. The court of Spain, delighted with the stipulations agreed upon at Lunéville, which secured Tuscany to the young Infant of Parma, with the title of king, appeared every day more and more devoted to the First Consul, and to his views. An unexpected event, the fall of M. d'Urquijo, far from injuring our relations, had only served to strengthen them. This was not at first anticipated, as M. d'Urquijo was in Spain a sort of revolutionist, from whom a greater degree of favour was expected towards France than from any other individual. But the result proved this to be a misapprehension. M. d'Urquijo had been at the head of affairs but a short time. Desirous of correcting certain abuses, he had induced his royal master, King Charles IV., to send an autograph letter to the Pope, recommending a series of propositions for the reform of the Spanish clergy. The Pope, alarmed at perceiving a

reforming spirit arising in Spain, appealed to the old Duke of Parma, brother to the queen, complaining of M. d'Urquijo, whom he stigmatised as a bad Catholic. This was sufficient to ruin M. d'Urquijo in the mind of the king. The Prince of Peace, an avowed enemy of M. d'Urquijo, availed himself of the opportunity, and struck the last blow during a royal progress. Through these combined influences, M. d'Urquijo was stripped of power, and treated with an unexampled degree of harshness and severity. He was seized in his own house, and banished from Madrid, like a criminal of State. M. de Cevallos, a relative and creature of the Prince of Peace, was appointed his successor. This prince thus again became, from that moment, the real prime minister of the court of Spain. As he had sometimes shown some sort of opposition to an intimate alliance with France, probably in order to have an opportunity of thus throwing blame upon the Spanish ministry, it was feared that this change of ministers might be prejudicial to the designs of the First Consul. But Lucien Bonaparte, recently arrived at Madrid, forming at once a correct opinion of the actual state of things, neglected M. de Cevallos, a powerless subordinate, and put himself in direct relations with the Prince of Peace. He gave this prince to understand, that it was he who was considered at Paris as in reality prime minister of Charles IV., that to him would be ascribed all the difficulties which French policy might encounter in Spain, and that upon his own conduct would depend whether we should regard him as a friend or as an enemy. The Prince of Peace, who had provoked numberless animosities, and, above all, that of the heir-presumptive, deeply irritated with the state of oppression in which he was condemned to live, and conscious that his ruin was inevitable if the king and queen chanced to die, regarded the friendship of the Bonapartes as most precious, and promptly preferred their alliance to their hostility.

From that moment, business was conducted between the Prince of Peace and Lucien directly. M. d'Urquijo, finding himself too weak to bring this question of Portugal to a solution, had from time to time postponed any positive explanation on the subject. He had made France a thousand promises, unattended by any substantial results. The Prince of Peace admitted in his interviews with Lucien that up to that time they had not been inclined to act, that M. d'Urquijo had cajoled France with fine words; but he declared that he was ready, as far as regarded himself, to concert measures with the First Consul to act effectually against Portugal, provided they could come to an understanding upon certain points. He demanded first, the co-operation of a French division of 25,000 men, as Spain had it not in her power to raise a larger force than 20,000.

to such a point of depression had that splendid monarchy been reduced. As the presence of a French force might alarm the king and queen, it would be necessary, therefore, in order to reassure them both, that this force should be placed under the command of a Spanish general. This general was to be the Prince of Peace himself. Finally, the provinces of Portugal, of which they were to take possession, were to remain as security in the hands of the King of Spain until a general peace: in the meantime, the ports of Portugal should be closed against England.

These proposals were accepted by the First Consul with the greatest eagerness, and returned in order to receive the sanction of King Charles IV. This prince, governed by his queen, who, in her turn, was under the influence of the Prince of Peace, consented to the war against his son-in-law, on condition that the latter should not be deprived of any portion of his territories; that he should be forced only to break with the English, and to enter into an alliance with France and Spain. These views did not coincide with those of the Prince of Peace, who was desirous, it was alleged at Madrid, to secure for himself a principality in Portugal. However this may be, he was obliged to submit, and he received accordingly the rank of generalissimo. A summons was sent to the court of Lisbon, to come to an explanation within a fortnight, and to make election between England and Spain, the latter supported by France. In the meantime, the preparations for war were commenced on both sides of the Pyrenees. The Prince of Peace, now created generalissimo of the Spanish and French troops, carried off even the king's own guards to enable him to complete his army. He amused the court with reviews, with warlike spectacles, and indulged in the wildest dreams of military glory. The First Consul, on his part, hastened to direct towards Spain a portion of the troops which were returning to France. He formed a division of 25,000 men, well armed and equipped. General Leclerc was appointed to the command of the advanced guard. General Gouvion St. Cyr, whom he justly regarded as one of the most able generals of the time, was appointed to the command of the entire army, in order to compensate for the utter incapacity of the prince generalissimo.

It was arranged that these troops, set in motion in the month of March, should be ready to enter Spain in the course of the ensuing month of April.

The whole of Europe thus co-operated to aid our designs. Under the influence of the First Consul, the States of the South closed their ports against England, and the Northern States entered into an armed league against her. Under these circumstances, this power was under the necessity of having troops

everywhere; in the Mediterranean in order to blockade Egypt; in the Straits of Gibraltar, to check the movements of the French fleets passing from one sea to the other; upon the coast of Portugal, to succour their threatened ally; before Rochefort and Brest, in order to blockade the great French and Spanish squadron which was ready to set sail; in the North, to keep the Baltic under control, and prevent the rising of the neutral powers; they were also necessary in India to maintain their authority and conquests in that quarter.

The First Consul was desirous of seizing this peculiar moment, when the British forces, required in all places at the same time, had their strength necessarily widely scattered, to attempt some great expedition. The principal object he had in view, that which he the most cherished, was to succour Egypt. He owed a great duty to the army led beyond the sea, and subsequently abandoned by him in order to return to the assistance of France. He also considered the colony founded on the banks of the Nile as the most glorious of his works. It was of importance to prove to the world that in transporting 36,000 men to the East he had not yielded to the inspirations of a young and ardent imagination, but had attempted a serious enterprise, susceptible of being brought to a successful conclusion. We have seen the endeavours made to negotiate a naval armistice, the object of which was to permit six frigates to enter into the port of Alexandria. This armistice, it will be recollected, had not been concluded. Not having sufficient financial resources for the equipment of armaments by sea and land, the First Consul had not yet been able to undertake the vast operation which he had in contemplation to succour Egypt. But now, relieved from the continental contest, being able to direct all his resources towards naval warfare, having almost entirely the coasts of Europe at his disposal, he meditated, in order to preserve Egypt, projects as extensive and as bold as those which he had executed to achieve its conquest. The winter season contributed to the success of his plans, by rendering the presence of the English cruisers on the coasts quite impossible.

In the meantime, vessels of every description, trading vessels, and ships of war from the smallest despatch boat up to frigates, sailed from the various ports of Holland, France, Spain, Italy, and even from the coast of Barbary, carrying to Egypt with news from France, provisions, European goods, wines, and munitions of war. Some of these vessels were captured, but the greater part reached Alexandria, and not a week elapsed without news from the government at home being received at Cairo, together with signal proofs of the interest which he took in the colony.

The First Consul also prepared a fleet adapted for the inland

navigation of Egypt. He had executed a model of a seventy-four gun ship, which would combine great strength with the advantage of being able to navigate the shallow channels of Alexandria without discharging her guns.\* Orders were given to build a certain number after this model.

Whilst he bestowed all this sedulous care to sustain the spirits of the army of Egypt, transmitting to it frequently news, with partial relief, the First Consul was, at the same time, preparing a vast expedition in order to convey thither, by one mighty effort, a powerful reinforcement of troops and materials of war. The armies returned to the soil of France were about to add a pressure on our finances; but, on the other hand, they supplied the government with great means to disquiet, perhaps to strike a blow at England. Thirty thousand men remained in the Cisalpine; 10,000 in Piedmont; 6000 in Switzerland; 15,000 were proceeding to the Gulf of Tarentum; 25,000 were directing their march towards Portugal; 25,000 were stationed in Holland: thus 111,000 men were to be supported by foreign powers. The remainder were about to be thrown on the French treasury, but nevertheless entirely at the disposal of the First Consul. A camp was forming in Holland; another in French Flanders; a third at Brest; a fourth was already collected in the Gironde, either destined for Portugal, or to furnish troops for embarkation at Rochefort. The corps returning from Italy assembled between Marseilles and Toulon. The division of 15,000 men appointed to the station in the Gulf of Tarentum was to occupy Otranto, in virtue of a secret article of the treaty of Naples, to cover the surrounding roadsteads by numerous batteries, to prepare a place of anchorage, where a fleet might approach and embark a division of 10,000 to 12,000 men in order to transport them to Egypt. Admiral Villeneuve had already set out to give the necessary orders on the spot for such embarkation.

The naval forces of Holland, France, and Spain, with some remains of the Italian navy, stationed near these several assemblages of troops, gave England reason to apprehend descents contemplated upon different points at the same time: upon Ireland, upon Portugal, upon Egypt, or upon the East Indies.

The First Consul had concerted measures with Spain and Holland, relating to the employment of their respective navies. By collecting the wrecks of the ancient Dutch navy, five ships of the line and a few frigates might be armed. Thirty vessels were lying at Brest, fifteen French, and as many Spanish, which had been detained two years in that harbour. The First Consul had made the following arrangements with Spain. Five Dutch ships combined with five French vessels, and five of the Spanish

\* Letter dated 1st Nivose, year IX. State Paper Office.

vessels lying at Brest, were to be despatched to Brazil, in order to protect that fine kingdom, and to prevent England from indemnifying herself for the enterprise set on foot against Portugal, by seizing on the Portuguese colonies. Twenty Spanish and French ships, according to the convention, were to remain at Brest, to be ready at any moment to throw an army into Ireland. A French division was preparing under Admiral Gauteaume, in the same port of Brest, destined, it was said, for St. Domingo, there to re-establish the French and Spanish authority. Another French division was being equipped at Rochefort, and a Spanish division of five vessels at Ferrol, for the purpose of carrying troops to the West India Islands, and recovering Trinidad, for instance, or Martinique. Spain, by the treaty which secured Tuscany to her in exchange for Louisiana, had engaged to furnish France with six vessels fully equipped, placed in the harbour of Cadiz, and to employ the resources of that ancient arsenal to reorganise a portion of the forces which she formerly possessed at that station.

The First Consul, in forming these arrangements, did not communicate to the Spanish government his real intentions, as he feared the indiscretion of that cabinet. He was desirous to send a portion of the combined fleets to Brazil, and to the West India Islands, to accomplish the avowed designs, and to attract thither the English fleets; but at Brest his paramount object was the expedition under Gauteaume, ostensibly destined for St. Domingo, but intended in reality for Egypt. He gave orders for the selection of seven of the fastest sailing ships of the squadron, with two frigates and a brig; and these vessels were to transport 5000 men to effect a landing, with an ample supply of warlike stores of all kinds, timber, iron, medicines, and a selection of European commodities most wanted in Egypt. The First Consul gave orders to reload the cargoes of those vessels which were already in a very advanced state of loading, and to reload them in conformity with the fresh arrangements which he had determined upon. He was anxious, in short, that each vessel should contain a complete assortment of every individual article prepared for the colony, and not an entire cargo of one single description of articles; so that in the case of one of the vessels being captured, the expedition would not be totally deficient of the precise article which the captured vessel might contain. This arrangement being contrary to the usage of the navy, rendered the stowage of these vessels more difficult, but the absolute will of the First Consul overcame all these obstacles. His aide-de-camp, Lauriston, was at Brest, seconding the written instructions of which he was the bearer by the influence of his presence, and by his urgent endeavours to expedite their departure. The expedition from Rochefort,



ostensibly announced for the West India Islands, was also destined for Egypt. Its equipment was proceeding as rapidly as possible. The aide-de-camp Savary urged its departure, and drew thither a body of troops detached from the army of Portugal. The division of 25,000 men, which was about to pass the Pyrenees, being assembled in the Gironde, furnished convenient means for disguising the real object of the Rochefort expedition. Without exciting the least suspicion, a few battalions had been borrowed from this force with the intention of embarking them in this squadron. The expedition was to be confided to Admiral Bruix, perhaps the most distinguished naval commander whom France at that time possessed. This admiral united to a superior understanding, seldom found amongst either civil or military men, a perfect knowledge of naval affairs, and had distinguished himself by his successful and well-known cruise of 1799 in the Mediterranean. When, at the last moment, General Bonaparte should disclose his secret to the cabinet at Madrid, Admiral Bruix was to proceed to Ferrol, and, reinforced by the squadron lying at that place, repair to Cadiz, there to be joined by the division furnished by Spain, and then proceed onwards to Otranto, embark the troops collected at that point, and from thence set sail for Egypt. This division at Cadiz, furnished by Spain, was composed of six fine vessels which were being prepared in the greatest haste. Admiral Dumanoir had just set out post to Cadiz, in order to urge on their equipment. Bodies of sailors were proceeding by land towards this port. Small vessels, filled with seamen, were sent also at the same time, and these men, when transferred, helped to complete the crews of the vessels of war.

These numerous expeditions would inevitably attract the attention of England to all points at once, divide her forces, cause her infinite confusion, and some of them taking advantage of this confusion would be almost certain to reach Egypt. Desirous of availing himself of the bad season, which rendered the enemy's cruising off Brest both difficult and interrupted, the First Consul intended to make Admiral Gauteaume sail before spring. His orders to this effect were very precise: but it was not easy for him to inspire his naval commanders with the same spirit that animated the generals of his land forces. Admiral Gauteaume had seemed to him bold and successful, as it was he who had brought him almost miraculously from Alexandria to Fréjus. But in this opinion he was mistaken. This officer, an experienced seaman, perfectly acquainted with the navigation of the Levant, of undaunted bravery, was, nevertheless, of irresolute character, and incapable of sustaining the burden of a heavy responsibility. The expedition was ready for sea: several families of workmen were embarked, under the

impression instilled into them, that they were bound to St. Domingo, but still they hesitated to put to sea. Savary, armed with the orders of the First Consul, overcame all the obstacles which presented themselves, and compelled Gauteaume to set sail. The enemy's cruisers descried them, and made signals to the blockading squadron that the French fleet was leaving the port, so that Gauteaume was under the necessity of returning to the anchorage in the outer road of Bertheaume. He then feigned to re-enter the inner roads, in order to induce the English to believe that his only object was to exercise his crews by performing these evolutions.

At last, on the 23rd of January (3rd Pluviôse), the enemy's cruisers being dispersed by a dreadful gale of wind, he set sail, and, in spite of the greatest dangers, happily succeeded in getting out of the port of Brest, and proceeded towards the Straits of Gibraltar. The success of Gauteaume's enterprise was the more desirable, as the famous expedition consisting of 15,000 or 18,000 English, destined one day for Ferrol, and another day for Cadiz, or it might be the South of France, was at that moment on its way to Egypt. It was lying in the road of Macri, opposite the island of Rhodes, waiting the season for landing, and the completion of the preparations of the Turks.

Orders were issued to the journals of the capital to make no mention of the naval movements which might be remarked in the ports of France, unless the intelligence was derived from the *Moniteur*.\*

Before we trace the operations of our squadrons in the South, we must revert to the North, and see what was passing between England and the neutral powers.

Great Britain was, at this moment, menaced by an accumulation of the greatest dangers. War had at length broken out between that government and the Baltic powers. The declaration of the neutrals, similar to that issued in 1780, being only a simple declaration of their rights, England might still have dissembled with them without construing this declaration, which was directed in a general manner to all the belligerent parties, as addressed especially to herself, and might have endeavoured, for the moment, to avoid any collision, by taking care to respect the Danish, Swedish, Prussian, and Russian flags. England had, in fact, much greater interest in maintaining peace with the

\* The following is a curious letter on this subject:—

“The First Consul to the Minister of General Police.

“Have the goodness, Citizen Minister, to address a short circular to the editors of the fourteen journals, forbidding the insertion of any article calculated to afford the enemy the slightest clue to the different movements which are taking place in our squadrons, unless the intelligence be derived from the official journal.

“Paris, 1st Ventôse, year IX.”—State Paper Office.

northern powers of Europe, than in harassing the commerce of the smaller maritime powers trading with France. Moreover, her immediate want of foreign corn rendered even the freedom of the neutrals temporarily expedient. Strictly considered, she was only justified in making reprisals against Russia; inasmuch, as amongst all the members of the neutral league, the Emperor Paul was the only one who had added to the declaration, the hostile act of an embargo on her vessels. Besides, the question of Malta was much more the motive of this measure, than were any of the contested points concerning maritime rights.

But England, in her pride, had met a simple exposition of principles by an act of violence, and had placed under embargo all the Russian, Swedish, and Danish vessels. She had only excepted from these rigorous proceedings the commerce of Prussia, towards which power she showed more moderation, in the hopes of detaching her from the confederacy, and moreover, because Hanover was at her mercy.

England, then, was actually at war at the same time with France and Spain, her ancient enemies, and with the courts of Russia, Sweden, and Prussia, her ancient allies; she had been abandoned by Austria since the peace of Luneville, and by the court of Naples since the treaty of Florence. Portugal, her last foothold on the continent, was about to be wrested from her. Her situation was precisely similar to that in which France was placed in 1793. She was reduced to struggle alone against all Europe, exposed, however, it is true, to fewer dangers than France, and entitled to less merit for being able to defend herself, inasmuch as her insular position protected her from the peril of an invasion. But to render the parallel of their respective positions more remarkable and complete, England was a prey to a frightful famine. The people were in want of food of primary necessity. This state of things was entirely brought about by the obstinacy of Mr. Pitt, and by the genius of General Bonaparte. Mr. Pitt having refused to treat before Marengo, and General Bonaparte having disarmed one portion of Europe by his victories, and turned the other against England by means of his policy, were both incontestably the authors of this prodigious change of fortune.

The position of England was unquestionably most alarming, and we must acknowledge that at this critical juncture she did not give way to despondency. The harvest of the preceding year having been less by one-third than an average crop, all the preceding stock on hand had been consumed. The harvest of the year 1800 having again been deficient by one-fourth, the present scarcity had followed. This scarcity was doubly aggravated by the general war, and especially by the war with the maritime powers, since the supplies of grain were usually derived

from the Baltic. If, therefore, the bad harvest was the primary cause of the famine, it is true that the war greatly tended to aggravate the calamity. Had it only raised the price of grain, by interposing impediments in the way of the Baltic trade, even then its influence upon the general distress must have been truly disastrous. The revenue presented this year the most alarming deficit. The income tax, customs, and excise gave apprehensions that there would be a deficiency in the revenue of £3,000,000 to £4,000,000 sterling. The expenditure of the year was enormous. To meet this it became necessary to borrow £25,000,000 to £26,000,000 sterling. The total expenses of the year for the three kingdoms (Ireland having just become united by the Act of Union), including the interest of the debt created by Mr. Pitt, were estimated at £69,000,000 sterling, an enormous amount at any time, but the more so in 1800, as at that period the revenue had not been augmented to that considerable amount to which a subsequent interval of forty years has raised it in England and in all the countries of Europe. France, as we have stated, had only to support a burden of 600,000,000 f. (£24,000,000 sterling). The exact total of the English debt was, as usually, stoutly disputed; but, in taking only the statement of the government,\* it amounted in capital to £484,365,474 sterling. To meet the interest of the debt and the Sinking Fund there was required annually a sum of £20,144,000 sterling, without taking into account the debt of Ireland, or the loans guaranteed to the Emperor of Germany. Mr. Pitt was accused of having increased the debt on account of the war of the Revolution more than £300,000,000 sterling. On the showing of the government the increase was £298,000,000.

But we must say that England presented a most surprising improvement in every branch, and that her riches had augmented in the same proportion as her burdens. Besides the conquest of India, consummated by the destruction of Tippoo Saib; besides the conquest of a portion of the French, Spanish, and Dutch colonies, to which was just added the acquisition of the island of Malta, England had monopolised the commerce of the whole world. According to the official returns, the imports, which had been in 1781, towards the close of the American war, £12,724,000 sterling, and which, in 1792, at the breaking out of the war of the Revolution, were £19,659,000 sterling, increased, in 1799, to £29,945,000. The exports of English manufactured goods, which, in 1781, were £7,633,000, in 1792 were £24,905,000, and rose, in 1799, to £33,991,000. Thus her foreign trade had tripled since the termination of the American war, and had nearly doubled since the war of the

\* These amounts are taken from the budget presented to Parliament in June 1801, by Mr. Addington, successor to Mr. Pitt.

Revolution. In 1788, the English trade employed 13,827 vessels, and 107,925 seamen; it now, in 1801, employed 18,877 vessels, and 143,661 seamen. The excise and customs had risen from £7,320,000 to £15,587,000. The Sinking Fund, which was, in 1784, £1,000,000, had also increased, in 1800, to £5,500,000.

The resources of the British empire had, then, all doubled or trebled during the preceding twenty years; and, if the pressure at the moment was great, there existed enormous wealth to meet it. England, it is true, was encumbered by a debt of more than £480,000,000, with an annual charge of £20,000,000, to meet the accruing interest; she had to meet, this year, an expenditure of £68,000,000, and to raise, by loan, £24,000,000, to meet her exigencies. All this was enormous, no doubt, if we, moreover, consider the value of money at the time; but England possessed resources within herself, proportionate to these demands. Although not a continental power, she had an army of 193,000 regular troops, 109,000 militia and fencibles, making a total of 302,000 men. She possessed 814 vessels of war, of all sizes, either in course of building or repairing, advance ships, or in commission at sea. In this number were included 100 ships of the line, and 200 frigates, under sail, in all quarters of the world: twenty ships of the line, and forty frigates in reserve, ready for sea. Her effective force then could not be estimated at less than 120 line-of-battle ships, and 250 frigates, manned by 120,000 seamen. In addition to this stupendous force, England possessed a number of naval officers of great merit, and, at their head, a renowned seaman in the person of Nelson. He was an eccentric, violent man, not fit to be entrusted with authority, in cases where diplomatic services were combined with his duties as a naval commander; and he had but recently given a proof of this at Naples, by allowing his name to be tarnished by the intrigues of women, during the bloody executions ordered by the Neapolitan government; but in the midst of danger he was a hero; and he displayed as much genius as courage: his country was justly proud of his glory.

England and France have filled the present age with the fame of their formidable rival exploits. The period at which we have now arrived in this recital is one of the most remarkable during the struggle which they maintained against each other. They both had waged war during eight years. France, with financial resources far less vast, but perhaps more solid, inasmuch as they were founded upon a territorial revenue, with a population nearly double, with all the enthusiasm which a good cause inspires, had successfully resisted all Europe, had extended her territory to the Rhine and to the Alps, had

acquired the dominion over Italy, and a decisive influence on the continent. England, with the profits arising from the commerce of the whole world, with a powerful navy, had acquired a preponderance on the ocean equal to that which France had acquired on land. England, by subsidising the European powers, had incited them against her rival, had urged them to fight, even to their destruction. But whilst she exposed them to be crushed in her service, at the same time she seized upon the colonies of all nations, oppressed the powers which remained neutral, taking revenge, for the success of France on land, by an oppressive tyranny on the ocean; and, although victorious upon this element, she could not prevent France from creating a magnificent maritime station in Egypt, threatening even the British dominions in the East Indies.

A strange revulsion of public opinion, as we have said elsewhere, resulted from this concatenation of events. France, admirably governed, appeared, in the eyes of the world, humane, wise, tranquil, evincing moderation in her victories—a combination of meritorious qualities as rare as they are admirable. Whilst the various cabinets were becoming reconciled to her, they perceived at once how they had all, till then, been the dupes of England's policy. Austria had been urged on to fight for the cause of England, as if she were struggling for her own existence. For this same England the Germanic empire had been dismembered. The powers of the North, with Russia at their head, discovered, at length, that under pretext of prosecuting a moral purpose, and contending against the French Revolution, they had only contributed to procure for England the commerce of the whole universe. Thus the whole world at this moment turned against the mistress of the seas. Paul I. had given the signal with the accustomed impetuosity of his character. Sweden imitated his example without hesitation. Denmark and Prussia followed in the same steps, although with a less degree of resolution. Austria conquered, and now recovered from her delusions, digested her spleen in silence, and, for the moment, at least, gave signs of resisting, for a long period to come, the baneful influence of the British subsidies.

England reaped the fruits of the policy she had pursued; she had doubled her colonies, her commerce, her revenue, her navy; but she had also doubled her debt, her expenditure, her burdens, her enemies, and she presented a spectacle of immense wealth, with all the frightful misery attending a people dying from hunger. France, Spain, Russia, Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden were leagued against her. France, Spain, and Holland united possessed eighty ships, fully equipped, and were capable of arming a greater number. Sweden had twenty-eight, Russia thirty-five, Denmark twenty-three, making a

total together of 166 ships of the line—a force superior to that of the British navy. But England, on her side, enjoyed one great advantage, in having to contend with a coalition; moreover, her armaments surpassed, in effectiveness, those of the coalition. The French and Danish vessels were the only ones which could cope with theirs; and these found it difficult, when fighting in large squadrons, as the manœuvres of the English navy excelled all others in the world. Nevertheless, the danger was becoming imminent, for, if the struggle were prolonged, General Bonaparte was capable of undertaking some formidable expedition, and, if he succeeded in crossing the English channel with an invading army, England was lost.

The long-continued good fortune of Mr. Pitt, like that of M. de Thugut, was now on the wane, before the rising star of young General Bonaparte. Mr. Pitt had enjoyed the most brilliant destiny of his time, after that of the Great Frederick; he was only forty-three years of age, and had already held the reins of power during seventeen years, a power almost absolute in a free country. But his fortune was declining with years, and that of General Bonaparte, on the contrary, was rising—it was just dawning. The fortunes of men succeed each other in the history of the world, like beings in the universe: they have their youth, their decrepitude, and their death. The incomparably more brilliant fortune of General Bonaparte was also destined one day to decline, but meanwhile it was reserved for it to witness the fall of the greatest statesman England ever had, sinking beneath its bright ascendant.

Great Britain seemed menaced by a sort of internal convulsion. The people, suffering from a frightful scarcity, were rising in different parts of the kingdom, pillaging the magnificent country seats of the English aristocracy, and in the cities, plundering the bakers' shops and the provision warehouses. There were in London in 1801, as in Paris in 1792, misguided friends of the people, who incited proceedings against the alleged engrossers, and, in fact, insisted upon a measure which differed only in name from a maximum in the price of bread. Nevertheless, neither the government nor the parliament appeared in the least degree disposed to yield to these senseless demands. The masses reproached Mr. Pitt with being the cause of all their present distresses, they alleged it was he, who, by loading the country with taxes, by doubling the debt, had raised the prices of articles of primary necessity to an exorbitant degree; that it was he, who, in persisting in prosecuting a mad war, in refusing to treat with France, had ended by turning all the maritime nations against England, and by depriving the English people of a supply of foreign grain from the Baltic, now become indispensable. The opposition,

seeing for the first time for seventeen years Mr. Pitt's power shaken, redoubled their energy. Mr. Fox, who had so long absented himself from Parliament, again resumed his seat. Sheridan, Tierney, Lords Grey and Holland, renewed their attacks, and (that which rarely happens in excited parties of an opposition) on this occasion, when contending with their political adversaries, they had right on their side. Mr. Pitt, in spite of his accustomed self-possession, had little in fact to urge in reply, when the question was asked, why he had not treated with France when the First Consul proposed peace before the battle of Marengo? Why, and that recently before Hohenlinden, why had he not consented, if not to a naval armistice which might have given the French a chance of maintaining themselves in Egypt, at least to the separate negotiation which they had proposed? Why had he so untowardly let slip the opportunity of securing the evacuation of Egypt, by refusing to ratify the convention of El Arisch? Why had he not temporised with the neutral powers in order to gain time with them? Why had he not imitated Lord North, who, in 1780, avoided answering a manifesto of maritime powers, by a declaration of war? Why had he thus drawn all Europe in array against England on account of doubtful questions of the law of nations upon which all countries entertained conflicting opinions, and which at the moment did not materially affect the interests of England? Why, with the view of preventing France from obtaining for her dockyards, timber, iron, and hemp, which were not sufficient to recruit its navy, why had he exposed England to be wholly deprived of foreign corn? Why, in short, had an English army been uselessly transported from Mahon to Ferrol, and from Ferrol to Cadiz, without any practical result? The opposition, contrasting the management of the affairs of England with that of the affairs of France, inquired of Mr. Pitt, with bitter irony, what he had to say of this young Bonaparte, of this rash youth, who, according to the ministerial language, was only doomed to enjoy a brief existence like his predecessors, so ephemeral that it did not entitle him to be treated with?

Mr. Pitt had great difficulty in maintaining his ground against Fox, Sheridan, and Tierney, Lords Grey and Holland, when in the face of all England he was pressed by these urgent questions, but became alarmed at the number of his enemies, and disconcerted at the clamour of a famished people, in vain demanding bread.

Mr. Pitt made but a feeble defence to all these reproaches. He constantly repeated his favourite argument, that if he had not made war, the English constitution would have perished;



and he cited as examples, Venice, Naples, Piedmont, Switzerland, Holland, and the ecclesiastical States of Germany, as if it could be believed that what had occurred to some third-rate Italian or German powers must necessarily have happened to powerful England, and to her liberal constitution. He replied, and on this occasion with more truth, that if France had greatly increased her territory by land, England had equally augmented her power by sea; that her navy was crowned with glory, that if her debts and her taxes had doubled, her riches had also doubled, and that all circumstances considered, England was more powerful at that moment than before the war. All this could not be disputed. Mr. Pitt added, moreover, that as the First Consul appeared to be more permanently established in authority, they were about to treat with him. But on the question of neutral rights he remained inflexible. "If England," said he, "subscribed to the doctrines laid down by the neutral powers, a small armed sloop would suffice to convoy the trade of the whole world. England would be precluded from taking any steps against the trade of her enemies, and she could no longer prevent Spain from receiving the precious metals of the New World, nor France from obtaining the naval munitions of war supplied by the North. We must," he exclaimed, "envelop ourselves in our own flag, and proudly find our grave in the deep, rather than admit the validity of such principles in the maritime code of nations."

Two sessions of Parliament succeeded each other without any interval of repose. In November 1800, the last meeting took place of what was called the Parliament of England and Scotland; in January 1801, the united Parliament of the three kingdoms assembled for the first time in virtue of the act which united Ireland with Great Britain. During these two sessions the most vehement discussions had been carried on without intermission. Mr. Pitt was visibly weakened, not as respected his numerical majority in the Parliament, but as regarded his popular influence, and moral power out of doors. Every one felt that in persisting in making war against France, he had overshot the mark, and had missed, on the eve of Marengo as on that of Hohenlinden, the favourable opportunity of treating advantageously. To miss an opportunity is for a statesman, as well as for a military man, an irreparable misfortune. The moment for making peace once past, fortune turned against Mr. Pitt. He felt himself, and the people perceived that he was vanquished by the talents of young General Bonaparte.

We must, however, do him, and also England, the justice to acknowledge, that the measures adopted during this frightful scarcity were marked by great moderation. The proposal of a maximum was rejected. They went no further than to grant

considerable bounties upon the importation of corn, to prohibit the use of grain in the distilleries, and to discontinue all parochial relief in money, lest it might raise the price of bread, affording, however, that relief in food, such as salted provisions, vegetables, &c. A royal proclamation was addressed to all classes in easy circumstances, and who had it in their power to vary their diet, urging them to use the utmost economy in the consumption of bread in their respective families. In addition to this they despatched numerous fleets to obtain rice in the East Indies, corn in America, and in the Mediterranean. They even endeavoured to procure it from France, by a contraband trade on the coast of Brittany and La Vendée.

Nevertheless, in the midst of this distress, which was borne with great fortitude, Mr. Pitt did not neglect the prosecution of the war, and he had made every arrangement for a bold expedition into the Baltic as soon as the season would permit. He was desirous to aim a blow first at Denmark and then at Sweden, and proceed even to the extremity of the Gulf of Finland, with a view of menacing Russia. But it is not known even in his own country whether he seriously wished to continue at the head of affairs in England. Two questions were constantly agitated by him in the cabinet, one of which, most inopportune at such a moment, led to his retirement. It has been seen, that after strenuous exertions made in the preceding year, he had obtained what is called the Act of Union with Ireland, that is to say, the union of the Parliaments of England, Scotland, and Ireland into one imperial legislature. This measure had appeared like a sort of party victory, especially in the face of the reiterated attempts of the French Republic to stir up an insurrection in Ireland. But they had only succeeded in stripping Ireland of her independence, by giving the Catholics a formal pledge that emancipation should be granted to them. The Catholics were told, that they never would obtain their enfranchisement, from the prejudices of the Irish Parliament, which was undoubtedly true; but it appears that promises were actually made, amounting to a positive pledge, which must be considered as a serious political error, if it be true, that Mr. Pitt was bound, by the tenor of these engagements, to grant emancipation, or to retire. It was a pledge at that time impossible of performance. Be this as it may, in the month of February 1801, at the opening of the first united Parliament, Mr. Pitt asked the consent of George III. to an emancipation bill. The king, a staunch Protestant, conceived this to be an infringement of his coronation oath, and obstinately refused it. Mr. Pitt made another request, which was a most reasonable one: namely, not to consider the occupation of Hanover by Prussia as an act of hostility, but to keep on terms with that

power, in order to preserve at least one friendly relation on the continent. The sacrifice was too great for a prince of the house of Hanover. The dispute between the king and the minister grew warm, and on the 8th of February 1801, Mr. Pitt, together with the majority of his colleagues, Messrs. Dundas and Windham, Lord Grenville, and others, tendered their resignation. This resignation, after an administration of seventeen years, under circumstances so extraordinary, caused the greatest sensation. The people could not view it as arising out of natural circumstances, but ascribed secret motives to Mr. Pitt; and an opinion at that time took possession of the public mind, which historians have zealously perpetuated ever since, that Mr. Pitt, perceiving the necessity of a temporary peace, consented to stand aloof during a few months, in order to allow this peace to be brought about by others, rather than by himself, and then afterwards to return to the helm of affairs, when the political exigency of the moment should have been provided for. Such are the motives which the multitude generally ascribe to public men, and which ill-informed writers repeat as they have heard them. Mr. Pitt neither foresaw the peace of Amiens, nor its short duration,\* nor did he conceive, moreover, that peace was incompatible with his continuance in the ministry, as he had consented to the famed negotiations at Lille in 1797, and even recently he had selected Mr. Thomas Grenville to represent England at Luneville. But Mr. Pitt had gone to great lengths with the Catholics; he had committed a blunder, of which public men are often guilty, that of sacrificing the interest of the future, to secure the advantages of the moment. Having promised too much, he felt all the embarrassment of not fulfilling those promises, and that in a critical state of parties, when a small accession of strength to his adversaries would suffice to overwhelm him. It is true that subsequently, he denied positively that he had ever given any distinct pledge respecting Catholic emancipation, and this denial was indeed wanting to defend him from such a charge of imprudence. Whatever opinion may be entertained on this point, there never was a period when the dangers of any country justified to the same degree, or even required, the postponement of solemn engagements, for in 1801, England was a prey to a famine within, while abroad she was at war with the whole of Europe. Nevertheless, Mr. Pitt withdrew from office, and his retirement can only be regarded as the weakness of a superior mind. It is evident that, everywhere surrounded by fearful embarrassments,

\* I am indebted for the above details to several contemporaries of Mr. Pitt, who were on the most intimate terms with him; who were engaged in the ministerial negotiations of that period, and who till, even at the present day, some of the highest offices in England.

Mr. Pitt was not sorry to be relieved from his situation, under the honourable pretext of an inviolable fidelity to his own engagements. He sent in his resignation to the great grief of the king, to the great dissatisfaction of the ministerial party, and to the great apprehension of all England, which viewed with alarming anxiety a set of new and inexperienced men seize the helm of affairs at this critical juncture. Mr. Pitt caused himself to be succeeded by Mr. Addington, who was his creature, and had for many years past held the speakership of the House of Commons. Lord Hawkesbury, afterwards Lord Liverpool, succeeded Mr. Grenville at the foreign office. They were moderate, prudent men, but of second-rate ability, both friends of Mr. Pitt, and for some time followed his advice. This it was which contributed, more than any other cause, to give currency to the report that the retirement of Mr. Pitt was ostensible rather than real.

The feeble intellect of George III. was unequal to bear the violence of the political crisis. He was seized with a fresh attack of insanity, and during a month was incapable of fulfilling the functions of royalty. Mr. Pitt had sent in his resignation. Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury were the ministers appointed to succeed him, but had not yet received the seals of office. Mr. Pitt, although he had ceased to be minister, was still, in fact, King of England, during this crisis of nearly a month's duration, and was so by the consent of the whole nation. Explanations took place upon the subject in the House of Commons. They were of a very delicate nature; they were demanded by Mr. Sheridan, and given in noble, statesmanlike language by Mr. Pitt. The various motions, usually made in the English Parliament, upon the state of the country, were postponed, and it perhaps occurred to some distrustful minds that Mr. Pitt prolonged, without reluctance, the sort of royal authority which he enjoyed. He trusted it would be believed, to use his own language at the time, that in the event of ministers being no longer able to receive the commands of his Majesty from his own mouth, they would propose measures to which it was unnecessary to allude more distinctly, but which they should not delay for one single day. They found themselves placed by their duty in an unprecedented situation, which they should not wish, on any account, to prolong one instant more than strict necessity required. Mr. Sheridan replied to this, by expressing the utmost confidence, that neither Mr. Pitt nor any other minister would ever presume to take advantage of the unhappy condition of the king's health, to prolong, for one moment, a power equal to that of the sovereign himself.

The most delicate reserve was observed. The word which characterised the real condition of the king, that of madness,

did not escape the lips of any one; and the nation waited with anxiety, but with perfect composure, the issue of this extraordinary crisis. During this period, Mr. Pitt induced subsidies to be voted, which no one opposed; the English fleets were got ready for sea, and Admirals Parker and Nelson left Yarmouth with forty-seven sail, and proceeded towards the Baltic.

In the middle of March, the king's health was restored. Mr. Pitt transferred the reins of government to Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury. The new ministers, when giving explanations, as usual, on assuming office, did not omit to state, from their seats in Parliament, that they entertained the highest sentiments of esteem for their predecessors; that they considered the course of policy they had adopted as highly salutary, and that it had, in fact, saved England; they consequently declared, that they should be guided by the same principles, and follow in the same steps. "Why, then, have you come into power?" asked Messrs. Sheridan, Grey, and Fox. "If you mean to pursue the same line of policy as your predecessors, the ministers who have retired were much more capable than yourselves of carrying on the affairs of the kingdom."

Impartial men, members of Parliament, censured Mr. Pitt for having relinquished the government of the nation at such a critical moment, and for retiring without valid and sufficient reasons. Even the opposition was so far in the wrong, as to reproach him with retiring at the expense of the king's popularity, by giving out, that the king refused to grant emancipation, which measure was generally acceptable to the country. This reproach was both unreasonable, and at variance with true constitutional principles. Mr. Pitt, in resigning, was under the necessity of publicly stating the reasons for his withdrawal from office; and if the king did really refuse his sanction to an emancipation bill, Mr. Pitt had a perfect right to proclaim it. He made it known, however, in language eminently suitable to the occasion. But it plainly appeared, that this refusal was rather a pretext than a real motive, and that Mr. Pitt yielded to a state of things with which he was unequal to contend. The lustre of his star faded before one that was now rising, and which was destined to diffuse a far brighter splendour than his own. Although he afterwards appeared at the head of affairs, and actually died in office, the expiration of his political existence may be dated at this period. Mr. Pitt, after having continued seventeen years in power, left his country loaded at once with increased riches and increased debt, with greater burdens, and with greater resources. He was an accomplished orator, if viewed as an organ of the government; an able and powerful leader, but with little enlightened views as a statesman. He had committed grievous errors, and was ever warped by all

the prejudices of his countrymen. No Englishman ever entertained a more deadly hatred towards France; but we must guard against being unjust towards him on this account, and evince our impartiality by honouring patriotism, even when engaged in a contest with our own.

Although Mr. Addington and Lord Hawkesbury were not to be compared, in talent, to Mr. Pitt, the impulse had been given, and the vessel of the State was borne onwards, for a time, by the momentum imparted to it by the fallen minister. The subsidies had been asked and voted; the English fleets were launched towards the Baltic, in order to settle the question of the rights of neutrals; and an army, transported on board the fleet of Admiral Keith, was on its way to the East, in order to dispute the possession of Egypt with the French.

Admiral Parker, an old experienced officer, whose judgment could be relied upon in critical emergencies, commanded the Baltic fleet. Nelson was next in command, ready to act whenever battle was necessary; the latter, in fact, was only qualified to fight, but nature had endowed him with a happy instinct for warfare, and he reasoned ably upon subjects connected with his profession. He proposed, that without waiting for the second division of the English fleet, they should pass the Sound, proceed direct to Copenhagen, and there, by some act of vigour, detach Denmark from the coalition; then afterwards repair to the Baltic, throw themselves into the midst of the combined fleets, prevent their junction, and thus, from that time, dictate terms at discretion. This plan was well conceived, for it was now the month of March, the northern waters were still covered with ice, and this alone was sufficient to prevent the fleets of the neutrals from effecting their junction; which, indeed, Nelson had good reason to fear, as it must greatly have endangered the British squadron.

This squadron, consisting of seventeen ships of the line, and thirty frigates, or smaller vessels, appeared on the 30th of March in the Cattegat. The Cattegat is the first gulf formed by the northern extremity of Denmark, when it approaches the opposite coast of Sweden.

The neutral powers were proceeding with extreme activity in their preparations. The Emperor Paul, animated by his accustomed ardour, had urged and incited on Sweden, Denmark, and Prussia, and threatened with his enmity those who did not manifest the same zeal as himself. Denmark and Prussia would have preferred negotiating in the first instance; but the menaces of Paul, and the stern, but no ways menacing admonitions of the First Consul, accompanied with a formal promise of assistance from France, had prevailed with these two cabinets. Denmark, besides, seeing the English respond to a simple declaration of

principles by a declaration of war, did not consider herself at liberty to recede, and accordingly took energetic measures to repel the enemy. Prussia, perplexed in the extreme by the intimidation of Russia on the one side, and France on the other, having ceased any longer to play the part of mediatrix, now that Paul I. and the First Consul were upon amicable terms, instead of taking the lead as before, was now reduced to the position of an obsequious follower, and from that time could rely upon their friendly dispositions alone for a share of the Germanic indemnities advantageous to her interests, and was therefore anxious to please those powers by her consistent firmness. She accordingly declared against England, and replied to her overtures by protestations of fidelity to the cause of the neutrals. She prohibited the English from entering any of the northern ports situated between Holland and Denmark; she closed the mouths of the Ems, the Weser, and the Elbe, and stationed troops and raised batteries at the principal points of the entrances to these rivers. To crown all, she marched a body of troops, and took possession of Hanover. This proceeding was of all the rest the most serious and decisive. The First Consul requited it by the warmest proofs of his satisfaction, and by the most positive pledge to her of an advantageous participation in the Germanic indemnities.

Denmark, on her part, took possession of Hamburg and Lubeck; the small port of Cuxhaven, which belonged to Hamburg, and which was the only place to which the English could have access, had been already occupied by Prussia. Thus, then, the English were left nothing but the sea and their vessels. They had not a place where they could cast an anchor. They now had the task to procure by force a readmittance for their ships into the continental ports.

It is necessary, in order to reach the Baltic from the Cattegat, to pass through the celebrated straits of the Sound. These straits are formed by the contiguity of the coasts of Denmark and Sweden. Between Elsinore and Helsingborg it is about three miles in width. The guns placed on the batteries of the two opposite banks can just reach a vessel passing in the middle of the channel, but without being able to do much damage to a fleet of ships. Nevertheless, as the channel is deeper on the Swedish side, ships of war of a large size are obliged to approach nearer to this coast, and by fortifying it with batteries the passage could have been rendered more difficult to the English. But the Swedish coast had at that time no batteries, and, indeed, had never had any at any previous period; in fact, it has no port which merchant vessels could be tempted to frequent. There is no other port in the Sound, except that of Elsinore, belonging to Denmark, and on

this account batteries have been erected for the defence of the Danish coast only, with scarcely any on the Swedish side. On the Danish side stands the fortress of Kronenberg, regularly fortified. For these reasons the usage has originated of paying to the Danes, and not to the Swedes, the dues levied in the Sound. In such a state of things, it would have been requisite to construct works on the coast of Sweden, of which they were deficient. King Gustavus Adolphus, who, next to Paul, was the most violent of the members of the league, had consulted the Czar on the subject, when he was at St. Petersburg, on his recent visit, but they were aware of the impossibility of executing the least work during the present winter season, when the soil, indurated by the frost, would resist the pickaxe and the spade to such a degree as to render any labour upon it wholly impracticable. Gustavus Adolphus had also just had an interview with the Crown Prince of Denmark, at that time regent of the kingdom, the same who died some years ago, in 1841, after a long and glorious reign. They conferred together upon this subject, and the Crown Prince, from private reasons by which Denmark was influenced, did not seem to attach much importance to the fortifying of the Swedish coast.\* The Sound then was but feebly defended on the Swedish side. There was only an old battery of eight pieces of cannon, constructed a long time ago upon the most salient point of the shore. Although this neglect has been greatly blamed since, it is certain that the Sound, even if it had been strongly fortified on both sides, would not have presented any serious dangers to the English, as the width of the channel being about three miles, vessels passing in the midst of the straits would be at a distance of a mile and a half from the batteries, and would therefore, being almost out of the range of their guns, escape with only perhaps some damage to their sails and rigging.

There is also another approach to the Baltic besides that of the Sound, which is formed by the two arms of the sea which separate, the one the island of Zealand from the island of Funen, the other the island of Funen from the coast of Jutland, passages well known by the names of the Great and Little Belt. The English would be but little inclined to sail by

\* Very erroneous assertions have been made on this subject. I have had recourse to the highest and most authentic authorities. The archives of France, Sweden, and Denmark contain the proofs of what I here advance. Those who have written to the contrary, Napoleon amongst others, have only repeated the allegations made at the time. The second passage of the Sound, which took place in 1807, at a period when Sweden was at war with Denmark, and viewed with pleasure the triumph of the English, has contributed to confirm the idea, that the Swedes had acted perfidiously. But on the first occasion, that is, in 1801, Sweden acted with perfect good faith; she was anxious for the general success, and would have done everything in her power to secure it.



this passage, in which they would be exposed to the fire of more than one Danish fort; but still more to the shoals, which rendered the navigation extremely dangerous for ships of the line; they were, therefore, most likely to decide upon going through the passage of the Sound.

The Danes concentrated all their defences, not exactly at the Sound, but lower down, in the channel which forms the continuation of the Sound, that is to say, before Copenhagen. The two coasts of Denmark and of Sweden, after having approximated to each other at the Sound, now stretch out to an extent varying in width from three to twelve leagues, forming a strait about twenty leagues in length, abounding with reefs and shoals, through which a vessel can only navigate by steering through the narrow channels, carefully ascertaining the depth of water by incessant soundings. The city of Copenhagen is situated on the most important of these channels, about twenty leagues from the Sound, in a direction towards the south. It was at this spot that the Danes had made immense preparations, waiting for the approach of the enemy. The post which they occupied did not exactly close the entrance to the Baltic, as we shall presently explain, but it compelled the English to risk an attack on a well-defended position, strongly fortified beforehand. The Crown Prince had taken prompt and numerous preliminary measures for defence. He had stationed before Copenhagen a number of vessels, cut down so as to form formidable floating batteries, and he had armed besides ten line-of-battle ships, which were only waiting for seamen from Norway to complete their crews. It is well known that the Danish navy is the best in the whole North.

Sweden and Russia, on their parts, had also made preparations for resistance. Sweden had placed troops on the coasts from Gottenburg to the Sound, and fortified Carlserona, in the Baltic, as well as all the other accessible points on that coast. King Gustavus Adolphus was urging on Admiral Cronstedt to complete the equipment of the Swedish fleet. This fleet already consisted of seven ships of the line and two frigates, ready to set sail the moment the sea was disencumbered of the winter ice. The Russians had twelve ships of the line all ready at Revel, and which, like the Swedish vessels, were only detained by the ice. The coalitionists had not accomplished, doubtless, all that would have been possible, if they had had at their head an energetic government, like France at that period, but by assembling, in time, the seven Swedish, the twelve Russian, and ten Danish ships before Copenhagen, there would have been formed a fleet of thirty ships of the line, and of from ten to twelve frigates, stationed in a formidable position, where the English could not have come to an engagement without danger,

and still less could have passed by and disregarded. To have passed it, without attacking it, in order to embark in any enterprise in the Baltic, would have been to incur the danger of leaving an imposing force in their rear, capable of closing up the sole outlet of this sea, and of preventing their egress therefrom, in case of reverses. But to collect together these naval divisions, in proper time, required a celerity of movements of which these three neutral governments were hardly capable. They used every despatch, doubtless, but relying too much upon the continuance of severe weather, they had not commenced their preparations sufficiently early, and the energetic promptitude of the English greatly surpassed theirs.

On the 21st of March, an English frigate touched at Elsinore, bringing Mr. Vansittart, who was commissioned to make a last application to the Danish government. Mr. Vansittart delivered to Mr. Drummond, the English *chargé d'affaires*, the ultimatum of the British cabinet. The terms of this ultimatum required the Danes to withdraw from the naval confederacy of the neutral powers; to open their ports to the English; and adhere to the provisional arrangement of the preceding August, by virtue of which, they had engaged no longer to convoy their merchant vessels. The Crown Prince of Denmark promptly refused to entertain the idea of such a defection, and replied that Denmark and her allies had not made a declaration of war, and that they had confined themselves to the publication of their principles of maritime law: that the English were the aggressors, as they had retaliated to a mere assertion of a dogma in the law of nations, by an embargo; that Denmark would not commence hostilities, but she would energetically repel force by force. The gallant people of Copenhagen nobly seconded, by their steady allegiance, the prince who represented them with so much dignity. The whole population took up arms; and, at the call of their noble leader, formed themselves into corps of militia and volunteers. Eight hundred students rushed to arms; every one who could handle a pickaxe assisted the engineers in completing the defensive works: redoubts were thrown up in every direction. Mr. Drummond and Mr. Vansittart abruptly left Copenhagen, threatening this unhappy city with all the thunders of England.

On the 24th, they rejoined the admirals of the fleet, who from that moment began to arrange their plan for immediate hostilities.

Nelson and the commander-in-chief, Parker, held a council of war, on board the fleet. The plan of operation was discussed. Some proposed to pass by way of the Sound, and others by way of the Great Belt. Nelson maintained that it was of little consequence by which strait the fleet should pass, only that not an hour should be lost in getting into the Baltic, and bearing up to Copenhagen, in order to prevent the junction of the coalitionists.

Once in the Baltic, a part of the English fleet should be directed against Copenhagen, to strike a blow against the Danes, and a part against Sweden and Russia, to destroy the northern fleets. They had twenty sail of the line, twenty-five or thirty frigates, and vessels of all descriptions. He would undertake with twelve ships to destroy all the Swedish and Russian fleets; the remainder must attack and bombard Copenhagen. As to which of the passages they should navigate, Nelson preferred braving some of the cannon-shot to which they might be exposed in passing the Sound, to encountering the dangerous shoals of the Great and Little Belt.

Admiral Parker, less enterprising, made an attempt, by the Great Belt, on the 26th of March. Several light vessels of the flotilla having grounded, the commander-in-chief recalled the squadron, and determined to force the Sound. Early on the morning of the 30th of March, they commenced this arduous passage. At the time, it blew a topsail breeze from the north-west, favourable for navigating this strait, which runs in a direction from north-west to south-east, as far as Elsinore, after which it continues almost due north and south. The squadron, favoured by the wind, advanced boldly, at an equal distance from the two opposite shores. Nelson led the van, Parker took the command of the centre, and Admiral Graves brought up the rear. The line-of-battle ships formed a single column in the middle of the channel. On each side a flotilla of gun and bomb vessels approached nearer to the coast of Denmark and Sweden, in order to engage the enemy's batteries at a shorter range. As soon as this squadron came in sight of Elsinore, the fortress of Kronenberg immediately opened a fire upon them. One hundred pieces of heavy cannon vomited forth a volley of shells and red-hot balls. But the English admiral, perceiving that the fire on the Swedish side did little or no execution, as the old battery of eight guns scarcely fired, immediately approached nearer to that side of the coast, and passed the straits amidst the jeers of the English sailors at the Danes, whose shells and balls fell 600 yards short of the enemy's ships. The flotilla of bomb and gun vessels, which had approached quite close to the Danish coast, poured forth, and received, an immense quantity of shells, but little bloodshed ensued, as four men only were wounded on the side of the Danes, two of whom were severely wounded, and two died. In Elsinore, only one house suffered from the fire of the English, and that was, singularly enough, the house of the English consul.

The whole fleet anchored, towards noon, in the middle of the gulf, off the island of Huen.

The gulf, as we have just said, runs from north to south, for the distance of about twenty leagues, varying in width, as the

shores advance or recede, from three to twelve leagues, and has only a few channels that are navigable. At about twenty leagues towards the south, stands Copenhagen, situated on the west side of the gulf, on the coast of Denmark, at a small elevation above the level of the sea, and forming a slightly inclined plane, from which a cannon-ball would just skim over the surface of the sea. The gulf is very wide at this spot, and divided by the low island of Saltholm into two navigable channels: the one, called the passage of Malmo, runs along the Swedish coast, and is scarcely accessible for large vessels: the other, called Drogden, skirts along the coast of Denmark, and is generally preferred by navigators. The latter is again divided by a sand-bank, which is called the Middle Ground, into two passages: one, called the King's Channel, forms the entrance to Copenhagen; the other, called the Dutch Channel, runs on the outer side of the Middle Ground. The Danes had taken up a position in the King's Channel, leaving the other open to the English, having in view rather the defence of Copenhagen, than to prevent the enemy entering into the Baltic. But it was very certain that Parker and Nelson would not venture into the Baltic, without first destroying the defences of Copenhagen, together with the maritime forces that the neutrals might have assembled there.

The means of defence, on the side of the Danes, consisted of land batteries, constructed on the right and left of the harbour, and of a line of razéed vessels, or floating batteries, moored in the middle of the King's Channel, the whole length of Copenhagen, with the view of keeping the enemy's fire at a distance. Commencing at the northern position was a battery called the Three Crowns, constructed of stone work, almost completely closed at the gorge, commanding even the entrance to the port, and connecting its fire with the citadel of Copenhagen. It was fortified with seventy pieces of cannon of the largest calibre. Four ships of the line, of which two were under sail, and two at anchor, besides a frigate under way, completely blocked up the entrance to the stream which led to the port. In proceeding from this fort, that is, the Three Crowns, towards the south, twenty hulks of large ships, armed with guns, and strongly moored, filled up the passage of the King's Channel, and was thus connected with the batteries on land, placed on the island of Amak. Thus the line of defence of the Danes was supported on the left by the Three Crowns battery, and on the right by the island of Amak; its length occupying, and completely blocking up, the middle of the passage of the King's Channel. The works of the Three Crowns could not be forced, defended as they were by seventy yawning cannon mouths; and also by five vessels, three of which were under sail. The line of defence, consisting of the rafts and stationary hulks, on the contrary,

was of too great length, not sufficiently close, and incapable of manœuvring; and, owing to the object they had in view, of obstructing the middle of the passage, was placed too much in advance of the point of support on the right, that is to say, the fixed batteries on the island of Amak. This island is but a continuation of the coast on which Copenhagen is seated. The line of floating batteries could, therefore, be attacked on the right. If it had been formed of a division of vessels, under sail, capable of shifting their position, or even if it had been more concentrated, more strongly supported on the bank, the English would not have come out of this attack altogether safe and sound. But the Danes set great value upon their naval squadron, which they had not the means of replacing if it was destroyed; and not having, besides, received all the seamen from Norway to man it completely, they kept it protected in the inner basin of the harbour, thinking that old unserviceable vessels were sufficient to answer the purpose of floating batteries against the English fleet.

Their bravest seamen, commanded by intrepid officers, worked the guns, mounted on these old hulks, which were strongly moored and chained together.

The English having arrived off Copenhagen, long before the junction of all the neutral maritime powers at this point, might have passed to the eastward of the Middle Ground, disregarding the Danes stationed in the King's Channel, and have proceeded by the before-mentioned Dutch Channel into the Baltic. They might have accomplished this beyond the reach of the guns of Copenhagen; but they would have left in their rear an imposing force, capable of cutting off their retreat, in case any untoward event should force them back weakened, and in want of shelter, through the passage of the Sound. It was better to take advantage of the isolated position of the Danes, and, by striking a decisive blow, detach them from the confederacy, and, after having, by this means, seized the keys of the Baltic, proceed, with all expedition, against the Swedes and the Russians. This plan was, at the same time, bold and prudent; and it received that which rarely occurred—the concurrent approbation of both Parker and Nelson.

The entire days of the 31st of March and 1st of April were occupied in examining the Danish line, in sounding the channel, and in concerting the plan of attack. Nelson and Parker, accompanied by the oldest officers of the fleet, with the chief officer of engineers, reconnoitred, in person, in the midst of the ice, the position of the enemy, being sometimes within reach of the enemy's shot. Nelson maintained that, with ten ships, he would undertake to attack, and break the right line of the Danes. His plan was to proceed down the whole length of

the Middle Ground, by passing through the Dutch Channel, doubling round the farther extremity, and reascending by way of the King's Channel, and then take his station, ship against ship, about a cable's length from the enemy. He arranged, moreover, that a division of the fleet, under a brave officer, Captain Riou, should attack the land battery of the Three Crowns, and, after having silenced their guns, disembark 1000 men, and take it by storm. The commander-in-chief, Admiral Parker, with the remainder of the fleet under him, was not to engage in this bold manœuvre; it was agreed that he should remain in the rear, to cannonade the citadel, and cover the disabled vessels as they retired from the action.

This manœuvre, as daring as that of Aboukir, could only succeed through great ability and good fortune. Admiral Parker gave his assent to it, on condition that it should not be carried too far, if the difficulties should be found insurmountable; and placed at Nelson's disposal twelve ships, instead of ten, for which he had applied. On the evening of the 1st of April, Nelson dropped through the Dutch Channel, and came to an anchor, considerably below Copenhagen, at a place on the island of Amak, called Draco. In order to get into the King's Channel, and traverse its entire length, a totally different wind was wanting to that which had brought him down the Dutch Channel. The next morning, the wind having opportunely shifted from its direction on the night before, he ascended the King's Channel, steering his fleet between the Danish line and the shoals of the Middle Ground. The whole channel had been sounded, but, notwithstanding this precaution, three ships struck on the Middle Ground, and Nelson took up his position with the remaining nine only. He was not disheartened, but anchored broadside on, within half a cable's length of the Danish line, a distance which must render the effect of the cannonading most terrific. The want of the three vessels aground was greatly felt, more particularly for the attack of the Three Crowns battery, which thus was obliged to be attempted by frigates.

At ten o'clock in the morning, the whole English squadron had taken up its position, and received and poured forth a frightful volley of artillery. A division of bomb and gun-ships, drawing but little water, was placed upon the shoal of the Middle Ground, and discharged their shells upon Copenhagen, over the masts of the two squadrons. The fire from the Danish batteries, consisting of 800 guns, inflicted considerable damage on the English. The officers in command of the rafts displayed great intrepidity, and their gunners exhibited the most heroic courage. The commander of the *Provesten*, in particular, who occupied the extremity of the line towards the south, conducted

himself with the most distinguished gallantry. Nelson, perceiving the importance of at once depriving the Danish line of the support which it received from the batteries of the island of Amak, directed four vessels against the *Provesten* alone. M. de Lassen, captain of the *Provesten*, defended himself until he had lost 500 out of his 600 gunners; he then threw himself into the sea, with the 100 remaining, and swam on shore from his vessel, which he left in flames. He thus had the glory of not striking his flag. Nelson then directed all his efforts against the other rafts and floating batteries, and succeeded in silencing several. In the meantime, at the other end of the line, Captain Riou suffered severely. Three English vessels being fast on the Middle Ground, he had only frigates to oppose to the Three Crown batteries, and he was exposed to a frightful and destructive fire from their guns, without any hope of silencing them, or of being able to take them by storm. Parker, perceiving the resistance of the Danes, and fearing that the English ships, too much injured in their rigging, would be exposed to be run aground, gave orders to discontinue action. Nelson perceiving this signal thrown out at Admiral Parker's masthead, gave way to a noble expression of indignation. He had lost the use of one eye, and, taking up the glass, and placing it to his blind eye, he said sarcastically, "I really don't see Parker's signal for leaving off action," and he kept his signal for closer battle still flying. This was a noble act of imprudence, and was followed, as it often happens to audacious boldness, by a successful result.

The floating batteries of the Danes, not being able to move, or seek shelter under the land batteries, were exposed to a most destructive fire. The *Danebrog* blew up with a terrific explosion; several others were disabled, and drifted from their moorings, after having suffered an enormous loss of men. But the English, on the other side, did not suffer less severely, and were placed in the greatest peril. Nelson, in endeavouring to take possession of the Danish vessels which had struck, received, as he neared the batteries on the island of Amak, a deadly discharge from their guns. At this moment, three or four of his vessels were so completely shattered as to be almost unmanageable; and, on the side of the Three Crown batteries, Captain Riou, compelled to draw off his vessels to a distance, was cut in two by a chain-shot. Nelson, almost beaten, was not disconcerted, and conceived the idea of sending a flag of truce to the Prince of Denmark, who was present, on one of the batteries, at this horrible scene. He told him that, if he did not stop the firing, which prevented him taking possession of his prizes, which, by right, belonged to him, since they had struck their flags, he should be obliged to blow them up, with all their

crews; that the English were the brothers of the Danes, that both had fought sufficiently to attest their valour, and ought to avoid the further effusion of blood.

The prince, moved by this appalling spectacle, fearing also for the city of Copenhagen, now deprived of the protection of the floating batteries, gave orders for the firing to cease. This was a mistake, for a few moments longer, and Nelson's fleet, almost disabled, would have been obliged to retire half destroyed. A sort of negotiation ensued, and Nelson took advantage of it to quit his place of anchorage. Whilst he was in the act of retiring, three of his vessels, considerably damaged, being no longer manageable, struck on the Middle Ground. If, at this moment, the fire had still continued, these three vessels must have been lost.

The next day, Nelson and Parker, after great efforts, got afloat the three vessels which had grounded, and opened a negotiation with the Danes for the purpose of obtaining a suspension of hostilities. They stood as much in need of this as the Danes, as they had 1200 men killed and wounded, and the havoc in six of their vessels was horrible. The loss of the Danes was not much greater, but they had relied too much upon the line of their floating batteries, and now that these batteries were destroyed, the lower part of the city, which is open to the sea, was exposed to a bombardment. They were also apprehensive for their vessels of war, which, half equipped, immovable, and locked in the basin, might have been set fire to, and totally consumed. This apprehension was to them most alarming. They, in fact, clung to their squadron as to their very maritime existence; and this squadron, once destroyed, they were not in a position to replace it. At this instant, under the momentary irritation of suffering and danger, they complained of their allies, without reflecting upon the difficulties which had prevented them from repairing to the walls of Copenhagen. The contrary winds, the ice, and the shortness of time, had detained the Swedes and the Russians, without any blame being fairly attributable to them. It is true, that had they arrived with their twenty ships and joined the Danish fleet in the straits, where the engagement took place, Nelson would have failed in his daring enterprise, and the cause of the maritime neutral confederacy would have triumphed on that day. But there had not been time for any of them to get ready, and the promptitude of the English changed the fortune of the war.

Admiral Parker, who was greatly alarmed at the temerity of Nelson, during the battle of the 2nd, formed now a correct opinion of the position of the Danes, and knew how to derive every advantage from the battle which had been fought. He required the Danes to withdraw from the confederacy of the



neutral powers, to open their ports to the English, and to receive, moreover, an English force, under the pretence of protecting them against the resentment of their allies. Nelson had the courage to land on the 3rd of April to carry these proposals to the Crown Prince. He went in a boat to Copenhagen, heard the murmurs of this brave people, who were filled with indignation at seeing him, but found the Crown Prince inflexible. This prince, more alarmed, the evening before, than the actual danger of Copenhagen justified, would not, nevertheless, consent to the ignominious defection proposed to him. He replied, that he would sooner be buried in the ashes of his city than betray the common cause. Nelson returned on board the flag-ship without having obtained any concession.

During this interval, the Danes, seeing themselves exposed to the dangers of a second conflict, set to work, and added new defences to those which before existed. They rendered the battery of the Three Crowns more formidable, covered the island of Amak with guns, as well as the lower part of the city. They transported their vessels of war, the paramount objects of their solicitude, into the innermost basins of the harbour, the farthest from the sea, carefully covering them with dung and blindage, so as to protect them against fire; and were at length reassured, when they perceived the hesitation of the English, who did not evince much eagerness to renew this terrific struggle. The whole of the available population lent their aid: one part was placed under arms, and the other part employed in preparing the means for extinguishing the conflagration. At length, after waiting five days, Nelson returned to Copenhagen, notwithstanding the threatening aspect of the preparations of the Danes. The discussion was animated, and he took upon himself to make concessions, which Admiral Parker had not authorised. He agreed upon an armistice which amounted virtually to a *statu quo*. The Danes did not withdraw from the confederacy, but all hostilities were suspended between them and the English for fourteen weeks; at the expiration of which period, they were to return to the same position as on the day on which this suspension of hostilities was signed. The terms of the armistice embraced only the Danish islands and Jutland, but not Holstein, so that hostilities might be continued in the Elbe, and that from that time the English were prohibited the navigation of that river. The English were to keep at a cannon-shot distance from all the Danish ports and vessels, with the exception of the King's Channel, which they were free to navigate, in order to reach the Baltic. They were forbidden, consequently, to establish themselves upon any points of the Danish territory, and they were only allowed to put into any port for the purpose of refreshment, or to take in a supply of provisions.

These terms were all Nelson could obtain, and they were, we must confess, all that his victory entitled him to demand. But, as he was on the point of leaving Copenhagen, a very untoward report obtained currency, and the Crown Prince, who had been influenced thereby to enter into negotiations, succeeded in keeping the knowledge of it from him. The report was in truth, at the moment, that Paul I. had just died suddenly. Nelson left the place, without being aware of this intelligence, which would doubtless have greatly increased his pretensions. The armistice was immediately ratified by Admiral Parker. The Crown Prince also intimated to the Swedes, that it was useless to expose themselves unavailingly to the attacks of the English, which they would be unequal to resist. This advice was not uncalled for, inasmuch as, after great efforts, Gustavus Adolphus had succeeded in getting his fleet ready to sail. He had in the earnestness of his zeal dismissed one rear-admiral the service, and sent another admiral before a court-martial, in order to punish them for an alleged dilatoriness, which could not justly be laid to their charge.

All these efforts were, however, superfluous. Paul I., in fact, had breathed his last, at St. Petersburg, on the night between the 23rd and 24th of March. This event put an end much more effectually than the incomplete victory of Nelson to the maritime confederacy of the northern powers. Paul I. had been the chief promoter of that confederacy; he had applied all the impetuous energy of his character to secure its success, and assuredly he would have exerted himself to the utmost to repair the disaster, in other respects pretty equally shared, of the battle of Copenhagen. He would have sent his land forces to Denmark, despatched the whole of the neutral fleet to the Sound, and probably have made the English rue their barbarous enterprise against the capital of the Danes. But this prince had driven the patience of his subjects to the last extremity, and he had just been put to death, a wretched victim of a tragical revolution at the palace.

Paul I. was of a lively disposition, but all his opinions were carried to the extreme, and as usual, with persons of his temperament, capable of good or evil actions, according to the temporary impulse of his weak, excitable, ill-regulated mind. If the temper of private individuals so constituted is fatal, it becomes still more so in the case of princes, especially when they are invested with absolute power. With them it often borders on madness, assuming sometimes even symptoms of a sanguinary character. Thus, at St. Petersburg, every man trembled for his own fate; even the favourites of Paul, who were treated with the greatest kindness, were not certain but that the favour they at present enjoyed might terminate in an exile to Siberia.

This prince, both sensitive and chivalrous, felt a lively sympathy for the victims of the French Revolution, and a vehement hatred against the Revolution itself. Thus, whereas the able Catherine had wisely, during her reign, confined herself to exciting all Europe against France, without setting a single soldier in motion, Paul, on his accession to the throne, had sent Suwarrow with 100,000 Russians into Italy. In the warmth of his zeal, he had interdicted from his dominions every article which came from France, books, fashions, and dress. This more than sufficed to give umbrage to the Russian nobility, who, like the whole of the aristocracy of Europe, delighted in reviling France, but nevertheless with the reservation, of enjoying her wit, her manners, and her highly advanced civilisation. They found this anti-revolutionary zeal intolerable, when carried to such an excess.

In a short time, however, Paul was seen to change these opinions and go to the very opposite extreme, conceiving a great hatred for his allies, and receiving his enemies into favour, crowding his apartments with the portrait of General Bonaparte, drinking publicly to his health, and carrying the contrast so far as actually to declare war against Great Britain. This step rendered him not only irksome, but actually odious to the Russian nobility, for he not only interfered with their tastes, but injuriously affected their material interests.

The vast extent of his dominions, occupying almost the whole of the northern part of Europe, abounding in grain, timber, hemp, and ores, requires the aid of foreign merchants, who seek these indigenous commodities, and give in exchange, either money, or manufactured goods. The English in their trade with Russia, supply her, in return for the raw produce of her soil, with the articles manufactured by their own labour, and thus the Russian farmers are enabled to pay to their landlords the rents of their land. The English then engross the most important branches of trade with St. Petersburg, and this is the tie by which, in some measure, the policy of Russia is fettered to English interests, and that rivalry, which sooner or later must inevitably break out between these two great co-partners in the possession of Asia, is modified.

The Russian aristocracy was accordingly highly exasperated with the newly adopted policy of Paul. If they had blamed, in this prince, an excess of hatred against France, they found still greater fault with an excess of affection towards her, especially when this surprising attachment was carried to such an extent as to adopt steps ruinous to the interests of the landed proprietors. Besides this obnoxious interference with their tastes and their interests, Paul was still further guilty of cruelties, to which, however, he was not naturally addicted, being rather of a good,

than of a mischievous disposition. He had sent a multitude of unhappy wretches to Siberia; afterwards, affected by their sufferings, he recalled them, but without reinstating them in their property. These unfortunate creatures filled all St. Petersburg with their complaints, and with their lamentable misery. Annoyed by these spectacles, he exiled them a second time. Becoming every day more and more distrustful, in proportion as the hatred of his subjects became more apparent to him, he threatened the lives of every one around him. He conceived sinister designs against his ministers, sometimes against his wife and children, and this prince, who was all but mad, assumed habitually the behaviour of a tyrant. He surrounded the palace Michael, which was his usual residence, like a fortress, with bastions and ditches. One would have said that he seemed to anticipate a sudden attack. At night he even barricaded the door which separated his apartments from those of the empress, and thus unwittingly predisposed everything for his tragical end.

Such a state of things could not long continue, and must inevitably terminate in some deed of violence, similar to that which, more than once, had been witnessed in this empire, where, it is true, rapid advances have been made towards civilisation, but where actual barbarism was the point of starting. The idea of getting rid of the unhappy Paul by the accustomed means, that is to say, by a revolution at the palace, there where the palace is the nation, suggested itself to every mind. Let us set a proper value upon the advantages of institutions. At another extremity of Europe, upon one of the greatest thrones of the universe, sat a prince afflicted also with insanity, a headstrong, but pious and good prince, George III. This king, occasionally deprived of his reason during whole months, had just experienced a relapse of his malady, at one of the most critical moments for England. Nevertheless, the business of the nation proceeded in the most regular and ordinary course. The constitution providing the king with ministers, who conduct the government on his behalf, this aberration of the royal mind did not, in any way, prejudice the affairs of the nation. Mr. Pitt held the government for George III., precisely as he had held it during seventeen years; the thought of an atrocious crime never entered into the imagination of any one! At St. Petersburg, on the contrary, the spectacle of an insane prince on the throne gave rise to the most sinister projects.

There was at that time, at the court of Russia, one of those men, dreaded by all, who never shrink from the perpetration of any audacious deed. In a regular government, such men may rise, perhaps, to the station of eminently good citizens, but in a despotic government, they become criminals, if crime is, in certain cases, one of the expedients not actually sanctioned by the

government, but incidental to its administration. Crime must be condemned in every country where it prevails, but we must condemn still more the institutions by which it is engendered.

Count Pahlen had served in the Russian army with distinction. He possessed a commanding person, and concealed beneath the rough, and sometimes familiar manner of a soldier, a deep and acute mind. He was endowed, moreover, with singular audacity, and an imperturbable presence of mind. As governor of St. Petersburg, entrusted with the police of the empire, and initiated, thanks to the confidence of his master, into all the great affairs of State, he was, in point of fact, though not by office, the principal personage in the Russian government. His political opinions respecting the public policy of the country were very decided. The crusade against the French Revolution seemed to him as unreasonable as the new-born zeal against England was intemperate. A prudent reserve, a neutrality skilfully maintained, in the midst of the formidable contest between France and England, appeared to him the only advantageous policy which Russia could pursue. Entertaining neither English nor French views, but being wholly Russian in his opinions, he was also a Russian in his manners, and a Russian such as existed in the days of Peter the Great. Being persuaded that everything was hastening towards ruin, unless the reign of Paul were curtailed, having even conceived some alarm for himself personally, from certain indications of dissatisfaction which had escaped the emperor, he boldly formed his resolution, and communicated it confidentially to Count Panin, vice-chancellor, who was at the head of foreign affairs. They both were of opinion that it was necessary to terminate this state of things, which had become as alarming for the empire as for individual safety. Count Pahlen took upon himself the execution of the terrible project upon which they had resolved.\* The heir to the

\* The following details are the most authentic that can be procured concerning the death of Paul I. This is the source from which they are derived. The court of Prussia, greatly shocked at the news of the death of Paul I., was still more highly indignant at the unparalleled effrontery with which some of the accomplices in the crime dared to boast of it at Berlin. The court obtained, through various channels, and principally from a well-informed person, some curious details, which were collected in a minute, and transmitted to the First Consul. These are the particulars which M. Bignon, at that time secretary of our embassy to the court of Prussia, was enabled to procure, and which he has introduced into his work. But the most private circumstances still remained unknown, who, a singular accident placed France in possession of the only account worthy of credit concerning the death of Paul I., which perhaps is in existence. A French emigrant, who had resided for some time in the service of Russia, and who had acquired some military renown, became the friend of Count Pahlen and General Bennigsen. Being at the country-seat of Count Pahlen, he obtained, from their own lips, a circumstantial detail of everything which took place in St. Petersburg on the fatal night between the 23rd and 24th of March. As the emigrant was very careful in taking notes of everything he saw and heard, he immediately committed to paper an

throne was the Grand Duke Alexander, of whose reign we have been contemporaries—a young prince, who gave every promise of superior qualities, and who appeared at that time, what he did not prove subsequently, easy to be led. He it was whom Count Pahlen desired to raise to the throne, by some catastrophe brought about suddenly, without disturbance or confusion. It was indispensably necessary to come to some understanding with the heir, the Grand Duke, to have his concurrence, in order to avoid, after the deed was perpetrated, being treated like a vulgar assassin, who is sacrificed, whilst, at the same time, advantage is taken of his crime. It was embarrassing to him to break the matter to this prince, who, governed by amiable feelings, was incapable of lending his countenance to an attempt against the life of his father. Count Pahlen, without disclosing his whole mind, without revealing any distinct project, discussed with the Grand Duke the affairs of State, and, at each successive extravagance of Paul, endangering the empire, communicated the fact to him, then remained silent, without deducing any consequences therefrom. Alexander, in receiving these communications, cast down his eyes, and also remained silent. These mute but expressive scenes were of frequent occurrence. At length, it was requisite to come to some clearer explanation. Count Pahlen, at last, gave this young prince to understand that such a state of things could not be prolonged, without bringing ruin to the empire; and, taking care to avoid the mention of a crime, to which Alexander would not have listened, he insinuated to him that it was necessary to depose Paul, to provide for him a quiet retreat, but at all hazards, to wrest from his hands the helm of power, and prevent him from driving the vessel of State to utter destruction.

Alexander shed a flood of tears, disclaimed any wish to dispute the throne with his father, but yielded, by degrees, before fresh proofs of the danger to which Paul exposed the affairs of the country, and even the imperial family itself. Paul, in fact, dissatisfied with the supine-ness of Prussia, in the affairs of the neutral league, even talked of marching 80,000 men upon Berlin. Besides this, in the delirium of his arrogant pride, he wished the First Consul to take him as his adviser in all things, and

account of the particulars given by these principal actors, and inserted it in the valuable memoirs he has left behind him. These manuscript memoirs are now the property of France. They correct numerous inaccurate or vague statements, and, moreover, do not compromise more than they were previously, the names already involved in this dark event. They furnish, however, more precise and probable details, instead of the false and exaggerated accounts already known. After comparing this report, emanating from a quarter perfectly well-informed, with the details furnished by the court of Prussia, we have drawn up the historical recital which follows, and which seems to us the only one truly worthy of credit, perhaps the only complete one which posterity will ever obtain of this tragical catastrophe.

that this powerful personage should not make peace with Germany, nor with the cabinets of Piedmont, Rome, Naples, or the Porte, excepting upon terms laid down by Russia; so that it was soon greatly to be feared that he would not remain long on amicable terms with France, whose policy he had so warmly espoused. To these suggestions Count Pahlen added the expression of his uneasiness concerning the safety of the royal family, of whom Paul, it was said, began to harbour suspicions.

Alexander acquiesced at length; but, at the same time, exacted from Count Pahlen the most solemn oath, that no attempt should be made against the life of his father; Count Pahlen swore to everything desired by this inexperienced youth, who imagined that a sceptre could be wrested from the grasp of an emperor, without depriving him of life.

The requisite actors in the scene yet remained to be provided, as Count Pahlen, in conceiving this scheme, deemed it beneath him to take any personal share in its execution. He fixed upon them accordingly, but decided upon only entrusting them, sooner or later, with the part they were destined to perform, according as they, by degrees, acquired his confidence. The brothers Soubow, upstarts raised by the favour of Catherine, were chosen as the chief instruments of the plot. Count Pahlen only revealed it to them at a late period. Plato Soubow, the favourite of Catherine, supple, restless, was worthy of figuring conspicuously in the revolution of a palace. His brother Nicholas, remarkable only for great personal strength, was well qualified to play a subordinate part; Valerien Soubow, a brave and honourable soldier, a friend of the Grand Duke Alexander, deserved, from his merit, to have been excluded from the plot. They had a sister, intimately connected with all the English faction—a friend of Lord Whitworth, the English ambassador—who inflamed them with zeal for the British policy. Count Pahlen engaged many other accomplices, and brought them to St. Petersburg, under various pretences, but still without disclosing anything to them. There was one other individual whom he had summoned to St. Petersburg, upon whose co-operation he knew he could rely, as well as upon his formidable courage; this was the famous General Benningsen, a Hanoverian, in the service of Russia, the first officer in the Russian service at that time, and who, at a later period, in 1807, had the honour to check, in Poland, the victorious march of Napoleon, and whose hands, worthy, indeed, of wielding a sword, should never have been sullied by a poniard.

Benningsen had retired into the country, dreading the effects of Paul's anger, which he had incurred; Count Pahlen withdrew him from his retreat, initiated him into the plot, but proposed nothing further to him, if General Benningsen can be credited,

than the project of deposing the emperor. Benningsen pledged his word, and kept it with an appalling courage.

They resolved to fix upon some day for the execution of their project, when the regiment of Semenourki, wholly devoted to the Grand Duke Alexander, should be on duty at the palace Michael. They were obliged to wait. But time pressed, for Paul's malady made rapid progress, became every day more alarming, and placed the interests of the empire, as well as the safety of his attendants, in greater jeopardy. One day Paul laid hold of the imperturbable Pahlen by the arm, and addressed him in these singular terms:—"Were you at St. Petersburg in 1762?" (It was in that year that the emperor, the father of Paul, was assassinated, to transfer the throne to the Great Catherine.) "Yes," answered Count Pahlen, quite coolly, "I was." "What part did you take in the event of that time?" "That of a subaltern cavalry officer in the ranks of his regiment. I was a witness of, but not an actor in, that catastrophe." "Well," continued Paul, casting a look of distrust and of accusation at his minister, "they want to re-enact to-day the revolution of 1762." "I am aware of it," replied Count Pahlen, without betraying the least emotion. "I know all the plot; I am a party to it." "What!" exclaimed Paul, "are you one of the conspirators?" "Yes! but to be better apprised of it, and that I may be in a position more effectually to watch over your safety." The calmness of this formidable conspirator quite set all Paul's conjectures at defiance, and disarmed his suspicions respecting him; but he still continued discomposed and excited.

An event of almost public interest, if such a term may be employed with reference to such a crime, concurred to hasten their proceeding. Paul ordered a despatch to be written, on the 23rd of March, to M. de Krudener, his minister at Berlin, enjoining him to declare to the court of Prussia, that if she did not promptly act against England, he would order an army of 80,000 men to march upon the Prussian frontiers. Count Pahlen, desirous, without saying too much, to induce M. de Krudener to attach no importance to this declaration, added, in his own handwriting, the following postscript:—"His Imperial Majesty is labouring under indisposition to-day; the consequences may prove serious."\*

The 23rd of March was fixed upon for the execution of the plot. Count Pahlen, under colour of giving a dinner-party, assembled at his house the Soubows, Benningsen, and several general officers upon whom he thought he could rely. Wines of all kinds were served with profusion. Pahlen and Benningsen

\* This despatch was shown to the French ambassador, General Beurnonville, who instantly forwarded these particulars to his government.



did not drink any. When dinner was over, they unfolded to the conspirators the project for which they were assembled. The most part were now, for the first time, made acquainted with this terrible plot. They were not told that they would be required to assassinate Paul, as almost every one would have shrunk with dismay from the perpetration of such a crime. They were told, that they must proceed to the palace, and compel him to abdicate, that thus they would deliver the empire from an imminent danger, and that they would save a multitude of innocent lives, at present threatened by the sanguinary madness of Paul. At last, in order to succeed in persuading them, it was affirmed that the Grand Duke Alexander himself, convinced of the necessity of saving the empire, was acquainted with the project, and approved it. Then these men, already excited with wine, no longer demurred, and, for the most part, with only three or four exceptions, set out under the impression that they were going to depose a mad emperor, and not to shed the blood of an unfortunate master.

The night appearing sufficiently advanced, the conspirators, to the number of about sixty, sallied forth, divided into two bands. Count Pahlen took one under his direction, General Benningsen the command of the other; both officers, dressed in their full uniform, and wearing their sashes and orders, marched forward, sword in hand. The palace Michael was constructed and guarded like a fortress; but the bridges were lowered and the gates thrown open to the chiefs of the conspirators. Benningsen's party marched first, and proceeded direct towards the emperor's apartments. Count Pahlen remained behind, with his reserved body of conspirators. This man, who had organised the conspiracy, disdained to assist personally in its execution. He was only there to provide for any unexpected emergencies. Benningsen penetrated into the apartment of the sleeping monarch. Two heyduks were on duty as his bodyguard. These brave and faithful attendants attempted to defend their sovereign. One was struck down by a blow from a sabre, the other took flight, crying out for help—cries utterly unavailing in a palace, the guards of which are almost all accomplices in the plot! A valet, who slept in a room adjoining that of the emperor, ran to the scene; they compelled him, by force, to open the door of his master's chamber. The unhappy Paul might have found a refuge in the apartments of the empress; but, in his distrustful suspicions, he had taken the precaution, every night, to barricade the door which led to them. All escape being cut off, he flung himself to the bottom of the bed, and concealed himself behind the folds of a screen. Plato Soubow ran to the imperial bed, and, finding it empty, cried out, in alarm, "The emperor has

escaped; we are lost!" But, at the same instant, Benningsen caught sight of the prince, rushed towards him, sword in hand, and presented to him the act of abdication. "You have ceased to reign!" he exclaimed to him; "the Grand Duke Alexander is now emperor. I summon you, in his name, to resign the empire, and to sign this act of abdication. On this condition alone I answer for your life." Plato Soubow repeated the same summons. The emperor, confused and lost in dismay, demanded of them what he had done to deserve such treatment. "For years past you have never ceased to persecute us," retorted the half-intoxicated assassins. They then pressed upon the unhappy Paul, who struggled hard, expostulated, and implored them in vain. At this moment a noise was heard; it was the footsteps of some of the conspirators who had remained behind; but the assassins, believing that some one was coming to the assistance of the emperor, fled in disorder. Benningsen alone, inflexibly resolute, remained in the presence of the monarch, and, advancing towards him, with his sword pointed at his breast, prevented him stirring from the spot. The conspirators having recognised each other, re-entered the chamber, the theatre of their crime. They again hemmed in the unfortunate monarch, in order to force him to subscribe his abdication. The emperor for an instant tried to defend himself. In the scuffle, the lamp which gave light to the frightful scene was overturned and extinguished; Benningsen ran to procure another, and, on his return, discovered Paul expiring under the blows of two assassins; one had broken in his skull with the pommel of his sword, whilst the other was strangling him with his sash.

Whilst this scene was enacting, Count Pahlen had remained outside, with the second band of conspirators. When he was told that all was over, he ordered the body of the emperor to be laid out on the bed, and placed a guard of thirty men at the door of the apartment, with orders not to admit any one, even the members of the imperial family. He then repaired to the Grand Duke, to announce to him the terrible occurrence of the night.

The Grand Duke, in a state of violent agitation, demanded of him, when he approached, what had become of his father. The silence of Count Pahlen soon dissipated the fatal illusions he had cherished, in imagining that an act of abdication was only contemplated. The grief of the young prince was profound; it continued to be, we are told, the secret remorse of his life, as he was naturally of a good and generous nature. He threw himself upon a chair, and burst into tears; would listen no longer to anything, but loaded Pahlen with bitter reproaches, which the latter received with an imperturbable composure.

Plato Soubow went in quest of the Grand Duke Constantine, who was wholly ignorant of what was going on, but who has

been unjustly accused of having been implicated in this bloody catastrophe. He came to the spot trembling, believing that all his family were to be sacrificed, found his brother overwhelmed with despair, and then learnt everything which had taken place. Count Pahlen had desired a lady of the palace, who was very intimate with the empress, to acquaint her with the fact of her tragical widowhood. This princess rushed in haste towards her husband's apartments, and attempted to reach his deathbed; but the guards kept her back. Having for an instant recovered from her first paroxysm of grief, she felt, together with the emotions of sorrow, the rising impulses of ambition awaken in her breast. She thought of the Great Catherine, and wished to reign. She despatched several persons to Alexander, who was about to be proclaimed, telling him that the throne belonged of right to her, and that it was she, and not he, who ought to be proclaimed as successor. This was a new embarrassment; this was increased anguish for the already lacerated heart of the son, who, about to ascend the steps of the throne, had to pass between the corpse of a murdered father, and an agonised mother, in tears, frantically demanding, by turns, her husband or the sceptre. The night was consumed while these appalling and tragical events were passing: the day approached; it was necessary to leave no time for reflection; it was of importance that the death of Paul and the accession of his successor should be proclaimed at the same time. Count Pahlen approached the young prince: "You have wept sufficiently as a child," said he; "come now and reign." He tore him from this house of mourning, and, followed by Benningsen, hastened to present him to the troops.

The first regiment they met was that of *Préobrajesnky*. As it was entirely devoted to Paul I., their reception was very cold. But the others, who were attached to the Grand Duke, and who, besides, were under the influence of Count Pahlen, who possessed considerable ascendancy over the army, did not hesitate to cry "Long live Alexander." The example was followed, and soon the young emperor was proclaimed, and placed in possession of the throne. He returned, and took up his residence with his wife, the Empress Elizabeth, at the Winter Palace.

St. Petersburg was filled with consternation at the news of this bloody catastrophe. The impression it created, proved that the manners of the empire had undergone a change, and that since 1762, Russian manners had become modified by the influence of European civilisation. It may be said to the honour of Russia, that if she had already progressed since 1762, she has equally advanced since 1800. The Russians exhibited on that occasion feelings which did them honour. They feared Paul I. and his insanity more than they hated him, as he was not of a

sanguinary character. The horrible circumstances of his death were immediately known, and inspired the deepest commiseration. His body lay in state according to usage, but infinite precautions were used to disguise his wounds. Military gloves concealed the mutilation of his hands. A large hat completely covered his head. His face was disfigured by contusions, but it was given out that he had died of apoplexy.

This barbarous event produced an extraordinary effect throughout Europe. The news spread like lightning to Vienna, Berlin, London, and Paris. It caused the deepest horror and consternation. Some years previously, Paris had terrified all Europe by shedding royal blood; but at present, Paris exhibited a spectacle of order, humanity, and tranquillity; it was now the ancient monarchies which in their turn scandalised the whole civilised world. A year before, the Neapolitan sovereign had imbrued his hands in the blood of his subjects; now a revolution in the palace bathed the imperial throne of Russia in blood.

Thus, in this agitated age, every country in succession furnished melancholy examples, and supplied deplorable subjects of animadversion to its enemies! Truly, if nations wish to revile each other, their several histories furnish ample materials for mutual recrimination; but let us avoid recurring to these sad reminiscences for such a purpose. If we relate these horrible details, it is because truth is the first duty of the historian; it is because truth is the most useful, the most powerful of lessons, the most effectual in averting the recurrence of similar scenes; and thus, without offending any nation, let us say again, that the institutions are more to be blamed than the people; and that if, at St. Petersburg, an emperor was murdered in order to bring about a change of policy; at London, on the contrary, without any sanguinary crisis, a peace policy followed a war policy, by the mere substitution of Mr. Addington in the place of Mr. Pitt.

The particulars of this catastrophe soon became public, through the indiscretion of the assassins themselves. At Berlin especially, where the court was closely connected with that of St. Petersburg, the details of the crime spread with singular rapidity. The sister of the Soubows had taken refuge in that city, and had manifested, it was said, certain symptoms of uneasiness and anxiety, like one who awaits some great event. It so happened that her son was the very officer appointed to announce to Prussia the accession of Alexander. This young man, with all the indiscretion of his age, partially divulged the particulars of the assassination, and thus occasioned at Potsdam a scandal which gave great offence to the young and virtuous King of Prussia. The court made this young man feel the impropriety of his conduct; but hence arose a foul calumny. This sister of the Soubows was on terms of intimate friendship

with the English ambassador, Lord Whitworth, who figured afterwards at Paris, and played there a very conspicuous part. The death of the Emperor Paul was so highly advantageous to the English, it occurred so opportunely to complete the doubtful victory of Copenhagen, that the vulgar throughout Europe readily ascribed the perpetration of this crime to British policy. The intimacy of the English ambassador with a family so deeply implicated in the assassination of Paul furnished strong plausible surmises confirmatory of the calumny, together with fresh arguments for those who can never perceive that events may originate in general and natural causes.

Nevertheless, none of these conjectures were founded in truth. Lord Whitworth was an honourable man, incapable of participating in such a plot. The cabinet by which he was accredited had committed numerous unpardonable acts during many previous years, and, soon after, was guilty of others still more difficult to justify, but it was as much taken by surprise as the rest of Europe by the death of the Czar. And yet, the First Consul himself, notwithstanding the unquestionable impartiality of his judgment, could not help entertaining some suspicions, and he gave rise to still more, by the terms in which the death of the Emperor Paul was announced in the *Moniteur*. "It is for history," says this official journal, "to develop the mystery which surrounds this tragical death, and to declare which cabinet in the world was the most deeply interested in bringing about such a catastrophe."

This event delivered England from a relentless enemy, and deprived the First Consul of a powerful ally, but one that latterly was becoming embarrassing, and almost as dangerous as he was serviceable. It is certain that the deceased emperor, in the fulness of his arrogance, believing that the First Consul could no longer refuse him anything in return for his alliance, had required conditions with regard to Italy, Germany, and Egypt, which France could never have conceded, and these demands must have interposed great obstacles to the re-establishment of peace, a desire for which was now becoming general throughout Europe. The First Consul selected his favourite aide-de-camp, Duroc, who had been previously sent to Berlin and to Vienna, and despatched him to Russia. He ordered him to repair to St. Petersburg, with an autograph letter, to congratulate the new emperor on his accession, and to bring to bear all the powers of flattery and persuasion of a great man, in order to instil, if possible, into his mind, sound ideas concerning the relations between France and Russia.

Duroc set out instantly with orders to proceed by way of Berlin. He was to visit Prussia for the second time, collect more correct information respecting the recent events which had occurred in

the North, and thus reach St. Petersburg better acquainted with the men and the facts with which he would there have to deal.

England was delighted, as well she might be, with receiving at the same time the news of the victory of Copenhagen, and the death of the formidable adversary who had originated the league of the neutral powers against her. The valour of the British hero, the gallant Nelson, was exalted to the skies, and that with a most natural and legitimate enthusiasm, for nations do well, in the first ecstasies of their joy, to celebrate, and even exaggerate their triumphs. Nevertheless, the first transports of enthusiasm being over, when the nation became more calm, the victory of Copenhagen was more correctly appreciated. The passage of the Sound had been, it was said, not very difficult to force; the attack on Copenhagen in a narrow strait, where the English ships could not manœuvre without great peril, was an adventurous, bold act, worthy of the victor at Aboukir. But the English fleet had been seriously disabled, and if it had not been for the too great eagerness of the Crown Prince of Denmark to listen to Nelson's flag of truce, the day would probably have been lost. The victory had been very close upon a defeat, and moreover, the results obtained were quite unimportant, since the English had only extorted from the Danes a simple armistice, at the expiration of which the struggle must be renewed. If the Emperor Paul had not died, this naval enterprise which the English must have prosecuted, in the midst of an enclosed sea, in which they could not put into any port, and the outlet from which might be shut against them, must have had many terrible dangerous chances against its success. But the blow struck so opportunely against the power which commanded the entrance to the Baltic, that is to say, the Danes, was decisive; Paul was no longer there to take up the gauntlet, and to continue the contest. This is an additional proof, illustrating the numberless others with which history abounds, that there are in this world many propitious chances in favour of boldness, especially when its efforts are seconded by sufficiently commanding ability.

The English immediately proceeded to take advantage of this fortunate change of sovereigns, by relaxing the rigour of the principles they had laid down respecting the maritime law of nations, so as to arrive at some honourable adjustment with Russia, and, after Russia, with all the remaining powers. They were well aware of the kind and amiable character of the young prince who had ascended the throne of Russia, as at that period it was pronounced to be rather bordering on weakness; and, besides, they flattered themselves with having regained considerable influence at St. Petersburg. They sent Lord St. Helens to that capital, with the necessary powers to effect an arrangement.

M. de Woronzoff, ambassador of Russia to the court of George III., wholly wedded to the cause of British policy, having even incurred the sequestration of his property on account of his not having quitted London, his accustomed place of residence, received an invitation to appear there in his official capacity, which he forthwith accepted. The vessels belonging to the neutral powers, detained in the English ports, were released. Nelson, by order of his government, continued inactive in the Baltic, and was instructed to intimate to the courts of the North, that he should refrain from any act of hostility, unless they determined to put their fleets to sea, in which case he should engage with them; but if, on the contrary, these fleets should remain in their respective ports, and not attempt to make the long threatened junction with the Danish squadron, he should abstain from any hostile act against the coasts of Denmark, of Sweden, and of Russia; that he should allow free passage to all the merchant vessels, and the relations between the countries should be upon the same footing as before the rupture.

The blow struck against Copenhagen had unfortunately produced its effect. The minor neutral powers, such as the Danes and the Swedes, although deeply irritated on their own account against England, had only been forced into the league by the menacing influence of Paul I. Prussia, who regarded her maritime interests as quite secondary compared with her other national interests, and who strongly inclined towards peace, had only engaged in the dispute, when urged on by the twofold influence of Paul I. and the First Consul: she, accordingly, felt overjoyed on finding herself extricated from such an embarrassment. She was, like the rest, eagerly disposed to co-operate in the re-establishment of commercial relations.

In a short time the trading vessels of all nations, English, Swedish, Danish, and Russian, reappeared in the Baltic; and trade and navigation resumed their accustomed activity. Nelson allowed them to pass unmolested, and received in return, along the northern coasts, the refreshments of which he stood in need. This virtual armistice was, therefore, generally acceded to. The Russian cabinet, directed by Count Pahlen, without yielding unbecomingly to British influence, showed a disposition to terminate the maritime dispute, by such an adjustment as would secure, up to a certain point, the rights of the neutrals. It intimated that they would receive Lord St. Helens. Already it had authorised the return of M. de Woronzoff to London, whither M. de Bernestoff also repaired, as the representative of Denmark.

The First Consul, who had ably contrived and elaborated this formidable coalition against Great Britain, a coalition founded moreover upon the interests of all the maritime nations,

viewed with regret its dissolution, occasioned as it was by the weakness of the confederates. He tried to make them ashamed of the promptitude with which they receded; but each excused his conduct by the example of his neighbour. Denmark, justly proud of the bloody engagement of Copenhagen, declared that she had done her part, and that it was the duty of the others to perform theirs. Sweden expressed herself ready to fight; but, she added, that as the Danish, Prussian, and, above all, the Russian flags, were freely traversing the seas, she could not see why her subjects alone should be debarred from the benefits of trade. Prussia excused her inaction by the change which had happened at St. Petersburg, but, at the same time, reiterated to France the warmest assurances of steadfast constancy. She declared that a just estimate would be formed of her perseverance in the cause, when the proper time arrived for concluding an arrangement, and the articles of the maritime law of nations should be definitively settled. Russia affected not to neglect the rights of the neutrals, but avowedly confined her endeavours to the accomplishment of one thing only, which was the cessation of hostilities commenced upon insufficient grounds.

The First Consul, who was desirous of retarding an accommodation between Prussia and England as long as possible, conceived a very ingenious expedient to prolong the dispute. He had offered Malta to Paul, and he now tendered Hanover to Prussia. We have seen that Prussia had occupied that province, so dear to the heart of George III., by way of reprisals for the violent acts which the English government had committed against the neutral flags. Prussia had lent herself with considerable hesitation to this act of aggression, but the secret longing which she has always felt for the possession of that province, the most desirable for her, that which would most conveniently enlarge and round off the frontiers of her territory, prompted her to seize upon it, notwithstanding her anxiety for peace and repose. Other motives also had influenced her. She had, besides, an indemnity to claim in Germany, as she was amongst the number of the secular princes who were to be indemnified for their losses on the left bank of the Rhine by the secularisation of the ecclesiastical States. These claims were very large, and in the hope that the First Consul would favour them, she was anxious to propitiate him, by taking possession of Hanover. General Bonaparte declared at once, that if she wished to keep Hanover, and indemnify herself thereby, although this indemnity was of ten times greater value than the amount to which she was entitled, he would willingly consent, without giving way to any jealousy at this great augmentation, conceded to a power whose territory was conterminous with France. This proposal at once delighted and disturbed the young monarch. The offer was a seductive



one, but the chief stumbling-block was, the resentment of England. Nevertheless, without accepting the proposal in a definitive manner, the cabinet of Berlin replied, that the king, Frederick William, was fully sensible of the friendly dispositions of the First Consul, that he had come to no resolution yet, that it was better to defer the consideration of this territorial question till the negotiations for a general peace throughout Europe; and he added, that grounding his conduct upon the present state of things, which was an armistice tacitly acquiesced in, rather than formally stipulated, he should continue to keep possession of Hanover.

The First Consul did not require more, being content with having thereby involved the courts of London and Berlin in a question of the most complicated solution, and placed in the hands of a power which was devoted to him, a precious pledge, which could be most advantageously used in the negotiations with England.

The period of these negotiations at length approached. England had seized with avidity the opportunity of relaxing the rigour of her maritime principles, with a view of quelling the danger which threatened her in the North; she was now anxious to terminate this state of things, and to conclude peace, not only with the neutrals, but with a power still more formidable than they; with France, which during the last ten years had convulsed all Europe, and which began to threaten the British soil with serious dangers. At one period, thanks to the obstinacy of Mr. Pitt, and the talents of General Bonaparte, she found herself alone, contending against all the world; having extricated herself from this position by a successful act of temerity, by a fortuitous stroke of good fortune, she was averse to again incur similar dangers, through a repetition of similar errors. England, moreover, could now treat with honour, and it was expedient, after having lost so many good opportunities, not to miss the one which now presented itself. Why, reasoned the people of England, why prolong the war? We have taken all the colonies worth having: France, at the same time, has vanquished all the allies to which we have been attached; she has aggrandised herself at their expense, and has become the most formidable power in the universe. Every day added to the struggle renders it more serious, especially through her successive conquest of all the European coasts and harbours. She has reduced Holland and Naples, and at the present moment is marching against Portugal. We must not render her more powerful, by pertinaciously persisting in the prosecution of the war. If it was for the maintenance of the most salutary principles that we contended some years past; if it was for social order menaced by the French Revolution;

that is now no longer the case, since France affords the brightest example of order and of wisdom. Can we think to re-establish the Bourbons? There, indeed, was Mr. Pitt's grand error, his mistaken policy; and if his great influence, his great talents are lost to us, we must secure the only advantage we can from his retirement, that is to say, we must relinquish that unremitting, malignant spirit of hatred, which dictated the most imprudent and gross personalities between him and General Bonaparte.

All sensible, reflecting men in England were in favour of peace. This feeling had the powerful support of the king and the people. The pious and obstinate King of England, who refused the emancipation of the Catholics to Mr. Pitt, out of fidelity to the Protestant cause, did not the less rejoice at the restoration of Catholicism in France, a re-establishment which was expected soon to take place. He viewed in that, the triumph of religious principles, and was content. He had a great aversion to the French Revolution, and although General Bonaparte had thwarted and seriously counteracted the policy of England, he was greatly pleased with him for the reaction against that Revolution, and for reinstating true social principles in public opinion. France, which possesses in such an eminent degree the power of communicating to other nations the feelings she herself experiences, being now calmed down, brought back to sound notions, King George III. regarded the blessings of social order as preserved to mankind. If with Mr. Pitt the war had been one of national ambition, as respected George III. it had been a war of principle. General Bonaparte might, therefore, consider him as a friend, but a friend of a very different stamp from Paul I. Having recovered from the attack which had obscured his reason during several months, he was now decidedly inclined to peace, and pressed his ministers to conclude it. The English people, fond of novelty, looked upon a peace with the French as the greatest of novelties; for they had slaughtered each other, during the last ten years, in every quarter of the world; ascribing also the prevailing scarcity to the sanguinary struggle which desolated both land and sea, they called loudly for a reconciliation with France. Moreover, the new prime minister, Mr. Addington, unfit to aspire to the same glory as Mr. Pitt, to whom he was greatly inferior in talents, in celebrity, and in general administrative capacity, had but one plain intelligible object in view, which was to make peace. He accordingly desired to bring it about, and Mr. Pitt, still powerful in Parliament, counselled him to this step, as the most expedient. The events in the North, far from swelling the pride of England, disposed her, on the contrary, to seize a very convenient and very honourable opportunity of negotiating.

The new minister had determined upon this on the day he assumed office; and he was only confirmed in his resolution, when the intelligence reached him of what had taken place at Copenhagen and at St. Petersburg. Going still further, he decided upon making a direct overture to the First Consul, which would correspond with the initiative taken by the latter towards England upon his accession to power.

Lord Hawkesbury, who presided over the foreign office in Mr. Addington's administration, sent for M. Otto. This gentleman transacted in London, as we have already seen, the diplomatic business relative to the prisoners, and had been six months before entrusted with the duties connected with the naval armistice. He was, therefore, the natural medium of fresh communications, which were about to take place between the two governments. Lord Hawkesbury informed M. Otto that the king had confided to him a most agreeable task, the knowledge of which would no doubt cause as much pleasure in France as in England, and this was, to propose peace. He said, that His Majesty was even ready to send a plenipotentiary to Paris, if it were so desired, or to any other city more agreeable to the French Consul. Lord Hawkesbury added, that the conditions which it was his intention to propose were perfectly honourable to both countries, and as a proof of the sincerity of this reconciliation, he declared, that from that day, every design directed against the present government of France should be discountenanced by the British cabinet. He expected a full reciprocity on the part of the French Republic.

This was disavowing the antecedent policy of Mr. Pitt, who had always pretended to aim at the re-establishment of the Bourbons, and who had unremittingly fomented the attempts of the emigrants and the Vendéans by English gold. The negotiations could not have been opened in a more dignified manner. Lord Hawkesbury, however, required a prompt reply.

The First Consul, who at that time only aimed at keeping faithfully the pledge made to France, to procure for the country peace and tranquillity, was delighted with this solution of the question, which he had, in fact, obtained by his successes, and by the wisdom of his policy. He accepted the overtures of England with as much eagerness as she had shown in proposing them. Nevertheless, a negotiation of formality appeared to him tedious, and not sufficiently efficacious. The remembrance of that of Lord Malmesbury, in 1797, which was but an empty demonstration on the part of Mr. Pitt, had left an unpleasant impression on his mind. He thought that, if they were really sincere at London, as indeed they appeared really to be, it was quite sufficient to confer directly with the foreign office, and there discuss, with frankness and candour, the

conditions of peace. He considered these easy of arrangement, if a reconciliation were sincerely intended. "For," said he, "England has taken the Indies, and we have taken Egypt: if we mutually agree, each to preserve these rich conquests, the rest is but of little importance. Of what importance are, in fact, a few islands in the West Indies, or elsewhere, which England keeps from us, or our allies, compared with the vast conquests we have made? Can she refuse to restore them, when Hanover is in our hands, when Portugal will soon be so, and we offer to evacuate these kingdoms in return for a few islands in America? Peace is therefore easy to be brought about," so ran his despatch to M. Otto; "if the English desire it. I empower you to treat, but directly only with Lord Hawkesbury."

Full powers were sent to M. Otto, with a recommendation not to make anything public, to write as little as possible, to negotiate verbally, and only to exchange written notes upon the most important questions. It was impossible to keep such a negotiation an absolute secret; but the First Consul enjoined M. Otto to require and, on his part, to observe the greatest discretion, relative to those questions which must necessarily on both sides be raised and discussed.

Lord Hawkesbury, in the name of the King of England, consented to this mode of proceeding, and it was agreed that the conferences should commence at once at London, between him and M. Otto. They did really open in the early part of April 1801 (middle of Germinal, year IX.).

From the 18th Brumaire, year VIII. (9th of November 1799), to the month of Germinal, year IX. (April 1801), eighteen months had elapsed, and France, at peace with the Continent, engaged in a frank and sincere negotiation with England, was about to obtain, for the first time for ten years, a general peace on land and at sea. The condition of this general peace, admitted by all the contracting parties, was the preservation of our brilliant conquests.







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